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Abstract	
The	Uncanny	Valley	Effect	(UVE)	first	emerged	as	a	warning	against	making	industrial	
robots	appear	so	highly	human-like	that	they	could	unsettle	the	real	humans	around	
them.	It	proposed	a	specific	pattern	of	negative	emotional	responses	to	entities	that	were	
almost	but	not	quite	human,	and	has	been	proposed	as	the	reason	why	some	entities	
such	as	dolls,	mannequins	and	zombies	may	appear	unsettling.		
The	aim	of	this	thesis	was	to	move	beyond	an	anecdotal	explanation	to	understand	
more	about	the	perception	of	near-human	faces,	and	how	this	compares	to	the	
perception	of	human	and	non-human	faces.	The	aims	were	to	explore	the	relationship	
between	the	human-likeness	of	faces	and	emotional	responses	to	them,	to	understand	
reactions	to	and	descriptions	of	near-human	faces,	to	explore	aspects	of	how	near-human	
faces	are	processed	and	to	explore	whether	mismatched	emotional	expressions	might	
contribute	to	the	perception	of	some	near-human	faces	as	eerie.	
Five	studies	were	carried	out	using	face	images	whose	human-likeness	was	
systematically	controlled	or	measured.	A	non-linear	relationship	between	human-likeness	
and	eeriness	was	found,	but	the	near-human	faces	were	not	always	the	eeriest	images.	
Near-human	faces	were	found	to	be	subject	to	the	effects	of	inversion,	and	inversion	was	
found	to	heighten	perceptions	of	eeriness.	Faces	were	created	which	contained	
mismatched	emotional	expressions,	and	the	blends	combining	happy	faces	with	angry	or	
fearful	eyes	were	rated	as	the	most	eerie.	Incongruities	between	aspects	of	appearance	
or	behaviour	had	been	cited	as	explanations	for	the	UVE	in	the	past	but	this	thesis	
presents	the	first	evidence	that	differences	in	eeriness	may	result	from	incongruities	
between	emotional	expressions.	Directions	for	future	research	have	been	suggested	to	
explore	these	findings	in	a	wider	context	and	to	understand	more	about	the	UVE.	
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Chapter	1:	Introduction	and	Literature	Review	
1.1:	Locating	The	Uncanny	Valley	Effect	
1.1.1	Defining	the	Uncanny	Valley	Effect	
More	recently,	androids	and	computers	have	taken	on	the	attributes	of	living	beings.	
As	many	examples	from	literature	and	film	demonstrate,	however,	there	remains	a	
profound	divide	between	artificial	life	and	our	own.	[…]	Paradoxically,	when	looking	
at	a	dead	body	or	a	dead	animal,	the	human	brain	'reads'	it	as	related	to	the	living	-	
we	know	it	is	dead	but	it	is	from	life.	By	contrast,	however	'lifelike'	a	robot	or	avatar,	
the	brain	does	not	(or	cannot)	perceive	it	as	alive.	What	is	still	lacking	in	the	collision	
between	the	organic	and	the	technological	is	the	'experience'	of	a	digital	face,	or	a	
bodily	or	sensory	response	to	the	image.	Without	these,	the	digitised	expressive	
elements	fail	to	communicate.	The	face	is	powerful	in	this	respect:	as	an	index	of	the	
heart,	it	has	so	far	proved	impossible	to	replicate	digitally.	(Kemp	(2004),	p140-141.)	
The	uncanny	valley	effect	(UVE)	was	once	a	little-known	idea	relating	to	robotics	
design	and	how	people’s	reactions	to	artificial	agents	changed	as	they	were	made	to	look	
increasingly	human-like.	It	related	to	changes	in	emotional	responses	to	mechanical	
objects	as	they	begin	to	take	on	human	characteristics	and	they	initially	become	more	
appealing	and	likeable	as	human-likeness	increases.	However,	this	only	holds	true	up	to	a	
certain	point	as	when	those	human	characteristics	were	sufficiently	realistic	to	look	
almost	but	not	quite	human,	the	reaction	changed	and	rather	than	continuing	to	increase	
in	acceptability,	the	agent	suddenly	appeared	eerie	and	seemed	unsettling.	This	sudden	
dip	in	emotional	response	is	the	‘valley’	component	of	the	term.	It	was	termed	an	
‘uncanny’	valley	as	the	responses	to	those	near-human	agents	(NHAs)	or	near-human	
entities	(NHEs)	were	characterised	by	unease	or	disquiet	rather	than	simply	being	
rejected	without	an	affective	component.	The	term	was	originally	coined	by	Mori	(1970)	
although	Reichardt	(1978)	is	credited	as	the	first	person	to	use	the	term	in	English.	Mori’s	
use	of	the	term	in	the	original	Japanese	was	bukimi	no	tani	which	was	translated	as	
meaning	‘valley	of	eeriness’.	Agents	cited	as	falling	into	the	uncanny	valley	(UV)	include	
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computer	game	characters	where	appearance	and	behaviour	are	mismatched,	
department	store	mannequins	with	realistic	faces	but	blank	eyes	and	animated	
characters	where	the	synchronised	voices	are	just	slightly	mis-timed.	The	UVE	is	best	
described	with	reference	to	the	following	graph:		
	
Figure	1:	The	Uncanny	Valley.	(MacDorman	(2005a),	after	Mori	(1970).)		
This	representation	of	the	valley	is	based	on	an	idea	described	by	Mori	(1970),	which	
described	a	hypothetical	relationship	between	‘human-likeness’	and	‘familiarity’,	defining	
the	human-likeness	dimension	using	examples	of	entities	ranging	from	the	extremely	un-
human-like	(an	industrial	robot)	to	completely	human	(a	healthy	living	person).	The	
‘familiarity’	dimension	is	more	complex	to	define,	particularly	given	its	dual	meaning	in	
English	as	it	can	indicate	either	an	absence	of	novelty	or	a	sense	of	closeness	so	this	axis	
has	been	interpreted	variously	in	terms	of	positive	affect,	increasing	affinity	and	
emotional	warmth.	The	graph	depicts	dual	curves,	describing	that	the	hypothesised	
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relationship	between	human-likeness	and	familiarity	also	varies	as	a	function	of	whether	
the	agent	is	moving	or	still.	Both	curves	initially	increase	in	familiarity	as	the	human-
likeness	increases	until	the	60-65%	human	point	where	familiarity	begins	to	decrease,	
finally	reaching	its	lowest	point	at	around	75-80%	human.	After	this	point,	it	rises	steeply	
again	until	the	highest	familiarity	is	reached	for	a	moving	and	completely	human-like	
agent	(100%	human-like	could	either	be	a	real	human,	or	something	so	close	that	it	is	no	
longer	possible	to	distinguish	it	from	one.)	The	curves	vary	in	magnitude	according	to	
whether	the	entities	are	still	or	moving,	but	on	both	there	is	a	distinct	dip	in	familiarity	
between	75%	and	90%	human	where	familiarity	plummets,	forming	the	valley	in	the	term	
UV.		
The	UV	concept	originated	from	Mori’s	observations	of	how	people	reacted	when	
non-human	entities	acquired	some	human	qualities	and	began	to	become	more	human-
like.	To	illustrate	the	idea	he	offers	a	striking	example	of	how	encountering	a	realistic	
prosthetic	hand	can	feel:	
'Some	prosthetic	hands	attempt	to	simulate	veins,	muscles,	tendons,	finger	nails,	
and	finger	prints,	and	their	color	resembles	human	pigmentation.	So	maybe	the	
prosthetic	arm	has	achieved	a	degree	of	human	verisimilitude	on	par	with	false	
teeth.	But	this	kind	of	prosthetic	hand	is	too	real	and	when	we	notice	it	is	prosthetic,	
we	have	a	sense	of	strangeness.	So	if	we	shake	the	hand,	we	are	surprised	by	the	
lack	of	soft	tissue	and	cold	temperature.	In	this	case,	there	is	no	longer	a	sense	of	
familiarity.	It	is	uncanny.	In	mathematical	terms,	strangeness	can	be	represented	by	
negative	familiarity,	so	the	prosthetic	hand	is	at	the	bottom	of	the	valley.	So	in	this	
case,	the	appearance	is	quite	human	like,	but	the	familiarity	is	negative.	This	is	the	
uncanny	valley.'	(‘The	Uncanny	Valley,	Appendix	B’,	in	MacDorman	(2005a).)	
Mori	gives	three	examples	to	illustrate	what	might	fall	into	the	valley,	starting	with	
zombies,	which	are	well-recognised	as	unsettling,	and	also	adding	corpses	and	prosthetic	
hands	which	may	be	potentially	disquieting	if	encountered	when	unexpected.	Mori	did	
not	offer	additional	examples	but	it	could	be	seen	that	clowns,	masks	and	dolls	designed	
to	be	particularly	realistic	could	also	live	in	the	same	valley.	The	original	article	was	a	
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short	paper	in	Japanese,	and	was	written	for	an	audience	of	roboticists	and	engineers.	It	
posed	questions	about	the	nature	of	human-likeness	and	suggested	that	designers	
working	in	the	field	of	robotics	should	pay	careful	attention	to	the	methods	they	used	to	
make	their	creations	appealing	or	acceptable	to	the	public,	challenging	the	prevalent	goal	
of	aiming	to	make	robots	as	human	as	possible.	It	was	translated	into	English	by	
MacDorman	(2005a)	and	began	to	gain	popular	attention,	particularly	as	Mori	revisited	
the	theory	twice	more	in	his	writings.	Mori	(2005)	reflected	on	the	idea	that	when	
someone	dies,	their	lack	of	animation	may	be	unsettling	but	it	may	also	suggest	that	the	
person	is	more	at	peace	if	the	death	released	them	from	suffering	or	uncertainty,	and	this	
peaceful	aspect	may	moderate	any	sense	of	uncanniness.	Mori	(2005)	also	suggested	that	
there	may	be	entities	that	deserve	to	be	positioned	at	the	highest	form	of	acceptability	
on	the	curve	and	proposed	that	the	faces	of	some	Buddhist	statues	may	actually	appear	
more	elegant,	calm	and	dignified	as	idealised	portrayals	of	the	human	form	than	genuine	
humans	can	be,	so	it	may	have	been	wrong	to	position	human	beings	as	the	highest	point	
on	the	original	curve.	Mori	(2012)	was	an	updated	re-translation	of	the	1970	original	
which	resolved	an	ambiguity	with	the	term	of	‘familiarity’	as	used	in	the	original	paper.	
This	re-translation	relabelled	the	‘familiarity’	axis	as	‘affinity’	as	this	is	a	clearer	term	than	
familiarity	which	could	refer	to	levels	of	novelty	or	strangeness.	The	2012	paper	
suggested	that	the	UVE	is	caused	by	the	viewer	discovering	the	‘deception’	that	the	agent	
is	not	actually	as	human	as	it	appears,	and	it	is	the	discovery	of	a	deceptively	human	
appearance	that	causes	eeriness	when	the	initial	affinity	drops	away.		
The	UVE	was	presented	as	a	theoretical	construct	in	1970,	and	at	the	time	was	
proposed	as	a	thought	experiment	rather	than	an	explanatory	framework.	The	classic	
graph	was	based	on	Mori’s	subjective	judgments	of	the	familiarity	and	human-likeness	of	
each	of	the	examples	included	in	the	graph	and	the	curves	linking	them	are	illustrative	
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rather	than	based	on	any	empirical	findings.	Human-likeness	was	presented	as	a	
percentage	but	the	placement	of	the	examples	seems	arbitrary,	as	a	stuffed	animal	is	
arguably	less	human-like	than	a	humanoid	robot	rather	than	more	as	it	appears	on	the	
graph.	However,	the	basic	premise	is	a	tantalising	one	for	exploration:	is	there	any	validity	
to	the	idea	that	almost-human	entities	have	unsettling	properties	and	if	so,	is	it	possible	
to	identify	attributes	of	those	entities	that	evoke	a	sense	of	uncanniness	in	a	reliable	and	
psychologically	grounded	way?	
The	UVE	concept	lay	dormant	for	several	years	before	it	caught	the	attention	of	
animators,	psychologists	and	philosophers	early	in	the	21st	century.	The	discipline	has	
progressed	well	beyond	its	initial	status	as	a	thought	experiment	and	now	receives	
serious	consideration	as	a	topic	of	psychological	interest	in	its	own	right	as	well	as	being	
relevant	to	the	domains	of	human-computer	interaction	and	android	design.	There	has	
been	an	increase	in	the	number	of	studies	which	have	provided	experimental	evidence	
that	there	is	a	pattern	of	responses	to	NHAs	which	matches	the	shape	described	in	Mori’s	
graph:	for	example	the	studies	by	MacDorman	(2006),	Seyama	and	Nagayama	(2009),	
Steckenfinger	and	Ghazanfar	(2009),	and	Tinwell	et	al	(2011b)	which	will	be	described	in	
detail	later	in	this	review.	This	thesis	has	been	developed	since	2006,	starting	from	the	
premise	that	research	at	that	time	was	mainly	focused	on	demonstrating	that	an	UVE	
existed,	and	that	there	was	a	lack	of	psychological	evidence	for	why	the	effect	might	
occur	for	certain	types	of	near-human	or	virtual	agent,	nor	was	there	a	detailed	
description	of	what	set	the	UVE	apart	from	other	types	of	emotional	response	to	a	
stimulus.	The	present	research	was	designed	to	address	that	knowledge	gap	by	
attempting	to	systematically	evoke	an	UVE	under	controlled	conditions	in	order	to	draw	
reliable	conclusions	about	the	types	of	stimuli	that	do	(or	do	not)	elicit	a	UVE	response.	
Over	a	series	of	studies,	psychological	research	techniques	were	used	to	draw	conclusions	
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regarding	how	NHEs	are	perceived	and	to	contribute	to	the	overall	sum	of	knowledge	
about	the	UVE.		
1.1.2	Early	20th	Century	Views	of	the	UVE	
The	UVE	was	only	translated	into	English	in	2005	but	the	concept	of	uncanniness	as	a	
more	general	term	was	the	subject	of	two	psychoanalytic	papers	in	the	early	1900s.	They	
formed	a	background	of	psychological	thinking	about	uncanniness	as	a	term	in	its	own	
right,	and	that	was	distinct	and	separate	from	the	more	general	emotions	of	fear	or	
disgust.	These	two	papers	are	therefore	useful	for	setting	a	background	and	context	for	
approaches	to	exploring	the	UVE.		
Jentsch’s	(1906)	paper	‘On	the	Psychology	of	the	Uncanny’	asked	what	can	cause	a	
feeling	of	uncanniness	and	gave	examples	that	could	elicit	uncanniness	regularly,	
powerfully	and	generally	in	everyday	life,	particularly	how	it	could	be	used	in	literature	to	
elicit	a	reaction	from	a	reader.	He	suggested	that	a	sense	of	uncanniness	occurred	when	
an	entity	or	event	deviates	from	what	is	expected	and	everyday,	but	is	more	than	a	
simple	rejection	of	novelty	and	involves	the	uncertainty	of	not	being	aware	whether	the	
entity	or	event	is	quite	what	it	appears	to	be.	The	core	of	the	uncanny	sense	was	seen	as	
a	feeling	of	being	lost,	out	of	place	or	disoriented	which	can	be	gleaned	from	the	literal	
meaning	of	the	word	in	German	where	‘unheimlich’	translates	as	‘unhomely’,	meaning	
that	that	which	is	homely	and	familiar	is	comfortable	and	acceptable,	but	that	which	is	
unhomely	is	unfamiliar	and	unsettling.	Doubt	over	whether	an	entity	is	living	or	dead	is	
given	as	one	example	as	suddenly	realising	that	one’s	assumption	of	animacy	is	wrong	
could	be	profoundly	unsettling.	For	instance,	it	is	easy	to	imagine	being	frightened	by	
waxworks	in	a	darkened	museum	where	something	inanimate	is	momentarily	and	
alarmingly	perceived	as	animate.	This	doubt	about	the	animacy	of	an	object	is	described	
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as	key	to	eliciting	a	sense	of	uncanniness	as	it	is	a	failure	to	understand	and	integrate	
sensory	input	from	the	world	leading	to	one	of	two	unsettling	outcomes.	Wrong	
conclusions	could	be	drawn	about	the	nature	of	an	object,	leading	to	an	unsettling	
reaction	when	these	conclusions	are	revealed	as	inaccurate,	or	it	may	simply	be	
impossible	to	be	sure	about	the	fundamental	nature	of	an	entity,	which	is	in	itself	an	
unpleasant	sensation.	Jentsch	predicted	that	children,	the	intoxicated	or	those	of	a	
nervous	or	sensitive	disposition	might	be	the	most	susceptible	to	uncanniness	and	also	
that	darkness	is	particularly	effective	at	evoking	an	uncanny	response,	as	is	the	
uncertainty	that	can	arise	from	a	very	noisy	environment,	such	as	a	factory	floor,	which	
could	cause	distractions	where	decisions	about	the	true	nature	of	things	may	be	
particularly	difficult.		
Freud	(1919)	wrote	about	the	uncanny	as	a	special	subset	of	that	which	is	frightening	
and	used	Jentsch’s	literary	and	everyday	observations	to	introduce	a	psychoanalytic	
description	of	the	sensation.	He	agreed	that	the	sense	of	the	uncanny	was	related	to	
novelty	and	unfamiliarity	but	that	there	was	more	to	the	effect	than	just	the	fear	of	new	
things.	He	approached	the	subject	firstly	through	a	lengthy	linguistic	analysis	of	how	the	
word	can	be	translated	in	several	different	languages	and	concluded	that	a	simplistic	and	
direct	translation	is	rarely	possible	but	that	most	versions	include	facets	of	the	gruesome,	
evil	or	disgusting	as	well	as	the	sense	of	disorientation	and	unfamiliarity	conveyed	in	the	
German	word.	The	paper	proceeds	with	examples	of	'things,	persons,	impressions,	events	
and	situations'	that	evoke	the	uncanny.	He	proposed	four	factors	which	serve	to	
distinguish	a	frightening	experience	from	an	uncanny	one:	firstly,	in	considering	'animism,	
magic	and	sorcery	and	the	omnipotence	of	thoughts'	he	suggested	that	one	source	of	the	
uncanny	is	the	inexplicable	or	the	poorly	understood	which	includes	a	component	of	a	
primitive	understanding	of	the	world	where	all	entities	contained	spirits.	An	uncanny	
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experience	is	an	evocation	of	this	less	enlightened	interpretation	of	the	world.	Secondly,	
Freud	suggested	that	our	attitudes	to	death	and	particularly	our	own	mortality	can	trigger	
a	sense	of	the	uncanny	particularly	where	entities	evoke	doubt	as	to	whether	they	are	
alive	or	dead.	Third,	uncanniness	occurs	in	'involuntary	repetition'	which	is	described	with	
reference	to	perceiving	elements	of	your	own	appearance	in	other	people	or	
unintentionally	catching	sight	of	one’s	own	reflection	under	circumstances	where	it	is	not	
immediately	clear	that	one	is	looking	at	oneself.	The	final	explanation	suggests	that	a	
sense	of	the	uncanny	is	actually	a	manifestation	of	the	'castration	complex'	and	explained	
with	reference	a	story	introduced	in	Jentsch’s	paper	about	a	‘Sandman’.	Jentsch	had	cited	
it	as	an	example	where	a	writer	uses	uncertainty	about	whether	an	entity	is	animate	or	
not	to	elicit	unease.	Freud	explains	that	the	entity	in	question	is	a	doll	who	presents	a	
convincingly	and	unsettlingly	human	appearance.	While	the	intellectual	uncertainty	of	
whether	the	doll	is	human	or	not	seems	undoubtedly	disturbing,	he	notes	that	there	is	a	
more	direct	source	of	unease	in	the	story	where	the	protagonist	has	a	childhood	fear	of	
his	eyes	being	stolen	by	the	mythical	‘Sandman’	of	the	title.	Freud’s	interpretation	of	this	
fear	is	not	just	the	natural	horror	of	mutilation	and	blinding	but	that	it	evokes	(in	males)	a	
childhood	fear	of	castration.	In	this	way,	the	uncanny	sense	is	the	recurrence	of	a	
repressed	fear	from	childhood	as	an	uncomfortable	intrusion	into	adult	life.		
The	present	research	is	not	conducted	in	the	psychoanalytic	tradition	and	as	such	the	
notion	of	a	castration	complex	is	not	a	relevant	framework	for	exploration,	but	the	other	
examples	presented	by	Freud	and	Jentsch	do	merit	consideration	when	looking	at	the	
uncanny	in	relation	to	almost-human	entities.	Both	authors	concluded	that	the	closer	
something	is	to	human,	the	more	likely	it	is	to	spark	a	sense	of	uncanniness	which	is	at	
the	core	of	Mori’s	proposal	of	the	UVE.	Jentsch’s	article	allows	a	framework	for	
considering	the	uncanny	from	a	psychological	perspective	as	it	locates	uncanniness	as	an	
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unpleasant	feeling	related	to	fear	and	aversion,	often	occurring	when	the	nature	of	
something	is	uncertain,	and	which	exhibits	individual	differences	in	how	susceptible	
people	are	to	experiencing	it.	However,	neither	study	provides	empirical	support	for	what	
makes	an	entity	uncanny.	To	understand	more	about	how	researchers	began	to	address	
that	question,	this	review	will	now	consider	studies	which	move	on	from	uncanniness	in	
general	to	looking	in	detail	at	Mori’s	idea	of	an	UVE.		
1.1.3	Establishing	Research	Into	the	UVE	
Research	into	the	UVE	began	to	proliferate	from	2005,	following	a	themed	workshop	
('Views	of	the	Uncanny	Valley,	2005')	and	an	UVE-focused	special	edition	of	the	
'Interaction	Studies'	journal	in	2006	which	developed	several	of	the	theories	presented	at	
the	workshop.	Four	themes	emerged	from	these	early	explorations.		
The	first	theme	was	around	how	the	nature	of	the	‘familiarity’	axis	can	be	best	
understood.	Pollick	(2005)	examined	how	the	importance	of	how	the	movement	and	
appearance	of	an	animated	entity	are	integrated	and	suggested	that	a	lack	of	such	
integration	may	be	responsible	for	the	UVE.	A	technique	using	gesture	exaggeration	was	
adopted	by	extrapolating	positions	within	a	movement	space	and	finding	prototypical	
locations	that	aid	recognition.	The	perception	of	emotion	as	conveyed	through	bodily	
movement	and	facial	expressions	was	examined	using	computer	generated	(CG)	models	
where	neutral	movements	and	expressions	were	matched	to	emotional	movements	and	
expression	and	the	ability	of	participants	to	correctly	recognise	these	was	measured.	
Identification	performance	varied	by	emotion,	with	anger	being	read	mainly	from	
movement	and	happiness	and	sadness	from	the	facial	expression.	While	these	
observations	offer	useful	insights	for	the	perception	of	form	and	motion,	Pollick	
concluded	that	at	that	stage	the	UV	was	a	descriptive	rather	than	predictive	term.	To	
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move	beyond	this	and	investigate	the	valley	fully,	it	was	suggested	that	both	axes	of	the	
graph	needed	to	be	better	understood,	but	that	attention	should	be	focused	particularly	
on	the	dimension	of	'familiarity'	where	the	nature	of	the	emotional	response	in	the	effect	
required	greater	definition.	Brenton	et	al	(2005)	questioned	whether	the	UVE	could	be	
linked	to	the	concept	of	‘presence’	in	virtual	reality.	To	achieve	a	sense	of	‘being	there’	in	
a	virtual	reality	environment	that	feels	comparable	to	being	in	a	real	world	environment,	
participants	make	and	test	a	series	of	hypotheses	about	their	surroundings.	Virtual	reality	
settings	which	offer	poor	or	confusing	input	to	the	viewer	make	it	hard	to	test	those	
hypothesis	which	causes	an	unsettling	‘break	in	presence’	(BIP)	to	occur	by	breaking	the	
illusion	and	revealing	that	the	virtual	world	is	not	real.	Due	to	the	unsettling	qualities	of	a	
BIP,	Brenton	et	al	suggested	that	BIP	is	to	presence	what	the	UV	is	to	human-likeness,	and	
that	it	would	be	appropriate	to	employ	the	same	investigative	methods	used	for	BIP	in	
exploring	the	UV	such	as	questionnaires	(Slater	et	al,	2003)	and	measurements	of	skin	
conductance	response	and	heart	rate	(Slater,	2002).	Ziemke	and	Lindblom	(2006)	argued	
that	it	may	be	functionally	impossible	to	evaluate	whether	the	responses	to	androids	
occur	because	participants	perceive	them	as	non-human	as	opposed	to	novel	or	
suspicious	and	raised	concerns	that	there	was	a	significant	measurement	issue	in	
evaluating	responses,	especially	if	responses	to	the	almost-human	occur	at	a	
subconscious	level	as	these	could	not	be	measured	using	verbal	reports	of	conscious	
perceptions	and	would	be	difficult	to	measure	using	physiological	measures	of	arousal.	
Hanson	et	al	(2005)	challenged	whether	the	UVE	was	even	a	problem	at	all,	as	a	survey	of	
responses	to	videos	of	two	human-like	robots	found	that	reported	that	73%	of	
respondents	found	both	of	the	robots	appealing	and	none	reported	them	as	disturbing.	
There	were	also	no	reports	of	the	robots	looking	'dead'	as	opposed	to	'lively'.	He	also	
presented	still	images	from	a	morphed	sequence	in	which	a	cartoon	figure	is	transformed	
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into	a	human	figure.	Participants	were	asked	to	rank	whether	they	found	the	images	
acceptable	or	unacceptable.	Hanson	reported	the	median	acceptability	and	argued	that	
as	none	of	the	images	were	rated	below	70%,	where	100%	indicated	completely	
acceptable,	this	negated	the	existence	of	a	UV.	However,	this	finding	is	questionable.	
Firstly,	the	dimension	used	to	rank	the	images	(acceptability)	is	different	from	Mori's	
'familiarity'	scale.	Secondly,	although	the	acceptability	does	not	dip	particularly	low,	the	
fourth	image	of	six,	which	is	almost	but	not	quite	human,	does	have	the	lowest	
acceptability	rating	and	indeed	to	counter	the	UV	idea	there	should	be	no	such	negative	
peak	at	that	point.	This	paper	does	not,	therefore,	constitute	sufficient	reason	to	
abandon	the	UV	concept.	
The	second	theme	introduced	the	role	of	one’s	own	mortality	in	triggering	
perceptions	of	the	uncanny.	MacDorman	(2005b)	asked	whether	human-like	robots	are	
eerie	because	they	evoke	memories	of	death	and	dead	bodies,	and	used	images	taken	
from	a	morph	sequence	between	a	robot	and	a	human.	Participants	were	asked	to	
identify	the	eeriest	point	in	the	sequence	as	well	as	to	provide	ratings	of	several	CG	
agents	and	robots.	The	eeriest	agent	was	then	used	in	an	experiment	designed	to	
measure	the	extent	to	which	participants	associated	ideas	of	death	and	mortality	with	
humanoid	robots.	The	researchers	concluded	that	the	participants	who	saw	the	eeriest	of	
the	two	robots	were	more	likely	to	exhibit	behaviours	relating	to	managing	their	fear	of	
death.	This	cognitive	explanation	of	the	UV	suggested	further	avenues	for	research	to	
establish	whether	it	could	be	elicited	more	generally	across	a	range	of	near	human	
entities.		
The	third	theme	was	the	role	of	category	boundaries:	Ramey	(2005)	suggested	that	
the	UVE	was	the	result	of	difficulties	in	making	decisions	across	a	particular	set	of	
categorical	boundaries.	He	argued	that	the	UVE	is	not	related	solely	to	robots	or	the	
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almost-human	but	extends	to	many	other	instances	where	it	is	difficult	to	make	boundary	
distinctions,	such	as	knowing	when	a	heap	of	sand	stops	being	a	heap	of	sand	when	single	
grains	are	removed	one	at	a	time.	When	the	first	grain	is	removed,	the	heap	retains	its	
heap	status.	With	repeated	removals,	a	point	will	be	reached	where	that	status	is	no	
longer	valid	-	it	is	no	longer	a	heap.	Ramey	asked	at	what	point	can	that	distinction	be	
made,	and	suggested	that	the	UVE	is	what	happens	when	it	is	no	longer	possible	to	make	
that	distinction,	not	between	heap	and	not-heap	but	between	non-human	and	human.	
There	are	other	examples	where	this	distinction	problem	may	occur	such	as	someone	
going	bald	one	hair	at	a	time,	or	the	development	of	a	foetus	from	a	single	cell	but	he	
observed	that	those	transitions	don’t	evoke	a	sense	of	eeriness	at	the	category	boundary	
and	wondered	about	the	special	qualities	of	human-likeness	that	could	cause	a	UVE	to	
emerge.		
The	final	theme	considered	neuropsychological	approaches	to	the	UVE.	Berthouze	
and	Berthouze	(2005)	used	a	mixed	methods	study	to	examine	responses	to	the	affective	
postures	of	avatars.	Participants	were	asked	to	identify	emotions	from	low-level	
descriptions	of	avatar	appearance	and	the	results	indicated	that	they	were	particularly	
accurate	at	identifying	the	arousal	of	the	avatars,	but	made	more	errors	when	identifying	
the	valence	of	the	emotion	or	the	motion	tendency.	An	fMRI	measured	the	cortical	
activity	when	participants	were	asked	to	evaluate	the	expressiveness	of	an	avatar	and	the	
face	fusiform	gyrus	and	anterior	cingulate	were	identified	as	potential	areas	of	activity	
when	looking	at	near-human	avatars.	Chaminade	et	al	(2005)	used	a	motor	interference	
paradigm	to	explore	how	seeing	different	types	of	artificial	agent	performing	a	particular	
action	would	interfere	with	participant’s	ability	to	perform	that	action	themselves.	Three	
levels	of	human-likeness	were	presented:	a	mechanical-looking	robot,	a	humanoid	robot	
and	a	human.	In	support	of	the	UV	hypothesis,	Chaminade	et	al	found	that	the	humanoid	
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robot	did	cause	this	type	of	interference	but	that	the	human	and	mechanical	robot	did	
not.	In	a	second	study,	animated	models	were	presented	at	differing	levels	of	detail	with	
the	lowest	level	of	detail	(dots	identifying	joints	moving	through	space)	acquiring	more	
human-like	traits	until	the	final	model	depicted	a	person	jogging,	presenting	the	most	
detailed	representation.	Participants	classified	whether	the	movement	was	natural	or	
artificial	and	sensitivity	and	bias	towards	biological	motion	were	identified	as	measures.	A	
UVE	was	found	in	both	measures	as	sensitivity	increased	as	the	models	became	more	
human-like	until	the	penultimate	model	where	it	dipped	before	peaking	with	the	jogger	
model.	Biological	response	bias,	operating	in	the	opposite	direction,	peaked	with	the	
penultimate	model	and	was	lowest	for	the	lowest	level	representation.	This	second	study	
was	repeated	using	fMRI	to	examine	the	brain	regions	involved	in	perceiving	different	
levels	of	human-like	motion	and	the	team	reported	that	the	right	anterior	insula	
responded	strongly	to	perceiving	the	full	model	but	not	as	strongly	to	the	lower	levels	of	
representation.		
Keysers	and	Gazzola	(2005)	used	fMRI	studies	to	explore	the	role	of	mirror	circuits	in	
the	perception	of	humanoid	robots.	They	argued	that	as	computers	replace	humans	in	
many	areas	of	life,	it	will	be	important	to	understand	how	people	might	react	when	
encountering	a	NHA	and	used	the	theory	of	‘shared	circuits’	which	are	activated	when	
someone	is	observing	an	action	performed	by	another	person	as	well	as	performing	it	
themselves.	Such	a	shared	circuit	would	be	extremely	efficient	for	empathetic	
communication	because	it	would	negate	the	need	to	describe	one’s	state	if	it	was	
possible	to	mirror	the	state	of	someone	else.	Keysers	and	Gazzola	asked	whether	such	
shared	circuits	could	be	activated	by	watching	a	robot	perform	an	action,	in	the	same	way	
that	they	would	be	activated	if	a	human	performed	it.	They	found	that	shared	circuits	
were	robustly	activated	even	if	the	robots	were	not	particularly	human-like:	as	long	as	
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their	behaviours	had	some	human	resonance,	the	shared	circuitry	was	still	activated.	
They	also	explored	participant	responses	to	being	touched	or	viewing	touch	and	
somatosensory	cortical	activity	was	measured	to	look	for	the	presence	of	secondary	
activity	when	participants	saw	but	did	not	experience	touch,	and	whether	that	still	
occurred	if	it	was	an	inanimate	object	experiencing	the	touch.	Keysers	and	Gazzola	did	
indeed	find	that	secondary	activity	was	comparable	regardless	of	whether	a	person	or	
object	was	being	touched,	suggesting	that	our	ability	to	take	the	perspective	of	others	is	
not	restricted	to	people.	Their	conclusion	that	humanoid	robots	are	able	to	evoke	
mechanisms	often	thought	to	be	purely	human	and	social	in	origin	is	broadly	supportive	
of	the	UVE	as	it	suggests	we	are	able	to	respond	to	these	NHAs	in	a	human-like	way.	
However,	none	of	the	neuropsychological	studies	linked	their	findings	to	whether	
participants	experienced	any	sense	of	unease	when	encountering	the	NHAs,	so	while	
their	findings	do	suggest	response	patterns	that	can	be	explored	in	more	detail,	at	that	
stage	there	was	no	attempt	to	link	uncanniness	to	those	responses.		
It	can	be	seen	that	by	2006,	android	science	was	becoming	a	burgeoning	area	for	
enquiry	and	that	research	into	the	UV	had	been	suggested	from	a	range	of	different	
perspectives	but	no	explanations	were	yet	forthcoming.	Gee	et	al	(2005)	observed	that	
too	many	studies	were	small-scale	and	observational	in	nature	where	responses	to	
individual	androids	were	used	to	draw	conclusions	about	the	UVE.	Applying	findings	
based	on	the	specific	qualities	of	one	robot	would	be	hard	to	generalise	even	to	all	other	
robots,	let	alone	to	the	range	of	NHAs	that	are	created	in	the	real	or	virtual	worlds.	This	
broad	area	of	enquiry	meant	that	the	field	was	lacking	a	unified	approach	to	what	might	
explain	the	UVE	and	also	lacking	a	systematic	method	for	collecting	empirical	data	about	
the	UVE.	Research	into	the	UVE	then	developed	some	of	these	initial	ideas	by	looking	at	
evolutionary	theories,	neuropsychological	techniques	and	sensitivity	to	detecting	flaws	in	
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appearance.	This	review	will	divide	that	body	of	literature	into	two	sections:	work	which	
applies	theoretical	perspectives	to	make	suggestions	about	the	nature	of	the	UVE	and	
those	which	empirically	tested	the	effect	itself.		
1.2:	Proposed	Explanations	for	the	UVE		
The	idea	of	the	UVE	touches	on	a	broad	range	of	questions.	As	a	product	of	changes	in	
human-likeness,	it	suggests	philosophical	questions	from	the	basic	level	of	what	it	means	
to	be	human,	through	to	primal	fears	of	death	and	‘otherness’	to	concerns	about	
emerging	technologies	and	a	changing	world.	As	a	negative	emotional	response	it	touches	
on	a	broad	body	of	existing	literature	on	how	we	experience	negative	emotions	and	how	
these	are	elicited,	and	how	subtle	emotions	can	be	defined	and	measured	rather	than	be	
taken	for	granted.	However,	as	a	psychological	construct,	it	should	be	possible	to	define	
the	nature	of	the	UV	response	and	identify	stimuli	that	are	reliably	able	to	evoke	it	under	
similar	circumstances.	To	this	end,	this	section	of	Chapter	1	looks	across	research	which	
has	proposed	explanations	for	the	UVE	and	reviews	the	extent	to	which	they	can	be	seen	
as	potentially	plausible	and	good	candidates	for	empirical	exploration.	The	review	will	
then	move	on	to	look	at	studies	which	have	carried	out	empirical	tests	of	the	UVE,	some	
of	which	have	been	grounded	in	these	explanations.	
1.2.1	Evolutionary	Aesthetics	
One	of	the	most	straightforward	explanations	for	the	UVE	is	that	certain	entities	
appear	unsettling	because	they	are	not	attractive	from	an	evolutionary	perspective:	
MacDorman	et	al	(2009)	used	the	term	‘evolutionary	aesthetics’.	Certain	facial	
appearance	traits	have	been	found	to	be	generally	and	universally	attractive,	for	example	
Langlois	et	al	(2000)	found	consistent	ratings	of	attractiveness	in	a	meta-analysis	of	face	
perception	studies.	Perception	of	attractiveness	appears	to	be	an	automatic	and	innate	
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process	with	high	attractiveness	linked	to	reproductive	fitness	so	being	able	to	identify	
and	choose	an	attractive	mate	is	an	adaptive	ability	that	increases	the	likelihood	of	
producing	viable	offspring	(Little	et	al,	2002).	There	is	therefore	an	evolutionary	pressure	
to	be	sensitive	to	attractiveness,	and	to	be	skilled	at	making	accurate	judgments	of	
attractiveness.	By	this	explanation,	the	NHEs	that	fall	into	the	UV	are	unsettling	because	
they	are	human	enough	to	be	judged	in	terms	of	attractiveness	but	are	not	
conventionally	attractive,	so	we	find	them	unpleasant	due	to	these	signals	that	they	may	
be	unfit	candidates	for	mate	selection.	Schneider	et	al	(2007)	collected	ratings	of	
attractiveness	and	human-likeness	and	found	evidence	for	an	UV-type	effect,	in	that	
attractiveness	initially	increased	with	human-likeness	but	a	valley	occurred	where	the	
least	attractive	characters	were	those	rated	between	3	and	3.5	on	a	human-likeness	scale	
of	1-5.		
An	evolutionary	explanation	could	also	relate	the	UV	to	the	concept	of	pathogen	
avoidance,	building	on	Rozin’s	(1987)	work	on	disgust,	as	there	is	an	evolutionary	
advantage	to	being	able	to	avoid	contact	with	something	that	may	cause	disease	or	
injury.	However,	Moosa	et	al	(2010)	argue	that	the	picture	is	more	complex,	and	suggest	
that	a	general	danger	avoidance	mechanism	is	at	work	in	causing	the	UV,	rather	than	a	
specific	need	to	avoid	particular	pathogens.	They	note	that	many	non-human	species	
have	methods	of	separating	the	dead	and	the	living	and	that	several	do	practice	burial,	
suggesting	this	is	not	a	specifically	human	response.	Both	theories	seem	intuitively	
appealing,	as	there	certainly	seems	to	be	something	about	the	appearance	of	uncanny	
entities	which	makes	them	unsettling.	However,	the	evolutionary	aesthetics	argument	is	
not	sufficient	as	an	explanation	of	the	UVE,	especially	as	eeriness	is	a	quite	subtle	
response	compared	to	terror	or	disgust.	It	may	be	unpleasant	to	feel	unsettled	or	
‘creeped	out’	but	many	people	may	tolerate	this	discomfort	reasonably	easily.	It	is	argued	
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that	if	the	core	of	the	UVE	is	an	evolutionary	protective	function	then	a	more	robust	
sensation	of	outright	disgust	or	fear,	leading	to	the	rejection	of	the	entity,	should	be	
evoked	by	NHEs.		
1.2.2	Category	Boundaries	and	Categorical	Perception	
The	concept	of	the	UVE	as	a	result	of	category	boundary	conflict	or	category	
confusion	appears	intuitively	appealing.	Historically	it	has	generally	been	the	case	that	
human	beings	have	encountered	things	that	are	either	definitely	human	or	definitely	not	
human	so	the	introduction	of	NHEs	that	possess	many	of	the	qualities	of	a	human	along	
with	non-human	attributes	introduces	an	‘other’	category	which,	it	could	be	argued,	we	
are	ill-prepared	to	deal	with.	Uncertainty	over	the	nature	of	things	was	at	the	heart	of	
early	writings	on	the	uncanny	(Jentsch,	1906)	and	since	then,	this	concept	has	received	
considerable	attention	from	researchers.	Ramey’s	(2005)	work	has	been	described	in	in	
Section	1:1	but	to	recap	the	key	points,	he	suggested	that	a	UV	could	occur	for	any	case	
where	there	may	be	confusion	about	the	point	at	which	something	becomes	the	member	
of	one	category	as	opposed	to	another,	similar,	but	different	category.	He	argued	that	
there	are	many	examples	where	this	might	occur	but	questioned	whether	there	was	
anything	special	about	the	example	of	human-likeness	except	for	the	fact	that	we	are	
particularly	familiar	with	humans	and	therefore	may	be	more	sensitive	to	the	qualities	
that	distinguish	the	human	from	the	non-human.	The	idea	of	boundary	distinction	
causing	an	unpleasant	sensation	has	also	been	used	to	explain	the	UV	by	applying	the	
theory	of	cognitive	dissonance	to	the	effect.	Plantec	(2007)	does	not	cite	any	
experimental	evidence	for	this	link	but	the	example	of	an	uncanny	robot	having	both	
human	and	non-human	qualities	is	explained	as	a	result	of	the	dissonance	between	the	
two	categories.	Kang	(2009)	interpreted	the	uncanny	response	to	NHAs	as	a	category-
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boundary	challenge	that	causes	an	unsettling	effect	because	it	threatens	our	sense	of	
safety	and	comfort.	He	describes	a	grid	of	potential	responses	to	NHAs	and	notes	that	the	
uncanny	responses	seem	to	arise	in	conditions	where	there	is	a	novel	experience	(seeing	
a	new	type	of	entity	which	has	both	human	and	non-human	qualities)	but	only	where	the	
viewer	lacks	control	over	the	outcome	of	the	encounter	and	therefore	feels	threatened.	
In	a	setting	where	the	viewer	has	control	over	the	outcome,	horror	and	eeriness	can	be	
replaced	by	fascination	and	wonder.	In	this	interpretation,	the	effect	of	the	category	
confusion	is	mediated	by	other	aspects	of	the	setting,	suggesting	that	the	uncanny	
experience	does	not	have	a	direct	cause	but	may	arise	through	an	interaction	between	
circumstances	and	potential	outcomes.	As	will	be	seen	in	Section	1.3	below,	recent	
research	into	the	UVE	has	taken	the	concept	of	category	boundary	distinction	and	used	
this	to	good	effect	in	pinpointing	transition	points	between	artificial	and	human.		
1.2.3	Neuropsychological	Perspectives	
The	following	neuropsychological	explanations	suppose	that	there	are	automatic,	low	
level	processes	that	respond	differently	to	NHEs	compared	to	humans	or	non-human	
entities.	The	following	three	studies	offer	potential	neuropsychological	explanations	for	
the	UVE.	Hanson	(2003)	proposed	a	neural	explanation	for	the	UV	which	combined	
known	neural	mechanisms	involved	in	processing	emotional	expressions	with	a	proposal	
that	near-human	faces	(NHFs)	disrupt	this	by	not	providing	all	the	necessary	cues	for	
social	engagement.	He	described	the	differences	between	the	processing	of	fearful	and	
happy	faces	whereby	a	fearful	expression	would	trigger	an	alarm	response	in	the	
observer,	readying	them	to	respond	to	whatever	was	causing	fear	in	the	person	we	are	
observing.	The	happy	expression	would	cause	no	such	alarm	and	the	observer	would	
instead	prepare	to	engage	in	some	form	of	social	behaviour.	However,	NHEs	would	begin	
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to	activate	those	social	engagement	cues	because	of	their	human-like	appearance	but	
then	an	alarm	response	would	be	triggered	because	some	non-human	aspect	of	their	
appearance	would	contradict	or	not	fulfil	the	normal	cues	required	for	social	
engagement.	This	theory,	termed	the	‘verisimilitude	discrimination	response’	(VDR)	
proposed	that	the	UVE	is	the	result	of	a	distributed	network	of	various	brain	systems	
reacting	to	partially-satisfied	expectations.	It	was	mainly	synthesised	from	evidence	
drawn	from	studies	of	activity	in	the	fusiform	face	area	and	amygdala	in	response	to	
different	facial	expressions	and	particularly	in	response	to	crisis	stimuli.	The	conclusion	of	
Hanson’s	paper	was	to	recommend	detailed	imaging	studies	to	validate	the	VDR	theory	
and	several	preparatory	experiments	were	also	proposed	to	provide	baseline	evidence	of	
the	VDR	from	standard	psychological	experiments,	and	to	provide	preliminary	evidence	
that	would	guide	the	eventual	imaging	studies.	While	the	proposal	is	certainly	intriguing,	
that	lack	of	any	experimental	evidence	to	support	whether	the	VDR	could	indeed	be	an	
explanation	for	the	UV	means	it	is	not	possible	to	evaluate	the	validity	of	this	theory.		
Lateral	inhibition	was	explored	by	Shimada	et	al	(2007)	who	suggested	that	the	
inhibition	caused	by	seeing	an	almost-human	robot	could	cause	any	pattern	representing	
a	human	to	be	suppressed.	This	would	cause	the	robot	to	be	recognised	as	an	object,	
rather	than	as	a	person.	It	is	this	mis-categorisation	due	to	the	activity	at	a	neural	level	
that	may	cause	the	uncanny	sensation.	Shimada	et	al	presented	the	results	of	two	
behavioural	studies:	in	the	first	study,	participants	held	a	conversation	either	with	a	
human	or	with	one	of	three	humanoid	robots	varying	in	their	human-like	appearance.	
Participant	gaze	response	was	measured	and	the	results	indicated	that	gaze	responses	
were	the	same	for	the	near-human	robot	and	the	human	interlocutor,	but	markedly	
different	for	the	two	less	human	robots.	Their	second	study	measured	preferential	
looking	towards	the	different	androids	in	infants	aged	12	months,	18	months	and	24	
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months.	They	interpreted	the	pattern	of	gaze	responses	as	representing	another	type	of	
UV	where	the	youngest	participants	were	unconcerned	about	the	android,	the	18	month	
olds	alarmed	and	the	oldest	children	were	again	unconcerned	by	its	appearance.	This	
age-related	difference	is	linked	to	the	development	of	lateral	inhibition	mechanisms	and	
suggests	that	this	is	the	source	of	the	UVE.	However,	behavioural	studies	do	not	directly	
measure	lateral	inhibition,	they	only	extrapolate	that	it	may	be	occurring	differently	at	
different	levels	of	human-likeness.	
Saygin	et	al	(2010,	2012)	studied	the	action	perception	system	(APS)	in	relation	to	
android	perception.	The	APS	perceives	body	movement	and	has	been	localised	to	a	
network	of	lateral	superior	temporal,	inferior	parietal	and	inferior	frontal	brain	areas.	
These	include	mirror	neurons	(Keysers	&	Gazzola,	2005)	which	respond	or	resonate	when	
people	see	an	action	being	performed,	as	well	as	when	they	are	performing	it	directly.	
Their	study	measured	responses	to	video	clips	of	an	android	which	could	appear	either	
mechanical	or	highly	humanised.	Two	sets	of	video	clips	of	the	android	performing	
everyday	actions	were	made,	allowing	comparisons	to	be	drawn	between	the	
mechanised	or	humanised	version	as	well	as	the	original	human	model	on	which	the	
android	was	based.	fMRI	measurements	of	repetition	suppression	were	taken.	It	was	
found	that	there	was	a	difference	in	the	level	of	suppression	found	for	the	three	levels	of	
realism:	repetition	suppression	was	found	in	the	posterior	temporal	cortex	for	all	videos	
but	there	was	a	larger	and	more	distributed	pattern	of	suppression	for	the	realistic	
android	compared	to	the	human	or	the	mechanical	android.	They	also	found	that	there	
was	considerably	less	activity	in	the	left	hemisphere	when	viewing	the	videos	of	the	
mechanical,	robotic-appearing	android.	Saygin	et	al	noted	that	this	could	suggest	lower	
activity	in	the	Extrastriate	Body	Area	which	responds	to	perceptions	of	the	human	body	
as	the	mechanical	android	lacked	a	human	appearance	even	though	it	was	making	
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human-type	movements.	They	described	the	pattern	of	activity	as	representing	uncanny	
‘hills’	-	unlike	the	drop	in	emotional	response	characteristic	of	the	valley.	Their	findings	
represented	an	increase	in	activity	for	the	human-like	agent	compared	to	the	real	or	
mechanical	version	of	the	agent.	The	authors	noted	that	they	did	not	explore	the	
emotional	component	of	how	participants	felt	when	they	were	viewing	each	of	the	videos	
so	this	study	cannot	comment	on	the	eeriness	aspect	of	the	valley,	but	it	does	provide	
evidence	of	that	brain	activity	that	varies	according	to	the	realism	of	the	agent	being	
witnessed.	There	is	some	evidence	from	these	three	studies	that	there	are	particular	
structures	involved	in	the	perception	of	human-like	entities	but	these	explanations	do	not	
constitute	evidence	of	a	neural	basis	for	the	UVE,	nor	are	they	attempting	to	provide	an	
explanation	of	how	the	effect	occurs.		
1.2.4	Fears	of	Own	Mortality	
The	social	psychological	Terror	Management	Theory	(TMT)	was	used	by	MacDorman	
(2005c)	to	link	the	unsettling	components	of	the	UVE	to	associations	with	personal	
mortality.	TMT	proposes	that	being	aware	of	one’s	inevitable	demise	is	so	distressing	that	
psychological	defences	need	to	exist	to	allow	people	to	deal	with	this	fear	so	it	does	not	
become	overwhelming.	The	theory	suggests	that	conscious	thoughts	are	dealt	with	by	
rationalization	or	suppression.	These	defences	involve	the	development	of	a	view	of	the	
world	which	provides	and	promotes	rationality,	continuity	and	organization,	and	acts	as	a	
barrier	between	oneself	and	the	inevitability	of	death.	The	‘mortality	salience’	hypothesis	
is	used	to	test	this	idea	as	anything	that	triggers	fear	of	death	should	also	increase	
support	for	that	worldview.	This	is	presented	as	a	‘distal’,	non-conscious	process	where	
even	subliminal	death-triggering	cues	should	elicit	a	tendency	to	prefer	that	which	is	
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culturally	familiar	and	comforting	and	to	avoid	anything	that	might	threaten	this	view	of	
the	world.		
MacDorman	(2005c)	used	an	online	experiment	to	test	whether	these	distal	
mechanisms	of	worldview	acceptance	would	differ	when	participants	saw	a	human-like	
android	or	a	female	actor.	The	humanoid	android	had	superficially	similar	features	to	the	
real	female,	but	also	had	a	slack	mouth,	blank	eyes	and	disconcerting	‘gaps’	around	the	
eye	sockets.	All	measures	were	based	on	earlier	research	on	mortality	salience	which	had	
found	that	thoughts	of	death	triggered	a	preference	for	charismatic	leaders	over	
relationship-oriented	leaders,	a	preference	for	praise	for	one’s	country	over	criticism,	and	
a	tendency	towards	negative	interpretations	of	words	which	shared	a	common	stem	but	
could	be	completed	either	negatively	or	positively.	For	example,	e.g.	MUR---	could	either	
be	completed	‘murder’	or	‘murmur’,	--EEPY	could	either	be	‘creepy’	or	‘sleepy’.	The	
results	showed	that	the	participants	who	saw	the	android	rated	the	charismatic	
(‘worldview-supporting’)	speakers	significantly	better	than	the	relationship-oriented	
speakers,	and	the	praise	over	criticism.	They	also	chose	significantly	more	of	the	death	or	
uncanny	spellings	for	the	word	puzzles	compared	to	those	who	saw	the	real	human	
image.	These	findings	are	what	would	be	expected	by	the	mortality	salience	hypothesis	if	
the	android	was	triggering	thoughts	of	mortality,	and	MacDorman	et	al	concluded	that	
these	results	may	demonstrate	that	the	eeriness	of	seeing	an	uncanny	android	does	
result	from	a	fear	of	death.		
The	usefulness	of	this	study	does	rely	on	an	acceptance	of	TMT,	and	that	is	an	area	in	
debate.	Navarrete	and	Fessler	(2005)	argued	that	the	foundations	of	the	theory	itself	are	
dubious,	and	that	any	evolutionary	mechanism	requiring	such	complex	defence	
mechanisms	is	unlikely	to	ever	be	a	reasonable	adaptation.	In	addition,	MacDorman	et	al	
acknowledged	that	these	findings	were	based	on	only	one	example	of	an	uncanny	
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stimulus,	and	suggested	exploration	should	take	place	across	a	wider	range	of	‘uncanny’	
stimuli.	The	issue	of	identifying	what	constitutes	an	uncanny	stimulus	will	be	examined	in	
detail	in	Chapter	2:	Methodology.	
Four	theoretical	perspectives	have	been	considered	as	ways	to	examine	the	UVE.	
However,	they	either	did	not	offer	empirical	support	for	their	proposals,	or	offered	
support	based	on	observations	from	examinations	of	individual	NHAs.	This	review	will	
now	look	at	empirical	studies	which	have	been	carried	out	to	test	the	concept	of	the	UVE	
across	different	approaches.		
1.3:	Empirical	Tests	of	the	UVE	
The	following	section	considers	seven	areas	of	research	into	the	UVE	by	evaluating	the	
empirical	evidence	that	has	been	presented	for	the	presence	of	an	effect	and	its	cause.	
Four	of	these	areas	have	been	introduced	in	Section	1.2	above	and	concerned	evidence	
that	the	UVE	results	from	an	evolutionary	pressure,	ambiguity	at	category	boundaries,	
from	neuropsychological	structures	and	processes	or	from	a	fear	of	death.	Four	new	
areas	are	introduced	below:	empathy	and	trust;	error	sensitivity;	anomalous	features;	
and	cue	mismatch	effects.	A	characteristic	of	studies	conducted	within	these	areas	is	that	
they	all	use	more	than	a	single	example	of	human-likeness	to	explore	the	UVE	as	it	might	
apply	more	generally,	rather	than	in	response	to	just	a	single	stimuli.		
1.3.1	Evidence	of	Evolutionary	Aesthetics	
Section	1.2.1	described	evolutionary	theories	that	had	been	proposed	as	explanations	
for	the	UVE.	Steckenfinger	and	Ghazanfar	(2009)	was	the	first	study	to	use	non-human	
subjects	to	validate	an	evolutionary	explanation	and	they	argued	that	if	the	valley	
emerged	in	non-human	subjects,	it	could	not	be	said	to	rely	on	specifically	human	
processes	and	therefore	the	evolutionary	explanation	may	be	valid.	This	study	consisted	
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of	preferential-looking	nehaviour	in	macaque	monkeys	who	looked	at	images	of	monkey	
faces	that	were	either	CG	or	photographs.	The	CG	faces	were	rendered	at	two	levels	of	
detail,	one	highly	realistic	and	one	unrealistic.	Steckenfinger	and	Ghazanfar	hypothesised	
that	spending	a	shorter	time	looking	at	the	realistic	faces	compared	to	the	unrealistic	or	
real	faces	would	indicate	a	UV	pattern	of	responses.	The	summary	of	the	potential	
outcomes	is	shown	in	Figure	2	below	and	is	illustrated	as	a	useful	way	to	visualise	the	
potential	outcomes	to	the	different	stimuli:	
	 	
Figure	2:	Potential	outcomes	from	a	preferential	looking	experiment	with	three	levels	of	realism.	(From	
Steckenfinger	and	Ghazanfar	(2009)).	
Their	results	supported	the	UV	outcome	as	the	monkeys	spent	significantly	less	time	
looking	at	the	realistic	faces	compared	to	the	unrealistic	and	real	faces,	measured	by	
duration	of	looking	and	by	number	of	fixations.	This	pattern	occurred	whether	the	faces	
were	static	or	dynamic,	when	different	facial	expressions	were	used	in	the	stimulus	
images	and	when	the	images	were	presented	at	different	levels	of	screen	brightness.	
Interestingly,	and	counter	to	Mori’s	original	theory,	there	did	not	seem	to	be	a	
significantly	deeper	valley	for	the	moving	faces	compared	to	the	static	faces.	This	pattern	
of	results	supports	the	notion	that	the	UV	is	not	uniquely	a	human	phenomenon	and	
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begins	to	support	the	evolutionary	argument	for	a	UV.	However,	as	the	authors	note,	it	is	
not	possible	to	tell	why	this	response	pattern	occurred	as	data	which	could	suggest	
whether	the	subjects	were	alarmed	or	disgusted	by	the	realistic	faces	were	not	collected	
as	part	of	this	exploration.	The	study	indicated	that	a	response	pattern	suggestive	of	the	
UV	is	found	more	broadly	than	in	humans,	but	not	whether	there	was	necessarily	any	
emotive	component	to	the	reason	why	the	monkeys	preferred	to	look	at	the	non-realistic	
and	real	faces.	It	could	be	argued	that	they	might	have	found	those	faces	more	attractive	
so	looked	at	them	more,	but	the	non-realistic	faces	were	rather	alarming	in	appearance	
which	makes	this	hard	to	support.	However,	it	is	certainly	a	valuable	initial	indication	that	
supports	the	idea	of	a	valley	type	effect	in	non-human	animals	and	that	some	aspects	of	
the	evolutionary	arguments	may	indeed	be	sound.		
Following	on	from	this	evolutionary	evidence,	Lewkowicz	and	Ghazanfar	(2011)	
argued	that	the	common	pattern	of	responses	between	monkeys	and	humans	may	be	
because	developing	the	ability	to	process	and	recognise	faces	requires	repeated	exposure	
to	face	stimuli.	At	some	point	during	the	development	of	this	ability,	infants	move	from	
being	drawn	to	general	representations	of	face-like	stimuli	to	a	specific	preference	for	
faces	that	have	particular	relevance	to	their	situation	and	culture.	Lewkowicz	and	
Ghazanfar	(2011)	suggested	that	it	is	during	this	perceptual	narrowing	that	the	UV	
emerges	and	carried	out	a	study	of	infants	aged	6,	8,	10	and	12	months	old.	They	
suggested	that	the	UV	should	emerge	between	10	and	12	months	of	age.	To	explore	this,	
they	created	pairs	of	faces	at	three	levels	of	human-likeness:	a	human	face,	a	realistic	
avatar	and	an	uncanny	avatar	which	was	based	on	the	realistic	avatar	but	had	been	
modified	to	give	it	unsettlingly	large	eyes.	It	was	found	that	6-month-old	infants	preferred	
to	look	at	the	uncanny	face	over	a	human	face	but	the	human	face	was	significantly	
preferred	by	12	months	olds.	Looking	preferences	had	crossed	over	in	the	second	six	
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months	of	life,	suggesting	support	for	the	theory	that	perception	of	the	UV	develops	
rather	than	is	an	innate	perceptual	quality.		
It	can	be	concluded	that	there	may	be	an	evolutionary	and	a	developmental	
component	to	the	UV.	In	terms	of	response	pattern	at	least,	non-humans	experience	it	
and	it	is	not	experienced	by	very	young	children,	but	emerges	during	the	second	six	
months	of	life.	However,	these	studies	did	not	examine	the	emotional	aspect	of	the	UV	
response,	nor	did	they	suggest	any	mechanisms	by	which	the	response	might	be	
explained.		
1.3.2	Evidence	of	Category	Boundaries	and	Categorical	Perception	
Section	1.2.2	above	suggested	that	one	explanation	for	the	UVE	may	be	difficulties	in	
making	categorical	decisions	about	the	nature	of	the	NHAs.	Matsuda	(2012)	et	al	
considered	the	question	posed	by	Ramey	(2005)	about	the	issue	of	valleys	for	
categorically	distinct	entities	other	than	humans	vs	non-humans,	and	asked	whether	a	
valley	would	occur	between	categories	of	familiarity	and	novelty	in	infants’	preferences	
for	looking	at	images	of	their	mothers	or	strangers’	faces,	compared	to	CG	images	created	
by	morphing	the	mother/stranger	images	together.	Three	images	from	the	morph	
sequence	were	used:	the	initial	mother	image;	the	final	stranger	image;	and	the	
intermediate	morph	between	the	two.	Three	age	groups	(7-8	months,	9-10	months	and	
11-12	months)	were	involved	in	the	study	and	it	was	found	that	a	UV-type	effect	did	
appear	irrespective	of	age.	This	manifested	as	the	infants	all	preferred	looking	at	the	
mother	and	the	stranger	more	than	the	intermediate	image	created	by	morphing	the	two	
together.	The	mother	was	slightly	preferred	over	the	stranger.	However,	it	could	have	
been	that	the	morph	itself	was	off-putting	for	the	infants,	causing	them	not	to	look	at	it	
for	so	long.	To	test	whether	the	results	in	the	first	study	did	occur	as	a	result	of	the	valley	
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between	familiarity	and	novelty,	a	second	study	was	conducted	where	Matsuda	et	al	also	
morphed	images	of	different	strangers	together	and	presented	the	resulting	morphs	of	
those	to	the	infants.	The	results	of	the	second	study	showed	that	there	was	little	
difference	in	looking	preference	between	the	morphs	and	original	stranger	images,	
meaning	that	the	valley	effect	observed	in	study	one	did	not	seem	to	occur.	They	
concluded	that	a	valley	does	exist	between	familiarity	and	novelty,	but	as	with	the	non-
human	studies	presented	above,	it	would	not	be	possible	to	use	this	evidence	to	look	at	
the	emotional	component	of	that	response.		
Cheetham	et	al	(2011)	applied	the	concept	of	categorical	perception	to	the	human-
likeness	axis	of	the	classic	UV	graph,	questioning	whether	the	steady	and	smooth	
continuum	of	a	dimension	of	human-likeness	as	presented	on	the	graph	was	actually	
psychologically	plausible.	If	categorical	perception	is	a	feature	of	human-likeness,	pairs	of	
images	that	‘straddle’	a	category	boundary	should	be	easier	to	distinguish	compared	to	
pairs	taken	from	within	either	category.	Their	results	supported	the	hypothesis	that	the	
measures	of	human-likeness	for	morphed	faces	are	categorically	perceived,	as	pairs	
between	the	categories	were	significantly	more	likely	to	be	judged	as	different	than	pairs	
within	the	categories.	They	concluded	that	their	findings	could	be	used	as	a	framework	
for	a	psychological	exploration	of	the	UV	and	may	offer	a	way	of	locating	Mori’s	theory	
within	a	tradition	with	existing	parameters	to	help	direct	future	research.		
Cheetham	et	al	(2013)	went	on	to	explore	the	‘dimension	of	human-likeness’	using	
eye-tracking	techniques	to	investigate	whether	a	relationship	would	be	found	between	
fixation	and	categorical	perception.	They	suggested	that	a	longer	dwell	time	on	faces	near	
to	the	categorical	boundary	would	support	the	additional	cognitive	load	created	by	
making	a	categorical	decision	under	uncertainty.	Cheetham	et	al	(2013)	also	looked	at	the	
number	of	fixations	for	different	facial	features.	While	they	did	not	find	significant	
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differences	in	the	number	of	fixations	on	faces	at	the	category	boundary	compared	to	
faces	clearly	within	a	category,	they	did	find	that	a	feature	hierarchy	emerged	with	more	
fixations	on	the	eyes	than	on	other	features.	In	terms	of	dwell	time,	participants	did	
spend	significantly	longer	looking	at	faces	at	the	category	boundary,	providing	support	for	
the	hypothesis	that	processing	faces	at	this	particular	boundary	requires	greater	
perceptual	effort	to	extract	the	relevant	information	in	order	to	make	the	distinction.		
The	evidence	for	categorical	perception	as	a	factor	in	the	valley-type	response	to	
agents	varying	in	human-likeness	has	been	considered	and	it	seems	clear	that	‘something’	
occurs	at	the	liminal	boundary	between	human	and	artificial	and	framing	this	in	terms	of	
categorical	perception	theory	may	help	to	explain	the	valley	effect,	but	not	why	it	is	
particularly	uncanny	in	nature.	As	Cheetham	et	al	(2011)	noted,	the	category	perception	
theory	of	the	UV	does	not	attempt	to	offer	a	commentary	on	the	emotional	component	
of	the	effect	and	there	is	not	yet	any	explanation	for	why	the	increased	sensitivity	at	this	
boundary	should	produce	an	uncanny	sensation.	Therefore,	there	are	definitely	more	
questions	to	ask	about	the	qualities	of	entities	on	the	boundary	between	human	and	non-
human	and	the	effect	that	they	can	have	on	how	people	feel.		
1.3.3	Neuropsychological	Evidence	
Section	1.2.3	above	presented	theories	for	the	neuropsychological	basis	of	the	UVE,	
and	some	studies	have	collected	measurements	of	neural	activity	at	different	levels	of	
human-likeness	which	may	help	to	develop	an	understanding	of	the	effect	of	changing	
human-likeness.	As	described	previously,	Chaminade	et	al	(2007)	compared	responses	to	
animated	short	films	of	characters	which	varied	in	the	extent	to	which	they	had	realistic	
human	characteristics,	starting	with	simple	shapes	composed	of	individual	‘dot’	point-
light	displays	or	jointed	ellipses,	to	a	mechanistic-looking	robot,	through	to	a	humanoid	
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monster	and	a	human-like	clown	and	jogger.	The	characters	were	either	created	from	
motion	capture,	representing	natural	motion,	or	CG,	representing	an	artificial	animation.	
Participants	viewed	a	random	presentation	of	the	characters	and	were	asked	to	decide	
whether	they	were	seeing	the	natural	motion	version	or	the	artificial	animated	version.	
Bias	towards	reporting	natural	motion	and	fMRI	measurements	were	taken.	A	difference	
in	this	bias	between	the	different	types	of	characters	was	found	with	the	dot	displays	
showing	the	greatest	increase	in	‘natural’	bias	and	the	robot	and	clown/monster	
representations	showing	the	least.	This	demonstrates	that	the	movements	which	were	
presented	with	the	human-like	characters	were	judged	as	less	natural	than	those	with	
only	rudimentary	human	characteristics.	Chaminade	et	al	linked	this	increasing	negative	
bias	to	the	idea	of	the	UV,	as	the	animated	characters	did	only	provide	a	partial	
representation	of	human-likeness	as	the	only	animated	aspect	was	the	running	motion,	
so	while	that	movement	would	have	had	an	element	of	realism	it	could	have	contrasted	
awkwardly	with	the	still	face	and	blank	expression.		
The	imaging	results	were	used	to	examine	this	idea,	and	it	was	found	that	the	
negative	response	bias	correlated	with	a	decrease	in	activity	in	regions	belonging	to	the	
mirror	system,	and	an	increase	in	regions	involved	in	mentalising.	They	gave	one	
explanation	for	the	decreased	mirror	system	activity	as	being	due	to	the	lower	human-
likeness	of	the	stimuli	and	that	a	more	realistic	depiction	of	a	human	may	be	required	to	
trigger	the	activity	of	mirror	neurons.	The	increase	in	mentalising	could	be	due	to	a	
variety	of	factors,	but	they	suggested	that	a	lack	of	familiarity	with	the	stimulus	might	be	
the	cause.	This	study	supports	the	idea	that	there	is	a	non-linear	relationship	between	
human-likeness	and	reaction,	and	does	provide	some	support	for	the	type	of	relationship	
Mori	proposed.	However,	no	emotional	measures	were	made	of	how	participants	felt	
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towards	the	different	levels	of	realism	so	while	an	effect	is	present,	its	nature	as	uncanny	
is	still	unproven.		
1.3.4	Trust,	Social	Actions	and	Empathy	
A	concern	arising	from	the	development	of	social	robots	is	whether	their	users	or	
owners	would	be	able	to	interact	with	them	comfortably	or	whether	aspects	of	their	
appearance	would	make	them	too	unsettling	to	interact	with	as	a	social	entity.	This	
concept	has	also	been	explored	in	the	use	of	artificial	agents	in	computer-mediated	
interactions.	The	following	section	will	describe	research	into	the	role	of	trust	and	social	
actions	in	NHAs	and	will	explore	the	implications	for	the	UVE.	
Mathur	and	Reichling	(2009)	explored	social	response	as	a	function	of	human-likeness	
by	presenting	participants	with	images	of	robot	faces	which	varied	from	mechanical	to	
human-like	and	realistic.	As	an	interesting	methodological	note,	they	considered	the	use	
of	morphing	between	human	and	robot	faces	to	create	their	continuum	but	as	their	work	
was	grounded	in	a	robotics	tradition	and	their	intention	was	to	be	able	to	make	design	
recommendations	for	‘buildable’	robots,	the	decision	was	taken	not	to	use	this	technique.	
Instead,	images	were	collected	of	robot	faces	that	varied	in	the	degree	to	which	they	
displayed	human-like	characteristics.	They	measured	social	attitudes	to	the	robots	in	two	
ways;	firstly,	by	using	a	survey	to	collect	rating	information	on	whether	people	would	like	
to	interact	with	the	different	robots	and	then	by	a	modified	game	theory	methodology	
where	the	trustworthiness	of	each	robot	could	be	ascertained	more	directly.	The	results	
of	the	rating	survey	found	a	pattern	consistent	with	the	UV	theory,	with	an	initial	rise	in	
acceptability	followed	by	a	decrease	below	neutrality	to	negative	liking	when	the	images	
became	more	human-like,	with	a	final	rise	again	as	they	became	human	in	appearance.	In	
the	game	theory	experiment,	they	found	that	the	near-human	robots	were	the	ones	likely	
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to	receive	the	lowest	bet	and	that	this	could	be	significantly	influenced	by	small	
modifications	to	the	facial	expressions	displayed	by	the	robots.	They	concluded	that	there	
does	appear	to	be	a	UV	for	social	attractiveness	and	that	this	represents	a	real-world	
concern	for	designers	working	to	produce	robots	that	will	need	to	interact	with	humans.		
McDonnell	(2010)	measured	how	the	trustworthiness	of	virtual	agents	when	they	
were	presented	at	different	levels	of	realism:	a	high-quality,	near-photographic	quality	
render;	a	lower	quality	render	corresponding	to	that	used	in	most	video	games;	and	a	
non-photorealistic	render	which	appeared	similar	to	a	ray-traced	caricature	of	a	face.	
Participants	were	significantly	more	likely	to	conclude	that	the	faces	rendered	in	the	
highest	quality	(i.e.	almost	but	not	quite	human)	were	lying.	This	suggests	a	lack	of	trust	
for	NHAs	compared	to	ones	rendered	at	lower	levels	of	realism.	It	would	have	been	
interesting	to	compare	how	trustworthy	participants	found	the	actual	human	model	who	
had	been	used	to	record	the	statements	and	after	whom	the	renders	had	been	modelled	
but	this	comparison	was	not	included	in	the	experiment.	This	lack	of	a	natural	human	
anchor	for	comparison	of	any	NHAs	will	become	an	important	methodological	
consideration	that	is	explored	later.		
In	anthropomorphising	or	attributing	human	qualities	to	a	non-human	entity,	one	is	
making	an	assumption	that	the	entity	shares	something	in	common	with	the	observer	
and	as	such	a	sense	of	misplaced	empathy	occurs	where	the	entity	seems	human	but	is	
not.	To	what	extent	can	our	tendency	to	attribute	human-like	qualities	to	non-human	and	
almost-human	agents	explain	the	unsettling	qualities	of	the	UVE,	and	is	this	tendency	
affected	by	our	perceptions	of	animacy	and	mimicry?		
Woods	(2006)	was	interested	in	the	range	of	robot	designs	that	children	would	find	
acceptable,	both	as	desirable	entities	to	interact	with	in	play	but	also	to	explore	whether	
a	UV	might	make	some	robots	off-putting.	Forty	images	of	robots	were	categorised	as	
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human-machine,	animal-machine,	and	machine-like	and	rated	using	a	questionnaire	
which	included	items	about	the	robot’s	appearance,	personality	and	its	emotions.	A	
principal	component	analysis	of	the	correlations	between	the	mean	scores	produced	two	
factors	which	were	labelled	‘behavioural	intention’	(BI)	and	‘emotional	expression’	(EE).	
BI	was	linked	to	perceptions	of	the	robot’s	intent,	either	positive	or	negative,	and	EE	was	
linked	to	the	perceived	happiness	or	sadness	of	the	robot.	Exploration	of	the	two	factors	
did	show	tentative	support	for	the	UV,	as	ratings	indicated	that	the	children	were	least	
comfortable	with	robots	which	were	human-like	but	not	100%	human.	Those	robots	that	
were	categorised	as	‘human-machine’	in	appearance	had	the	highest	positive	BI	scores,	
but	those	that	were	rated	as	‘human-like’	had	the	lowest.	Woods	noted	that	there	had	
been	no	deliberate	measurement	of	how	close	to	human	each	of	the	robots	was,	which	
made	the	positioning	of	each	example	of	the	horizontal	axis	of	the	UV	graph	problematic,	
and	recommended	that	this	should	be	investigated	in	detail	in	a	separate	study.	It	was	
concluded	that	NHAs	are	subject	to	anthropomorphism	and	are	perceived	as	happy,	sad	
or	angry	based	on	the	non-emotive	components	of	their	appearance.		
Riek	and	Robinson	(2008)	examined	empathy	with	NHAs	by	adapting	a	commercially	
available	robot	to	be	capable	of	facial	expression	mimicry.	The	authors	described	how	
being	able	to	mirror	the	emotions	displayed	by	someone	else	in	social	interaction	aids	
with	the	establishment	of	empathy	because	mirroring	someone’s	expression	indicates	
non-verbally	that	you	understand	what	they	are	saying	and	to	an	extent	are	at	least	
capable	of	experiencing	the	same	emotions	even	if	they	are	not	being	elicited	at	that	
moment	in	time.	Riek	and	Robinson	found	that	participants	reported	most	satisfaction	
with	an	encounter	with	the	robot	when	it	attempted	to	mimic	their	own	expressions.	
Participants	were	also	interviewed	and	those	findings	indicated	that	the	mimicry	
condition	increased	empathy	with	the	robot.	In	terms	of	the	UVE,	this	suggests	that	an	
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absence	of	mimicry	may	be	one	of	the	factors	involved	in	causing	NHEs	to	be	disliked.	If	
the	agent	cannot	convey	that	sense	of	empathy,	the	interaction	with	them	would	not	
seem	natural	and	may	lead	to	feelings	of	unease.		
However,	there	may	be	a	limit	to	this.	Leander	et	al	(2012)	found	that	excessive	
amounts	of	mimicry	could	actually	prove	negative	rather	than	positive.	The	researchers	
observed	that	implicit	behavioural	rules	tend	to	be	well	followed	during	normal	
interactions,	but	any	violations	of	those	standards	could	cause	a	negative	reaction	in	an	
interlocutor.	This	negative	response	can	be	characterised	by	experiencing	feelings	of	
physical	coldness	towards	the	person	violating	the	standards	of	behaviour.	This	is	
described	figuratively	when	someone	whose	behaviour	is	‘a	little	off’	is	said	to	give	
someone	‘chills’	or	‘sends	me	cold’.	The	researchers	explored	this	experimentally	in	
studies	where	mimicry	was	either	absent	or	displayed	inappropriately	and	found	that	
there	was	a	complex	pattern	for	where	mimicry	appeared	to	ease	the	social	interaction	
and	when	it	did	not.	It	was	not	the	case	that	mimicry	was	always	welcome	or	unwelcome,	
but	instead	it	varied	according	to	context.	For	example,	when	encountering	a	friendly	
interlocutor,	a	lack	of	mimicry	caused	feelings	of	coldness	but	when	the	interlocutor	was	
task	oriented	and	not	as	friendly,	mimicry	caused	feelings	of	coldness.	The	picture	was	
complicated	further	by	the	finding	that	there	were	no	absolute	thresholds	for	acceptable	
levels	of	mimicry,	but	that	these	actually	varied	from	person	to	person.	Applying	these	
findings	to	the	UV,	it	was	suggested	that	it	would	be	very	difficult	for	a	NHA	to	interact	in	
a	way	that	did	not	make	people	feel	chilled	and	cold	as	thit	would	need	to	be	extremely	
sophisticated	at	reading	and	responding	to	the	human	cues	to	be	able	to	evaluate	and	
appropriately	return	mimicry	behaviours	that	were	timed	appropriately,	judged	correctly	
for	the	situation	and	were	appropriate	to	that	particularly	individual.		
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Gray	and	Wegner	(2012)	suggested	that	human-like	robots	may	be	unsettling,	not	
because	of	some	isolated	aspect	of	their	appearance,	but	because	they	give	the	overall	
impression	that	they	might	possess	a	mind	and	it	is	this	impression	that	sets	up	
expectations	which	then	cannot	be	fulfilled.	People	perceive	the	presence	of	a	mind	in	an	
other	as	either	a	dimension	of	agency,	where	the	other	has	the	ability	to	plan	and	act,	or	
as	a	dimension	of	experience	where	the	other	is	able	to	engage	with	the	products	of	its	
actions	and	experience	the	world.	Gray	and	Wegner	used	a	series	of	encounters	with	a	
robot	which	could	appear	very	mechanical	or	very	human-like,	where	the	amount	of	
agency	and/or	experience	could	be	varied.	Measurements	were	taken	of	the	extent	to	
which	the	robot	was	judged	as	uncanny.	The	researchers	found	that	when	participants	
saw	videos	of	the	human-like	version	of	the	robot,	they	reported	that	they	were	more	
unsettled,	uneasy	and	‘creeped	out’	than	when	seeing	the	mechanical	version.	No	
differences	in	the	agency	perception	were	found	between	the	two	levels	of	human-
likeness,	but	the	human-like	robot	was	significantly	more	likely	to	receive	attributions	of	
experience	compared	to	the	mechanical	robot.	A	second	study	tested	whether	we	apply	
such	attributions	to	humans	as	well	as	robots	by	presenting	subjects	with	a	description	of	
a	person	who	had	lost	abilities	relating	to	agency	or	experience	or	was	not	affected	by	
lost	abilities.	Participants	provided	ratings	of	eeriness	for	the	person	under	each	of	the	
three	conditions	and	it	was	found	that	the	human	lacking	in	experience	made	participants	
significantly	more	uneasy	than	the	human	without	agency.	In	other	words	it	is	more	eerie	
to	encounter	a	person	who	cannot	feel	than	one	who	cannot	act.	The	researchers	
concluded	that	the	entities	that	fall	into	the	UV	do	so	because	they	are	human-like	agents	
who	lack	an	ability	to	experience.	As	long	as	robots	are	mechanical,	their	appearance	
remains	utilitarian	and	therefore	we	are	comfortable	with	them	as	‘things	that	do’,	but	
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when	their	appearance	becomes	human-like	and	suggests	they	should	also	be	able	to	
experience,	this	is	no	longer	acceptable	and	causes	unease.		
However,	an	aspect	of	empathic	behaviour	which	was	not	found	to	be	affected	by	
levels	of	human-likeness	was	the	ability	to	take	on	another’s	viewing	perspective.	
MacDorman	et	al	(2013)	described	a	study	looking	at	the	ability	to	take	on	the	
perspective	of	someone	(or	something)	else.	A	prerequisite	of	this	ability	is	being	able	to	
imagine	a	scene	from	the	point	of	view	of	an	observer	placed	somewhere	in	the	scene	
rather	than	how	it	appears	to	the	participant	themselves.	This	‘perspective	taking’	has	
been	used	as	a	measure	of	empathy	as	it	requires	the	establishment	of	a	theory	of	mind	
in	the	case	of	the	observer.	The	researchers	hypothesised	that	there	would	be	a	
difference	in	the	extent	to	which	participants	were	able	to	take	the	perspective	of	
observers	of	different	levels	of	human-likeness	and	that	levels	of	human-likeness	close	to	
the	UV	would	cause	difficulties	in	the	ability	of	participants	to	take	their	perspective.	This	
hypothesis	would	seem	to	follow	from	the	observations	described	so	far	but	the	final	
results	showed	that	there	was	no	such	difference	as	uncanniness	did	not	influence	
perspective	taking	ability.	This	does	not	invalidate	the	areas	of	empathy	where	human-
likeness	did	have	an	effect	but	does	suggest	one	area	where	it	appears	there	is	no	
relationship	with	human-likeness.	
One	final	aspect	of	mind	perception	that	has	been	considered	in	this	area	is	that	of	
animacy.	Perceptions	of	animacy	can	be	seen	as	a	necessary	condition	for	empathy	to	
occur	as	it	is	only	at	the	point	where	we	perceive	something	as	alive	that	it	becomes	a	
candidate	for	interaction.	Looser	and	Wheatley	(2010)	explored	this	experimentally	in	a	
series	of	studies	where	morphed	images	of	faces	were	presented	to	participants	who	
were	asked	to	identify	the	point	at	which	they	perceived	the	face	as	animate.	There	were	
three	key	findings	from	the	studies.	Firstly,	perceptions	of	animacy	and	a	sense	of	mind	
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consistently	appeared	towards	the	human	end	of	the	continuum.	They	looked	for	a	point	
of	subjective	equality	(PSE)	where	participants	judged	that	an	image	representing	a	
specific	point	in	the	morph	sequence	was	equally	likely	to	seem	animate	as	inanimate.	As	
the	morphs	were	created	by	transforming	inanimate	faces	into	animate	ones,	this	point	
should	appear	at	the	50-50	point	between	the	two.	They	found	that	it	actually	occurred	
significantly	closer	to	the	human	end	of	the	morph,	between	the	60	and	65%	human	
points.	Secondly,	they	found	that	participants	(who	had	not	rated	the	original	images	for	
animacy)	were	able	to	categorise	pairs	of	images	that	straddled	the	PSE	as	animate	or	
inanimate,	suggesting	that	their	appearance	contained	information	that	allowed	
participants	to	put	them	into	qualitatively	different	categories.	Finally,	when	the	face	
images	were	processed	to	present	just	part	of	the	face,	the	eyes	were	found	to	be	most	
salient	when	participants	were	making	judgements	of	animacy.	These	findings	are	
applicable	to	the	UV	idea	as	they	found	that	on	a	continuum	from	inanimate	to	human,	
animacy	emerges	just	before	the	uncanny	dip	is	thought	to	take	place.	They	did	not	
specifically	test	for	eeriness	but	their	discussion	includes	an	anecdotal	report	that	some	
of	the	participants	found	the	morph	faces	at	the	animacy	boundary	to	be	unsettling.	With	
perceptions	of	animacy	appearing	just	before	the	hypothesised	location	of	the	UV,	it	may	
be	that	a	perception	of	animacy	is	required	for	us	to	begin	to	perceive	faces	as	close	to	
humanlike	and	thus	for	uncanniness	to	occur.		
While	the	role	of	empathy	and	the	tendency	to	empathise	with	others	may	be	a	factor	
in	understanding	unsettling	responses	to	NHAs,	the	research	reviewed	here	demonstrates	
an	incomplete	picture.	It	is	suggested	that	we	do	not	trust	almost-human	agents	or	find	
them	credible	and	there	is	a	definite	point	where	an	inanimate	object	begins	to	appear	
animate.	However,	some	effects	which	may	be	expected	with	a	NHA	do	not	manifest.	For	
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example,	mimicry	creates	empathy	but	only	up	to	a	point	and	there	is	no	‘valley’	apparent	
in	perspective	taking	during	interactions	with	a	NHA.		
The	studies	discussed	above	suggest	that	the	UVE	may	result	from	a	difficulty	in	
trusting	agents	that	appear	almost	but	not	quite	human.	The	question	of	how	
comfortable	people	would	feel	with	a	NHA	was	used	to	frame	one	of	the	research	
questions	for	the	current	project	in	which	a	scenario	of	how	comfortable	participants	
would	feel	about	sharing	their	home	with	a	social	robot	of	different	appearances	was	
used	to	elicit	emotional	reactions	to	NHAs.		
1.3.5	Error	Sensitivity	
It	has	been	suggested	that	the	UVE	occurs	as	a	result	of	increased	realism	causing	
greater	sensitivity	to	the	non-human	elements	of	an	agent.	In	other	words,	as	NHAs	
become	more	realistic	there	is	more	information	available	from	their	appearance	and	
behaviour	which	means	we	may	be	more	sensitive	to	any	small	deviations	from	genuine	
humanness	that	designate	near-humans	as	different,	dangerous	or	alarming.	These	
deviations	therefore	acquire	a	salience	out	of	proportion	to	the	size	of	their	defects	and	
become	the	focus	of	attention	(Steckenfinger	and	Ghazanfar,	2009).	MacDorman	et	al	
(2009)	found	evidence	for	the	role	of	error	sensitivity	when	examining	the	level	of	detail	
used	to	display	a	face,	and	found	that	two	subtle	manipulations	of	the	facial	proportions	
(eye	height	and	eye	separation)	would	interact	to	cause	significant	differences	in	whether	
the	faces	were	judged	as	eerie.	The	level	of	detail	was	operationalised	by	three	types	of	
texture	being	used	on	the	faces:	line	drawings;	a	bronze	texture;	and	a	photorealistic	
rendering.	The	study	was	carried	out	online	and	the	researchers	employed	a	novel	
method	for	operationalising	eeriness,	in	that	rather	than	rating	the	images	on	a	scale,	
participants	were	presented	with	an	interface	where	they	could	modify	the	level	of	detail	
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and	were	instructed	to	do	so	until	the	faces	were	as	eerie	as	they	could	make	them.	They	
found	that	sensitivity	to	the	eeriest	proportions	was	indeed	highest	when	the	level	of	
detail	was	highest,	suggesting	that	the	idea	of	error	sensitivity	is	a	valid	one.	However,	it	
should	be	noted	that	only	three	levels	of	realism	were	used	in	this	experiment	and	the	
base	model	(a	static	male	figure	with	a	neutral	expression)	was	the	same	for	each	pose	so	
it	would	be	difficult	to	generalise	from	these	observations.	Tinwell	et	al	((2011a),(2009))	
also	identified	error	sensitivity	as	a	salient	factor	in	causing	the	UVE.	Participants	rated	
videos	of	virtual	characters	on	measures	of	familiarity	and	human-likeness	and	it	was	
found	that	rather	than	describing	a	single	valley-type	curve,	a	series	of	local	minima	were	
found	when	familiarity	was	plotted	against	human-likeness.	They	suggested	that	rather	
than	a	UV,	an	‘uncanny	wall’	would	be	a	more	apt	description	for	the	response	pattern	
observed	in	their	studies	and	theorised	that	it	may	never	be	possible	to	traverse	the	UV	
as	people	would	begin	to	adapt	to	each	new	development	in	realism	and	that	the	
sensitivity	to	the	anomalies	in	the	artificial	agents	would	always	be	marked	and	significant	
in	making	them	seem	unsettling	and	eerie.	There	are	positions	that	run	counter	to	the	
error	sensitivity	argument	and	this	includes	Pollick	(2009),	who	asked	whether	it	really	is	
inevitable	that	increased	realism	would	lead	to	an	increase	in	sensitivity	to	errors,	and	
questions	the	mechanism	by	which	this	might	occur.	It	seems	just	as	plausible	that	the	
more	realistic	figure	may	present	so	many	cues	that	are	realistic	that	they	‘drown	out’	the	
anomalous	information	rather	than	emphasise	it.	In	light	of	this	counter	argument,	error	
sensitivity	does	not	seem	an	explanation	in	its	own	right	and	it	may	instead	function	as	
way	to	describe	the	uncanny	problems,	as	it	does	serve	to	present	some	elements	of	the	
effect	effectively.		
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1.3.6	Anomalous	Features	
The	explanations	and	evidence	considered	to	date	have	mainly	been	concerned	with	
holistic	traits	of	NHAs	which	might	be	responsible	for	their	unsettling	effects.	NHAs	
disturb	us	because	they	may	call	to	mind	thoughts	of	our	own	mortality	and	make	us	feel	
threatened,	they	make	us	believe	they	are	inanimate	when	they	are	not	or	they	cause	
consternation	because	they	are	difficult	to	assign	to	an	ontological	category.	These	
general	explanations	tend	to	consider	the	agent	as	a	whole	entity	but	the	last	two	
sections	of	this	part	of	the	review	will	narrow	the	focus	to	the	appearance	of	the	NHA	
itself	and	consider	its	component	parts	to	explore	whether	the	uncanny	experience	can	
be	said	to	result	from	features	that	are	anomalous	in	appearance	or	unusual	in	their	
proportions.	This	can	be	observed	anecdotally	when	presenting	potentially	uncanny	
stimuli	to	peers	as	people	often	responded	with	exclamations	of	alarm	at	the	appearance	
of	the	eyes,	which	were	then	described	as	cold,	blank,	unsettling	or	even	‘evil’.	However,	
there	are	more	rigorous	sources	of	conjecture	on	this	issue.	Brenton	et	al	(2005)	
suggested	that	an	explanation	for	the	eeriness	of	the	UVE	was	that	the	appearance	of	
NHAs	conveyed	impressions	of	falsehood	or	deceit.	An	artificial	agent’s	inability	to	convey	
a	fully-realised	and	genuine	expression	in	a	context	where	other	aspects	of	its	appearance	
suggest	a	believable	character	may	be	off-putting	and	unsettling	in	an	interaction.	They	
argue	that	the	root	of	this	effect	would	be	present	in	the	eyes	of	faces	given	their	salience	
for	communicating	intent	and	emotional	expression.	Fear	may	be	considered	a	sensible	
response	to	an	inability	to	read	the	intentions	of	another	being.		
Geller	(2008)	addressed	the	importance	of	realistic	eyes	in	NHAs.	In	a	section	focusing	
on	the	animation	techniques	that	can	be	used	to	create	a	believable	representation	of	a	
human	character,	he	quoted	several	animation	practitioners	on	the	challenge	of	
reproducing	the	fine	details	of	attention,	intention	and	emotional	expressions	that	are	
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carried	mainly	or	solely	in	the	eye	region	of	an	artificial	face.	Geller	suggested	that	being	
able	to	present	realistic	eyes	is	key	to	avoiding	the	UVE	in	animated	characters	to	the	
extent	that	some	productions	splice	together	footage	to	use	videos	of	real	eyes	in	a	CG	
face	to	overcome	the	‘cold’	effect	that	results	from	eyes	that	are	not	realistic	enough	to	
be	acceptable.		
To	discover	the	parameters	for	acceptable	CG	characters,	Green	et	al	(2008)	allowed	
participants	to	manipulate	the	proportions	of	images	of	faces	to	either	create	the	most	or	
least	acceptable	configuration	of	individual	features.	The	faces	were	presented	at	
different	levels	of	human-likeness	so	the	acceptable	proportions	for	very	human-like	
characters	could	be	compared	to	those	for	mechanical	robots	and	other	far-human	
agents.	They	found	that	the	more	human-like	the	faces,	the	narrower	the	range	of	
tolerable	proportions	with	only	small	changes	being	required	on	the	human-like	faces	to	
make	them	lose	acceptability.	In	terms	of	uncanny	agents,	this	supports	the	concept	that	
their	eeriness	may	be	due	to	small	deviations	from	acceptable	proportions.	It	has	been	
suggested	in	Section	1.3.5	above	that	one	reason	for	rejecting	a	NHA	could	be	that	its	
human-like	qualities	do	not	match	with	the	qualities	that	are	not	sufficiently	human-like	
and	this	may	be	an	explanation	for	that	finding.		
Another	aspect	of	MacDorman	et	al’s	(2009)	research,	which	was	described	above,	
considered	whether	participants	would	be	more	likely	to	agree	on	acceptable	proportions	
for	faces	that	were	closer	to	human-like	compared	to	those	with	lower	levels	of	detail	or	
which	possessed	features	that	made	them	look	less	human.	Nine	different	CG	characters,	
representing	all	possible	combinations	of	appearance	based	on	the	different	levels	of	
texture	and	detail,	were	presented	to	participants.	These	were	three	styles	of	texture	
representation	(a	wireframe	sketch,	a	smoothed	bronze	statue-like	texture	and	a	
photorealistic	skin-like	texture)	with	each	presented	at	three	levels	of	detail	from	a	basic	
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realisation	through	to	a	detailed	rendering.	They	found	that	there	was	a	difference	in	the	
acceptable	proportions	as	the	figures	became	more	human-like.	With	regards	to	the	UV	
theory,	this	supports	the	idea	that	part	of	the	unsettling	effect	may	be	when	some	
features	do	not	meet	those	standards	of	acceptability.		
Finally,	Seyama	and	Nagayama	(2009)	developed	the	concept	of	acceptable	
proportions	in	more	detail	in	a	series	of	studies	systematically	varying	eye	size	and	
examining	the	effect	that	this	had	on	how	unsettling	people	found	the	resulting	faces.	
They	carried	out	three	experiments	using	an	adaptation	technique	where	the	adaptation	
faces	had	been	manipulated	to	increase	the	size	of	the	eyes	to	disproportionate	and	
unusual-looking	levels.	The	adaptation	paradigm	anticipated	that	after	looking	at	these	
adaptation	faces,	participants	looking	at	non-manipulated	test	faces	should	report	that	
the	eyes	look	disproportionately	small.	The	faces	used	in	this	study	were	six	pairs	of	
images.	Images	of	six	humans	were	matched	to	similar	dolls	or	masks,	and	manipulated	
to	produce	three	sets	of	stimuli	consisting	of	natural	faces	with	eyes	increased	to	150%	of	
their	normal	size,	artificial	faces	with	eyes	at	150%	and	artificial	faces	with	their	eyes	
hidden.	These	faces	were	split	up	into	adaptation	and	test	stimuli,	with	participants	being	
required	to	adapt	to	one	of	the	three	sets	and	then	tested	using	the	natural	set.	The	aim	
was	to	find	out	where	the	boundary	of	acceptability	for	eye	size	would	fall	for	each	
participant	after	they	had	been	adapted	to	the	manipulated	face.	Would	the	participants	
who	saw	the	enlarged	eyes	on	the	artificial	faces	report	that	smaller	eyes	on	the	natural	
test	face	were	acceptable	compared	to	those	who	had	been	adapted	to	the	natural	faces	
or	to	an	artificial	face	with	their	eyes	hidden?	After	a	baseline	exercise	was	carried	out	to	
ascertain	their	threshold	for	non-modified	eyes,	participants	were	presented	with	their	
three	adaptation	and	test	faces	and	their	mean	boundary	size	measured.	The	boundary	
size	was	identified	using	a	PEST	detection	method	to	select	the	smallest	acceptable	
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difference	in	eye	size.	From	the	baseline	measurement	and	adaptation/test	boundary,	an	
eye	size	aftereffect	could	be	calculated.	The	results	of	this	demonstrated	that	there	was	a	
significant	difference	between	the	artificial,	natural	and	artificial/eyes	hidden	faces,	with	
the	natural	faces	causing	the	largest	aftereffect	compared	to	a	very	small	after	effect	for	
the	artificial	faces.	The	artificial/hidden	eyes	condition	also	caused	a	small	aftereffect,	
well	below	the	natural	faces.	The	researchers	offered	two	interpretations	for	this	finding.	
Firstly,	that	there	is	a	different	mechanism	involved	in	the	way	that	artificial	and	human	
faces	are	processed	so	that	seeing	a	natural	face	was	not	affected	by	the	prior	sight	of	the	
artificial	face.	Alternatively,	it	could	be	that	this	adaptation	effect	is	transferable	between	
artificial	and	human	faces,	but	the	conditions	of	the	study	were	not	sufficient	to	elicit	it.	
This	possibility	was	explored	in	their	second	study	where	the	artificial	faces	were	used	as	
test	stimuli.	The	eye-hidden	condition	was	also	dropped	from	this	second	study.	9	found	
that	when	tested	on	artificial	faces,	the	after-effect	for	human	faces	did	occur,	countering	
the	suggestion	that	there	was	a	different	perceptual	mechanism	in	place	for	the	artificial	
and	human	faces.	The	same	pattern	of	results	was	found	when	they	modified	the	
experimental	conditions	used	in	the	first	experiment	to	make	the	task	easier	and	the	
adaptation	period	longer.	Their	conclusions	were	that	when	explored	using	eye-size	
adaptation	effects,	human	and	artificial	faces	were	processed	in	the	same	way.	However,	
this	does	leave	the	outstanding	issue	of	NHFs	and	whether	the	same	perceptual	
mechanism	would	have	been	applied	if	rather	than	the	artificial	and	human	faces,	an	
almost-human	face	from	a	morph	sequence	between	the	two	had	been	presented.	
It	can	be	seen	that	explorations	of	the	role	of	how	we	perceive	different	facial	
features	and	the	influence	of	strange	or	anomalous	features	can	provide	valuable	insights	
into	a	sense	of	the	uncanny.	To	progress	this	area	of	enquiry	the	present	project	has	
framed	a	research	question	developing	the	approach	taken	by	Seyama	and	Nagayama	in	
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applying	a	standard	face-processing	methodology	to	entities	along	the	continuum	of	
varying	human-likeness	to	explore	whether	there	is	any	evidence	to	suggest	that	NHFs	
are	processed	differently	from	human	or	artificial	faces.	Seyama	and	Nagayama	used	
adaptation	to	investigate	eye	size	aftereffect,	and	the	present	research	project	will	use	
the	face-inversion	effect	(FIE).		
1.3.7	Cue	Mismatch	Effects	
So	far,	this	review	has	considered	a	range	of	potential	explanations	for	the	UV,	but	
there	is	still	a	final	area	to	be	explored.	Cue	mismatches	may	be	a	cause	of	the	UVE,	
particularly	when	some	aspects	of	a	NHA	convey	a	more	convincing	appearance	of	
human-likeness	than	others	and	so	the	discrepancy	appears	unsettling	or	alarming.	
What	may	be	unsettling	about	a	robot	is	not	that	its	overall	degree	of	human	
likeness	places	it	in	an	'uncanny	valley'	but	that	there	is	a	mismatch	among	
elements—some	aspects	of	its	form,	motion	quality,	or	interactivity	may	seem	more	
human	than	others—and	it	is	this	we	find	disturbing.	An	example	of	this	would	be	
the	human-like	eyes	and	teeth	of	[a]	robot	combined	with	its	absence	of	skin	or	hair	
and	the	mechanical	jerkiness	of	its	movement.	(Ho	et	al	(2008),	p176.)		
Within	the	broad	concept	of	cue	mismatch,	there	are	several	different	domains	of	
‘cue’	that	could	be	mismatched	to	give	rise	to	an	unsettling	experience.	It	has	been	seen	
earlier	in	this	review	that	a	mismatch	in	realism	has	been	implicit	in	the	trust,	empathy	
and	social	action	studies	where	the	degree	of	realism	has	been	varied	as	a	way	to	explore	
the	effect	on	our	tendency	to	trust	or	empathise	with	a	NHA.	At	some	point	along	the	
continuum	of	realism,	there	is	some	quality	or	trait	of	the	agent	which	is	no	longer	in	
keeping	with	the	overall	degree	of	realism	and	it	is	at	this	point	that	the	UV	emerges.	
Brenton	et	al	(2005)	suggested	that	eyes	were	particularly	relevant	to	the	UVE	as	they	can	
be	responsible	for	perceptual	cues	suggestive	of	duplicitous	or	misleading	intent.	If	the	
appearance	of	a	NHE	is	highly	realistic	then	we	might	reasonably	expect	to	be	able	to	
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infer	intent	from	their	eyes.	If	this	does	not	occur,	either	because	the	eyes	lack	the	
realism	of	the	rest	of	the	form	or	because	the	intent	is	not	actually	there,	this	mismatch	
in	expectations	could	be	responsible	for	the	UVE.	A	mismatch	could	also	be	seen	as	
implicit	in	the	category	boundary	and	categorical	perception	theories	with	their	emphasis	
on	distinctiveness	and	discrimination.	If	the	realism	of	an	entity	varies	in	a	linear	fashion,	
any	difficulties	in	identifying	the	correct	category	may	be	due	to	a	growing	mismatch	
between	the	cues	suggesting	category	A	and	those	suggesting	category	B.		
Seyama	and	Nagayama	(2007)	provided	experimental	evidence	to	support	the	effect	
of	a	mismatch	between	the	realism	of	face	and	eyes	in	contributing	to	a	sense	of	the	
uncanny.	They	conducted	four	experiments	using	stimuli	which	had	been	created	using	a	
morphing	technique	to	smoothly	blend	an	initial	face	into	a	different	face.	The	stimuli	
were	still	images	taken	at	even	points	through	this	blending	process.	In	each	experiment,	
the	basic	methodology	remained	the	same:	participants	viewed	images	of	faces	and	were	
asked	to	indicate	on	a	five	point	scale	how	pleasant	or	unpleasant	they	found	each	image.	
First,	the	researchers	tested	the	hypothesis	that	a	dip	in	emotional	response	should	
emerge	at	some	point	if	a	face	is	morphed	between	artificial	and	human,	increasing	in	
realism.	They	described	this	dip	as	a	‘negative	peak’.	Three	sets	of	images	were	used	for	
the	first	study,	morphing	from	three	artificial	faces	(a	doll,	a	CG	face	and	a	cartoon)	
through	to	three	photographs	of	matched	faces.	They	did	not	find	that	any	such	negative	
peak	occurred	as	increasing	realism	alone	was	not	sufficient	to	show	a	UVE.	However,	
they	observed	that	even	the	‘human’	anchor	at	the	end	of	the	realism	morph	was	not	
truly	realistic,	given	the	limitations	of	a	disembodied	head	shown	as	a	low-resolution	
graphic.		
The	UVE	may	not	have	appeared	because	the	images	were	only	approaching	the	first	
peak	on	the	graph	and	thus	not	getting	far	enough	to	fall	into	the	valley.	As	the	eyes	are	
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the	most	expressive	feature	on	the	face,	the	second	study	addressed	this	by	morphing	
the	eyes	from	artificial	to	human	separately	from	the	rest	of	the	face	so	that	either	the	
eyes	were	morphed	and	then	the	face	was	morphed,	or	the	face	was	morphed	followed	
by	the	eyes.	In	this	case,	a	negative	peak	did	indeed	occur	as	in	both	examples,	the	lowest	
pleasantness	rating	was	found	for	the	greatest	mismatch	between	artificial	and	human	
features,	e.g.	the	100%	human	face	with	the	0%	artificial	eyes,	and	vice	versa.	As	the	
range	of	realism	was	no	different	to	that	used	in	the	first	study,	the	researchers	
concluded	that	the	lack	of	a	UV	found	was	not	due	to	the	lack	of	the	range	in	realism,	but	
instead	the	mismatch	in	facial	features	may	have	been	the	cause	thus	possibly	echoing	
perceptions	of	facial	disfigurement	or	abnormality.	However,	if	there	is	a	link	between	a	
UV	and	perceptions	of	disfigured	or	distorted	faces,	other	abnormalities	should	also	
trigger	it.	Their	third	study	tested	this	by	manipulating	eye	size	from	normal	to	
abnormally	large,	while	also	continuing	the	artificial	to	real	morphs	as	for	the	first	and	
second	studies	to	control	for	changes	in	realism	and	for	mismatch.	Again,	a	negative	peak	
occurred,	this	time	at	the	point	where	the	face	was	100%	human,	but	the	eyes	were	
enlarged	to	150%.	Thus	the	UV	seemed	to	be	emerging	with	highly	realistic	faces	with	the	
highest	degree	of	eye	size	distortion.		
To	explore	whether	there	might	be	other	reasons	for	this	negative	peak,	the	
researchers	used	a	separate	set	of	rating	experiments	to	test	for	significant	differences	in	
the	perception	of	realism,	gender,	expression	and	age,	and	only	found	a	significant	result	
for	the	perception	of	age.	This	led	to	their	final	study	where	the	stimuli	were	deliberately	
drawn	from	a	range	of	ages	and	expressions	across	both	genders.	The	morphs	again	
included	both	realism	and	eye	size,	which	allowed	the	influence	from	the	confounding	
factors	to	be	subtracted.	The	results	showed	that	even	where	the	confounding	factors	
were	controlled	for,	there	was	still	a	negative	peak	for	the	highly	realistic	faces	with	the	
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most	highly	distorted	eyes.	The	overall	conclusion	drawn	from	the	four	studies	is	that	a	
UV	can	occur,	but	the	sense	of	uncanniness	is	enhanced	under	the	specific	circumstances	
where	there	is	an	element	of	distortion	and	mismatch	along	with	the	transformation	from	
artificial	to	human-like.		
This	finding	was	developed	by	MacDorman	et	al	(2009)	who	considered	the	same	type	
of	mismatch,	namely	that	between	the	realism	of	the	face	and	eyes,	could	be	a	causal	
factor	in	determining	the	eeriness	of	CG	characters.	The	realism	of	the	eyes	and	the	
surrounding	face	of	the	character	were	modified	separately	to	produce	stimuli	where	the	
face	could	be	highly	detailed	yet	the	eyes	could	be	presented	at	a	minimum	level	of	
detail.	Their	hypothesis	was	that	a	mismatch	in	the	level	of	realism	would	cause	an	
unsettling	sensation	and	this	was	found	in	their	results	of	analysing	semantic	differential	
scales	measuring	eeriness,	artificiality	and	attractiveness.	It	was	found	that	the	extremes	
of	mismatch	did	result	in	negative	evaluations	on	all	scales.		
A	large	body	of	work	which	commenced	with	the	consideration	of	a	face	and	voice	
mismatch	has	produced	some	compelling	evidence	to	suggest	that	this	can	also	be	
responsible	for	the	emergence	of	an	uncanny	sensation.	Tinwell	has	explored	this	area	
with	findings	related	to	speech	synchronisation,	speech	speed,	facial	appearance	qualities	
and	emotional	expressions	produced.	This	review	will	focus	particularly	on	the	
mismatches	in	experience	and	expression	which	began	when	Tinwell	(2009)	looked	to	
recreate	Mori’s	(1970)	UVE	curve	by	collecting	ratings	of	satisfaction,	human-likeness	and	
familiarity	for	virtual	characters.	There	was	no	single	UV	curve	demonstrated	by	plotting	
human-likeness	against	familiarity,	and	instead	a	pattern	described	as	a	'series	of	valleys'	
appeared	where	there	are	several	dips	in	familiarity	at	different	points	of	human-likeness,	
seemingly	clustered	by	groups	of	characters.	Three	distinct	valleys	appeared	as	can	be	
seen	in	Figure	3.		
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Figure	3:	Tinwell	(2009)’s	graph	showing	three	distinct	valleys,	which	occurred	when	plotting	mean	
human-likeness	against	familiarity.	
A	notable	finding	was	that	these	valleys	do	not	always	represent	the	characters	which	
were	created	to	be	the	most	disturbing.	For	example,	the	second	valley	contains	two	
agents,	the	chat	bot	and	the	second	zombie,	with	the	chat	bot	rated	as	considerably	less	
human	and	equally	as	strange	as	the	zombie	even	though	the	latter	has	been	designed	to	
appear	unsettling	while	the	chatbot	was	designed	for	a	communicative	purpose	and	
without	the	intention	to	disturb.	The	final,	broader	valley	contains	some	characters	
designed	to	evoke	fear	but	also	the	main	protagonists	from	two	popular	games	where	
there	would	be	no	such	intention.	An	additional	finding	was	that	the	genuine	human	
character	in	the	set	was	actually	rated	as	less	acceptable	than	the	photorealistic	
characters	which	may	have	been	due	to	the	experiment	being	set	in	the	context	of	video	
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games	meaning	that	the	participants	were	mainly	experienced	gamers	who	may	have	
developed	expectations	for	what	would	be	acceptable	in	a	video	game	context	so	the	
presence	of	a	real	human	may	have	seemed	incongruous.	To	explore	the	reasons	why	the	
acceptability	of	the	characters	did	not	follow	the	rise-and-dip	pattern	predicted	in	the	
classic	UV	graph,	the	researchers	reviewed	the	characters	that	had	been	found	to	be	the	
most	eerie	and	noted	that	some	idiosyncrasies	of	their	animation	may	have	contributed	
to	these	ratings.	For	example,	there	were	subtle	mismatches	between	the	speech	and	the	
lip	synchronisation	which	may	have	been	unsettling.	Therefore,	the	multiple	valleys	may	
arise	from	specific	mismatches	in	the	believability	of	the	characters	where	a	
photorealistic	appearance	is	paired	with	a	speech	performance	that	does	not	deliver	the	
same	level	of	verisimilitude.		
The	researchers	went	on	to	develop	this	theoretical	framework	further	in	a	study	
(Tinwell	et	al,	2011b)	where	the	lack	of	expression	in	different	parts	of	the	face	was	
paired	with	different	types	of	emotion	being	expressed.	The	intention	was	to	look	for	a	
differential	effect	of	a	lack	of	expression	depending	on	the	emotion	being	portrayed.	New	
video	clips	were	created	for	this	study	to	control	the	type	of	emotion	being	
communicated	by	the	agent.	CG	characters	were	created	using	a	system	where	emotional	
expressions	could	be	finely	manipulated	to	control	the	magnitude	of	the	emotion	being	
expressed.	The	emotions	that	were	tested	were	based	on	Ekman’s	(1992)	core	six	of	
anger,	disgust,	fear,	happiness,	sadness	and	surprise	plus	a	neutral	expression.	The	
controls	allowed	independent	manipulation	of	the	muscles	in	the	upper	and	lower	part	of	
the	face	so	it	was	possible	to	create	videos	where	the	expression	was	being	displayed	
fully	or	was	lacking	in	each	region.	A	human	actor	was	also	filmed	posing	the	same	
expression	but	given	that	these	were	natural	rather	than	CG	expressions,	there	was	no	
corresponding	lack	of	animation	in	the	upper	part	of	the	face.	Three	conditions	were	
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tested	in	the	study;	a	human;	an	animation	with	fully	articulated	expressions;	and	an	
animation	without	expression	in	the	top	part	of	the	face.	A	repeated	measures	design	
was	used	where	videos	from	all	three	conditions	were	presented	to	the	participants.	This	
would	have	meant	that	participants	had	prior	experience	of	the	stimuli	when	viewing	
later	clips	in	the	series.	Ratings	of	the	human-likeness	and	strangeness	of	each	character	
were	again	collected.	An	emotion	identification	task	was	also	carried	out	where	
participants	were	asked	which	emotion	would	best	describe	the	character.	As	expected,	
the	lack	of	expression	in	the	upper	part	of	the	face	did	cause	an	uncanny	effect	(and	so	
the	animated	characters	without	expression	were	found	to	be	more	uncanny	than	either	
the	fully	animated	characters	or	the	human	actor)	but	they	found	that	the	magnitude	of	
this	effect	was	modulated	by	the	type	of	expression	being	communicated	with	a	lack	of	
expression	of	disgust,	fear,	sadness	and	surprise	exaggerating	a	sense	of	the	uncanny.	
However,	there	was	no	difference	in	uncanniness	when	the	expression	displaying	a	lack	
was	either	anger	or	happiness.	It	may	be	that	the	mouth	shape	conveying	a	smile	is	
enough	to	denote	happiness	or	a	grimace	for	anger	and	so	the	information	present	in	the	
upper	part	of	the	face	is	less	relevant.	Tinwell	et	al	suggested	that	the	cause	of	this	
unsettling	effect	was	due	to	ineffective	communication	of	the	desired	expression	as	a	
result	of	suppressed	emotion	in	the	upper	part	of	the	face,	in	other	words,	an	inability	to	
communicate	expression	fluently	may	function	as	a	cue	that	all	is	not	right	with	the	
person	in	front	of	us.		
To	explore	one	explanation	for	this	reaction,	another	paper	to	be	considered	in	this	
part	of	the	review	linked	a	lack	of	emotional	fluency	with	a	tendency	to	make	inferences	
about	the	emotional	or	psychological	state	of	the	agent	with	which	we	are	interacting.	
Many	such	inferences	might	be	used	as	explanations	for	an	abnormal	expressive	pattern	
but	this	study	specifically	tested	the	hypothesis	that	this	is	due	to	perceptions	of	
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psychopathy.	Tinwell	et	al	(2013)	observed	that	it	is	characteristic	of	people	who	score	
high	on	tests	of	psychopathy	to	not	show	a	typical	wide-eyed	expression	in	response	to	
startling	or	surprising	stimuli.	As	her	previous	work	(Tinwell	et	al,	2011b)	had	found	a	lack	
of	emotion	in	the	upper	part	of	the	face	was	important	for	the	UVE,	it	was	hypothesised	
that	uncanniness	was	due	to	unconscious	perceptions	of	this	trait	and	the	possible	
expectation	of	corresponding	anti-social	behaviour.	They	used	the	three	sets	of	stimuli	as	
described	above:	human	videos;	fully	animated	CG	characters;	and	CG	characters	with	a	
lack	of	animation	in	the	upper	part	of	the	face.	A	scene	for	each	character	was	filmed	or	
constructed	to	represent	the	character	responding	to	the	noise	of	a	scream,	selected	as	a	
stimulus	that	participants	should	expect	to	startle	the	character.	Male	and	female	
versions	were	created	for	each	of	the	three	types	of	character	to	explore	the	effect	of	
character	gender	on	the	perceived	uncanniness	and	psychopathic	traits.	Measurements	
of	human-likeness	and	familiarity	where	collected	as	before	but	for	this	study,	
measurements	of	several	negative	traits	were	also	collected	including	some	which	are	
specifically	indicative	of	psychopathic	traits	along	with	more	general	negative	evaluations.	
The	results	demonstrated	that	the	characters	lacking	in	animation	in	the	top	part	of	the	
face	were	again	found	to	be	the	most	unsettling	and	the	extent	to	which	participants	
perceived	the	psychopathic	traits	over	the	other	negative	traits	was	able	to	explain	the	
variance	in	the	uncanniness	ratings.	This	relationship	was	particularly	strong	for	the	male	
characters	and	the	authors	suggested	that	this	finding	links	back	to	the	original	
hypothesis	as	males	are	more	likely	than	females	to	display	psychopathic	and	anti-social	
traits.	The	authors	acknowledge	that	there	are	other	cues	which	may	be	notable	in	
causing	a	perception	of	the	uncanny	but	the	evidence	in	these	studies	suggests	that	an	
expectation	of	negative	social	outcome	caused	by	the	lack	of	expression	in	a	certain	part	
of	the	face	can	be	seen	as	explanatory	for	the	uncanny	response	to	some	virtual	
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characters.	This	research	approach	has	been	informative	during	the	design	of	the	present	
project	and	some	elements	of	the	method	will	be	considered	further	in	the	Methodology	
chapter	and	introductions	to	Phase	3	of	this	project.		
Finally,	Creed	and	Beale	(2008)	explored	mismatched	emotional	expressions.	While	
this	study	does	not	explicitly	measure	human-likeness	or	reference	the	UV,	combining	
their	findings	with	the	lack	of	expression	evidence	above	has	allowed	the	present	
research	project	to	develop	a	second	novel	area	for	enquiry.	Creed	and	Beale	asked	how	
participants	would	respond	when	interacting	with	a	virtual	agent	whose	voice	track	and	
the	expression	carried	mismatched	emotions.	One	possible	outcome	could	be	that	the	
two	would	be	blended	into	a	new	emotional	composite,	another	that	there	would	be	no	
clear	emotion	communicated,	or	alternatively	that	there	might	be	a	dominance	from	one	
‘track’	over	the	other	with	the	sound	or	visuals	taking	precedence.	Four	emotions	were	
used	for	the	two	modes:	happy;	warm;	neutral;	and	concerned.	24	conditions	were	tested	
combining	static	presentations	of	the	emotions	with	videos	where	all	possible	
combinations	were	presented.	They	found	that	the	mismatched	presentation	did	cause	
participants	to	evaluate	the	agent	more	negatively,	particularly	where	the	warm	or	happy	
expression	was	paired	with	a	concerned	voice.	There	was	also	a	high	level	of	confusion	
expressed,	but	considering	the	issue	of	cognitive	load,	it	was	found	that	there	were	no	
significant	differences	in	the	time	taken	to	rate	the	expressions.	If	the	mismatch	had	been	
placing	a	higher	cognitive	load	on	the	participants,	a	longer	time	to	rate	the	agent	would	
have	been	expected	but	this	was	not	found.	The	nature	of	the	agent	and	ethical	
considerations	constrained	the	emotions	that	could	be	presented	meaning	an	exploration	
of	a	wider	range	of	emotions	is	needed	to	explore	questions	relating	to	the	eeriness	
dimension	of	the	UV	experience.		
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1.4:	Summary	and	Review	of	UVE	Literature	
This	literature	review	has	considered	four	theoretical	explanations,	and	seven	areas	of	
empirical	research	into	the	UVE,	and	has	reviewed	how	researchers	have	used	a	range	of	
different	theoretical	frameworks	and	concepts	to	inform	their	approaches	to	investigating	
the	effect.	By	considering	the	theoretical	approaches	and	evidence-based	research	
separately,	it	has	been	possible	to	critically	evaluate	what	could	be	known	from	this	body	
of	literature,	and	it	was	concluded	that	four	aspects	presented	the	most	promising	areas	
of	enquiry	to	develop	in	the	present	thesis.	These	were	the	theories	of	categorical	
perception	and	the	evidence	for	trust	and	empathy,	anomalous	features	and	cue	
mismatch	effects.		
The	other	perspectives	and	explanations	were	not	chosen	for	exploration	in	the	
present	thesis	as	they	were	limited	or	flawed	in	various	ways,	which	will	now	be	detailed.	
It	was	felt	that	evolutionary	aesthetics	was	unable	to	offer	a	reasonable	explanation	for	
the	UVE,	as	the	premise	of	an	evolutionary	drive	to	avoid	eerie	near-humans	would	
predict	a	far	stronger	emotional	reaction	than	the	subtle	sense	of	unease	that	
characterises	the	effect.	The	neuropsychological	explanations	proposed	that	particular	
patterns	of	activity	in	different	areas	of	the	brain	would	occur	when	stimuli	varying	in	
human-likeness	were	presented,	but	the	evidence	gathered	in	support	of	these	theories	
were	flawed	in	not	linking	levels	of	activity	to	how	participants	actually	felt	when	
encountering	the	different	stimuli.	In	addition,	single	examples	of	stimuli	were	often	used	
which	meant	that	conclusions	of	whether	a	valley	was	present	in	the	data	are	difficult	to	
draw.	When	considering	the	theory	of	fears	of	one’s	own	mortality,	it	was	felt	that	two	
issues	were	caused	by	viewing	the	UVE	from	the	TMT	perspective.	Firstly,	the	evidence	
for	TMT’s	general	applicability	was	limited,	and	secondly,	it	represented	a	level	of	
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abstraction	away	from	the	experienced	emotion	of	uncanniness	which	hampered	its	
ability	to	explain	the	effect.	Finally,	no	compelling	evidence	was	found	for	the	error	
sensitivity	explanation	and	it	could	reasonably	be	argued	that	an	increase	in	sensitivity	
may	actually	decrease	any	sense	of	eeriness	as	additional	information	may	serve	to	
reduce	any	ambiguity	between	cues	that	could	have	contributed	to	an	unsettling	effect.		
From	the	four	promising	areas	of	enquiry,	the	one	that	most	influenced	the	design	of	
the	present	research	project	was	that	of	cue	mismatch	but	the	issue	of	anomalous	
features	was	also	highly	influential.		The	present	research	project	took	the	mismatch	issue	
as	one	of	the	key	research	questions	as	it	has	been	demonstrated	that	an	element	of	the	
uncanny	experience	occurs	when	there	is	a	mismatch	in	the	information	presented	in	a	
face	and	evidence	now	suggests	that	a	lack	of	expression	may	cause	eeriness	because	of	
unconscious	expectations	of	threatening	behaviour.	The	role	of	mismatched	facial	
expressions	as	perceptual	cues,	which	may	enhance	a	sense	of	the	uncanny,	is	a	novel	
area	for	enquiry	and	that	is	the	knowledge	gap	that	the	final	phase	of	this	study	will	
cover.	In	reviewing	the	results,	perception	of	categorical	boundaries	and	the	influence	of	
trust	and	empathy	were	also	considered	and	used	to	inform	the	final	conclusions	about	
the	research	findings.		
1.5:	Face	Perception	Literature	
It	was	identified	above	that	one	explanation	for	the	UVE	is	the	presence	of	features	
that	are	anomalous	to	the	overall	face.	This	literature	is	introduced	here	as	it	is	
particularly	relevant	to	Phase	2	of	the	current	project.	The	relationship	between	
perceiving	parts	of	faces	and	perceiving	the	whole	face	has	been	extensively	researched	
in	psychology,	and	this	section	of	the	review	will	present	a	selection	of	literature	in	this	
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area	to	help	frame	specific	research	questions	on	whether	NHFs	follow	the	same	
processing	patterns	as	natural	human	faces.		
1.4.1	Introducing	Analytic	and	Holistic	Processing	
Humans	possess	a	seemingly	effortless	ability	to	recognise	familiar	faces	and	to	
extract	a	wide	range	of	information	from	both	familiar	and	unfamiliar	faces.	In	everyday	
life,	a	brief	glimpse	of	someone	is	enough	for	us	to	be	able	to	ascertain	their	gender,	race	
and	age,	to	perceive	how	they	are	feeling,	where	their	attention	is	currently	directed	and	
whether	they	have	any	direct	intentions	towards	us	(Kanwisher	and	Moscovitch,	2000).	In	
the	case	of	familiar	faces,	we	are	able	to	identify	who	they	are	and	access	any	facts	
known	about	the	person	even	though	any	single	example	is	just	one	from	a	vast	number	
of	faces	encountered	over	a	lifetime.	While	this	may	seem	automatic	and	effort-free,	this	
is	actually	an	achievement	of	exceptionally	sophisticated	processing	as	faces	are	complex	
animated	stimuli	which	share	a	broadly	similar	appearance	and	which	are	routinely	
encountered	under	different	lighting	conditions,	at	different	angles	and	which	markedly	
change	in	their	physical	characteristics	over	time.	Despite	these	challenges,	faces	are	
recognised	quickly	and	generally	with	a	high	degree	of	accuracy	(Bruce	and	Young,	2000).	
The	question	of	how	faces	are	perceived	has	attracted	attention	from	a	wide	range	of	
areas	and	face	perception	research	has	developed	into	a	broad	and	cross-disciplinary	field	
with	contributions	from	neuropsychology	and	computer	science,	as	well	as	cognitive,	
social,	developmental	and	evolutionary	psychologists	(Hole	and	Bourne,	2010).		
Humans	are	so	well	attuned	to	the	importance	of	face-like	stimuli	that	we	are	prone	
to	perceiving	a	face-like	appearance	even	when	no	face	is	present.	Little	et	al	(2011)	
provided	a	striking	illustration	of	this	as	shown	in	Figure	4	below	where	several	inanimate	
objects	appear	to	have	a	face-like	appearance.	
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Figure	4:	Non-face	objects	which	are	readily	seen	as	face-like:	from	Little	et	al	(2011).		
[Images	from	Flickr	users	eworm,	Aquario,	mallol,	Listener42	and	vectr	(provided	under	Creative	
Commons	licences).]		
The	induced	face-perception	effect	seen	in	the	images	in	the	figure	results	from	the	
configuration	of	the	elements	of	the	objects	as	few	of	the	components	of	those	objects	
have	any	resemblance	to	the	facial	features	they	stand	in	for	but	nonetheless	the	face-
like	impression	is	compelling.	To	borrow	a	concept	from	Gestalt	psychology,	the	whole	
impression	is	more	than	the	sum	of	the	individual	parts.	The	question	of	this	relationship	
between	the	part	and	the	whole	in	how	faces	are	processed	has	been	at	the	heart	of	a	
debate	for	the	last	century	with	one	consideration	being	the	terms	used	to	describe	the	
‘whole’	and	‘part’	elements.	Peterson	&	Rhodes	(2003)	used	the	terms	‘analytic’	and	
‘holistic’	to	describe	parts	and	whole	respectively	but	noted	that	there	was	not	a	
consensus	on	that	definition,	with	the	literature	on	face	processing	including	such	terms	
as	’piecemeal’,	‘local’,	‘fine-grained’,	‘part-based’	or	‘componential’	as	synonyms	for	their	
‘analytic’	term	and	‘global’,	‘configural’	or	‘coarse’	for	‘holistic’.	This	review	will	adopt	the	
convention	of	using	‘analytic’	and	‘holistic’	unless	otherwise	noted.		
One	approach	which	has	been	taken	to	investigate	the	extent	to	which	analytic	and	
holistic	processes	contribute	to	how	we	perceive	faces	is	to	explore	how	that	perception	
is	affected	when	faces	are	presented	upside-down	rather	than	upright.	The	act	of	
inverting	a	face	changes	the	arrangement	of	features	from	that	which	we	are	used	to	
seeing	so	that	the	standard	configuration	of	mouth,	nose	and	eyes	is	lost	when	the	face	is	
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turned	upside	down.	As	the	studies	to	be	presented	below	describe,	faces	are	harder	to	
recognise	when	they	are	inverted,	leading	to	the	suggestion	that	face	perception	is	
primarily	driven	by	the	perception	of	this	relationship	between	the	features	rather	than	
the	features	themselves.		
This	question	was	first	posed	by	Yin	(1969)	who	noted	that	faces	represent	a	class	of	
objects	only	commonly	encountered	in	their	upright	orientation.	This	study	explored	the	
effect	of	how	easily	faces	could	be	recognised	if	that	orientation	was	changed,	comparing	
this	performance	to	the	ability	to	recognise	houses,	another	type	of	complex	shape	
usually	only	seen	in	one	orientation.	The	study	tested	four	modes	of	presenting	both	
faces	and	houses	and	participants	learned	to	identify	the	objects	and	were	then	tested	on	
their	ability	to	recognise	them.	The	faces	or	houses	were	presented	in	four	different	
ways:	upright	when	learned	and	when	tested;	inverted	when	learned	and	tested;	learned	
upright	and	then	tested	inverted;	and	learned	inverted	then	tested	upright.	The	results	
demonstrated	that	both	faces	and	houses	were	harder	to	recognise	when	inverted	but	
faces	showed	the	greater	decrement	in	performance.	This	became	known	as	the	‘face-
inversion	effect’	(FIE)	and	these	initial	findings	established	inversion	as	a	marker	of	face-
specific	processes	and	also	a	tool	for	investigating	what	makes	face	perception	special	
(Kanwisher	and	Moscovitch,	2000).		
This	review	will	describe	selected	publications	about	the	FIE.	Within	face	recognition	
research,	evidence	from	three	areas	has	been	used	to	argue	that	faces	represent	a	special	
class	of	visual	stimuli	which	are	processed	in	a	unique	way,	and	have	tried	to	explore	the	
reasons	for	this,	which	are	the	FIE,	developmental	studies	and	studies	of	the	effects	of	
prosopagnosia.	Prosopagnosia	will	be	considered	in	Section	1.5	under	emotional	
responses	to	faces,	so	this	section	will	cover	developmental	and	behavioural	evidence	for	
the	FIE.	As	it	has	been	adopted	in	this	study	of	the	UVE	as	a	tool	for	investigating	whether	
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NHFs	are	processed	using	an	analytic	approach	rather	than	holistically,	the	review	of	each	
study	will	be	considered	for	its	approach	to	investigating	the	FIE	and,	where	relevant,	
evaluated	in	terms	of	the	evidence	supplied	for	analytic	versus	holistic	processing.		
1.4.2	Developmental	approaches	
Valentine	(1988)	posed	the	general	question	of	whether	the	FIE	suggests	that	faces	
are	processed	by	a	unique	and	specialised	mechanism	which	is	not	shared	in	the	
processing	of	other	complex	stimuli.	One	of	the	strands	for	investigating	this	was	to	
review	developmental	studies	of	the	FIE	to	explore	whether	the	effect	was	present	from	
birth	or	whether	it	developed	with	age.	An	early	sensitivity	to	orientation	is	observed	in	
studies	of	infants	between	16	and	22	weeks	of	age	but	there	is	also	evidence	that	
abstract	patterns	were	similarly	discriminated,	with	one	study	suggesting	that	this	does	
not	provide	evidence	of	a	face-specific	sensitivity.	Evidence	for	piecemeal	encoding	in	
very	young	children	was	found	by	Cohen	and	Cashon	(2001)	who	explored	whether	
seven-month	old	babies	perceived	faces	as	individual	features	or	organised	
configurations.	This	study	presented	babies	with	images	of	two	female	faces	followed	by	
either	images	of	familiar	faces,	images	created	by	re-arranging	familiar	features	into	
novel	configurations	(switched	faces),	or	an	entirely	novel	face.	These	were	presented	
upright	or	inverted.	They	measured	the	amount	of	time	babies	spent	looking	at	each	type	
in	each	orientation.	The	results	showed	longer	looking	for	switched	faces	in	the	upright	
condition	but	not	when	inverted,	suggesting	analytic	processing	for	the	inverted	faces	but	
holistic	processing	for	the	upright	faces.		
Returning	to	Valentine	(1988),	the	developmental	path	of	sensitivity	to	orientation	is	
also	subject	to	question:	studies	are	reported	that	demonstrated	that	young	children	
(aged	under	10)	did	not	experience	a	FIE.	Instead	it	appeared	at	around	10	years	of	age	
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and	it	was	suggested	that	young	children	process	faces	in	a	piecemeal	fashion,	rather	
than	holistically,	until	the	development	of	holistic	face	perception,	which	is	marked	by	the	
appearance	of	the	FIE.	Diamond	and	Carey	(1977)	termed	this	change	from	analytic	to	
holistic	processing	an	'encoding	switch'	and	provided	supporting	evidence	for	piecemeal	
perception	by	demonstrating	that	children	aged	6-10	relied	on	external	cues	such	as	
sunglasses	or	hairstyles	to	identify	faces	but	that	this	reliance	stopped	after	age	10.	
However,	Valentine	(1988)	argued	that	the	design	of	this	study	was	subject	to	floor	
effects	preventing	the	actual	inversion	effect	being	measured	and	indeed	further	studies	
found	evidence	of	a	FIE	in	children	of	7	years	old.	The	idea	of	a	change	in	encoding	
method	during	development	remained	open	to	question,	and	was	examined	in	Brace	et	al	
(2001).	This	study	used	an	innovative	experimental	design	where	the	stimuli	were	
presented	in	the	context	of	illustrating	a	story	rather	than	just	as	isolated	images	without	
narrative.	This	study	also	used	an	inverted	versus	upright	recognition	task	where	children	
(aged	between	2	and	12)	were	asked	to	select	a	learned	target	face	from	eight	distractor	
faces	as	quickly	as	possible.	The	inclusion	of	a	large	number	of	distractor	faces	was	
another	innovation	and	was	necessary	to	allow	children	across	the	age	span	to	
demonstrate	their	perceptual	ability	without	risking	floor	or	ceiling	effects.	The	speed	of	
recognition	and	recognition	accuracy	were	measured.	It	was	found	that	a	FIE	did	emerge	
even	in	children	aged	5-6,	considerably	younger	than	had	been	previously	been	observed,	
suggesting	that	an	alternative	to	the	encoding	switch	explanation	for	the	observed	
pattern	could	be	that	the	children	were	developing	in	perceptual	expertise	as	they	gained	
face	experience.	Unexpectedly,	the	youngest	group	of	participants	demonstrated	an	
‘inverted	inversion	effect’	where	their	recognition	was	faster	for	the	inverted	faces	than	
for	the	upright	faces.	This	effect	could	have	been	due	to	the	presence	of	an	encoding	
switch	taking	place	at	an	earlier	age	than	previously	hypothesised	or	that	the	findings	
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could	represent	children’s	use	of	a	generally	inefficient	encoding	strategy,	regardless	of	
whether	that	was	an	analytic	or	holistic	approach.		
Finally,	Pellicano	and	Rhodes	(2003)	compared	the	performance	of	child	(aged	4	and	
5)	and	adult	participants	on	a	test	of	recognition	of	facial	features	when	presented	in	
isolation	compared	to	being	presented	as	they	would	normally	appear	in	a	face.	
Participants	were	presented	with	a	target	face	followed	by	two	test	faces.	The	test	faces	
were	either	presented	as	a	whole	face	or	as	just	the	eyes	or	mouth.	The	two	whole	test	
faces	were	the	same	except	for	the	substitution	of	eyes	or	mouth	from	another	
individual;	the	two-part	test	faces	contained	face	parts	from	different	individuals.	They	
found	that,	when	presented	upright,	the	components	presented	in	the	face	were	easier	
to	recognise	than	the	features	in	isolation	and	this	applied	generally	across	all	the	age	
groups.	However,	an	inversion	effect	was	found	for	all	groups,	with	the	decrement	
increasing	with	age.	These	results	suggest	that	adults	and	children	are	able	to	use	holistic	
processing	for	upright	faces	and	that	reliance	on	analytic	processing	may	have	emerged	in	
previous	studies	as	a	result	of	the	way	that	the	tasks	were	constructed	or	the	reactions	
measured.		
1.4.3	FIE	as	a	loss	of	configural	representation	
The	present	research	project	will	include	an	experimental	study	using	the	FIE	to	
explore	how	NHFs	are	processed.	The	classic	explanation	of	an	inversion	decrement	
occurring	due	to	a	disruption	of	holistic	processing	will	be	considered	first,	followed	by	
alternative	explanations	and	interpretations.	Farah	and	Tanaka	(1995)	tested	whether	the	
inversion	effect	occurred	because	of	how	the	act	of	inverting	something	affects	the	whole	
shape	rather	than	the	detail	of	its	individual	parts	and	whether	an	inversion	effect	could	
also	be	induced	in	complex	non-face	stimuli.	Their	first	study	addressed	the	second	
74	
 
question	using	stimuli	that	were	not	in	any	way	suggestive	of	faces	but	which	had	two	
face-like	properties	in	that	they	were	complex	overall	shapes	composed	up	of	smaller	
sub-shapes.	These	abstract	stimuli	were	composed	of	patterns	of	dots	which	could	either	
all	be	presented	as	black	dots,	or	with	groups	of	the	dots	presented	in	different	colours.	
Where	all	the	dots	were	black,	this	represented	a	holistic	way	to	present	the	overall	
shape,	with	the	differently	coloured	dots	suggesting	a	part-based	representation.	The	
patterns	were	used	as	training	stimuli	for	a	recognition	test	where	participants	learned	
the	shapes	in	the	part	or	the	whole	representation	and	then	were	tested	on	their	ability	
to	identify	them	when	presented	as	the	whole	shape.	The	results	indicated	that	the	
inversion	decrement	was	greatest	when	the	shapes	were	learned	in	the	whole	
representation	rather	than	the	part	representation.	Their	second	study	used	a	similar	
approach	but	used	actual	faces	rather	than	the	dot-pattern	representations.	In	this	
instance,	the	part-based	stimuli	were	created	by	taking	individual	component	features	
from	sketches	of	faces	(the	eyes,	nose,	mouth	and	face	outline	with	no	features	inside)	
and	presenting	them	as	the	stimuli	to	be	learned.	The	whole	face	sketch	was	used	for	the	
whole	face	conditions.	The	same	pattern	of	responses	was	found	as	in	the	first	
experiment	with	the	inversion	decrement	affecting	the	whole	faces	rather	than	those	
where	the	individual	components	had	been	learned.	Their	conclusion	was	that	the	FIE	
does	occur	as	a	result	of	faces	comprising	a	complex	whole	which	is	rarely	broken	down	
into	its	component	parts,	but	that	other	complex	shapes	could	also	be	subject	to	a	similar	
effect.	However,	the	use	of	faces	sketches	rather	than	photographs	as	the	stimuli	in	the	
second	experiment	may	be	a	methodological	concern	in	this	study	as	it	may	be	that	the	
sketch	representations	are	processed	differently	to	photographs	of	faces.	
In	another	exploration	directly	comparing	the	effect	of	manipulating	individual	
features	with	the	effect	of	manipulating	of	spatial	relations,	Searcy	and	Bartlett	(1996)	
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created	face	stimuli	(from	photographs,	avoiding	the	methodological	concern	noted	
above)	which	were	manipulated	to	produce	two	types	of	new,	distorted	faces.	This	study	
is	of	particular	interest	to	the	current	project	as	some	of	the	distorted	stimuli	used	in	the	
study	have	definite	uncanny	qualities.	In	the	first	type	of	distortion,	the	individual	
features	were	altered	with	the	goal	of	deliberately	creating	grotesque	faces:	eyes	were	
given	the	appearance	of	cataracts	or	had	the	pupils	tinted	red,	teeth	were	blackened,	
discoloured	or	lengthened	to	produce	a	fang-like	appearance.	In	the	second	type,	the	
features	were	moved	within	the	face	to	create	improbable	and	grotesque	spatial	
arrangements.	These	altered	faces	were	presented	(upright	and	inverted)	to	participants	
who	performed	two	tasks.	Firstly,	they	rated	the	grotesqueness	of	each	face	on	a	scale	of	
1	to	7.	They	were	then	asked	to	perform	a	same/different	classification	when	presented	
with	pairs	of	the	faces	consisting	of	one	unaltered	face	with	either	the	same	unaltered	
face	or	the	componential	or	spatially	altered	face.	The	pairs	were	presented	upright	or	
inverted,	and	the	experimenters	measured	both	the	speed	of	response	to	make	a	same-
different	judgement	and	also	the	percentage	of	participants	who	were	able	to	make	a	
decision	in	the	allocated	interval.	The	results	of	the	grotesqueness	ratings	found	that	
inversion	reduced	the	grotesqueness	for	the	spatially	distorted	faces	but	not	for	the	
componentially	distorted	faces.	The	results	of	the	same-different	task	showed	that	
inversion	caused	participants	to	find	it	harder	to	decide	between	the	spatially	distorted	
faces,	with	a	fall	of	44%	in	the	response	rate	when	these	faces	were	inverted.	These	
results	both	support	the	hypothesis	that	inversion	interferes	most	with	the	holistic	
encoding	of	faces.	Searcy	and	Bartlett’s	second	study	addressed	a	concern	about	the	
procedure	for	the	first	study	that	the	‘different’	pairs	in	the	same-different	task	were	
always	the	original	face	plus	a	distorted	face	so	the	very	presence	of	either	type	of	
distortion	may	have	been	available	to	participants	as	a	cue	to	respond	with	a	‘different’	
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response.	To	address	this,	they	constructed	new	pairs	where	both	faces	were	distorted.	
Two	methods	had	been	used	to	create	each	type	of	distortion	so	it	was	possible	to	create	
‘different’	pairs	of	images	of	the	same	face	where,	for	example,	the	eyes	were	blurred	
into	cataracts	and	the	teeth	blackened	in	one	image	and	the	features	moved	to	
implausible	locations	in	the	second.	This	negated	the	presence	of	distortion	alone	as	a	
helpful	cue	for	participants	who	were	asked	to	compare	the	two	images.	The	original	
faces	were	never	seen	in	this	experiment.	Again,	the	faces	were	rated	for	grotesqueness	
and	a	same-different	judgement	task	used.	The	response	patterns	replicated	those	in	the	
first	study,	suggesting	that	participants	were	not	using	grotesqueness	as	a	cue	and	that	
the	spatially	distorted	faces	were	subject	to	an	inversion	effect	whereas	the	
componentially	distorted	faces	were	not.	These	two	studies	provide	evidence	to	support	
the	role	of	holistic	information	in	face	processing.	
Freire	et	al	(2000)	introduced	an	exploration	of	a	delay	in	the	time	between	learning	
and	recalling	a	face	when	upright	or	inverted	to	test	the	hypothesis	that	the	FIE	occurs	
due	to	a	‘bottleneck’	in	the	encoding	of	holistic	information.	As	with	the	study	above,	
they	compared	componentially	and	spatially	manipulated	faces	but	without	such	a	focus	
on	creating	grotesque	faces.	Instead	the	manipulations	were	more	subtle	and	at	first	
glance	appear	to	be	normal	photographic	portraits.	Across	two	initial	experiments	they	
first	found	the	expected	pattern	that	inversion	disrupted	the	recognition	of	the	spatially	
altered	faces	but	not	the	componentially	altered	faces.	To	explore	the	bottleneck	
hypothesis	they	introduced	a	memory	task	where	participants	were	asked	to	view	a	
target	face	and	then	pick	it	out	from	a	pair	of	faces	after	either	one	second,	five	seconds	
or	ten	seconds.	They	found	that	there	was	an	inversion	effect	on	memory	for	faces	that	
were	spatially	altered	but	none	for	the	componentially	altered	faces,	and	that	there	was	
no	significant	effect	of	delay.	This	finding	supported	their	suggestion	that	a	bottleneck	
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occurs	at	the	encoding	stage	of	face	representations	and	that	this	is	responsible	for	the	
FIE.		
1.4.4	Alternative	explanations	for	the	FIE	
As	has	been	seen	in	the	studies	detailed	above,	there	exists	strong	evidence	for	the	
role	of	holistic	representations	in	the	FIE.	However,	alternative	explanations	have	been	
proposed	which	challenge	that	explanation	of	the	FIE	and	may	suggest	that	other	
processes	may	have	a	role.		
Firstly,	Rhodes	et	al	(1993)	challenged	the	assumption	that	inversion	increases	
recognition	difficulty	by	disrupting	holistic	information.	They	found	a	large	decrement	in	
detecting	changes	to	eyes	and	mouth,	but	not	when	the	features	were	presented	out	of	a	
face	context,	suggesting	that	this	is	due	to	encoding	them	in	a	face	differently	than	
presented	in	isolation	outside	a	face.	They	suggest	that	this	ambiguity	in	knowing	when	
features	and	configuration	have	been	disrupted	imply	that	the	picture	is	more	complex	
than	simply	an	analytic	versus	holistic	notion.		
Maurer	et	al	(2002)	suggested	that	a	simple	concept	of	holistic	processing	is	
insufficient	and	that	rather	than	considering	this	as	a	single	process,	they	identified	three	
separate	sub-processes.	Firstly,	the	perception	of	first-order	relations	indicating	a	face	is	
present	(i.e.,	the	detection	of	eyes,	nose	and	a	mouth)	followed	by	holistic	processing	to	
combine	the	features	into	a	gestalt,	and	then	finally	the	processing	of	second-order	
relations	to	encode	the	spacing	between	the	individual	features.	The	authors	present	
evidence	from	behavioural	studies	to	suggest	that	inversion	affects	all	of	these	sub-
processes,	and	suggests	that	the	prevalent	view	of	holistic	processing	as	a	single	process	
could	benefit	from	consideration	of	these	sub-processes.		
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Sekuler	et	al	(2004)	suggested	that	the	inversion	effect	is	not	caused	by	a	specific	type	
of	encoding	but	is	instead	a	result	of	the	amount	of	information	available	to	an	observer	
when	viewing	faces	under	different	conditions.	This	study	used	a	novel	response	
classification	technique	to	identify	the	regions	of	the	face	that	were	used	to	differentiate	
between	images	of	different	faces.	While	they	did	find	a	classic	inversion	effect	in	
discrimination	performance	with	the	inverted	faces	being	harder	to	recognise,	they	were	
able	to	analyse	the	areas	of	the	face	that	were	being	used	to	make	those	discriminations	
and	found	that	they	were	the	same	in	upright	as	in	inverted	faces.	Their	conclusions	were	
that	inversion	interferes	with	the	efficiency	of	extracting	information	from	faces	and	
there	is	a	quantitative	difference	but	not	a	qualitative	one	between	the	processing	of	
inverted	faces.		
Continuing	the	theme	of	examining	the	method	by	which	information	is	extracted	
from	faces,	Hills	et	al	(2011)	examined	the	importance	of	fixation	in	understanding	how	
upright	and	inverted	faces	are	processed.	Across	three	experiments	they	tested	a	
‘feature-saliency’	hypothesis	by	firstly	carrying	out	a	recognition	test	with	upright	and	
inverted	faces,	cueing	participants	to	fixate	either	on	the	eyes	or	the	mouth	region	by	
highlighting	those	areas	with	a	cross.	They	found	that	drawing	attention	to	the	eyes	
reduced	the	inversion	decrement	on	recognition	accuracy	compared	to	drawing	attention	
to	the	mouth	or	not	providing	a	cue	at	all.	In	a	second	study,	they	addressed	a	limitation	
of	the	first	study	where	it	was	observed	that	the	location	of	the	cross	may	have	served	as	
a	cue	to	where	the	top	of	the	face	was	located.	To	address	this	the	cross	remained	in	a	
fixed	location	at	the	centre	of	the	screen	and	the	face	was	presented	lower	or	higher	to	
align	the	eyes	or	mouth	with	the	cross,	thus	removing	the	salience	of	the	cross	as	a	
marker	of	where	to	direct	attention.	These	results	were	consistent	with	the	first	study,	
suggesting	that	the	additional	expectancy	caused	by	the	position	of	the	fixation	cross	
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could	not	explain	the	effects	that	were	found.	A	final	study	tested	whether	giving	the	cue	
at	the	point	of	learning	the	face	or	being	tested	on	the	face	would	significantly	affect	the	
outcome.	It	was	again	found	that	the	eye	cue	had	more	of	an	effect	on	the	inversion	
decrement	than	the	mouth	cue	and	this	occurred	regardless	of	when	the	cue	was	used.	
When	considering	the	UVE,	if	it	is	the	case	that	anomalies	in	the	eye	regions	of	NHFs	are	
acting	as	a	cue	to	pay	particular	attention	to	this	region,	a	decreased	inversion	effect	may	
be	found	for	those	faces	compared	to	human	or	artificial	faces.		
Finally,	Schwaninger	et	al	(2009)	challenged	the	absolute	nature	of	the	holistic	versus	
analytic	explanations	and	instead	suggested	a	dual	mode	hypothesis	for	face	processing,	
where	both	types	of	encoding	are	fundamental	to	a	fully	processed	perception	of	a	face.	
A	novel	approach	to	separating	holistic	and	analytic	processing	involved	manipulating	
face	photographs	to	preserve	feature-based	information	but	losing	the	configuration	of	
the	face	(cutting	faces	into	individual	features	and	‘scrambling’	them	randomly)	or	to	
preserve	the	arrangement	of	the	features	while	removing	the	detail	of	the	features	
(blurring	the	face	image	to	the	point	where	the	features	were	indistinct).	They	used	these	
stimuli	in	three	behavioural	experiments	and	three	computer	modelling	studies.	The	
behavioural	experiments	explored	whether	it	would	be	possible	to	recognise	faces	in	
conditions	where	only	the	features	or	only	the	configuration	was	available.	This	was	
found	to	be	possible	for	unfamiliar	faces	as	well	as	familiar	faces.	Those	studies	also	
measured	the	extent	to	which	seeing	one	of	the	face	types	facilitated	the	perception	of	
the	other	and	the	results	indicated	that	these	are	separate	and	distinct	processes.	Their	
third	study	investigated	the	role	of	first	and	second	order	relational	information	about	
the	features.	As	above,	first-order	relational	information	gives	the	position	of	features	
relative	to	one	another	and	the	second	order	relations	are	the	specific	distances	between	
them.	The	scrambling	technique	used	served	to	decompose	the	face	into	individual	
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pieces,	randomly	scattered,	and	so	disrupted	both	types	of	relational	information.	In	a	
final	behavioural	study,	the	face	pieces	were	‘exploded’	rather	than	scrambled	meaning	
that	they	were	presented	in	the	original	arrangement	but	with	the	spacing	altered	to	
disrupt	the	second	order	relational	information.	In	this	way	it	was	possible	to	measure	
the	extent	to	which	this	disruption	affected	a	participant’s	ability	to	recognise	the	faces	
and	the	results	demonstrated	they	found	that	the	recognition	sensitivity	for	these	faces	
was	not	significantly	different	from	the	fully	scrambled	faces,	suggesting	that	the	second-
order	relational	information	between	the	features	is	not	used	in	the	encoding	of	faces	
into	memories.		
This	section	has	reviewed	the	FIE	and	considered	evidence	suggesting	that	it	arises	as	
a	result	of	disrupted	holistic	processing	as	well	as	explanations	suggesting	that	there	may	
be	other	factors	at	work	in	the	observed	degraded	performance	when	faces	are	inverted.	
Several	common	techniques	used	to	measure	the	FIE	have	also	been	detailed	in	this	
section.	A	question	arising	from	the	earlier	review	of	the	literature	specific	to	the	UV	was	
that	of	how	NHFs	are	processed	was	whether	NHFs	are	processed	in	the	same	way	as	
human	faces.	Through	studies	of	the	effect	of	anomalous	features	it	had	been	observed	
that	uncanny	sensations	could	emerge	when	eyes	were	distorted	or	where	there	was	a	
mismatch	between	different	components	of	the	face.	This	leads	on	to	a	question	of	
whether	analytic	processing	is	being	engaged	for	NHFs	to	a	greater	extent	than	is	usually	
engaged	for	human	faces.	The	FIE	effect	will	be	adopted	as	a	tool	for	investigating	this	
question	and	drawing	conclusions	about	differences	in	how	human,	near-human	and	non-
human	faces	are	processed.	
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1.6:	Emotional	Expression	Literature	
This	review	has	considered	the	specific	issue	of	the	FIE	which	will	be	investigated	in	
Phase	2	of	the	present	project:	Phase	3	continued	to	explore	face	perception	but	focused	
on	facial	expressions	and	the	potential	role	of	mismatched	expressions	in	eliciting	a	sense	
of	the	uncanny.	This	section	of	Chapter	One	begins	with	a	general	background	to	the	
psychology	of	facial	expressions,	followed	by	a	review	of	the	literature	on	emotional	
expressions	in	faces	which	have	been	CG	or	otherwise	manipulated	leading	on	to	a	
discussion	of	mismatched	or	incongruous	expressions.	Finally,	to	build	on	the	
considerations	identified	in	the	second	phase	of	this	project,	the	effect	of	inversion	on	
perceiving	emotion	from	faces	will	be	considered.		
1.5.1	Processing	expressions	of	emotion	
As	described	above,	humans	have	sophisticated	expertise	in	extracting	information	
from	faces	under	widely	varying	circumstances.	One	key	source	of	information	to	be	
extracted,	processed	and	used	is	an	understanding	of	how	other	people	are	feeling	as	
being	able	to	see	how	an	interlocutor	is	feeling	allows	us	to	predict	their	behaviour	and	
tailor	our	own	response	accordingly.	In	terms	of	the	UVE	literature,	Canamero	(2006)	
initially	suggested	an	incongruence	between	the	upper	and	lower	halves	of	the	face	may	
have	a	role	in	eliciting	an	UVE	as	it	could	affect	the	ability	to	perceive	emotion	from	the	
face.	A	fundamental	question	in	this	area	asks	what	is	the	nature	of	the	core	emotions	
that	can	be	communicated	through	facial	expressions.	Ekman	and	Friesen’s	(1978)	
classification	of	emotional	expressions	is	one	route	for	addressing	this	question.	Their	
approach	is	known	as	the	'facial	action	coding	system'	and	it	provided	an	extremely	
detailed	method	for	both	codifying	the	emotions	that	could	be	conveyed	through	facial	
expressions	and	describing	the	muscular	mechanics	that	elicit	each	expression.	While	
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over	two	hundred	different	expressions	were	detailed	in	the	full	classification,	Ekman	
(1992)	also	made	a	case	for	six	emotions	to	be	recognised	as	‘basic’	by	virtue	of	their	
universal	nature,	distinctive	causes	and	emotional	responses	and	also	the	timeframe	over	
which	they	occurred.	These	six	were:	anger;	fear;	sadness;	enjoyment;	disgust;	and	
surprise.	Contempt,	shame,	guilt	and	embarrassment	were	also	considered	but	were	not	
considered	to	meet	the	full	criteria	for	basic	emotion	status.	While	the	universality	of	
these	emotions	became	the	subject	of	intense	debate	(Russell,	1994),	their	
distinctiveness	and	links	to	emotional	response	mean	they	have	become	generally	
accepted	as	basic	emotions	and	have	been	cited	in	previous	research	into	the	UV.	As	a	
result,	these	basic	emotions	will	be	used	later	in	the	present	project	both	in	creating	
stimulus	materials	and	also	as	response	items	for	participants	to	use	in	identifying	and	
labelling	emotions.		
However,	research	has	found	differences	in	the	recognition	performance	for	different	
emotions.	While	these	may	be	considered	basic	emotions,	they	are	not	all	recognised	
with	the	same	speed	and	accuracy.	Calvo	and	Lundqvist	(2008)	compared	the	recognition	
performance	for	faces	posing	neutrality,	happiness,	anger,	sadness,	surprise,	fear,	and	
disgust	and	found	that	while	neutrality	and	happiness	were	identified	very	quickly	and	
accurately,	there	were	areas	of	confusion	with	significant	differences	in	the	recognition	
performance	for	negative	emotions.	Two	symmetrically	crossed	pairs	of	emotions	
emerged,	these	being	anger-disgust	and	surprise-fear,	with	sadness	misclassified	as	both	
disgust	and	fear.	The	happiness	superiority	effect	had	been	found	in	previous	studies,	but	
this	work	particularly	emphasised	the	differences	between	different	negative	emotions.	
This	is	particularly	salient	for	the	current	consideration	of	the	UV	as	the	experience	is	
characterised	by	a	negative	emotional	experience.		
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1.5.2	Experimental	Studies	of	Emotional	Expression	
Having	considered	general	issues	relating	to	emotional	expressions,	this	review	will	
now	consider	specific	studies	concentrating	on	recognising	emotion	in	faces	where	some	
form	of	manipulation	has	been	used	to	create	the	stimuli.		
An	early	study	in	this	area	used	images	of	emotional	expressions	created	by	morphing	
and	investigated	whether	these	would	be	perceived	in	the	same	way	as	‘natural’	
photographs	of	emotional	faces.	Takehara	and	Suzuki	(1997)	used	morphing	software	
blending	pairs	of	images	of	emotional	expressions,	blending	happiness	into	surprise,	
surprise	to	fear,	fear	to	anger,	anger	to	disgust,	disgust	to	sadness,	and	sadness	to	
happiness.	Participants	were	shown	the	original	images	and	the	intermediate	
combination	faces	and	asked	to	rate	them	on	happiness,	sadness,	anger,	fear,	disgust,	
and	surprise.	Prior	to	the	experiment	it	was	not	known	whether	the	categorisation	of	the	
intermediate	expressions	would	follow	the	same	patterns	as	the	processing	of	natural	
expressions.	Takehara	and	Suzuki	visualised	the	results	using	a	two-dimensional	scaling	
model	of	pleasantness	versus	arousal	and	plotted	the	location	of	each	face	combination.	
An	examination	of	this	plot	shows	similar	patterns	of	confusion	between	fear-surprise	
and	anger-disgust	to	those	observed	by	Calvo	and	Lundqvist	(2008),	suggesting	that	these	
combinations	do	share	common	elements.	However,	the	main	conclusion	drawn	from	the	
research	was	that	the	morphed	faces	were	perceived	in	a	similar	fashion	to	the	natural	
emotional	expression	faces	as	they	were	rated	in	the	expected	order	despite	the	
ambiguity	produced	in	the	intermediate	expressions.	These	findings	suggest	that	
morphed	images	are	understood	as	valid	psychological	stimuli,	and	that	emotional	
expressions	can	still	be	perceived	under	ambiguous	circumstances.		
The	concept	of	categorical	perception	has	been	considered	with	reference	to	the	UV	
earlier	in	this	review.	Calder	(1996)	explored	the	categorical	perception	of	morphed	facial	
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expressions,	as	it	had	been	previously	found	that	line	drawings	of	emotional	expressions	
were	perceived	categorically	but	there	was	uncertainty	as	to	whether	this	would	also	
apply	to	morphed	expressions.	As	with	the	study	above,	morphs	were	created	by	merging	
images	of	one	intentionally	posed	expression	into	a	different	expression:	in	this	study,	the	
expression	pairs	were	happiness	to	sadness,	sadness	to	anger	and	anger	to	fear,	
examined	in	two	studies.	They	found	evidence	for	categorical	perception	for	all	three	of	
the	pairs.	However,	they	observed	that	this	effect	may	have	occurred	as	an	artefact	of	the	
way	the	studies	were	constructed	with	a	disproportionate	presentation	of	the	morph	
images	compared	to	the	anchoring	original	images.	To	address	this,	a	separate	set	of	
images	were	selected	from	a	single	model	representing	a	continuum	ranging	from	
happiness	through	anger	to	fear.	These	images	were	used	in	two	studies	of	recognition	
and	identification	and	categorical	perception	effects	were	still	found.	Developing	this	
idea,	Calder	et	al	(1997)	explored	caricaturing	which	is	another	type	of	face	manipulation	
technique	where	the	positions	of	features	can	be	altered	with	a	resulting	change	in	
appearance.	In	the	case	of	emotions,	the	physical	distances	between	features	in	a	neutral	
expression	and	a	specific	emotional	expression	can	be	increased	to	produce	a	new	and	
often	more	emphatic	presentation	of	the	target	emotion.	Conversely,	decreasing	the	
distances	creates	an	anti-caricature.	The	researchers	hypothesised	that	the	caricatured	
images	would	be	recognised	faster	than	the	original	expressions,	and	the	anti-caricatures	
would	be	recognised	more	slowly	than	the	originals.	Their	findings	supported	this	
hypothesis	for	all	six	basic	emotions	and	caricatures	of	each	emotion	were	recognised	
faster	than	the	original	faces	which	were	in	turn	recognised	faster	than	their	anti-
caricatures.	Following	on	from	this	finding,	a	second	study	explored	whether	this	would	
also	hold	when	the	caricatures	were	created	using	a	different	starting	point.	The	
inexpressive	neutral	face	noted	above	was	replaced	with	an	‘average’	face	created	by	
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blending	together	all	six	basic	emotions.	This	was	to	understand	more	about	the	
underlying	mechanism	involved	in	the	caricature	effect.	If	the	effect	occurred	as	a	result	
of	perceiving	changes	of	muscles	when	an	expression	changed,	the	neutral	face-based	
caricatures	would	differ	from	the	average	or	prototypical-based	caricatures.	The	results	
of	the	second	study	found	that	both	types	of	caricature	produced	the	pattern	of	results	
found	in	the	first	study	that	caricatures	improves	performance	while	anti-caricatures	
decreased	performance.	An	explanation	proposed	for	this	finding	was	that	the	
manipulations	represented	the	types	of	changes	that	might	be	found	as	emotions	
increase	or	decrease	in	intensity,	thus	how	strongly	recognisable	they	appear.		
The	part	of	the	face	responsible	for	conveying	different	emotions	has	also	been	
examined.	It	has	been	found	that	some	emotional	expressions	are	recognised	mainly	
from	the	top	part	of	the	face,	some	from	the	bottom	part	of	the	face	and	some	seemingly	
unaffected	by	top	versus	bottom.	Hanawalt	(1944)	found	that	the	pleasant	emotions	
(happiness,	warmth	and	mirth)	could	be	easily	perceived	from	the	mouth	or	lower	part	of	
the	face,	but	less	pleasant	emotions	such	as	fear	and	surprise	were	perceived	mainly	from	
the	eyes	or	the	upper	part	of	the	face.	Bassili	(1979)	found	that	there	was	a	difference	in	
the	emotions	accurately	recognised	in	the	top	and	bottom	half	of	the	face,	with	
happiness	and	disgust	recognised	from	the	bottom	of	the	face,	anger	and	fear	recognised	
from	the	top	half	and	little	difference	found	for	surprise	and	sadness.	In	addition,	Baron-
Cohen	et	al	(1997)	found	that	even	complex	emotional	states	such	as	scheming	or	guilt	
could	be	recognised	from	eye-expressions	presented	in	isolation	from	the	rest	of	the	face.	
More	recently,	this	has	been	extensively	researched	using	composite	faces,	which	
represent	another	method	for	creating	faces	that	cannot	be	encountered	in	the	course	of	
everyday	life.	The	technique	joins	parts	of	faces	together	to	form	a	new	composite	face,	
commonly	formed	by	dividing	a	face	across	the	bridge	of	the	nose	and	pairing	a	top	part	
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of	forehead	and	eyes	with	a	bottom	half	of	nostrils,	mouth	and	chin.	Composites	of	
different	people	can	be	used	to	investigate	which	parts	of	the	face	are	used	in	recognising	
identity,	and	composites	of	the	same	person	intentionally	displaying	different	emotions	
can	be	used	to	investigate	how	emotions	are	recognised.		
Calder	et	al	(2000)	used	composite	faces	in	four	studies	investigating	emotion	
identification.	The	composites	combined	two	pictures	of	the	same	model	posing	different	
expressions	by	using	a	top-recognisable	emotion	in	the	top	part	of	the	face	with	a	
bottom-recognisable	emotion	in	the	bottom	part.	It	had	previously	been	that	found	by	
Young	et	al	(1987)	that	participants	were	slower	to	identify	a	face	created	from	a	
composite	of	two	different	people,	and	it	was	expected	that	recognition	of	emotion	
would	also	be	slower	from	a	composite	face	where	the	top	half	was	displaying	a	different	
emotion	to	the	bottom	half.	Calder	et	al’s	first	study	did	find	this	effect	as	participants	
who	saw	the	composite	faces	were	slower	to	identify	the	emotion	compared	to	those	
who	saw	the	two	halves	mis-aligned.	More	mistakes	were	also	made	when	recognising	
emotions	displayed	as	part	of	a	composite.	The	fact	that	the	slower	recognition	and	
greater	error	rate	(together	known	as	the	composite	effect)	did	not	occur	when	the	faces	
were	mis-aligned	suggested	that	the	ambiguity	caused	by	the	composite	face	was	a	
product	of	the	holistic	combination	of	the	two	halves	rather	than	an	intrinsic	property	of	
seeing	two	emotions	together.	In	a	second	study	Calder	et	al	also	found	that	the	
composite	effect	did	not	occur	when	the	faces	were	presented	inverted.	The	role	of	
inversion	in	disrupting	perception	of	expression	will	be	considered	in	more	detail	later	in	
this	review.	To	verify	that	the	composite	effect	was	not	due	to	a	novelty	effect	of	the	
compositing	technique	they	tested	composites	created	from	different	models	and	found	
that	no	effect	occurred.	It	can	be	concluded	that	creating	composite	faces	by	combining	
different	emotional	expressions	makes	it	harder	for	those	emotions	to	be	recognised.	It	is	
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theorised	that	this	may	link	to	the	UV	and	be	a	potential	explanation	for	why	some	NHFs	
may	appear	unsettling.	These	findings	will	be	considered	in	detail	during	Phase	3	of	the	
present	project.		
The	links	between	specific	arrangements	of	facial	features	and	perception	of	
emotional	expressions	was	investigated	by	Tipples	(2007)	in	two	experiments	looking	at	
how	a	threatening	facial	expression	could	be	enhanced	by	the	presence	of	an	open	
mouth	and	widened	eyes.	The	study	was	designed	to	extend	existing	research	by	
Lundqvist	et	al	(1999,	2004)	which	had	suggested	that	a	threatening	expression	could	be	
signalled	just	by	a	V-shaped	eyebrow.	It	had	been	suggested	that	this	was	because	that	
arrangement	of	features	formed	an	angular	shape	which	was	associated	with	unpleasant	
consequences.	Tipples	(2007)	aimed	to	build	on	previous	findings	by	adding	the	two	new	
attributes	and	also	by	using	more	detailed	face	renderings	than	had	been	previously	used.	
In	their	first	study,	CG	images	were	created	from	a	standard	male	base	face	to	cover	
every	possible	combination	of	eyebrow	shape,	mouth	shape,	mouth	curvature	and	eye	
wideness.	Participants	rated	each	image	on	how	pleasant	it	appeared,	how	aroused	the	
person	appeared	to	be	and	how	threatening	the	person	seemed.	Their	second	
experiment	added	a	female	model	as	well	as	the	original	male	model.	In	both	studies,	the	
ratings	of	pleasantness	were	lower	and	the	ratings	of	arousal	and	threat	were	higher	
when	the	eyes	were	wide	and	the	mouth	was	open	compared	to	normal	eyes	and	a	
closed	mouth.		
1.5.3	Concealment	and	deception:	the	effects	of	partially-seen	expressions	
The	studies	reviewed	so	far	have	considered	the	perception	of	emotional	expressions	
under	circumstances	where	those	displaying	the	emotion	are	depicting	a	genuine	feeling,	
either	as	a	‘candid’	naturalistic	emotion	or	one	deliberately	posed	to	create	a	‘happy’,	
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‘angry’	or	similar	expression.	This	review	of	emotional	expressions	sits	within	the	context	
of	research	into	the	UV,	and	the	starting	premise	for	its	inclusion	is	how	emotion	
perception	may	be	affected	under	non-normal	circumstances.	This	review	will	now	turn	
to	research	conducted	on	the	effects	of	expressions	which	are	concealed,	partially	seen	
or	masked	either	deliberately	or	in	response	to	social	cues	about	the	emotions	that	are	
socially	acceptable	to	display.		
The	first	to	be	considered	here	is	that	of	genuine	versus	non-genuine	smiles	and	the	
impressions	formed	when	each	are	used.	Within	the	mechanics	of	facial	expressions,	one	
of	the	areas	considered	by	Ekman	et	al	(2005)	was	that	of	the	smile.	A	smiling	expression	
may	have	a	core	role	of	indicating	happiness,	but	Ekman	explored	the	role	of	'masking	
smiles'	which	are	ones	made	when	someone	is	lying.	A	masking	smile	is	one	in	which	the	
person	is	trying	to	conceal	a	negative	emotion	so	that	a	smile	might	comprise	a	smiling	
mouth	combined	with	‘leaked’	facial	movements	from	other	negative	expressions.	In	
their	study	exploring	this	effect,	participants	were	interviewed	while	watching	either	a	
disturbing	or	a	neutral	video	and	were	asked	to	try	to	conceal	their	emotions.	They	were	
videotaped	during	this	process,	it	is	an	ethical	point	of	note	that	their	consent	to	the	
video	taping	did	not	take	place	until	after	the	recording	had	been	made.	Analyses	of	the	
video	tapes	showed	that	even	though	the	mouth	produced	a	smile,	negative	expressions	
were	present	in	the	rest	of	the	facial	expression.	Ekman	suggested	that	these	‘leaked’	
negative	expressions	could	give	an	impression	of	untrustworthiness	where	it	is	clear	that	
the	smiles	are	not	genuine	and	that	someone	is	trying	to	conceal	something.		
1.5.4	Expression	and	Inversion	
The	present	project	will	consider	the	impact	of	inversion	on	perceiving	emotion	from	
‘blended’	faces,	which	are	similar	to	composite	or	chimeric	faces	but	rather	than	taking	
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halves	of	faces	as	a	whole,	they	blend	a	particular	region	of	interest	into	a	different	base	
face.	In	the	case	of	Phase	3	of	this	research	project,	these	were	created	to	blend	
emotional	expressions	so	a	happy	base	face	could	be	shown	with	a	sad,	disgusted	or	
fearful	expressions	from	the	eye	region.	The	main	aim	of	Phase	3	was	to	examine	
whether	any	of	these	blends	produced	eerie	or	unsettling	responses	in	participants	but	
following	the	findings	from	the	Phase	2	of	this	project,	the	effect	of	inverting	these	
blended	faces	was	also	studied	to	see	which,	if	any,	emotions	would	be	recognised	from	
the	inverted	versions	of	the	face	blends.	The	studies	below	have	been	included	as	a	
review	of	relevant	literature	on	the	effect	of	inversion	on	the	processing	of	emotional	
expressions.		
Firstly,	Fallshore	and	Bartholow	(2003)	used	schematic	drawings	of	faces	displaying	
surprise,	sadness,	anger,	happiness,	disgust	and	fear	to	explore	whether	these	
expressions	would	be	recognised	when	the	images	were	inverted.	They	found	that	
sadness,	anger,	happiness	and	fear	showed	an	inversion	effect	as	participants	were	
significantly	less	accurate	at	recognising	these	expressions	when	the	faces	were	
presented	inverted.	However,	surprise	and	disgust	showed	no	such	inversion	decrement	
as	there	was	no	significant	difference	in	the	identification	of	the	emotions	when	the	faces	
were	inverted.		
Prkachin	(2003)	reported	studies	of	emotion	labelling	(the	ability	to	give	a	linguistic	
label	to	an	expression	of	emotion)	and	emotion	detection	(the	ability	to	identify	that	a	
particular	emotion	is	present)	for	inverted	and	upright	faces.	The	emotion	labelling	study	
found	that	inversion	impaired	participant’s	ability	to	accurately	label	emotions	and	
detailed	how	each	emotion	was	affected	by	inversion.	It	was	found	that	there	was	a	
relationship	between	how	easily	an	emotion	can	be	recognised	when	upright	and	the	
extent	to	which	this	is	affected	by	inversion,	with	the	faces	harder	to	recognise	when	
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upright	being	most	affected	by	inversion.	However,	Prkachin	questioned	whether	part	of	
that	pattern	may	have	been	due	to	the	cognitive	load	imposed	in	the	type	of	task	used	for	
the	study	as	choosing	which	label	to	apply	to	a	face	when	inverted	can	be	a	cognitively	
challenging	task.	To	address	this,	for	their	second	study	participants	simply	had	to	state	
when	they	saw	a	particular	target	emotion	on	a	displayed	face	rather	than	identify	and	
label	it.	Inversion	was	found	to	disrupt	sensitivity	on	this	task.	The	pattern	of	particular	
emotions	and	how	they	were	differentially	affected	by	inversion	on	each	task	was	
considered.	It	was	found	that	on	both	tasks,	performance	for	labelling	or	identifying	the	
expressions	of	anger,	fear,	happiness	and	surprise	was	similar	but	labelling	disgust	in	
particular	was	disproportionately	affected	by	inversion.	The	response	pattern	to	sadness	
was	also	interesting.	While	it	was	not	difficult	to	label	sadness	when	presented	upright,	
identification	of	the	sad	expression	was	difficult	and	this	was	made	harder	when	the	face	
was	inverted.	It	was	found	that	participants	would	confuse	sadness,	anger	and	disgust	
when	inverted.	It	was	concluded	that	perceptual	processing	of	emotions	was	affected	by	
inversion,	but	the	nature	of	that	effect	varied	according	to	the	emotion	concerned.		
However	there	has	been	debate	as	to	the	extent	to	which	inversion	affects	the	
perception	of	emotional	expressions.	Lipp	et	al	(2009)	questioned	the	extent	of	the	
detrimental	effect	of	inversion	and	found	some	responses	to	emotional	content	were	
augmented,	rather	than	impaired,	when	faces	were	inverted.	This	meant	that	happy	faces	
were	processed	as	more	positive	and	angry	faces	were	found	to	be	faster	to	detect.		
The	development	of	an	inversion	effect	for	emotional	expression	perception	has	also	
been	considered.	Durand	et	al	(2007)	explored	the	role	of	holistic	information	in	the	
processing	of	emotion	in	two	tasks	involving	adults	and	children	of	five	different	age	
groups.	Their	overall	finding	was	that	holistic	information	has	the	same	role	in	emotion	
processing	as	for	identity	recognition,	and	that	this	information	was	being	used	by	
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children	as	young	as	six.	They	also	identified	the	developmental	path	for	emotions,	as	the	
ability	to	perceive	different	emotions	emerged	at	different	ages.	Basic	happiness	and	
sadness	were	the	first	to	emerge	at	5	to	6	years	of	age	and	may	represent	a	basic	valence	
discrimination	ability	that	appears	as	a	precursor	to	the	perception	of	more	complex	
emotions.	After	this,	the	ability	to	detect	fear	emerged	at	around	7	to	8	years,	anger	
around	9-10	and	disgust	around	11.	A	neutral	expression	was	often	read	as	a	different	
emotion	up	to	the	age	of	9.	They	concluded	that	this	did	not	indicate	that	children	cannot	
understand	or	experience	those	emotions,	but	more	that	they	were	unable	to	adequately	
predict	the	effect	that	an	emotion	would	have	on	the	facial	expression	of	another	person	
in	such	a	way	as	to	be	able	to	identify	it	when	seen.	The	developmental	path	and	
evidence	of	both	inversion	and	composite	effects	found	in	this	study	mirrored	that	found	
in	identity	recognition	and	this	study	was	the	first	to	explore	whether	this	effect	was	
transferrable	from	identity	to	expression	processing.		
Finally,	a	different	approach	to	the	role	of	configural	and	holistic	information	in	
recognising	emotions	was	taken	by	Martin	et	al	(2012).	The	researchers	observed	that	
configurations	of	specific	facial	features	could	be	used	to	identify	particular	emotional	
expressions,	suggesting	that	there	is	a	role	for	local	processing	of	features	in	the	
recognition	of	those	emotions.	If	this	was	the	case,	participants	who	were	cued	to	use	a	
local	processing	technique	rather	than	a	global	one	would	have	an	advantage	in	
recognising	the	emotional	expression	displayed.	This	paper	reported	the	results	of	a	study	
designed	to	explore	this	premise	and	found	that	local	cueing	did	give	participants	
accuracy	and	speed	advantages	in	identifying	all	emotions	when	compared	to	a	global	
orientation.	This	supports	the	importance	of	individual	feature	perception	in	decision-
making	about	emotional	expressions.		
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This	final	section	of	the	literature	review	has	presented	a	selected	background	to	the	
perception	of	emotional	expressions	to	give	context	to	the	final	research	phase	of	this	
project,	the	study	of	mismatched	emotional	expressions	and	their	potential	for	explaining	
part	of	the	UVE.		
1.7:	Research	Design	
This	review	has	considered	theoretical	perspectives	on	the	UVE	and	evidence	collected	
from	a	range	of	different	approaches.	The	current	project	was	initiated	during	the	period	
covered	in	Section	1.2	where	ideas	were	beginning	to	be	proposed	about	the	UVE	but	
there	were	no	empirical	studies	which	had	demonstrated	evidence	for	those	ideas.	At	
that	stage,	no	empirical	work	had	been	produced	which	set	out	to	operationalise	what	
was	meant	by	the	‘familiarity’	axis	of	Mori’s	graph,	to	address	ways	of	systematically	
varying	the	dimension	of	human-likeness	or	to	map	the	emotional	components	of	the	
UVE	response	itself.	This	research	set	out	to	do	this	with	an	initial	exploration	of	the	area.	
As	those	results	were	analysed,	further	research	became	available	that	allowed	the	key	
areas	of	anomalous	facial	features	and	cue	mismatch	to	be	identified	as	particularly	
salient.	This	allowed	a	focus	to	be	developed	on	two	specific	novel	research	questions:	
whether	NHFs	are	perceived	differently	from	human	and	artificial	faces,	and	whether	
mismatched	facial	expressions	could	provide	an	explanation	for	why	the	UVE	appears	for	
NHFs.	The	theoretical	background	to	those	research	questions	has	been	presented	in	this	
Introduction	and	Literature	Review	chapter.	Chapter	2	will	now	describe	the	
Methodological	approaches	which	were	chosen	to	answer	them.		
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Chapter	2:	Methodology	
2.1:	Theoretical	Background	
2.1.1	Structure	of	the	Methodology	Chapter	
This	thesis	presents	studies	which	have	used	psychological	research	techniques	to	
understand	the	UVE	in	NHFs	as	a	perceptual	and	a	social	phenomenon.	This	Chapter	
contains	four	sections	which	describe	and	justify	the	methods	that	have	been	used.	
Section	1	will	describe	the	theoretical	context	in	which	the	research	has	been	grounded.	
Section	2	will	detail	the	chosen	methods	and	techniques	for	gathering	participant	data.	
The	third	section	will	present	several	methodological	issues	that	are	specific	to	the	UVE	
and	discuss	how	these	have	been	addressed	in	the	research	studies.	The	final	section	will	
cover	the	ethical	issues	relating	to	research	in	this	area	and	describe	how	these	have	
been	addressed	while	working	with	participants.	
2.1.2	Theoretical	Background	
The	research	presented	in	this	thesis	uses	the	social	cognitive	approach	to	explore	the	
features	of	NHFs	which	may	cause	unsettling	or	disturbing	reactions	in	a	viewer.	An	early	
and	broad	definition	of	social	cognition	was	the	study	of	how	people	think	about	people	
(Wegner	and	Vallacher,	1977).	Carlston	(2013)	saw	this	as	being	formed	through	social	
cognitive	events	where	impressions	about	other	people	are	created	or	changed	as	a	
result	of	an	interaction,	leaving	each	party	with	new	memories	and	impressions	of	the	
other.	To	adapt	Kunda’s	(1999)	definition,	social	cognition	can	be	understood	as	the	way	
in	which	cognition,	motivation	and	affect	(or	thoughts,	goals	and	feelings)	are	used	to	
make	sense	of	the	social	world	to	understand	the	people	that	are	encountered	in	daily	
life.	Interactions	are	shaped	by	pre-existing	assumptions,	prior	knowledge	and	the	social	
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context	of	the	encounter	and	an	understanding	of	the	social	world	is	shaped	by	what	
participants	in	encounters	bring	to	those	interactions	in	terms	of	beliefs,	attitudes	and	
ideas.	The	approach	combines	the	methodologies	of	cognitive	psychology	with	theories	
from	social	psychology	to	move	beyond	the	quantification	and	measurement	of	social	
behaviours	to	explore	the	meanings	those	encounters	have	for	the	individuals	involved.		
This	thesis	is	specifically	concerned	with	social	cognition	as	applied	to	face	perception.	
It	may	seem	self-evident	that	viewing	a	face-like	stimulus	will	activate	the	perceptual	
mechanisms	of	decoding	its	identity	and	evaluating	its	familiarity	along	with	judgements	
of	the	face	owner’s	attractiveness,	emotional	state	and	intentions	but	face	perception	is	a	
relatively	new	area	for	research	within	social	cognition.	Quadflieg	and	Macrae	(2010)	
noted	that	although	cognitive	science	and	neuropsychology	had	made	significant	
progress	in	mapping	the	processes	and	mechanisms	of	face	perception,	it	was	only	
recently	that	experimental	social	psychologists	had	started	applying	those	theories	and	
findings	to	the	perception	of	people	in	a	social	context.	However,	this	area	of	research	is	
now	gaining	considerable	attention	and	the	importance	of	this	interrelation	between	face	
perception	and	social	evaluation	is	described	by	Hugengerg	and	Wilson	(2013)	as:		
Faces	are	central	to	social	cognition.	They	are	informationally	rich	and	processed	
with	remarkable	efficiency.	Across	multiple	lines	of	converging	evidence,	it	seems	
quite	clear	that	face	perception	and	our	social	cognitions	about	others	are	
intimately	linked.	…	We	see	such	recent	advances	at	the	interface	of	social	cognition	
and	face	perception	to	be	an	exciting	development,	with	social	cognitive	
psychologists	increasingly	treating	the	face	as	a	serious	topic	of	study.	(p187)	
Similarly,	Quinn	and	Macrae	(2011)	proposed	an	integrated	social	cognitive	theory	of	
face	perception	which	could	account	for	the	social	attributes	that	are	perceived	when	
seeing	faces	as	well	as	extracting	information	on	identity	and	emotional	state.		
This	research	aims	to	contribute	to	this	growing	area	through	an	examination	of	
human-likeness.	Social	cognition	has	traditionally	been	interested	in	interactions	between	
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people,	but	encounters	with	NHAs	are	becoming	more	commonplace.	Near-humans	are	
encountered	as	virtual	assistants	or	companion	androids,	or	in	multiplayer	computer	
games	where	the	other	players	are	depicted	by	their	human-like	avatars.	It	therefore	
becomes	relevant	to	consider	the	nature	of	these	encounters	and	to	consider	those	
features	of	the	NHAs	that	may	make	those	encounters	less	than	pleasant.	The	objective	
of	the	present	research	is	to	understand	the	relationship	between	the	‘unusual’	
appearance	of	the	NHA	and	the	viewer’s	emotional	response	to	it.	This	type	of	response	
is	only	relevant	if	the	agent	is	considered	in	a	social	context	with	some	potential	for	
impacting	on	the	viewer.	To	adapt	Wegner	and	Vallacher’s	definition	mentioned	above,	
this	research	could	be	seen	as	exploring	'how	people	think	(and	feel)	when	someone	is	
not	quite	human.'		
2.2:	General	Methodological	Issues	
2.2.1	Research	Approach	
Phillips	and	Pugh	(1999)	identified	three	basic	types	of	academic	research:	testing-out;	
problem-solving;	and	exploratory.	In	testing-out	research,	studies	demonstrating	an	
existing	theory	or	finding	would	be	identified	and	then	replicated	under	different	
circumstances	with	the	aim	of	testing	the	extent	to	which	that	theory	could	be	
considered	generalisable	and	mapping	the	limitations	of	the	existing	theory.	Problem-
solving	research	applied	academic	methods	and	scrutiny	to	real-world	problems	which	
often	require	the	application	of	multiple	techniques	and	methods.	It	has	the	goal	of	
arriving	at	a	solution	to	the	problem	as	well	as	an	academic	piece	of	research.	Phillips	and	
Pugh	noted	that	this	could	be	problematic	as	the	drive	to	find	and	implement	a	practical	
solution	could	overwhelm	the	research	aspects	of	the	project.	Both	testing-out	and	
problem-solving	research	were	based	on	an	existing	theory	or	problem.	in	contrast,	
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exploratory	research	involved	tackling	questions	about	which	very	little	was	already	
known	and	where	the	researcher	would	need	to	begin	from	first	principles	in	establishing	
their	research	concepts,	developing	new	theories	where	appropriate	and	deciding	which	
methods	to	apply	to	investigate	the	subject.	In	terms	of	Phillips	and	Pugh’s	classification,	
this	thesis	can	be	seen	as	an	exploratory	research	project	as	there	was	no	existing	
framework	for	social	cognitive	psychology	research	into	the	UVE	and	no	methodological	
tradition	to	build	upon.	Instead,	early	findings	about	the	UVE	in	disciplines	such	as	
human-computer	interaction	or	robotics	were	used	to	design	a	suite	of	studies,	beginning	
with	collecting	thoughts	and	feeling	about	NHAs	through	to	two	controlled	studies	which	
tested	hypotheses	developed	from	the	results	of	the	qualitative	study.		
2.2.2:	Survey	Research	
'Wherever	we	need	to	know	the	characteristics	of	a	population,	or	its	resources,	or	
its	needs,	or	its	opinions,	the	natural	thing	to	do	is	to	go	out	and	ask	questions.'	
(Sapsford	(2006),	p4)	
This	study	used	surveys	in	Phase	1	to	collect	thoughts	and	feelings	about	NHAs.	This	
was	one	of	several	methods	that	could	have	been	chosen	this	data	collection,	where	it	
may	have	been	equally	valid	to	carry	out	interviews	or	observations	of	participants	
encountering	NHAs.	Sapsford	(2006)	describes	five	questions	for	assessing	whether	a	
survey	is	the	appropriate	method	for	any	research	question,	the	first	of	which	is	whether	
it	is	feasible	to	research	the	topic	at	all,	to	eliminate	topics	with	unanswerable	questions	
or	a	population	that	cannot	be	identified.	The	UVE	certainly	can	be	researched	as	its	
scope	touches	on	many	areas	of	human	enquiry	and	the	effect	is	assumed	to	be	broadly	
applicable	to	the	general	population	so	it	is	possible	to	draw	conclusions	from	the	results	
given	by	a	sample	of	participants.	
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Secondly,	can	survey	research	answer	the	questions	that	need	to	be	asked?	Survey	
questions	are	fundamentally	a	means	of	prompting	participants	appropriately	to	elicit	
useful	responses.	A	survey	would	not	be	appropriate	if	the	topic	could	not	be	formed	into	
discrete	questions	or	if	they	were	too	ambiguous	to	answer	clearly.	The	UVE	had	been	
clearly	described	as	a	phenomenon	in	the	literature	in	such	a	way	as	to	make	it	possible	
to	formulate	questions	about	the	NHAs	thought	to	trigger	the	effect,	and	to	provide	
examples	of	those	agents	as	stimuli	for	participants	to	respond	to.		
Thirdly,	if	it	is	possible	to	ask	questions	about	a	topic,	can	those	answers	provide	valid	
conclusions?	This	condition	requires	the	use	of	appropriate	question	types	to	collect	
measurements	at	a	level	and	granularity	that,	when	analysed	descriptively	or	
inferentially,	are	meaningful	in	terms	of	the	research	question.	Satisfying	this	for	the	UVE	
meant	adopting	some	measurement	scales	that	had	been	used	in	previous	studies	(e.g.	
the	eeriness,	strangeness	and	human-likeness	scales	first	used	by	MacDorman	(2006))	as	
well	as	designing	new	questions	and	measures	(e.g.	the	categorisation	tasks	and	
emotional	expression	ratings	used	in	the	Phase	3	and	the	scenario-based	description	and	
emotion	tasks	used	in	Phase	1).		
Fourth,	Sapsford	(2006)	asked	is	it	ethically	appropriate	to	survey	participants	rather	
than	use	any	other	method?	One	advantage	of	surveys,	particularly	those	completed	
online,	is	that	they	can	be	completed	privately	and	anonymously	but	for	some	topic	areas	
this	distance	may	actually	be	a	disadvantage.	For	example,	if	the	subject	matter	is	
potentially	upsetting	then	a	method	where	the	researcher	has	more	of	a	presence	and	is	
able	to	interact	with	the	participant	might	be	ethically	preferable.	This	aspect	was	
carefully	considered	as	the	potential	to	unsettle	or	unnerve	is	at	the	heart	of	the	UVE	so	
at	least	some	of	the	experimental	stimuli	needed	to	be	capable	of	potentially	causing	
disquiet	in	participants.	This	issue	is	discussed	more	fully	in	Section	2.4:	Ethical	
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Considerations	below	but	it	was	concluded	that	the	risk	of	disquiet	did	not	present	
enough	of	a	threat	to	participant	well-being	to	necessitate	a	face-to-face	presence	for	all	
phases	of	research.	Instead,	several	methods	for	making	contact	with	the	researcher	
were	always	available	for	participants	taking	the	surveys	online.		
Finally,	is	any	type	of	research	ethically	and	politically	appropriate,	given	the	nature	of	
the	research	questions?	This	broad	and	philosophical	question	is	perhaps	most	applicable	
to	applied	research	where	the	conclusions	may	influence	economic	or	social	policies	or	
treatment	decisions.	These	applications	are	unlikely	for	research	into	the	UVE,	where	the	
conclusions	are	likely	to	be	used	to	inform	future	research	into	this	specific	topic	or	
broader	work	on	face	perception	and	potentially	to	be	applied	to	animation	or	computer	
graphics	developments	which	are	unlikely	to	present	an	ethical	or	political	barrier	to	
research	in	this	area.		
It	was	concluded	that	surveys	were	an	appropriate	and	valid	method	for	collecting	
data	on	the	UVE,	supplemented	with	results	from	a	more	controlled	study	to	be	
described	below.		
2.2.3:	Collecting	Data	Online	
With	the	exception	of	a	laptop-based	experiment	in	Phase	2,	all	data	collection	for	the	
present	research	was	collected	online,	mainly	by	directing	volunteer	participants	to	a	web	
page	where	the	studies	were	hosted.	Online	research	methods	are	a	fast	and	effective	
way	to	systematically	present	stimuli	to	large	numbers	of	participants	(potentially	
allowing	many	simultaneous	completions	at	once)	and	collect	their	responses	without	
requiring	any	intervention	from	the	researcher	once	the	study	has	been	designed.	It	is	an	
efficient	method	for	data	collection	at	scale	and	can	be	considerably	more	cost-effective	
compared	to	postal	or	laboratory-based	data	collection.	(After	Hewson	(2003).)		
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Reips’	(2007)	guide	to	carrying	out	online	experiments	identified	eighteen	separate	
benefits	of	conducting	research	in	this	way.	As	well	as	the	efficiency	and	cost-saving	
benefits	noted	above,	another	relevant	benefit	is	that	online	research	is	truly	voluntary	as	
participants	cannot	be	compelled	to	visit	a	particular	website	and	take	part	in	a	piece	of	
research.	Online	research	also	benefits	from	a	reduction	in	demand	characteristics	and	
experimenter	effects	as	the	researcher	is	able	to	essentially	‘step	out	of	the	picture’	after	
the	web	study	has	been	introduced	and	allow	the	participant	to	work	directly	with	the	
stimulus	materials.	One	issue	which	is	often	raised	with	reference	to	online	research	is	
the	extent	to	which	findings	can	be	generalised	to	the	wider	population,	especially	if	a	
simulation	of	real-world	behaviour	is	used	during	the	study.	Reips	cites	Horswill	and	
Coster’s	(2001)	study	of	driver	risk-taking	as	evidence	of	the	generalisability	of	online	
research.	Horswill	and	Coster	found	that	the	mode	of	data	collection	was	not	a	significant	
confounding	factor	and	that	the	results	collected	online	were	as	sensitive	a	measure	of	
risk-taking	behaviour	as	those	collected	using	more	traditional	methods.		
Reips’	guide	gives	a	comprehensive	overview	of	issues	to	be	aware	of	in	online	
research.	Five	of	these	were	identified	for	attention	in	designing	the	present	studies	and	
processing	the	results.	Firstly,	drop-out	or	non-completion	is	a	significant	concern	with	
online	studies	as	participants	can	stop	at	any	point	at	little	cost	to	themselves.	They	may	
lose	interest,	be	interrupted	or	experience	technical	difficulties	and	unless	there	is	a	
compelling	reason	for	them	to	return	and	carry	on,	this	results	in	an	incomplete	response.	
Reips	recommends	techniques	for	addressing	this	such	as	ensuring	that	participants	have	
a	realistic	estimate	of	how	long	the	exercise	will	take	before	they	start,	ensuring	that	
page	loading	times	are	kept	to	a	minimum	to	avoid	boredom	and	frustration	and	ensuring	
that	participants	are	able	to	return	to	complete	the	study	if	they	do	step	out.	These	were	
implemented	in	each	of	the	present	studies.	It	was	also	desirable	to	avoid	any	invalid	
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access	to	the	study	as	if	online	studies	are	included	in	search	engines	it	can	be	possible	
for	them	to	be	‘completed’	by	tools	that	are	attempting	to	index	the	site	content	which	
do	not	make	the	distinction	that	it	is	a	data	collection	page	rather	than	a	standard	web	
page.	This	was	avoided	by	using	software	tools	that	blocked	search	engines	from	
accessing	the	web	pages	which	also	prevented	multiple	submissions	by	the	same	
participant.	Reips	discussed	issues	of	recruitment	in	detail,	exploring	the	benefits	of	
mailing	lists,	participant	panels	and	word-of-mouth	recruitment	and	cautioning	against	
distributing	online	studies	to	acquaintances	or	family.	These	principles	were	followed	in	
the	design	of	all	studies.	Finally,	care	should	still	be	taken	to	ensure	that	no	particular	
demographic	groups	are	overly	represented	or	excluded	from	the	research,	particularly	if	
there	is	a	reason	to	think	that	certain	types	of	participant	may	respond	systematically	
differently.	Hewson	(2003)	recommends	collecting	demographic	details	about	
participants	to	be	able	to	monitor	any	relevant	characteristics.	In	the	present	research,	
gender,	age	and	location	were	identified	as	participant-specific	variables	that	may	
influence	susceptibility	to	the	UVE	either	directly	or	as	a	proxy	for	experience	with	
technology	and	therefore	levels	of	comfort	with	NHAs.	
On	balance,	the	online	method	was	found	to	be	an	effective	way	to	gather	the	data	
that	was	required	for	this	exploration	of	the	UVE.		
2.2.4:	Coding	Qualitative	Data	
Phase	1	included	two	‘imagined	encounter’	tasks	where	participants	were	asked	to	
view	an	image	of	a	face	and	give	their	answers	to	two	open	questions	asking	how	they	
would	describe	it	to	someone	else	and	how	they	would	feel	if	that	face	was	used	for	a	
domestic	robot	living	in	their	home.	An	open	question	approach	was	taken	in	this	
exploratory	phase	to	avoid	biased	or	leading	language	and	to	capture	descriptions	or	
101	
 
emotions	that	might	not	necessarily	fit	within	a	taken-for-granted	taxonomy	of	
uncanniness.	This	approach	was	chosen	to	elicit	detailed	and	rich	responses	from	
participants	in	their	own	words.	These	narrative	comments	needed	to	be	coded	to	learn	
more	about	the	approaches	that	participants	took	to	answering	the	questions,	the	
physical	features	they	chose	to	emphasise	in	the	descriptions	and	the	emotional	
responses	they	reported	at	the	idea	of	sharing	their	home	with	the	NHAs.	Basit’s	(2003)	
review	of	manual	versus	electronic	coding	provided	a	useful	overview	of	techniques	for	
how	coding	frames	can	be	implemented	and	an	electronic	method	was	chosen	as	a	result.	
The	process	of	transforming	these	narrative	comments	into	coded	values	was	informed	
by	Swift’s	(2006)	three	types	of	coding	system;	representational	coding,	anchored	coding	
and	hypothesis-guided	coding.	Each	system	assigns	text	items	to	one	or	more	categories	
but	the	methods	are	subtly	different.	Representational	coding	uses	the	content	of	the	
text	to	decide	whether	it	should	belong	to	a	particular	category	and	is	often	based	on	
keywords	so	if	a	participant	uses	a	key	trigger	word,	the	comment	will	be	categorised	as	
relating	to	that	theme.	Anchored	coding	develops	this	by	only	including	categories	that	
are	directly	relevant	to	that	question	that	had	been	asked	so	that	some	of	the	codes	that	
may	emerge	from	a	representational	coding	could	relate	to	other	questions	in	the	survey	
so	text	referencing	those	would	be	classified	as	‘other’.	Finally,	hypothesis-driven	coding	
uses	the	principles	behind	the	design	of	the	instrument	to	create	a	list	of	relevant	codes	
to	test	each	piece	of	text	against	and	categorise	accordingly.	This	latter	hypothesis-guided	
system	was	used	for	the	imagined	encounter	responses	as	previous	research	on	holistic	
and	analytic	face	processing	informed	the	categorisation	of	features	in	those	terms	and	
the	classic	UV	hypothesis	that	NHFs	may	be	judged	as	eerie	or	unsettling	was	used	to	
design	a	coding	for	positive,	neutral	and	negative	emotion	terms.	Sapsford	(2006)	
observed	the	unscientific	nature	of	this	process	as	the	coding	frame	itself	is	a	subjective	
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product	of	the	researcher’s	concepts	relating	to	the	subject	matter,	and	although	efforts	
were	made	to	ensure	that	the	frame	was	clear	and	unambiguous,	it	is	inevitable	that	
there	is	a	subjective	element	to	deciding	how	to	code	each	phrase.		
2.2.5:	Controlled	Experimental	Study	
Phase	2	and	3	were	designed	as	controlled	experiments,	testing	hypothesises	
generated	from	the	findings	of	Phase	1	and	grounded	in	the	UVE	and	face	perception	
literatures.	A	controlled	experiment	is	defined	in	Clark-Carter’s	(1997)	handbook	of	
quantitative	research	as	a	situation	where:	
'The	experimenter	manipulates	an	aspect	of	the	situation	and	measures	what	are	
presumed	to	be	the	consequences	of	those	manipulations…	It	is	felt	that	the	
properly	designed	experiment	is	the	best	way	to	identify	causal	relationships.	By	
properly	designed,	I	mean	one	in	which	all	those	aspects	of	the	situation	which	may	
be	relevant	are	being	controlled	for	in	some	way.'	(p5)		
Study	4	used	the	FIE	to	investigate	whether	participants	responded	differently	to	
NHFs	compared	to	human	and	non-human	faces	and	to	explore	the	nature	of	that	
difference.	Study	5	explored	whether	mismatched	faces	would	elicit	eeriness,	evoke	
strong	emotion	or	be	difficult	to	identify	or	categorise.	The	experimental	method	was	
chosen	to	ensure	the	external	and	internal	validity	of	the	studies	and	demonstrate	that	
any	differences	in	response	could	be	confidently	attributed	to	the	differences	between	
the	stimulus	images.	Clark-Carter	details	three	threats	to	external	validity	and	twelve	
threats	to	internal	validity	which	should	be	taken	into	account	in	order	to	have	that	level	
of	confidence	in	the	findings.	To	ensure	a	study	is	externally	valid	and	can	be	
meaningfully	generalised	beyond	the	sample	population,	it	is	necessary	to	design	the	
study	in	such	a	way	as	to	control	for	those	particular	aspects	of	the	participants	and	the	
task	that	could	introduce	bias	into	the	results.	It	is	assumed	that	the	UVE	is	a	
phenomenon	that	should	be	broadly	found	in	the	general	population	so	it	was	important	
103	
 
to	ensure	that	the	participants	did	not	over-represent	any	particularly	demographic	group	
and	this	was	achieved	both	Study	4	and	5	by	randomly	allocating	participants	to	
experimental	groups.	In	terms	of	the	tasks	themselves	itself,	Clark-Carter	suggests	
ensuring	that	design	choices	on	aspects	such	as	length	of	presentation	and	image	type	
are	considered	for	their	ecological	validity	so	that	as	far	as	possible,	they	should	replicate	
experiences	that	participants	may	come	across	outside	an	experimental	setting.	This	was	
accommodated	by	ensuring	that	the	images	were	high-definition	where	possible	and	
presented	in	colour.	
	Several	of	the	cited	threats	to	internal	validity	(maturation/selection	by	maturation,	
mortality,	imitation,	compensation,	compensatory	rivalry,	demoralisation,	regression	to	
the	mean)	were	not	relevant	to	the	present	as	they	refer	to	methods	where	participants	
are	involved	over	a	longer	period	of	time	rather	than	single	session,	or	where	participants	
are	aware	of	the	tasks	experienced	by	other	groups.	Four	threats	were	applicable	and	
controlled	for;	biases	of	selection;	history;	instrumentation;	and	testing.	To	control	for	
selection	bias,	participants	were	randomly	allocated	to	one	the	conditions	in	each	study	
either	a	random	number	generation	process	was	used	to	produce	a	non-repeating	
sequence	which	allocated	participants	to	their	condition	(Study	4)	or	by	a	system-
generated	random	routing	(Study	5).	History	bias	refers	to	experiences	that	the	
participants	may	have	had	before	their	participation	that	could	influence	their	responses	
in	a	systematic	fashion.	In	the	case	of	this	UVE	study,	a	relevant	historical	concern	would	
have	been	prior	participation	in	one	of	the	earlier	studies.	Participants	were	asked	at	the	
recruitment	stage	whether	they	had	taken	part	in	any	of	the	earlier	studies,	and	excluded	
if	they	had.	In	Study	4,	instrumentation	bias	was	controlled	for	by	using	the	same	
equipment	for	each	test	to	ensure	that	the	on-screen	presentation	was	the	same	for	each	
participant	and	the	hardware	was	identical	for	every	trial.	Finally,	testing	bias	or	the	
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effects	of	practice	and	fatigue	were	controlled	by	the	randomisation	of	the	order	of	trials	
within	the	experiments	to	ensure	that	they	were	counterbalanced	across	the	whole	
participant	population.		
It	is	therefore	felt	that	this	application	of	the	experimental	method	was	appropriate	
and	well	controlled,	and	the	results	can	be	used	to	draw	conclusions	as	to	the	nature	of	
participant	responses	to	faces	varying	in	human-likeness.		
2.3:	Methodological	Issues	Pertaining	to	the	Uncanny	Valley	
2.3.1:	The	Circularity	Problem	
An	empirical	test	of	whether	the	response	patterns	described	in	Mori’s	(1970)	thought	
experiment	actually	do	occur	in	a	controlled	setting	should	be	at	the	heart	of	all	research	
into	the	UVE.	Is	it	possible	to	demonstrate	the	presence	of	that	particular	non-linear	
relationship	between	levels	of	human-likeness	and	emotional	response?	If	the	
relationship	can	be	demonstrated	then	it	becomes	meaningful	to	look	for	possible	causes	
for	its	occurrence	and	to	consider	the	characteristics	of	the	entities	at	the	crucial	almost-
but-not-quite	human	point.	If	no	relationship	occurs,	then	the	idea	of	the	UVE	cannot	be	
supported	empirically	and	alternative	explanations	for	the	‘gut	instinct’	reaction	to	NHAs	
should	be	sought.	At	face	value	it	seems	as	though	it	should	be	a	trivial	matter	to	test	the	
principles	of	the	thought	experiment	by	collecting	examples	of	different	NHAs	and	asking	
people	how	eerie	they	appear.	This	formed	a	core	of	early	research	in	this	area.	However,	
the	present	research	will	argue	that	there	is	a	serious	flaw	in	this	approach	as	there	is	a	
risk	of	a	circular	argument	in	establishing	this	basic	principle	in	that	certain	NHAs	are	
judged	as	eerie	because	they	fall	into	the	UV	(i.e.	they	appear	clearly	near-human	rather	
than	human	or	artificial),	and	they	are	considered	as	examples	of	‘things	that	must	belong	
to	the	UV’	because	they	look	eerie.	The	circular	argument	means	it	is	impossible	to	move	
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beyond	that	self-perpetuating	tautology	and	does	not	aid	the	understanding	of	those	
NHAs	or	the	response	they	provoke.		
2.3.2:	Operationalising	the	UV	graph	
It	could	be	argued	that	there	is	bound	to	be	a	circularity	risk	in	attempting	to	replicate	
a	relationship	sketched	as	a	graph	where	the	scales	are	unlabelled	and	unquantified	and	
the	points	are	illustrated	by	examples	with	no	indication	of	the	magnitude	of	the	
difference	between	them.	For	example,	a	zombie	is	plotted	as	less	familiar	than	a	corpse,	
but	without	a	labelled	scale,	how	much	less	familiar	is	it?	And	why	would	negative	
familiarity	necessarily	result	in	a	sense	of	eeriness?	Empirically	testing	the	UVE	calls	for	
aspects	of	the	original	graph	to	be	defined	in	more	detail	and	this	research	argues	that	
there	are	three	components	that	need	to	be	operationalised	when	attempting	to	design	a	
study	testing	whether	the	UVE	exists.	Considering	these	will	avoid	the	circularity	problem	
and	allow	confidence	that	any	findings	are	a	valid	and	fair	test	of	the	UVE.	Firstly,	the	
human-likeness	of	the	stimuli	should	be	quantified	either	when	they	are	generated	or	by	
independent	ratings.	It	is	important	to	not	just	to	know	that	an	agent	is	near-human	but	
to	be	able	to	say	empirically	how	human-like	it	is.	Secondly,	examples	of	human	and	non-
human	stimuli	should	be	evaluated	along	with	any	NHAs.	This	would	act	as	an	anchoring	
measure	to	ensure	that	any	evaluations	are	making	use	of	a	full	scale	of	human-likeness	
rather	than	risking	ratings	grouping	towards	the	human	end	of	the	scale.	This	could	give	
misleading	results	and	potentially	magnify	very	small	differences.	Finally,	consideration	
should	be	given	to	the	emotional	response	that	is	measured	when	human-likeness	is	
varied.	It	may	be	easy	to	find	a	‘valley’-type	pattern	as	a	response	to	varying	human-
likeness	but	to	truly	explore	whether	this	is	an	uncanny	valley,	the	emotional	dimension	
needs	to	be	explored.	These	considerations	will	now	be	discussed	in	detail.		
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2.3.2.1	Methods	of	systematically	varying	human-likeness	and	ensuring	valid	
anchoring.	
Human-likeness	can	be	systematically	varied	in	several	ways	but	two	will	be	
considered	here,	morphing	techniques	and	image	manipulation.	Firstly,	in	terms	of	
morphing,	identifying	or	generating	stimuli	that	can	be	used	in	studying	the	UVE	is	a	
challenge	in	this	area.	The	approach	of	selecting	a	bank	of	images	or	videos	of	existing	
androids,	zombies,	robots	or	computer	game	characters	has	been	used	in	several	studies	
(e.g.	Ho	et	al,	2008;	MacDorman,	2006;	Tinwell	et	al,	2009)	but	given	the	twin	issues	of	
circularity	and	subjectivity	this	may	be	a	risky	strategy.	Methods	for	systematically	varying	
the	human-likeness	of	an	agent	are	preferable	as	it	would	always	be	possible	to	be	sure	
where	on	the	human-likeness	axis	each	example	could	be	located.	One	method	of	
achieving	this	is	to	use	computer	software	to	‘morph’	between	an	image	of	a	human	and	
a	non-human	face	in	a	series	of	gradual	steps.	While	it	is	possible	to	morph	between	a	
whole-body	image,	faces	are	the	area	of	interest	for	the	present	study.	The	features	of	
the	starting	face	are	gradually	blended	into	the	target	face	until	all	the	original	features	
have	been	replaced	by	the	final	image.	It	is	possible	to	extract	images	at	defined	points	
during	the	blending	process	and	these	would	consistently	give	a	stimulus	that	was	X%	
human	/	Y%	non-human.	In	this	way,	it	is	possible	to	say	with	confidence	that	each	
stimulus	occupies	a	certain	place	on	the	X-axis	of	the	UVE	graph	which	would	then	allow	
the	plotting	of	a	response	variable	against	that	human-likeness	value.	This	method	also	
ensures	that	the	set	of	stimuli	for	any	human	/	non-human	pair	will	always	have	an	
anchor	in	their	start	and	end	images	which	can	then	be	included	in	the	experiment	to	
ensure	that	comparisons	are	validly	drawn	across	the	whole	of	the	human-likeness	scale.		
Recent	technological	advances	in	computer	graphics	technology	have	made	morphing	
a	fast	and	easy	process	to	use	to	create	stimuli	.	However,	the	initial	choice	of	matched	
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human	to	non-human	image	is	key	to	the	success	of	any	pair	of	images.	It	is	important	
that	the	human	and	non-human	images	are	carefully	chosen	and	well	matched	for	
aspects	such	as	skin	tone,	gaze,	face	shape	and	rough	shapes/sizes	of	internal	features.	
This	is	to	ensure	that	any	sudden	and	jarring	transitions	during	the	blend	are	avoided	as	
the	morphing	algorithms	can	cope	well	with	small	changes	but	making	large	transitions	
between	faces	posing	different	expressions	or	looking	in	different	directions	can	cause	
the	introduction	of	‘artefacts’	-	shadows	or	lines	on	the	face	that	did	not	appear	in	either	
starting	or	end	image	but	which	are	created	in	an	attempt	to	elide	from	one	to	the	other.	
Morphing	has	been	a	popular	technique	for	explorations	of	the	UVE	and	has	been	used	by	
Hanson	et	al,	(2005)	Green	et	al,	(2008)	and	Cheetham	et	al	(2013)	and	with	carefully	
chosen	start	and	end	images	it	can	be	a	valuable	method	for	systematically	creating	near-
human	stimuli	that	also	have	a	relevant	human	and	non-human	anchor	for	comparison.		
Secondly,	image	manipulation	will	be	considered.	While	morphing	offers	fine	control	
of	the	dimension	of	human-likeness,	there	are	types	of	stimuli	that	need	to	be	created	
which	require	different	techniques.	In	Phase	3	of	this	research,	it	was	necessary	to	create	
modified	human	faces	which	blended	different	expressions	within	a	single	face.	For	
example,	a	smiling	and	happy	face	was	modified	so	that	the	expression	shown	in	the	eye	
region	was	actually	angry,	sad,	fearful	or	disgusted.	This	was	achieved	using	a	graphics	
package	to	carefully	isolate	the	eye	region	in	the	second	face	and	paste	it	onto	the	first	
face.	The	edges	of	the	pasted	eye	area	were	smoothed	into	the	base	face	to	ensure	that	
the	blended	face	looked	realistic.	These	faces	were	used	to	test	hypotheses	about	
perceptions	of	emotional	expression	and	the	role	of	mismatched	expressions	in	triggering	
the	UVE.	Image	manipulation	techniques	have	been	used	within	the	UVE	literature	
previously	as	Seyama	and	Nagayama	(2009)	used	manipulation	of	individual	features	to	
create	faces	where	the	eyes	were	exaggerated	in	size.	Tinwell	et	al	(2010)	manipulated	
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video	footage	of	facial	expressions	to	create	modified	faces	which	did	not	display	any	
expression	in	the	upper	part	of	the	face.	In	both	instances,	and	with	the	present	research,	
the	manipulation	allowed	the	creation	of	‘impossible’	faces	that	could	not	be	experienced	
in	nature	and	so	were	useful	for	isolating	and	testing	specific	aspects	of	faces	that	may	
contribute	to	the	UVE.		
2.3.2.2	Issues	of	Measurement.	
The	question	of	what	should	be	measured	and	which	emotions	characterise	the	UVE	
is	key	to	a	valid	exploration	of	the	effect.	Ziemke	and	Lindblom	(2006)	posed	an	initial	
broad	question	on	this	topic	by	asking	whether	it	was	possible	to	compare	a	response	to	
an	android	to	a	response	to	a	human	and	wondered	what	would	constitute	a	just	
noticeable	difference	between	the	two.	There	was	a	particular	challenge	to	overcome	as	
it	may	be	that	the	mechanisms	which	dictate	how	we	respond	to	androids	may	not	even	
be	available	to	conscious	introspection.	Mauss	and	Robinson’s	(2009)	meta-analysis	
review	of	studies	measuring	emotion	concluded	that	it	was	valid	to	ask	for	self-reports	of	
emotion,	especially	if	this	was	in	direct	response	to	a	current	stimuli.	Recall	of	past	
emotions	was	seen	as	being	more	problematic.	Mauss	and	Robinson	also	questioned	
whether	it	was	most	productive	to	conceptualise	emotions	as	dimensions	or	discrete	
states	for	the	purposes	of	measurement.	Dimensions	of	emotion	aggregate	measures	of	
the	levels	of	several	underlying	factors	which	Mauss	and	Robinson	suggested	could	
include	valence,	arousal	and	motivational	state.	The	emotional	state	of	fear	would	
therefore	be	a	negative,	high-arousal	state	with	an	avoidance	motivation.	The	discrete	
state	theory	does	not	see	emotions	as	combinations	of	points	on	different	continua	but	
defines	them	as	unique	entities	with	their	own	specific	behavioural,	physiological	and	
subjective	properties.	Through	their	review,	Mauss	and	Robinson	concluded	that	
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dimensions	of	emotion	had	better	explanatory	power	for	measuring	emotions	and	their	
recommendation	was	that	they	represented	a	better	approach	than	discrete	emotions.	It	
is	therefore	valid	to	take	a	scale-based	approach	to	the	measurement	of	emotions	and	
this	was	implemented	in	the	present	research	where	participants	were	asked	not	only	
which	emotion	they	were	experiencing	when	looking	at	the	NHFs,	but	how	strongly	they	
experienced	it	at	that	moment	in	time.		
These	considerations	of	emotional	measurement	should	be	put	in	the	context	of	the	
labels	and	interpretation	of	the	original	UVE	graph	where	the	Y-axis	was	simply	labelled	
as	displaying	positive	and	negative	‘familiarity’,	the	English	label	for	the	original	Japanese	
shinwa-kan.	There	has	been	considerable	discussion	in	the	literature	as	to	how	this	can	
best	be	interpreted.	Bartneck	et	al	(2007)	reviewed	the	original	translation	and	suggested	
that	a	better	term	for	a	Western	readership	would	have	been	‘liveability’	or	how	
comfortable	people	would	feel	living	with	the	agent	in	question	and	this	was	a	term	that	
informed	the	development	of	the	imagined	encounter	scenarios	in	the	first	phase	of	this	
research.	The	most	recent	translation	of	Mori’s	original	article	(2012)	suggests	that	
‘affinity’	may	be	the	most	accurate	word	to	describe	the	intended	scale	and	negative	
affinity	is	more	easily	understood	as	having	unsettling	or	eerie	components	than	negative	
familiarity.		
Ho	et	al	(2008)	explored	the	emotions	that	were	associated	with	negative	perceptions	
of	near-human	robots.	Participants	viewed	videos	of	robots	(plus	a	human	anchor)	and	
indicated	the	extent	to	which	they	agreed	with	statements	of	the	nature	'The	figure	
makes	me	feel…',	completed	with	one	of	27	emotions.	There	were	four	groups	of	
emotion	terms:	negative	terms	for	how	the	figure	may	be	perceived,	(e.g.	‘nauseated’	
and	‘resentful’);	positive	experiential	terms,	(e.g.	‘happy’	and	‘attracted’);	negative	terms	
for	how	the	figure	made	participants	feel	(e.g.	‘sad’,	‘loneliness’);	and	neutral	terms	
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relating	to	surprise	or	confusion.	As	well	as	those	general	emotions,	(Ho	et	al.,	2008)	also	
measured	the	UVE-specific	terms	of	eeriness,	creepiness,	strangeness	and	human-
likeness	using	statements	of	the	form	‘the	figure	looks	…'.	The	agreement	with	the	
emotion	statements	were	analysed	along	with	the	UVE	attributes	and	it	was	concluded	
that	eeriness	and	creepiness	were	the	best	terms	in	describing	how	participants	
responded	to	the	‘uncanny’	robots.	They	found	that	there	was	a	strong	association	
between	‘eerie’,	‘creepy’	and	‘fear’,	as	well	as	‘shocked’,	‘disgusted’,	and	‘nervous’	and	a	
weaker	association	with	the	term	‘strange’.	This	provides	support	for	the	idea	that	the	
familiarity-strangeness	measurement	derived	from	the	original	graph	is	only	capturing	
part	of	the	response	to	the	UVE	and	that	it	is	always	important	to	evaluate	eeriness	
alongside	any	emotion	terms	that	are	explored.	Ho	et	al's	(2008)	findings	were	
incorporated	into	the	analysis	of	the	exploratory	phase	of	the	present	project	and	provide	
a	useful	framework	for	evaluating	those	responses.		
The	current	research	presented	in	this	thesis	has	been	designed	as	a	systematic	
exploration	of	NHAs	created	using	systematic	techniques	to	represent	carefully	controlled	
points	on	the	dimension	of	human-likeness.	It	measures	emotion	and	eeriness	and	as	
such	explores	not	only	whether	there	is	a	valley	in	emotional	responses	but	also	the	
extent	to	which	it	can	be	considered	uncanny.	In	this	way,	it	represents	an	empirical	test	
of	the	UVE,	uses	qualitative	and	quantitative	responses	to	explore	the	emotions	that	
typify	a	response	to	NHAs	and	also	explores	the	characteristics	of	those	NHAs	which	
participants	found	to	be	unsettling	and	eerie.		
2.3.3:	Near-humans	as	research	stimuli	
The	final	methodological	aspect	relating	specifically	to	studies	of	the	UVE	is	the	issue	
of	near-humans	as	research	stimuli,	and	specifically	the	use	of	static	pictures	of	NHFs.	
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This	section	will	consider	two	issues,	the	use	of	static	images	over	videos	or	embodied	
examples	and	the	novelty	of	stimulus	images	within	a	study.		
2.3.3.1	Photographs,	video	and	embodied	stimuli	
The	present	research	uses	static	images	as	the	stimuli	for	all	studies.	Animation	and	
video	were	considered	as	alternatives	as	they	have	a	precedent	in	previous	studies	(e.g.	
Pollick	(2001),	MacDorman	(2006),	Chaminade	et	al	(2007),	Tinwell	et	al	(2013))	and	there	
is	a	theoretical	argument	based	on	Mori’s	original	(1970)	graph	that	motion	exacerbates	
the	steepness	of	the	UV	curve	which	could	only	be	validated	using	moving	stimuli	rather	
than	still	images.	Embodied	stimuli	were	also	considered	and	Gee	et	al	(2005)	suggest	
that	studies	examining	reactions	to	prosthetics	(limbs	or	partial	limbs)	would	be	of	
interest	as	embodied	examples	of	stimuli	which	share	many	characteristics	with	their	real	
counterpart,	but	are	still	tangibly	different.	Some	case	study	research	into	the	UV	has	
been	carried	out	with	actual	androids,	such	as	Ishiguro	(2005),	and	Becker-Asano	et	al	
(2010)	but	these	were	small	scale	explorations	and	hard	to	generalise.	These	embodied	
stimuli	do	add	more	information	to	the	perceived	object	used	in	research	studies	but	it	is	
this	complexity	which	might	actually	present	a	problem	for	analysis	as	it	would	have	been	
harder	to	isolate	individual	features	for	scrutiny	and	draw	direct	conclusions	from	the	
findings.	Ziemke	and	Lindblom	(2006)	make	a	strong	argument	that,	in	evaluating	a	whole	
embodied	android,	you	are	in	effect	evaluating	a	large	number	of	subsystems	of	that	
android	rather	than	any	one	single	component	so	if	just	one	of	those	was	the	component	
responsible	for	the	near-human	sense	of	eeriness,	not	only	would	it	be	difficult	to	isolate	
which	was	responsible	but	it	might	lead	to	erroneously	concluding	that	the	android	as	a	
whole	was	causing	eeriness	when	only	one	sub-system	had	those	qualities.	The	decision	
to	use	static	images	over	video	or	working	with	embodied	agents	was	made	for	reasons	
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of	parsimony	as	well	as	empirical	clarity	as	it	is	more	complex	to	produce	or	manipulate	
video	or	to	access	androids	than	it	is	to	work	with	still	images.	
2.3.3.2	Novelty	of	stimuli	
A	final	issue	of	design	with	regard	to	near-humans	as	research	stimuli	relates	to	how	
images	are	presented	to	participants	during	a	research	trial	and	considers	whether	
participants	should	view	each	image	once	or	repeatedly	during	their	participation	in	the	
study.	Some	of	the	more	recent	studies	(Creed	and	Beale,	2008;	Tinwell	et	al,	2013)	
presented	participants	with	the	same	stimuli	more	than	once	during	data	collection.	
Using	multiple	presentations	of	the	same	face	also	poses	a	problem	in	evaluating	
‘familiarity’,	and	indeed	familiarity	could	easily	impact	on	an	emotional	response	to	a	
face.	In	addition,	avoiding	repeated	exposure	to	the	same	facial	stimuli	is	a	key	element	
of	psychological	studies	of	face	perception,	other	than	where	a	repeated	exposure	is	the	
subject	of	the	research.	The	present	research	has,	therefore,	avoided	this	in	the	
experimental	studies	to	ensure	that	participants	are	not	making	relative	judgments	
between	the	different	presentations	of	the	faces	and	instead	are	rating	each	one	
independently	based	on	its	individual	attributes.		
2.4	Ethical	Considerations	
2.4.1:	Ethical	Clearance	
The	studies	reported	in	this	thesis	were	approved	by	the	Open	University’s	Human	
Research	Ethics	Committee,	under	references	#592	and	#878.	The	studies	were	carried	
out	using	the	British	Psychological	Society’s	Code	of	Ethics	for	Human	Research	as	a	
guiding	framework	(Reeves,	2011)	and	were	judged	as	presenting	a	very	low	risk	to	
participants,	especially	during	the	web-based	studies	where	the	experiment	was	taking	
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place	at	a	distance	and	there	was	no	direct	presence	influencing	participation.	This	
section	will	detail	the	ethical	issues	that	were	considered	in	designing	the	present	
research,	both	in	terms	of	general	issues	relevant	to	all	psychological	research	with	
human	participants	and	some	specific	points	for	consideration	due	to	the	nature	of	the	
UV	and	the	materials	that	are	used	in	its	exploration.		
2.4.2:	General	Considerations	
The	studies	in	this	research	thesis	were	designed	to	meet	current	high	standards	for	
ethical	good	practice.	This	section	will	detail	the	measures	that	were	taken	to	ensure	the	
ethical	treatment	of	participants	from	recruitment	through	to	participation	and	
debriefing.		
Firstly,	all	participants	were	recruited	as	volunteers.	There	was	no	compulsion	for	any	
individual	to	take	part	in	any	of	the	studies	and	similarly,	no	interested	volunteers	were	
denied	the	opportunity	to	take	part.	Participants	were	informed	at	the	recruitment	stage	
that	all	research	data	were	to	be	held	confidentiality	and	securely.	Confidentiality	was	
maintained	as	no	uniquely	identifying	information	was	stored	with	the	experimental	
response	data,	ensuring	that	it	would	not	be	possible	to	identify	a	respondent	from	the	
answers	they	provided	to	the	research	instruments.	The	web-based	studies	did	include	
the	facility	to	leave	an	email	address	to	join	a	mailing	list	and	receive	a	report	of	the	final	
results	of	each	study	but	these	were	separated	from	the	responses	to	the	survey	after	the	
results	had	been	downloaded.	Data	security	was	managed	by	storing	all	research	
materials	on	a	secure	server	which	was	encrypted	using	a	strong	password	and	could	only	
be	accessed	by	the	researcher.		
Returning	to	the	recruitment	of	participants,	a	detailed	introduction	to	each	study	
was	provided	to	ensure	that	the	broad	purpose,	scope	and	plans	for	using	participant	
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data	were	clear	and	to	provide	participants	with	the	relevant	information	they	needed	to	
be	able	to	make	an	informed	decision	to	take	part.	The	details	of	the	specific	research	
aims	and	subtleties	of	how	participants	were	routed	through	each	study	were	not	
described	in	the	introduction	but	were	included	in	the	debriefing	at	the	end.	Participants	
were	advised	that	their	participation	remained	voluntary	all	through	the	progress	of	the	
study	and	they	were	able	to	withdraw	at	any	stage	and	have	any	data	they	had	provided	
up	to	that	point	deleted	by	contacting	the	researcher.	No	participants	chose	to	do	this.	
Withdrawal	was	possible	in	the	web	studies	simply	by	not	completing	all	of	the	questions	
and	there	was	also	no	penalty	for	not	completing	the	questions	or	for	simply	clicking	
through	them	to	the	end.		
Secondly,	it	was	important	to	ensure	that	participants	had	a	clear	route	for	contacting	
the	researcher	with	queries	before,	during	and	after	the	studies.	With	the	web-based	
studies	participants	were	able	to	make	contact	by	email,	telephone	or	Internet	telephony	
from	the	initial	launch	of	the	study	all	the	way	through	to	the	eventual	end	of	the	overall	
data	collection	phase.	Support	for	the	face-to-face	study	included	conversations	prior	to	
participation	as	well	as	support	by	email	after	the	sessions	had	taken	place.	This	support	
was	in	place	in	case	of	questions	about	data	handling,	confidentiality	and	data	usage	as	
well	as	any	concerns	that	the	participants	had	as	a	result	of	their	experience	working	with	
the	stimulus	materials.	No	adverse	reactions	or	events	were	recorded	and	the	contact	
strategy	had	an	unexpected	positive	outcome	in	that	some	participants	continued	to	
make	use	of	the	contact	channels	to	share	anecdotes	or	experiences	relating	to	the	UVE	
several	years	after	they	had	been	involved	in	the	studies.		
Thirdly,	each	study	closed	with	a	detailed	debriefing	step	which	explained	the	
research	aims	in	the	context	of	the	UVE	and	detailed	how	the	responses	provided	by	each	
participant	would	be	used	in	aiding	understanding	of	this	phenomenon.	Where	
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participants	had	been	randomly	allocated	to	a	particular	experimental	or	control	group	
this	was	explained.	Participants	were	also	given	the	opportunity	to	keep	in	touch	for	final	
dissemination	of	the	eventual	results.	In	this	way,	participants’	last	experience	of	the	
experimental	setting	was	a	positive	one,	hopefully	leaving	them	with	a	good	impression	
of	this	project	in	particular	and	psychological	research	in	general.		
2.4.3:	UVE-Specific	Considerations	
The	considerations	above	are	standard	to	general	psychological	research	and	were	
built	into	the	research	studies	as	implementations	of	general	good	practice.	However,	the	
specific	nature	of	this	research	project	meant	that	there	were	some	areas	where	special	
consideration	needed	to	be	given	to	how	to	handle	potentially	challenging	ethical	issues.	
These	will	now	be	described	and	the	steps	taken	to	address	them	detailed.		
Firstly,	any	exploration	of	the	UVE	has	the	risk	that	at	least	some	of	the	stimulus	
materials	must	have	the	potential	to	unsettle	or	disturb.	If	there	was	no	possibility	of	the	
images	seeming	uncanny	then	they	would	not	be	valid	for	an	exploration	of	the	effect.	
The	UVE	is	a	subtle	effect	rather	than	one	causing	overwhelming	fear	or	horror	so	the	
materials	would	never	be	shocking	or	terrifying,	but	some	of	the	faces	were	certainly	
subtly	disturbing	and	had	the	potential	to	elicit	anxiety	and	nervousness	in	participants.	
This	is	an	issue	which	will	be	faced	by	any	research	into	this	area	and	the	general	
approach	has	been	to	ensure	that	although	this	small	risk	exists,	participants	should	not	
be	exposed	to	anything	more	distressing	than	they	might	encounter	in	day	to	day	activity	
involving	NHAs.	Stimuli	should	be	no	more	distressing	than	witnessing	a	computer	game	
character,	android	or	CG	avatar.	This	rule	of	thumb	combined	with	a	support	strategy	to	
ensure	that	participants	had	a	means	of	making	contact	with	the	researcher	in	the	event	
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of	any	distress	was	deemed	to	be	an	acceptable	risk	management	strategy	when	applying	
for	ethical	approval.		
Secondly,	while	participants	were	not	deceived	as	to	the	overall	direction	of	the	
research,	the	specific	details	of	how	the	stimuli	they	had	encountered	had	been	
manipulated	to	vary	their	human-likeness	and	how	this	aided	research	into	the	UVE	were	
not	revealed	until	after	they	had	taken	part.	This	was	to	avoid	any	chance	that	
participants	might	skew	their	answers	to	either	support	or	contradict	the	UV	theory	if	
they	were	aware	of	the	specific	purpose.	This	is	not	an	issue	unique	to	the	UVE	and	it	is	
generally	felt	that	as	long	as	participants	are	debriefed	as	soon	as	possible	after	their	
participation	and	are	given	a	clear	route	for	contacting	the	researcher	if	they	have	any	
further	queries	then	this	withholding	of	the	full	detail	of	the	purpose	of	the	study	is	
acceptable	practice.	In	the	present	study,	debriefing	took	place	either	as	soon	as	the	last	
question	had	been	answered	for	the	online	studies	or	when	the	task	had	been	completed	
for	the	face-to-face	experiment.		
Thirdly,	the	face-to-face	study	in	Phase	2	should	be	considered	for	the	presence	of	
demand	characteristics	as	in	this	case,	the	researcher	was	present	while	the	study	was	
being	carried	out.	This	carries	the	risk	that	participants	may	feel	pressured	to	perform	
‘correctly’,	or	more	quickly	than	they	would	otherwise	feel	comfortable	doing	if	they	
were	not	being	observed.	This	was	managed	in	those	sessions	by	reassuring	participants	
that	while	they	were	encouraged	to	respond	as	quickly	as	they	felt	able	to	do,	they	were	
not	being	personally	judged	on	the	speed	or	accuracy	of	their	responses	and	that	their	
individual	times	would	be	anonymised	before	being	compared	with	any	other	responses.		
In	conclusion,	it	is	felt	that	the	methods	taken	to	address	these	considerations	were	
effective	and	that	this	research	was	carried	out	in	an	ethically	sound	manner,	ensuring	
that	no	harm	came	to	any	participants	as	a	result	of	their	contributions.		 	
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Chapter	3:	Phase	1:	Exploring	The	Valley	
3.1:	Introduction	to	Phase	1	
The	first	phase	of	research	for	this	thesis	was	set	in	the	context	immediately	following	
the	Views	of	the	Uncanny	Valley	workshop	and	Interaction	Studies	special	edition	and	
develops	Pollick’s	(2005)	conclusion	that	at	that	stage	the	UV	was	a	descriptive	rather	
than	predictive	term.	To	move	beyond	this	and	investigate	the	valley	fully,	it	was	
suggested	that	both	axes	of	the	graph	needed	to	be	better	understood.	Pollick	suggested	
that	attention	should	be	focused	particularly	on	the	dimension	of	'familiarity'	as	the	
nature	of	the	emotional	response	in	the	UVE	required	greater	definition.	The	position	at	
the	close	of	the	special	edition	appeared	to	be	that	the	UVE	had	been	established	as	a	
novel	area	for	scientific	enquiry	with	considerable	interest	in	detailing	the	nature	of	the	
effect	itself	and	establishing	what	was	responsible	for	causing	it.	While	the	eerie,	
unsettling,	and	aversive	nature	of	the	UV	had	been	described	in	colourful	terms,	there	
was	no	detailed	mapping	of	that	emotional	component,	or	a	consideration	of	whether	it	
was	a	novel	elicitation	of	familiar	components	from	fear	or	disgust,	or	a	specific	emotion	
only	elicited	by	NHAs.	Further	research	was	clearly	required	and	several	approaches	had	
been	suggested	for	how	these	enquiries	could	be	carried	out	but	this	thesis	will	argue	
that	empirical	evidence	at	the	time	was	limited	with	none	of	the	studies	published	at	that	
time	adequately	defining	both	human-likeness	and	emotional	response	and	as	a	result,	
there	was	a	clear	gap	in	the	understanding	of	both	the	emotions	that	were	involved	in	the	
UVE	and	the	properties	of	the	agents	that	could	cause	it	to	occur.		
Mori’s	(1970)	proposal	suggested	a	specific	pattern	of	emotional	reactions	when	
encountering	agents	increasing	in	human-likeness.	His	graph	presented	the	path	that	he	
believed	this	pattern	would	describe	and	provided	examples	of	agents	that	he	saw	as	
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illustrative	of	certain	points	along	the	path.	The	UV	concept	only	holds	true	if	the	
conjectured	graph	can	be	reproduced	from	a	real-world	dataset	by	plotting	the	positions	
of	the	illustrative	agents	using	data	points	gathered	from	collecting	measurements	of	
certain	key	variables.	A	study	resulting	in	such	a	dataset	could	be	designed	by	identifying	
a	quality	or	a	behaviour	of	a	NHA	that	appears	to	contribute	to	the	UVE.	That	specific	
quality	or	behaviour	would	be	the	object	of	the	investigation	but	to	ensure	rigour	in	the	
translation	process	of	mapping	the	idealised	UV	graph	in	real-world	data,	certain	criteria	
would	need	to	be	set	for	how	data	were	collected	about	those	qualities.		
MacDorman	(2006)	reported	a	study	where	ratings	were	collected	for	several	video	
clips	of	NHAs	to	explore	the	relationship	between	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	
eeriness.	While	this	study	did	not	set	out	to	offer	an	explanation	for	the	UVE,	it	started	to	
set	out	parameters	for	considering	how	to	collect	data	about	the	UVE	as	this	was	the	first	
study	to	propose	specific	scales	for	measuring	those	qualities.		
A	critical	reading	of	the	literature	that	had	attempted	to	comment	on	or	explain	the	
UVE	concluded	that	no	studies	were	ably	capturing	all	of	the	elements	of	the	complex	
problem	inherent	in	researching	the	UVE.	The	‘common	sense’	idea	that	near	human-
likeness	would	inevitably	provoke	an	eerie	response	appeared	to	dominate	the	design	of	
the	research	studies.	It	was	felt	that	this	was	only	able	to	represent	part	of	the	overall	
relationship	between	perceptions	of	human-likeness,	eeriness,	and	some	measured	
emotional	response.	To	address	this	gap,	the	items	in	Table	1	below	are	proposed	as	
principles	for	any	future	studies	attempting	to	draw	conclusions	about	the	nature	or	
cause	of	the	UVE.	
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1)	A	range	of	stimuli	should	be	examined,	as	it	is	not	possible	to	draw	conclusions	
about	a	continuum	of	human-likeness	when	only	two	illustrative	points	are	being	
compared	or	when	the	continuum	does	not	include	a	human	anchor	or	control.	
2)	To	emulate	the	graph’s	X	axis,	the	human-likeness	of	the	stimuli	displaying	the	
identified	quality	should	be	controlled	or	measurable.	Control	would	involve	the	
selection	of	stimuli	that	vary	in	their	human-likeness	in	a	systematic	way	(e.g.	CG	
agents	or	morphs	between	human	and	non-human	agents)	but	if	this	is	not	possible,	
the	stimuli	should	be	independently	rated	to	measure	their	subjective	human-likeness.	
Without	a	measure	of	the	human-likeness	of	the	stimuli,	a	study	risks	being	an	
arbitrary	inventory	of	the	qualities	of	NHAs.		
3)	The	Y	axis	of	the	graph,	labelled	as	'familiarity',	represents	an	emotional	response	or	
reaction.	This	is	not	as	clear-cut	as	the	human-likeness	dimension	as	there	are	many	
different	interpretations	of	what	could	be	meant	by	this	axis.	Therefore,	an	effective	
study	of	the	UVE	should	clearly	identify	the	emotion	that	is	being	measured	for	this	
aspect.	To	ensure	psychological	validity,	response	scales	that	are	used	to	measure	this	
aspect	should	be	grounded	in	established	psychological	evidence	relating	to	human	
emotions.	
4)	When	the	two	measurements	of	human-likeness	and	emotional	response	are	
plotted	against	each	other,	the	path	described	by	the	response	measurement	should	
display	a	clear	dip	or	deviation	from	a	linear	path,	occurring	between	50%	and	100%	on	
the	human-likeness	axis.		
5)	Alongside	the	measurements	of	human-likeness	and	emotional	reaction,	a	specific	
rating	of	eeriness	should	also	be	collected	for	each	of	the	stimuli.	There	are	two	
reasons	for	this.	Firstly,	without	it,	any	observed	valley	could	be	explained	as	a	mere	
dip	in	appreciation	or	liking	and	it	would	not	be	possible	to	confidently	assert	that	the	
valley	was	uncanny	in	its	nature.	Secondly,	it	avoids	the	risk	of	a	circular	approach	as	
described	in	Chapter	2	above	as	by	including	a	direct	measurement	of	eeriness,	the	
researcher	can	be	more	confident	in	the	conclusions	that	are	being	drawn	about	the	
qualities	under	examination.		
Table	1:	Research	principles	for	investigating	the	UVE		
If,	when	these	factors	are	controlled	and	measured,	a	pattern	can	be	plotted	which	
approximates	the	path	described	by	Mori,	with	the	stimuli	falling	into	the	valley	also	
displaying	high	ratings	of	eeriness,	then	an	UVE	can	be	said	to	have	been	found	and	
conclusions	can	be	drawn	about	the	qualities	of	the	stimuli	which	have	elicited	it.	Studies	
which	do	not	display	this	careful	control	may	be	useful	in	collecting	other	forms	of	
evidence	about	NHAs	but	cannot	be	said	to	contribute	to	an	understanding	of	the	UVE	
per	se.		
Considering	the	studies	discussed	in	Section	1.1:	Locating	The	Uncanny	Valley	Effect,	it	
can	be	seen	that	the	empirical	evidence	was	limited	with	none	of	the	reported	studies	
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meeting	the	criteria	set	by	the	design	principles	above.	None	adequately	controlled	for	
both	human-likeness	and	emotional	reaction	with	concurrent	measurements	of	eeriness	
and	the	selection	of	stimuli	was	small	scale	and	in	some	cases	appeared	arbitrary.	The	
studies	can	be	considered	in	three	categories:	those	that	offered	a	theoretical	perspective	
on	the	UV	but	did	not	report	primary	data	collection	(Brenton	et	al,	2005;	Gee,	2005;	
Ramey,	2005;	Ziemke	and	Lindblom,	2006);	those	that	applied	existing	human-likeness	or	
anthropomorphic	research	to	the	UV	concept	(Chaminade	et	al,	2005;	Keysers	and	
Gazzola,	2005;	Pollick	2005)	and	those	that	report	primary	data	collection	about	NHAs.	Of	
those,	Berthouze	and	Berthouze	(2005)	collected	data	about	the	qualities	of	agents	that	
varied	in	human-likeness	but	did	not	conduct	any	measurement	of	emotion	or	eeriness	
and	did	not	demonstrate	the	presence	of	an	uncanny	curve.	Hanson	et	al’s	(2005)	second	
study	uses	a	morphing	technique	to	standardise	the	human-likeness	dimension	but	then	
only	measured	acceptability	so	no	conclusions	of	uncanniness	can	be	drawn.	In	addition,	
the	study	in	question	used	a	single	continuum	so	the	observed	ratings	of	acceptability	can	
only	be	applied	to	that	one	instance	of	human	to	cartoon	morph.	Finally,	both	Ishiguro	
(2005)	and	MacDorman	(2005c)	reported	data	collection	exercises	that	did	not	employ	a	
range	of	stimuli	varying	in	human-likeness	as	Ishiguro	(2005)	used	a	single	example	of	an	
android,	and	MacDorman	(2005c)	a	single	android	paired	with	a	human	anchor.		
Interest	in	this	area	was	also	informed	by	research	carried	out	by	the	author	in	
fulfilment	of	an	earlier	qualification	(Gray	(2006),	[unpublished	MSc	dissertation]).	The	
aim	of	that	study	was	to	take	an	empirical	approach	to	the	concept	of	the	UVE	using	
morphed	images	of	faces,	where	artificial	faces	were	gradually	transformed	into	human	
faces	and	static	images	were	taken	at	set	points	within	that	process.	These	produced	a	set	
of	images	which	each	represented	a	defined	level	of	human-likeness,	and	were	used	in	an	
online	experiment	testing	whether	it	was	possible	to	identify	a	point	where	participant’s	
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emotional	responses	changed	from	a	general	increase	in	positivity	to	indicating	a	sudden	
‘uncanny’	downturn	indicating	a	more	negative	response.	A	downturn	in	emotional	
response	was	found	but	this	was	placed	at	the	midpoint	between	artificial	and	human.	
Reflections	on	the	research	design	identified	several	areas	for	further	exploration	as	the	
study	had	demonstrated	that	the	non-linear	relationship	between	human-likeness	and	
emotional	response	did	suggest	a	pattern	indicative	of	the	UVE	but	it	was	limited	in	its	
scope	and	did	not	attempt	to	explore	the	reasons	why	this	effect	may	occur	or	explore	
the	nature	of	the	emotions	involved	beyond	classifying	the	responses	as	positive	or	
negative.	Therefore,	it	can	be	seen	that	at	the	inception	of	this	Phase	in	2006,	none	of	the	
available	evidence	provided	a	sufficient	explanation	for	the	UVE	and	as	a	result,	the	cause	
of	the	UVE	was	unexplained	and	the	emotional	components	of	the	effect	were	not	
known.		
The	overall	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	advance	understanding	in	these	two	areas,	and	this	
first	research	phase	established	the	first	steps	towards	addressing	this	gap.	In	Study	1	
(Section	3.2:	Study	1:	Subjective	ratings	of	near-human	agents),	a	collection	of	varied	
NHFs	were	rated	for	subjective	measurements	of	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	
eeriness,	using	the	scales	established	by	MacDorman	(2006)	which	satisfied	the	design	
criteria	1)	2)	and	4)	from	Table	1	above.	Conclusions	drawn	from	these	measurements	led	
to	Study	2	(Section	3.3:	Study	2:	Imagined	Encounters	with	near-human	agents)	where	
three	agents	were	chosen	for	further	exploration	along	with	a	non-human	and	human	
anchor	for	comparison.	This	study	was	designed	to	contribute	to	an	understanding	of	the	
Y	axis	of	Mori’s	chart	(criterion	3)	by	detailing	how	participants	reacted	emotionally	to	
each	of	the	agents	and	introduced	a	consideration	of	the	nature	of	NHFs	by	collecting	
data	on	how	participants	described	each	face.	By	analysing	measurements	it	was	possible	
to	overlay	real-world	response	data	on	to	Mori’s	hypothesised	UV	curve,	thus	allowing	
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conclusions	to	be	drawn	about	the	qualities	of	the	chosen	stimuli	and	satisfying	criterion	
5).	In	this	way	the	first	research	phase	began	to	explore	the	nature	of	the	emotional	
reaction	involved	in	the	UVE	and	provide	a	basis	for	further	studies	to	elucidate	its	
causes.		
3.2:	Study	1:	Subjective	ratings	of	near-human	agents	
3.2.1:	Introduction	to	Subjective	ratings	of	near-human	agents	
The	first	study	in	this	phase	carried	out	a	survey	of	the	eeriness,	human-likeness	and	
strangeness	of	a	collection	of	NHAs,	using	the	principles	outlined	in	the	Introduction	
above	and	adopting	the	scales	used	in	MacDorman	(2006).	As	with	MacDorman	et	al’s	
study,	this	first	study	was	not	designed	to	provide	an	explanation	of	the	UVE,	but	rather	
to	begin	to	collect	evidence	for	later	studies	which	would	fulfil	that	function.	The	core	aim	
of	this	study	was	to	satisfy	design	principles	1)	2)	and	4),	and	thus	establish	a	baseline	of	
ratings	for	stimuli	images	to	be	used	in	future	studies	exploring	the	nature	of	emotional	
responses	to	‘uncanny’	agents	compared	to	their	non-uncanny	counterparts.	This	
introduction	will	describe	the	measurement	scales	that	were	used	and	outline	the	
research	question	and	hypotheses	that	were	addressed	by	this	study.		
Measurement	scales	
Three	scales	that	had	been	demonstrated	as	effective	in	MacDorman	(2006)	were	
adopted	for	this	study.	In	the	original	study,	they	were	used	to	measure	the	human-
likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness	of	several	video	clips	of	robots.	The	aim	of	MacDorman	
et	al’s	study	was	to	test	whether	the	pattern	of	those	responses	would	match	the	UV	
proposal	by	showing	the	type	of	negative	peak	that	Mori	had	described.	The	three	scales	
were	an	interpretation	of	Mori’s	description.	Firstly,	it	was	necessary	to	measure	human-
likeness	as	Mori	observed	that	the	effect	occurred	as	entities	become	less	mechanical	
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and	more	human-like	so	MacDorman	anchored	the	scale	as	'very	mechanical'	at	point	1	
with	'very	human'	at	point	9.	The	other	two	measurements	(strangeness	and	eeriness)	
were	MacDorman’s	means	of	operationalising	the	y-axis	on	that	chart.	The	strangeness	
scale	was	labeled	based	on	Mori’s	use	of	the	term	‘familiarity’	to	describe	how	people	felt	
about	an	entity	as	human-likeness	changes.	Mori’s	graph	showed	positive	and	negative	
familiarity	on	this	axis,	but	MacDorman	believed	that	‘strangeness’	would	be	a	more	
intuitive	factor	for	participants	to	rate	than	‘negative	familiarity’.	The	eeriness	scale	
allowed	MacDorman	to	test	the	relationship	between	a	measurement	of	strangeness	and	
the	particularly	unsettling	quality	that	the	uncanny	valley	seemed	to	elicit	as	something	
measured	as	strange	alone	is	not	necessarily	eerie.	Both	Y-axis	scales	ran	from	1-10.	
MacDorman’s	study	provided	evidence	that	these	measurements	had	been	successful	
and	reliable	in	examining	responses	to	comparable	materials	and	so	they	were	adopted	
for	the	present	study.		
Research	question	
What	will	the	subjective	ratings	of	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness	be	for	an	
identified	collection	of	NHAs?	
Hypotheses	
H1.	This	hypothesis	tests	whether	two	measurements	of	emotional	response	
(strangeness	and	eeriness)	vary	with	measurements	of	human-likeness	and	tests	whether	
such	a	response	could	be	considered	uncanny.		
When	considering	the	ratings	for	each	agent,	the	following	overall	patterns	of	
correlation	will	be	found:		
• Human-likeness	and	strangeness	will	be	strongly	negatively	correlated	as	this	
hypothesis	is	based	on	the	overall	shape	of	Mori’s	graph	which	requires	that	as	
human-likeness	increases,	familiarity	should	also	increase.	MacDorman’s	(2006)	
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scale	uses	strangeness	as	the	antonym	to	familiarity	in	measuring	this	axis,	so	as	
familiarity	increases,	strangeness	should	decrease.		
• Eeriness	and	strangeness	will	be	strongly	positively	correlated	as	Mori’s	graph	is	
only	labelled	according	to	familiarity	but	his	description	of	the	concept	evokes	
ideas	of	eeriness.	To	be	able	to	accurately	describe	a	response	to	changes	in	
human-likeness	as	‘uncanny’,	it	should	follow	that	ratings	of	eeriness	should	
increase	as	ratings	of	strangeness	increase.		
• Human-likeness	and	eeriness	will	be	strongly	negatively	correlated	as	if	there	is	a	
‘valley’	effect,	and	it	can	be	understood	to	be	uncanny,	it	would	need	to	follow	
that	as	human-likeness	increases,	eeriness	should	decrease.		
H2.	This	hypothesis	is	testing	for	whether	a	‘valley’	pattern	can	be	seen	to	emerge	in	
the	relationships	between	human-likeness	and	strangeness	or	eeriness.	When	the	mean	
ratings	for	each	agent	are	plotted	against	each	other,	the	strangeness	and	eeriness	
ratings	will	show	a	‘dip’	or	valley	in	their	linear	trend	and	this	will	occur	somewhere	
between	the	50%	and	100%	on	the	human-likeness	scale.	
3.2.2:	Method	
Design	
This	study	used	a	repeated	measures	design	to	collecting	ratings	of	20	NHFs	on	three	
dependent	variables:	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness.		
Materials	
Twenty	images	were	selected	from	a	collection	of	‘almost	human’	faces.	Several	types	
of	NHA	were	used,	and	included	androids,	CG	artwork	and	digitally	manipulated	faces.		
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The	rating	scales	were	taken	from	MacDorman	(2006):	
Human-likeness:	Very	mechanical	(1)	to	very	human-like	(9)	
Strangeness:	Very	familiar	(1)	to	very	strange	(10)	
Eeriness:	Not	eerie	(1)	to	very	eerie	(10).	
A	Microsoft	Word	document	was	produced	which	presented	standardized	
instructions,	followed	by	all	20	images	accompanied	by	the	three	rating	scales.		
Participants	
Eight	participants	judged	all	20	images.	They	were	acquaintances	of	the	researcher	
and	7	were	employed	at	a	UK	university.	All	had	an	interest	in	psychological	research,	but	
none	had	studied	psychology,	or	had	specific	or	expert	knowledge	of	the	uncanny	valley.	
They	were	asked	to	volunteer	their	time,	and	received	no	reward	for	their	participation.		
Procedure	
Once	they	had	agreed	to	take	part,	participants	were	sent	the	Word	document	by	
email	and	asked	to	work	through	the	document,	rating	each	image	on	each	of	the	three	
scales.	They	also	had	the	opportunity	to	add	comments	about	each	image	if	they	wished.	
The	document	was	then	returned	by	email.	
3.2.3:	Results	
This	study	was	an	initial	step	towards	answering	the	first	research	question	in	Phase	1:	
What	will	the	subjective	ratings	of	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness	be	for	an	
identified	collection	of	NHAs?	Table	2	presents	the	overall	means	and	standard	deviations	
for	the	measures,	and	Table	3	presents	the	mean	values	on	each	measure	for	each	image.		
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Table	2:	Overall	means	and	standard	deviations	for	ratings	of	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness	
	
Table	3:	Mean	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness	by	image	
When	analysed	using	Pearson’s	r	correlation,	significant	relationships	were	found	
between	all	three	measures	and	these	did	indeed	follow	the	hypothesised	patterns.	
There	were	negative	correlations	between	human-likeness	and	strangeness	(r=	-.681,	
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N=160,	p	<	0.005,	one	tailed)	and	human-likeness	and	eeriness,	(r=	-.615,	N=160,	p	<	
0.005,	one	tailed).	A	positive	correlation	was	found	between	strangeness	and	eeriness:	r=	
.777,	N=160,	p	<	0.005,	one	tailed.		
A	second	key	area	of	interest	here	is	in	the	relationship	between	human-likeness	and	
strangeness,	human-likeness	and	eeriness	and	the	extent	to	which	this	supports	the	
concept	of	an	UVE.	The	two	plots	below	visualise	those	relationships.	H2	predicted	that	
when	the	mean	human-likeness	and	strangeness	ratings	for	each	agent	are	plotted	
against	each	other,	the	strangeness	and	eeriness	plots	will	show	a	deviation	from	a	linear	
trend	between	the	50%	and	100%	human	point.	
	
Figure	5:	Scatter	plot	of	mean	human-likeness	and	strangeness:	data	labels	refer	to	picture	references.		
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Figure	6:	Scatter	plot	of	mean	human-likeness	and	eeriness:	data	labels	refer	to	picture	references.		
As	can	be	seen	in	the	figures	above,	the	mean	ratings	cluster	around	three	distinct	
areas	so	that	a	deviation	from	a	linear	trend	cannot	be	determined.	The	implications	of	
this	and	of	the	earlier	findings	will	now	be	discussed.		
3.2.4:	Discussion	
The	goal	of	this	first	study	was	to	explore	ratings	of	a	variety	of	near-human	images	to	
see	whether	Mori’s	hypothesised	relationship	between	human-likeness	and	familiarity	
could	be	reproduced	using	real-world	examples	and	whether	there	was	any	evidence	to	
support	the	anecdotal	suggestion	that	some	of	those	near-human	images	would	be	found	
particularly	eerie.	Subjective	ratings	of	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness	were	
collected	from	participants	who	looked	at	20	different	near-human	images	collected	from	
a	range	of	sources	including	images	of	robots,	computer	game	characters	and	dolls.	The	
UV	hypothesis	suggests	that	two	features	should	be	found	in	the	results.	Firstly,	that	
there	should	be	a	specific	type	of	relationship	between	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	
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eeriness	and	secondly,	that	faces	rated	as	the	eeriest	would	fall	in	a	region	close	to	but	
not	quite	human.		
Hypothesis	1	tested	the	first	of	these	by	looking	at	whether	two	measurements	of	
strangeness	and	eeriness	varied	with	measurements	of	human-likeness.	Support	was	
found	for	the	hypotheses	that	had	been	proposed	for	all	three	relationships.	Firstly,	the	
UVE	requires	that	overall,	as	human-likeness	increases,	strangeness	should	decrease	and	
so	a	negative	correlation	should	be	found.	This	relationship	describes	the	overall	shape	of	
the	UV	graph	and	is	a	necessary	condition	for	a	valley	to	emerge	at	some	point	along	that	
continuum	between	non	human	and	human.	This	significant	negative	correlation	was	
found,	and	it	had	a	moderate	explanatory	strength	with	46%	of	the	variance	explained,	
providing	evidence	that	the	relationship	between	human-likeness	and	strangeness	is	as	
predicted	by	the	UV	hypothesis.		
Eeriness	ratings	were	also	collected,	as	per	MacDorman’s	(2006)	study,	in	order	to	be	
able	to	go	beyond	the	identification	of	a	relationship	between	human-likeness	and	
familiarity	and	see	whether	the	increasing	strangeness	can	be	said	to	be	representative	of	
an	‘uncanny’	valley.	This	would	also	help	to	disambiguate	the	‘familiar-strange’	axis	
proposed	in	the	original	graph.	Without	a	measure	of	eeriness	or	a	comparable	term,	
even	if	a	valley-type	pattern	was	found,	it	may	be	that	participants	were	interpreting	
familiarity	in	the	sense	of	being	well	acquainted	with	a	particular	face	image	rather	than	
interpreting	it	as	the	opposite	of	strange.	Support	was	found	for	this	hypothesis	as	
eeriness	and	strangeness	were	indeed	positively	correlated.	This	was	actually	a	stronger	
correlation	than	the	one	between	human-likeness	and	strangeness,	with	60%	of	the	
variance	in	the	strangeness	ratings	explained	by	the	ratings	of	eeriness.	This	allows	two	
conclusions,	firstly,	it	confirms	that	it	is	valid	to	talk	about	eeriness	and	strangeness	as	
related	terms	in	the	evaluation	of	NHFs	and	secondly,	that	the	images	selected	for	this	
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study	are	good	examples	of	entities	which	may	evoke	eerie	responses	and	so	are	valid	for	
an	exploration	of	the	UVE.	A	final	correlation	was	performed	to	test	the	prediction	that	a	
negative	correlation	would	also	be	found	between	human-likeness	and	eeriness	as	a	
more	human-like	face	should	seem	less	eerie	according	to	the	UV	hypothesis.	This	was	
again	found,	explaining	38%	of	the	variance	between	the	variables.	It	can	be	concluded	
from	these	correlation	results	that	the	subjective	ratings	for	human-likeness,	strangeness	
and	eeriness	did	conform	to	the	first	part	of	the	UV	hypothesis.		
The	second	part	of	this	study	then	went	on	to	look	at	whether	a	‘valley’	pattern	can	
be	seen	to	emerge	in	the	relationships	between	human-likeness	and	strangeness	or	
eeriness.	This	was	tested	by	plotting	the	mean	ratings	for	those	value	pairs	for	each	of	the	
near-human	images.	It	had	been	expected	that	there	would	be	a	clear	pattern	in	the	plots	
where	increasing	human-likeness	would	lead	to	a	decrease	in	strangeness,	but	only	up	to	
a	certain	point	where	there	would	be	a	sudden	local	increase	in	the	strangeness	ratings.	It	
was	expected	that	some	of	the	faces	would	be	rated	as	very	nearly	human/highly	strange	
and	very	nearly	human/highly	eerie.	However,	this	pattern	was	not	found.	Instead,	three	
distinct	clusters	were	formed	of	low	human-likeness/high	strangeness,	moderate	human-
likeness/moderate	strangeness,	and	high	human-likeness/low	strangeness,	and	low	
human-likeness/high	eeriness,	moderate	human-likeness/moderate	eeriness,	and	high	
human-likeness/low	eeriness.	
A	goal	of	this	first	study	was	to	provide	baseline	ratings	of	stimulus	images	with	the	
intention	of	using	them	later	in	experiments	to	examine	if	there	are	significant	
differences	in	the	description	of	and	reaction	to	different	types	of	near-human	face.	
While	it	can	be	concluded	that	the	pattern	of	responses	found	in	these	results	does	not	
support	the	location	of	faces	that	would	be	predicted	by	the	UV	hypothesis,	the	pattern	
of	three	distinct	clusters	is	a	notable	finding	and	it	is	possible	that	within	those	clusters,	
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some	of	the	images	could	still	be	considered	uncanny.	One	approach	to	this	is	to	review	
prior	research	which	did	find	a	UVE	in	similar	rating	data	and	compare	the	mean	values	
found	with	those	that	were	found	in	this	study.	In	this	way,	an	examination	of	the	original	
UVE	graph	and	the	measurement	scales	as	used	by	MacDorman	(2006)	can	be	used	to	
develop	criteria	for	faces	that	could	be	classified	as	uncanny	based	on	the	area	of	the	
chart.	In	this	way,	faces	could	be	classed	as	uncanny	if	their	mean	human-likeness	was	
between	4.5	and	8,	and	their	mean	strangeness	or	eeriness	was	over	6.	In	the	present	
study,	3	faces	met	those	criteria	and	are	shown	in	Table	4	below.	
	
Table	4:	The	three	images	(11,	7	and	1)	rated	as	medium-high	human-likeness	with	high	strangeness	or	
eeriness.		
These	all	came	from	the	middle	cluster,	so	using	this	method	the	moderately	human	
cluster	may	be	considered	the	one	most	likely	to	contain	faces	which	would	be	perceived	
as	uncanny.	The	study	to	be	described	in	the	next	phase	uses	an	example	from	each	of	
the	clusters	and	compares	rating	and	behavioural	data	to	explore	whether	any	significant	
difference	will	be	found	between	the	clusters.		
A	final	point	to	note	in	discussing	this	study	is	that	it	was	rather	small	in	scale,	with	
only	a	small	number	of	participants	(8)	providing	rating	data	for	the	faces.	This	study	has	
provided	an	initial	mapping	of	these	three	key	ratings	for	a	variety	of	different	NHFs	but	
later	studies	which	will	aim	to	explain	the	nature	of	the	UVE	will	seek	to	produce	more	
robust	findings	by	recruiting	a	larger	number	of	participants.	The	first	of	these	
explanatory	studies	will	now	be	introduced.		
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3.3:	Study	2:	Imagined	Encounters	with	near-human	agents	
3.3.1:	Introduction	to	Imagined	encounters	with	near-human	agents	
It	has	already	been	argued	that	at	the	time	of	the	first	phase	of	this	thesis,	the	UVE	
was	a	descriptive	rather	than	a	predictive	term.	The	details	of	the	emotions	involved	in	
the	effect	were	based	on	arbitrary	agent	selection	and	insight-based	conclusions	drawn	
about	the	agents	said	to	trigger	it.	Study	2	was	designed	to	test	these	assumptions	by	
gathering	evidence	about	the	emotions	involved	in	the	UVE	and	exploring	possible	causes	
for	its	particular	pattern	of	emotional	reactions.	It	developed	the	findings	of	Study	1	using	
three	of	the	stimuli	rated	in	that	study,	plus	one	human	and	one	non-human	anchor,	to	
ask	detailed	questions	about	how	people	felt	when	they	imagined	an	encounter	with	
those	agents	and	the	techniques	they	used	when	asked	to	produce	descriptions	of	them.	
This	work	was	necessary	to	begin	to	address	the	third	design	principle	detailed	in	Section	
3.1	which	described	that,	in	order	to	validate	Mori’s	chart,	an	empirical	measure	of	
emotional	response	is	required.	By	identifying	the	emotions	associated	with	different	
NHAs,	it	becomes	possible	to	derive	such	a	measure	and	use	it	to	test	which	qualities	of	
NHAs	are	most	likely	to	cause	a	UVE.	This	study	comprised	three	tasks,	a	rating	task	
applying	the	standardised	scales	used	in	Study	1	and	two	tasks	where	participants	
imagined	an	encounter	with	a	NHA	and	answered	questions	about	that	encounter.	This	
introduction	will	describe	the	background	to	those	imagined	interaction	tasks	and	
describe	the	stimuli	that	were	used	before	detailing	the	research	questions	and	
hypotheses	that	were	addressed	in	this	study.		
Imagined	Interaction	Scenarios	
The	scenario	that	participants	were	asked	to	imagine	in	this	study	involved	an	
exhibition	of	robots	and	other	NHAs	and	participants	were	asked	to	either	describe	each	
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agent	in	sufficient	detail	for	a	friend	to	be	able	to	find	them	in	this	crowded	public	space,	
or	imagine	how	it	would	feel	to	have	this	agent	as	a	domestic	robot	at	home.	This	
scenario-based	technique	borrowed	aspects	of	the	social	cognitive	concept	of	Imagined	
Interactions	(IIs).	Edwards	et	al	(1988)	and	Honeycutt	(1990)	suggested	that	IIs	acted	as	
an	element	of	the	cognitive	process	of	communication	where	people	(‘actors’	in	the	
terminology	of	the	theory)	use	a	mental	representation	of	a	social	encounter	to	rehearse	
for	a	future	experience	or	ruminate	on	a	past	incident.	Edwards	et	al	and	Honeycutt	used	
questionnaires	to	explore	the	frequency	and	functions	of	IIs	by	asking	closed	questions	on	
how	often	participants	engaged	in	IIs	as	well	as	several	free-text	questions	which	were	
then	coded	for	further	analysis.	They	found	that	IIs	were	commonly	reported	and	that	
certain	themes	emerged.	Romantic	and	relational	themes	were	common	in	their	
population	but	other	studies	have	examined	IIs	relating	to	family	life	and	employment	
scenarios.	The	researchers	drew	a	clear	differentiation	between	IIs	and	fantasies	as	IIs	
had	a	different	and	preparatory	function	and	often	included	mundane	activities	or	
interactions	with	negative	consequences	which	did	not	take	place	in	most	fantasy	
scenarios.	However,	a	question	remained	as	to	whether	IIs	were	confined	solely	to	an	
imaginative	realm	and	to	explore	this,	Gotcher	and	Edwards	(1990)	compared	IIs	with	
actual	communications	and	found	that	there	was	a	positive	correlation	between	the	
frequency	and	content	of	IIs	and	with	conversations	that	actually	took	place,	suggesting	
that	IIs	serve	as	practical	rehearsals	when	an	interaction	that	has	been	imagined	takes	
place	in	reality.	These	early	findings	were	also	supported	by	Honeycutt	(2003)	who	found	
that	IIs	were	used	on	a	daily	basis	by	most	people,	and	in	a	cross-cultural	study	by	
McCann	and	Honeycutt	(2006)	who	found	that	IIs	were	regularly	used	by	US,	Thai	and	
Japanese	participants	but	that	the	functions	varied	according	to	the	cultural	background	
of	the	participants.		
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The	evidence	established	IIs	as	a	cognitive	phenomenon	in	common	use	and	in	terms	
of	the	present	study,	it	was	felt	that	asking	participants	to	self-report	their	IIs	would	be	a	
valid	way	to	gain	insight	into	how	they	might	feel	about	encounters	with	NHAs.	The	
present	study	was	the	first	to	apply	this	type	of	methodology	to	a	study	of	the	UVE	but	it	
was	felt	that	this	was	a	valid	approach	for	four	reasons.	Firstly,	it	had	been	demonstrated	
that	IIs	could	mirror	how	someone	would	actually	feel	and	react	in	a	genuine	encounter.	
Secondly,	asking	participants	to	report	the	content	of	their	imagined	encounter	produces	
a	rich	source	of	themed	qualitative	data.	Thirdly,	the	present	study	had	the	aim	of	
exploring	more	about	a	topic	where	certain	assertions	had	been	made,	but	these	had	not	
yet	been	definitely	tested.	IIs	are	unique	to	the	participant	and	as	long	as	the	scenarios	
describing	an	interaction	are	free	from	leading	language,	a	self-report	of	an	II	represents	
a	rich	source	of	data	about	the	interaction	but	without	the	participant	being	unduly	
influenced	about	what	to	say	about	each	of	the	agents.	Finally,	on	a	practical	level	a	
report	of	an	II	can	be	collected	easily	from	participants	in	their	own	time	and	at	a	distance	
and	so	lent	themselves	well	to	online	data	collection	methods	used	in	this	phase.		
A	scenario	for	eliciting	face	descriptions	and	emotional	responses.		
This	study	asked	participants	to	produce	two	types	of	description	of	each	of	the	five	
agents.	These	were	a	description	of	the	agent’s	face	and	a	response	to	how	they	would	
feel	if	they	were	asked	to	spend	time	in	close	proximity	to	the	agent.	From	a	theoretical	
perspective,	describing	to	and	reacting	to	a	face	are	explored	separately	in	recognition	of	
a	long-running	debate	in	the	literature	of	face	perception.	The	cognitive	psychology	of	
face	perception	has	described	human	abilities	in	recognising,	remembering	and	reacting	
to	faces	in	terms	of	models	of	face	processing	as	process	flow	descriptions	which	serve	as	
a	representation	of	the	neural	functions	and	information	flow	involved	when	face	
processing	occurs.	Developments	in	face	perception	theory	have	often	been	marked	by	
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revisions	to	the	contents	or	arrangement	of	these	models.	The	classic	model	of	face	
perception	(Bruce	and	Young	(1986))	proposed	that	face	processing	could	be	understood	
as	a	pathway	involving	several	systematic	steps,	with	information	passed	between	each	
discreet	module	to	eventually	arrive	at	a	face	identification.	A	refinement	to	this	model	
was	proposed	by	Breen	et	al	(2000).	In	order	to	explain	delusional	misidentification	
syndromes	(such	as	Capgras	syndrome)	in	which	activation	of	a	‘face	recognition	unit’	led	
to	two	outputs,	one	to	a	‘personal	identity	node’	and	one	to	an	‘affective	response’.	In	
normal	function,	the	affective	response	helps	differentiate	between	familiar	and	
unfamiliar	faces,	but	in	people	suffering	from	certain	delusional	misidentification	
syndromes,	the	link	between	the	face	recognition	unit	and	affective	response	is	damaged,	
meaning	that	although	the	person	can	recognise	the	face	and	knows	it	is	familiar	they	do	
not	get	the	expected	emotional	response.		
The	concept	that	the	identity	and	emotional	aspects	of	a	face	might	be	dealt	with	
separately	has	been	explored	in	research	looking	at	whether	there	may	be	two	routes	or	
pathways	involved	in	face	processing,	each	responsible	for	the	transmission	of	different	
types	of	information	about	the	face	stimuli.	The	'dual-stream	hypothesis'	(originally	
proposed	by	Bauer	(1986)	and	Ellis	and	Young	(1990),	suggests	that	in	addition	to	a	
pathway	processing	information	about	the	identity	of	a	face,	there	is	a	second	pathway	
which	is	responsible	for	processing	the	information	about	the	emotional	reaction	
displayed	in	a	face.	Due	to	the	locations	of	the	brain	structures	involved	in	the	two	
pathways,	the	routes	were	identified	as	the	ventral	(identification)	and	dorsal	(emotion)	
pathways.	The	regions	involved	are	illustrated	in	Figure	7	below.		
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Figure	7:	An	extract	of	a	diagram	taken	from	A.D.	Milner	and	M.	Goodale	(1995),	The	Visual	Brain	In	
Action,	demonstrating	the	dorsal	and	ventral	streams	of	visual	processing	in	the	macaque	monkey	brain.	
Reproduced	by	permission	of	Oxford	University	Press.	(From	Breen	(2000))	
The	original	evidence	for	the	different	pathways	was	drawn	from	studies	of	patients	
with	two	types	of	face	processing	disorder	meaning	that	one	of	the	pathways	was	
unavailable	to	them.	Initially,	Bauer	(1986)	observed	covert	face	recognition	in	patients	
diagnosed	with	prosopagnosia	where	some	patients	displayed	a	different	skin	
conductance	response	(SCR)	to	familiar	faces	compared	to	unfamiliar	faces	as	even	
though	there	was	no	conscious	awareness	of	recognition,	a	different	level	of	arousal	is	
evoked	for	familiar	and	unfamiliar	faces.	This	observation	led	Bauer	to	propose	this	dual	
route	for	face	recognition	with	a	main	ventral	route	responsible	for	overt	recognition	and	
a	secondary	dorsal	route	of	covert	face	recognition	where	this	secondary	route	carried	
the	emotional	significance	of	a	face	and	in	the	non-clinical	population	this	additional	
information	supports	the	main	route	for	recognition.	In	patients	with	prosopagnosia	
where	the	main	route	is	not	accessible,	the	dorsal	route	alone	gives	rise	to	the	non-
conscious	reaction	described	as	covert	recognition.	Ellis	and	Young	(1990)	developed	this	
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dual-route	hypothesis	further	by	synthesising	Bauer’s	evidence	from	prosopagnosia	with	
observations	from	studies	of	patients	with	Capgras’	syndrome	as	these	patients	have	
intact	face	recognition	ability	but	an	abnormal	response	to	faces	familiar	to	them,	
thinking	that	they	represent	duplicates	or	imposters.	It	was	later	found	by	Ellis	et	al	
(1997)	that	patients	with	Capgras	syndrome	did	not	show	a	difference	in	SCR	for	familiar	
faces,	providing	support	to	the	idea	that	information	about	the	emotional	significance	of	
the	face	via	a	dorsal	route	is	not	operational	for	those	patients.	In	terms	of	the	dual	
hypothesis	theory	these	patterns	of	preserved	and	lost	perceptual	abilities	in	Capgras	
syndrome	could	be	said	to	represent	a	mirror	of	the	covert	recognition	present	in	some	
prosopagnosic	patients	as	in	prosopagnosia,	the	emotion-route	is	intact	even	though	the	
perception-route	is	not.	In	Capgras	syndrome,	the	perception-route	is	preserved	but	the	
emotion-route	is	disrupted.	Considered	as	a	pair,	those	two	clinical	presentations	mirror	
each	other	in	the	types	of	face	recognition	abilities	preserved	and	lost	and	this	pattern	
was	used	as	evidence	for	the	dual	route	hypothesis.	
		
	
Figure	8:	Summary	of	research	findings	relating	lost	and	preserved	abilities	to	the	dual	pathway	
hypothesis.		
Breen	et	al	critically	approached	this	argument.	Firstly,	they	note	that	the	evidence	at	
the	heart	of	this	idea	is	the	SCR	which	is	measured	for	both	type	of	patients	as	in	itself	it	
doesn’t	actually	indicate	recognition,	it	is	a	measure	of	arousal	only.	The	magnitude	of	
the	SCR	is	also	markedly	smaller	in	the	prosopagnosics	compared	to	normal	controls.	
Secondly,	they	question	the	evidence	for	the	designation	of	the	two	routes	as	perceptual	
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versus	emotional	and	note	that	the	original	neuropsychological	evidence	cited	by	Bauer	
contained	more	detail	on	the	emotional	processing	of	different	systems	than	is	present	in	
Bauer’s	conception	of	the	dual	route	hypothesis	and	that	Bauer’s	hypothesis	conflates	
affect	and	arousal.	To	address	these	perceived	limitations	of	the	dual	route	model,	Breen	
et	al	propose	a	new	model.	They	suggest	that	in	both	normal	and	prosopagnosic	or	
Capgras	brains,	a	single	neuroanatomical	route	across	multiple	structures	explains	face	
recognition.	The	pattern	of	preserved	and	lost	abilities	in	Capgras	and	prosopagnosia	
result	from	problems	in	passing	the	information	between	the	ventral	temporal	lobe	
structures	and	the	ventral	limbic	system.	In	contrast,	they	proposed	a	new	dual-route	
cognitive	model	based	on	this	concept	with	familiar	and	unfamiliar	face	recognition	
taking	different	routes.		
Debate	continues	into	the	validity	of	the	dual	route	hypothesis,	with	Young	(2009)	
emphasising	the	similarity	in	the	subjective	experience	in	patients	with	each	type	of	
delusional	misidentification	disorders	and	explored	what	could	be	understood	from	their	
differing	experiences	of	‘familiarity’.	However,	and	in	terms	of	the	present	study,	
presence	of	a	lively	debate	into	whether	emotional	responses	to	faces	are	processed	
separately	to	the	more	cognitive	recognition,	identification	and	ability	to	describe	a	face	
does	support	that	it	is	valid	to	examine	these	two	areas	through	separate	tasks.	To	this	
end,	separate	tasks	were	designed	to	explore	how	participants	would	feel	when	
presented	with	the	different	NHAs,	and	how	they	would	approach	being	asked	to	provide	
a	detailed	description	of	each	one.		
Emotion	task	
The	emotion	task	was	informed	by	the	common-sense	assumptions	used	to	describe	
the	emotions	that	characterise	the	UVE	and	was	designed	to	elicit	free-form	descriptions	
of	emotional	responses	to	the	different	agents.	While	negative	reactions	were	expected	
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to	the	NHAs,	the	question	wording	was	neutral	so	positive	reactions	could	also	be	given	if	
participants	felt	warmly	towards	them	and	to	ensure	there	was	no	influence	due	to	
leading	questions.	The	task	asked	how	participants	would	feel	about	sharing	their	home	
with	the	NHA	which	was	chosen	to	elicit	deeper	feelings	than	a	simple	one-off	encounter	
and	also	the	presence	of	the	agent	in	a	domestic	setting	was	designed	to	evoke	a	sense	of	
the	extent	to	which	participants	felt	they	would	be	able	to	trust	the	NHA	when	present	in	
a	setting	where	they	could	expect	to	be	comfortable.		
Description	task	
In	this	task,	participants	were	asked	to	provide	a	description	of	the	agent,	sufficiently	
detailed	as	to	allow	someone	else	to	find	them	in	a	crowded	arena.	The	purpose	of	this	
task	was	to	see	how	participants	would	approach	the	task	of	describing	the	agents,	with	
the	specific	research	aim	of	whether	they	would	concentrate	more	on	descriptions	of	
individual	features	or	of	an	impression	of	the	face	as	a	whole.	It	has	been	described	
above	that	human	faces	are	generally	processed	holistically	rather	than	analytically	so	the	
results	of	this	task	will	allow	an	examination	of	whether	this	tendency	holds	for	NHAs.	It	
may	be	that	there	is	a	division	between	human	and	NHAs	where	faces	stop	being	
processed	as	mechanical	objects	and	become	processed	holistically	and	this	task	will	
allow	an	initial	exploration	of	that	relationship	by	looking	at	the	frequency	of	references	
to	different	parts	of	the	face.		
Stimuli	
Five	faces	were	used	as	stimuli	for	this	study.	Three	were	taken	from	the	image	
clusters	as	identified	in	Study	1,	one	from	each	of	the	barely	humanoid,	moderately	
humanoid	and	highly	humanoid	clusters.	The	moderately	humanoid	cluster	contained	the	
three	faces	(out	of	20)	which	were	found	to	meet	theoretical	criteria	for	uncanniness	and	
so	it	is	theorised	that	this	cluster	is	the	most	likely	to	represent	uncanny	faces.	To	ensure	
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that	this	study	meets	the	first	design	principle	described	in	the	Section	3.1	above,	two	
anchors	were	added	to	the	stimuli	set,	a	robot	face	to	represent	an	entirely	artificial	face	
and	a	natural	human	face	to	act	as	the	entirely-human	anchor.		
Research	Questions	and	Hypotheses	
Rating	task	
RQ1:	What	will	the	subjective	ratings	of	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness	be	
for	an	identified	collection	of	NHAs?		
H1.	Face	type	will	have	a	significant	effect	on	the	ratings	of	human-likeness,	
strangeness	and	eeriness.	
H2.	When	considering	the	ratings	for	each	agent,	the	following	patterns	of	correlation	
will	be	found:		
• Eeriness	and	strangeness	will	be	strongly	positively	correlated	
• Human-likeness	and	strangeness	will	be	strongly	negatively	correlated	
• Human-likeness	and	eeriness	will	be	strongly	negatively	correlated	
H3.	When	the	mean	human-likeness	and	strangeness	ratings	for	each	agent	are	
plotted,	the	strangeness	plot	will	show	a	deviation	from	a	linear	trend	between	the	50%	
and	100%	human	point.		
(These	are	the	same	correlations	and	plots	predicted	in	Study	1	above	and	grounded	in	
Mori’s	UV	graph	and	MacDorman’s	(2006)	scales	derived	from	this,	so	the	rationale	for	
these	predictions	is	the	same.)	
Description	task	
RQ2:	When	asked	to	describe	the	faces	of	five	NHAs,	which	features	will	be	
emphasised	and	how	will	this	compare	to	the	descriptions	of	human	and	non-human	
comparison	faces?		
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H4.	When	descriptions	are	analysed	for	the	frequency	of	types	of	descriptive	term,	
there	will	be	a	significant	difference	between	the	frequency	of	terms	describing	the	
whole	face	compared	to	those	describing	individual	features.	The	rationale	for	this	
hypothesis	is	to	begin	to	explore	whether	there	is	a	relationship	between	levels	of	
human-likeness	and	how	faces	are	processed	and	particularly	whether	there	was	any	
evidence	that	NHFs	were	processed	analytically	rather	than	holistically.	At	this	stage,	
while	this	was	an	area	of	interest,	there	was	no	suggestion	from	the	supporting	literature	
relating	to	the	UVE	that	human-likeness,	eeriness	and	analytic	processing,	so	no	specific	
predictions	were	made	about	the	nature	of	that	difference.		
H5.	When	the	descriptions	are	analysed	for	the	frequency	of	references	to	different	
facial	features,	there	will	be	a	significant	difference	in	the	number	of	references	to	the	
eyes	by	face	type.	This	hypothesis	is	grounded	in	the	idea	that	it	may	be	an	aspect	of	how	
eyes	are	presented	that	can	make	NHFs	appear	eerie	because	as	the	moderately	human	
face	was	drawn	from	the	cluster	containing	the	most	likely	UV	candidates,	it	is	predicted	
that	the	references	to	eyes	will	be	highest	for	this	cluster.		
Emotion	task	
RQ3:	When	considering	a	hypothetical	social	encounter	with	the	NHAs,	which	terms	
will	be	used	to	express	how	people	would	feel	about	this	and	which	emotions	will	
characterise	their	reactions?	What	emotions	characterise	the	reactions	to	the	five	faces?	
What	pattern	of	negative,	positive	and	neutral	words	will	be	used	in	people’s	reactions,	
and	will	the	negative	words	vary	in	accordance	with	a	hypothesis	that	the	UV	is	
characterised	by	‘creepiness’	or	‘unease’?	
H6.	The	response	descriptions	will	be	analysed	for	how	frequently	positive,	negative	
and	neutral	emotion	terms	are	used	to	describe	each	face:		
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a.	The	highest	frequency	of	negative	emotions	will	be	used	for	the	moderately	human	
face	type.		
b.	The	lowest	frequency	of	positive	emotions	will	be	used	for	the	moderately	human	
face	type.		
c.	There	will	be	no	significant	difference	in	the	number	of	neutral	emotion	terms	used	
for	each	face	type.		
The	rationale	for	these	predictions	is	that	the	moderately	human	face	was	drawn	
from	the	cluster	containing	the	three	best	UV	candidates.	The	concept	of	the	UV	requires	
that	there	is	a	negative	or	unsettling	emotional	component	to	the	response	to	NHFs	so	
that	would	predict	that	the	moderately	human	face	would	be	described	more	negatively	
and	less	positively.		
H7.	Emotion	terms	synonymous	with	eeriness	or	unease	will	be	highest	for	the	
moderately	human	face	type.	This	develops	H6	and	is	a	more	direct	check	of	whether	the	
UV	candidate	face	type	was	actually	described	as	more	eerie	when	viewed	by	
participants.		
Triangulating	Across	Tasks	
RQ4:	This	question	combines	results	across	tasks	to	develop	H4,	H5	and	H7	and	
understand	the	relationship	between	eeriness	ratings	for	each	face	type	and	the	
measured	references	to	individual	features	as	opposed	to	whole	face	descriptors,	
references	to	eyes,	and	emotional	responses	containing	words	synonymous	with	
eeriness.	
H8.	A	significant	correlation	will	be	found	between	ratings	of	eeriness	and	the	
frequency	of	descriptions	referring	to	individual	features	rather	than	to	the	whole	face:	
the	rationale	follows	from	H4	but	this	looks	at	the	eeriness	ratings	as	opposed	to	
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predicting	based	on	the	moderately	human	face	type	as	the	potential	UV	candidate.	As	
above,	no	specific	prediction	about	the	direction	of	the	correlation	was	made.		
H9.	There	will	be	a	positive	correlation	between	ratings	of	eeriness	and	the	frequency	
of	references	to	eyes	which	develops	the	concept	detailed	in	H5	above	that	one	of	the	
explanation	for	the	eeriness	in	the	UVE	may	be	some	aspect	of	eye	appearance	where	
higher	ratings	of	eeriness	are	linked	to	referring	to	the	eyes	more	in	the	description.		
H10.	Ratings	of	eeriness	will	be	positively	correlated	with	the	proportion	of	
descriptions	containing	a	word	synonymous	with	uncanniness.	The	rationale	here	is	to	
examine	whether	the	eeriness	ratings	were	in	line	with	the	emotional	response	behaviour	
as	it	would	be	expected	that	as	rated	eeriness	increases,	so	would	the	emotional	
response	behaviour.		
3.3.2:	Method	
Design	
This	study	used	a	repeated	measures	design	to	explore	the	within	participants	factor	
of	'face	type',	with	five	levels	representing	an	example	of	either	a	potentially	‘uncanny’	
face	or	a	human	or	artificial	anchor	face.	The	levels	were	identified	as	Artificial,	Cluster	
One,	Cluster	Two,	Cluster	Three	and	Human-like:	cluster	one	represented	faces	rated	low	
for	human-likeness	and	high	for	strangeness/eeriness,	cluster	two	faces	that	were	
medium	human-likeness	and	medium	strangeness/eeriness	and	cluster	three	faces	that	
were	highly	human-like	but	low	on	strangeness/eeriness.	The	same	design	was	adopted	
for	three	different	tasks	that	were	completed	in	the	same	session	by	participants.	The	
following	dependent	variables	were	drawn	from	the	three	tasks:	
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Description	Task	
The	first	dependent	variable	from	the	description	task	counted	references	to	specific	
facial	features	or	characteristics	for	each	face	type.	The	free	text	comments	were	coded	
and	the	numbers	of	references	to	gender,	race,	age,	whole	face,	eyes,	mouth,	nose,	hair,	
skin,	chin,	cheeks,	ears	and	accessories	were	counted.	These	counts	were	also	used	to	
derive	a	second	dependent	variable	categorising	whether	the	references	were	to	the	
whole	face	or	to	individual	features.		
Emotion	Task	
The	first	dependent	variable	from	the	description	task	counted	references	to	different	
feelings	that	participants	expressed	about	the	different	face	types.	The	free	text	
comments	were	coded	and	the	numbers	of	references	to	seventeen	different	emotions	
were	counted.	These	counts	were	also	used	to	derive	a	second	dependent	variable	
categorising	whether	the	references	were	positive,	neutral	or	negative	in	nature.		
Rating	Task	
The	rating	task	contributed	three	dependent	variables,	ratings	of	each	face	type	on	
three	scales:	human-likeness	(H)	strangeness	(S)	and	eeriness	(E).		
The	scale	constructions	were:		
H:	9	point	scale	from	'very	mechanical'	to	'very	human'	
S:	10	point	scale	from	'very	familiar'	to	'very	strange'	
E:	10	points	from	'not	eerie'	to	'extremely	eerie'.		
Controls	
The	task	order	was	fixed	for	each	participant	so	that	the	description	task	was	always	
followed	by	the	emotion	task	and	then	the	final	rating	task.	Within	each	task	the	order	of	
presentation	of	the	face	types	was	randomised	to	control	for	order	effects.	While	it	was	
not	possible	to	screen	participants	for	naivety	about	the	UVE,	no	explicit	reference	to	the	
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theme	of	the	study	was	made	in	the	recruitment	notices.	None	of	the	participants	from	
Study	1	took	part	in	Study	2.		
Participants	
212	participants	were	recruited	to	take	part	in	the	online	study	website	hosted	at	the	
Open	University.	There	were	no	special	eligibility	requirements	so	it	was	possible	to	issue	
an	open	invitation	for	participation	which	recruited	members	of	staff	at	the	institution	
where	the	study	was	carried	out	and	social	networks	to	which	the	researcher	belonged.	
No	direct	contact	was	made	to	target	individuals	to	ask	them	to	take	part	and	all	
participants	volunteered	to	take	part	after	reading	messages	with	a	link	to	the	study	
which	were	posted	on	an	institutional	noticeboard,	on	an	online	blog	or	on	social	
networking	sites.	While	participants	were	not	screened	or	selected	for	age,	gender	or	
location,	they	were	asked	if	they	would	be	willing	to	leave	some	basic	demographic	
information	but	only	at	the	end	of	the	study	once	a	full	set	of	experimental	data	had	been	
collected.	67%	of	the	respondents	to	the	study	were	female,	most	were	aged	between	21	
and	40	and	most	reported	living	in	the	United	Kingdom.	A	full	breakdown	of	the	
responses	to	the	age	and	location	questions	is	shown	in	Appendix	1b.		
Materials	and	Presentation	
The	stimulus	materials	in	this	online	study	were	five	black	and	white	images	of	female	
faces.	All	five	images	were	standardised	to	show	the	same	portion	of	the	face.	They	were	
also	scaled	to	the	same	size	of	320x240	pixels.	This	size	was	chosen	after	testing	the	web	
pages	in	several	browsers	and	on	several	monitors	and	provided	a	clear	image	of	the	face	
while	still	allowing	space	in	the	rest	of	the	page	to	present	the	rating	scales	and	
accompanying	text.		
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Figure	9:	Five	face	types	presented	to	participants	in	this	study.		
The	online	study	pages	were	designed	to	display	the	faces	clearly	and	to	present	the	
relevant	task	in	a	way	that	participants	could	easily	answer.	Fonts	and	colours	were	
chosen	for	ease	of	reading	and	high	contrast.	The	pages	used	standard	HTML	code,	did	
not	require	participants	to	have	any	plug-ins	or	non-standard	components	and	were	
tested	in	a	range	of	different	web	browsers	to	maximise	the	number	of	people	who	
would	be	able	to	take	part.	The	development	of	the	study	pages	included	a	small	pilot	
phase	where	colleagues	tested	the	functionality	of	the	pages	in	different	browsers	after	
which	minor	changes	were	made	to	the	layout	to	improve	clarity.	The	pilot	testers	did	not	
take	part	in	the	final	experiment.		
The	experimental	part	of	the	study	was	presented	in	four	blocks,	as	detailed	in	the	
Procedure	section.	At	all	times	during	the	study,	participants	were	clearly	told	how	many	
images	they	had	seen	so	far	and	how	many	they	still	had	to	rate.	This	provided	a	count	of	
images	and	also	a	percentage	completion.	Progress	information	was	provided	as	a	way	to	
help	participants	remain	motivated	to	work	through	all	of	the	questions.	
Participants’	responses	were	stored	in	a	Lotus	Notes	database	hosted	at	the	Open	
University.	To	ensure	compliance	with	Data	Protection	legislation	individual	responses	
were	only	accessible	to	the	researcher	and	to	the	database	designer	while	the	study	was	
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live	and	once	the	final	results	had	been	passed	to	the	researcher	they	were	permanently	
deleted	from	the	database.	To	ensure	that	responses	to	the	survey	were	unique,	IP	
address	tracking	was	used	so	that	if	a	participant	came	back	to	complete	the	survey	from	
the	same	IP	address	they	were	told	that	their	responses	had	already	been	collected.		
Examples	of	the	pages	used	in	the	study	are	given	in	Appendix	1c.		
Procedure	
Participants	started	the	online	study	by	clicking	on	a	web	link	and	landing	on	the	study	
website.	This	consisted	of	three	sections:		
1)	Introductory	information	and	consent	screen.		
Once	participants	had	arrived	at	the	first	page	they	were	asked	to	read	through	an	
introduction	giving	details	of	what	the	tasks	would	involve.	They	were	asked	to	give	their	
consent	to	participate	and	were	reassured	of	their	right	to	withdraw	at	any	point.	They	
were	then	presented	with	the	overarching	scenario	for	the	study.	The	three	tasks	were	
presented	in	the	context	of	attending	an	imaginary	conference.	Participants	were	told:		
'For	the	purposes	of	this	study,	I	would	like	you	to	imagine	that	you	are	attending	a	
robotics	exhibition.	You	will	be	asked	to	carry	out	three	different	kinds	of	task	relating	to	
figures	that	you	encounter	while	you	are	at	the	exhibition.	I	will	then	ask	some	questions	
about	yourself,	but	these	will	only	be	used	to	analyse	your	answers	by	group	
characteristics,	never	to	identify	you	personally.	
Please	give	your	answers	honestly,	and	feel	free	to	use	as	much	detail	as	you	wish.	
There	are	no	right	or	wrong	answers	to	the	tasks.'	
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2)	Task	screens.		
All	task	screens	were	laid	out	to	present	the	image	of	the	face	in	the	upper	right	part	
of	the	screen,	with	the	question	on	the	upper	left	and	the	input	area	filling	the	lower	part	
of	the	screen.		
2A)	Description	task	screens.	
The	scenario	wording	was:	'You	arrive	at	the	exhibition	while	the	displays	are	
still	being	set	up.	You	start	to	look	around	while	you	are	waiting	for	your	
colleagues	to	arrive.	You	see	five	figures	that	you	would	really	like	them	to	take	a	
look	at,	but	you	know	that	they	will	be	in	a	hurry	when	they	get	here.	How	would	
you	describe	this	figure	so	that	your	colleagues	will	be	able	to	find	it	easily?'	
A	large	free	text	area	filled	the	lower	part	of	the	screen.	There	we	no	upper	or	
lower	limits	on	the	numbers	of	characters	that	participants	could	enter.		
2B)	Emotion	task	screens.	
The	scenario	wording	was:	'During	the	exhibition,	you	learn	that	these	figures	
are	all	prototypes	for	a	new	household	robot.	A	researcher	for	the	company	who	is	
building	the	robot	would	like	to	know	how	people	would	feel	about	having	each	of	
these	in	their	home.'	
The	free	text	area	was	presented	as	for	2a.		
2C)	Rating	screens.		
The	question	wording	was:	'At	the	end	of	the	exhibition,	you	are	asked	to	
complete	an	evaluation	of	the	five	figures	you	have	been	interested	in.	Please	can	
you	rate	each	of	them	on	the	following	scales.	Note	that	the	scales	may	vary	for	
each	question.	The	scale	points	are	not	numbered,	as	we	want	you	to	think	about	
feelings	rather	than	precise	numbers.'	
149	
 
A	radio-button	scale	was	presented	in	the	lower	part	of	the	screen.	The	scales	
were	as	described	in	the	Design	section:	text	labels	were	used	at	the	ends	of	the	
scale	but	the	individual	points	were	not	numbered.	There	were	15	rating	screens	
in	total	presenting	the	five	face	types	for	the	three	scales.		
3)	Demographic	Screens.		
Once	the	experiment	data	collection	was	complete,	participants	were	asked	some	
questions	about	basic	demographic	information	and	invited	to	leave	their	contact	details	
if	they	wanted	to	learn	more	about	the	project	in	the	future.		
Once	participants	had	clicked	a	final	button	to	save	their	answers	they	were	taken	to	
the	main	project	website	where	they	were	given	some	further	information	about	the	UVT	
and	the	purpose	of	the	study.	This	information	was	only	available	to	participants	who	had	
completed	all	of	the	questions	so	was	not	available	for	the	general	public	or	potential	
participants	to	find	by	accident	and	potentially	bias	their	responses	to	the	survey.		
Given	that	some	of	the	faces	used	in	the	task	had	the	potential	to	be	unsettling,	
participants	were	invited	to	make	contact	with	the	researcher	by	email	or	telephone	if	
they	were	disturbed	or	adversely	affected	at	any	point	during	their	participation.	While	
several	emails	were	received	from	participants	their	content	related	to	interest	about	the	
study	or	suggestions	for	future	research	directions	rather	than	any	areas	of	concern.	It	is	
therefore	reasonable	to	conclude	that	no	participants	experienced	adverse	effects	as	a	
result	of	taking	part	and	that	from	an	ethical	perspective	the	study	did	not	give	grounds	
for	concern.		
Content	Analysis	of	free	text	data	
The	description	and	emotion	tasks	in	this	study	were	designed	to	collect	rich	and	
detailed	qualitative	comments	about	the	different	face	types.	In	the	main,	the	scenarios	
that	featured	in	these	tasks	elicited	lengthy	responses	from	participants	and	some	
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participants	even	gave	answers	several	paragraphs	in	length.	In	order	to	analyse	these	
unstructured	responses	a	content	analysis	of	the	unstructured	data	was	performed.	This	
coding	approach	was	chosen	over	two	other	techniques,	semantic	resonance	mapping	
and	text	characteristic	analysis.	Hand-coded	content	analysis	was	chosen	as	it	offered	the	
greatest	level	of	engagement	with	the	detail	of	the	text	data	and	offered	the	richest	form	
of	output.	To	do	this,	the	dataset	was	manually	hand-coded	to	allocate	the	comment	
itself	to	a	designated	category	(e.g.	'Comment	uses	positive	emotion	terms')	or	to	tag	
individual	parts	of	the	comment	text	to	provide	counts	(e.g.	'Comment	mentions	eyes	
three	times,	mouth	once.').	The	categories	and	tags	were	designed	to	allow	evaluation	of	
the	extent	to	which	the	faces	were	being	processed	analytically	or	holistically	and	
whether	the	patterns	of	emotional	response	supported	the	idea	of	an	UVE.	For	example,	
to	explore	whether	participants	approached	the	description	task	analytically	or	
holistically,	the	number	of	times	the	following	attributes	were	mentioned	in	comments	
were	tagged	and	the	number	of	instances	counted:	Gender,	Race,	Age,	Face	as	a	whole,	
Eyes,	Mouth,	Nose,	Hair,	Skin,	Chin,	Cheek,	Ear,	Accessories.	References	to	these	
individual	features	could	then	be	aggregated	into	whether	the	description	was	analytic	or	
holistic	in	nature.	To	explore	whether	there	were	differences	in	participants	reacting	
negatively,	positively	or	neutrally	across	the	different	face	types,	comments	were	
categorised	according	to	those	three	dimensions,	or	put	into	a	‘neither’	or	‘multiple’	
category	where	applicable.	The	categories	were	also	designed	to	be	as	clearly	defined	as	
possible	to	allow	reliable	and	accurate	coding	with	several	phases	of	checking	built	in	to	
ensure	that	no	comments	had	been	mistakenly	coded	as	the	wrong	category.		
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3.3.3:	What	will	the	subjective	ratings	of	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness	
be	for	an	identified	collection	of	NHAs?		
3.3.3.1:	Results	
This	section	will	present	the	results	of	analyses	designed	to	explore	this	first	research	
question	by	testing	three	hypotheses.		
H1.	Face	type	will	have	a	significant	effect	on	the	ratings	of	human-likeness,	
strangeness	and	eeriness.	
The	ratings	on	each	scale	were	analysed	to	compare	five	face	types:	the	artificial	and	
human	anchor	points	were	compared	to	the	three	exemplar	faces,	one	drawn	from	each	
of	the	three	clusters,	as	illustrated	in	Figure	9.	Cluster	1	represented	low	human-likeness,	
high	strangeness/eeriness.	Cluster	2	represented	medium	human-likeness	
strangeness/eeriness	and	Cluster	3	represented	high	human-likeness,	low	
strangeness/eeriness.		
	
Figure	10:	Comparison	of	the	mean	rating	scales	for	each	face	type.		
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When	the	human-likeness	ratings	were	analysed	with	a	one-way	within-participants	
ANOVA,	Mauchley’s	test	indicated	that	the	assumptions	of	sphericity	had	been	violated:	
χ2(9)=49.47,	p	<	.0005,	and	so	degrees	of	freedom	were	corrected1	using	the	Huynh-Feldt	
estimates	of	sphericity	(ε=.92).	The	corrected	results	show	that	the	ratings	on	the	
mechanical-human	scale	were	significantly	affected	by	the	face	type:	
F(3.67,777.55)=1006.009,	p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	=	.83.	Post-hoc	paired	t-tests	using	
Bonferroni’s	correction	(10	comparisons,	p	threshold=0.005)	revealed	significant	
differences	between	nine	of	the	ten	possible	comparisons	with	only	the	Cluster	3-Human	
pair	not	showing	a	significant	difference	(p=.74).		
When	the	strangeness	ratings	were	analysed	with	a	one-way	within-participants	
ANOVA,	Mauchley’s	test	indicated	that	the	assumptions	of	sphericity	had	been	violated:	
χ2(9)=32.71,	p	<	.0005,	and	so	degrees	of	freedom	were	corrected	using	the	Huynh-Feldt	
estimates	of	sphericity	(ε=.94).	The	corrected	results	show	that	the	ratings	on	the	
eeriness	scale	were	significantly	affected	by	the	face	type:	F(3.75,792.16)=446.78,	p	<	
.0005,	partial	η2	=	.68.	Post-hoc	paired	t-tests	using	Bonferroni’s	correction	(10	
comparisons,	p	threshold=0.005)	revealed	significant	differences	between	nine	of	the	ten	
possible	comparisons	with	the	Cluster	3-Human	pair	not	showing	a	significant	difference	
(p=.101).		
The	eeriness	ratings	were	analysed	with	a	one-way	within-participants	ANOVA	and	
Mauchley’s	test	indicated	that	the	assumptions	of	sphericity	had	been	violated:	
																																																						
1	In	all	instances	where	assumptions	of	sphericity	are	violated,	the	correction	to	the	degrees	
of	freedom	was	chosen	based	on	the	value	of	ε,	following	Field	(2009).	Where	ε	is	over	.75,	the	
Huynh-Feldt	correction	has	been	used,	otherwise	the	Greenhouse-Geisser	correction	has	been	
used.	
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χ2(9)=83.17,	p	<	.0005,	and	so	degrees	of	freedom	were	corrected	using	the	Huynh-Feldt	
estimates	of	sphericity	(ε=.86).	The	corrected	results	show	that	the	ratings	on	the	
eeriness	scale	were	significantly	affected	by	the	face	type:	F(3.43,722.84)=472.53,	p	<	
.0005,	partial	η2	=	.69.	Post-hoc	paired	t-tests	using	Bonferroni’s	correction	(10	
comparisons,	p	threshold=0.005)	revealed	significant	differences	between	eight	of	the	
ten	possible	comparisons	with	the	Artificial-Human	and	Cluster	3-Human	faces	not	
showing	a	significant	difference.	
H2.	When	considering	the	ratings	for	each	agent,	the	following	patterns	of	correlation	
will	be	found:		
• Eeriness	and	strangeness	will	be	strongly	positively	correlated	
• Human-likeness	and	strangeness	will	be	strongly	negatively	correlated	
• Human-likeness	and	eeriness	will	be	strongly	negatively	correlated	
The	ratings	were	analysed	using	Spearman’s	rs	and	support	for	the	three	hypotheses	
was	found	although	the	strength	was	not	always	as	predicted.	There	was	indeed	a	
significant	positive	but	moderately	weak	correlation	between	eeriness	and	strangeness	
(rs=.496,	N=212,	p<0.001,	one-tailed,	explaining	25%	of	the	variance.)	A	significant	
negative	but	weak	correlation	was	found	between	human-likeness	and	strangeness	(rs=-
.262,	N=212,	p	<0.001,	one-tailed)	and	this	only	explained	7%	of	the	variance.	Finally,	a	
significant	negative	correlation	was	found	between	human-likeness	and	eeriness	(rs=-
.224,	N=212,	p<.0001,	one-tailed).	However,	this	is	a	weak	correlation,	explaining	only	5%	
of	the	variance.	
H3.	When	the	mean	human-likeness	and	strangeness	ratings	for	each	agent	are	
plotted,	the	strangeness	plot	will	show	a	deviation	from	a	linear	trend	between	the	50%	
and	100%	human	point.	
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This	was	not	demonstrated	in	the	results,	as	shown	in	Figure	11	below.	The	secondary	
curve	approximates	the	relationship	between	strangeness	and	human-likeness	that	would	
be	expected	in	an	UVE	where	strangeness	decreases	with	increasing	human-likeness	until	
the	midpoint	where	strangeness	sharply	increases.	It	is	an	inverse	version	of	Mori’s	curve	
which	measured	changes	in	familiarity	as	the	scale	used	in	Study	2’s	scale	had	strangeness	
at	the	highest	end	of	that	scale,	rather	than	familiarity.		
	
Figure	11:	Plot	of	mean	human-likeness	against	strangeness,	overlaid	with	the	curve	that	would	be	
expected	in	an	UVE.		
3.3.3.2:	Discussion	
This	initial	exploration	tested	three	hypotheses	of	whether	the	results	of	subjective	
ratings	for	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness	demonstrated	a	pattern	indicative	of	
the	UVE.	Firstly,	tests	were	carried	out	into	whether	the	different	face	types	would	be	
rated	significantly	differently	in	terms	of	their	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness.	
It	was	hypothesised	that	the	face	type	(defined	as	either	the	cluster	from	which	the	
exemplar	face	was	drawn	or	the	human/artificial	anchor)	would	have	a	significant	effect	
on	each	of	the	ratings,	and	also	predicted	patterns	for	the	nature	of	this	difference.	(These	
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are	the	same	correlations	and	plots	predicted	in	Study	1	above	and	grounded	in	Mori’s	UV	
graph	and	MacDorman’s	(2006)	scales	derived	from	this,	so	the	rationale	for	these	
predictions	is	the	same.)	
To	explore	H1,	the	findings	of	Study	1	predicted	that	the	Cluster	1	face	type	would	
have	low	human-likeness,	the	Cluster	2	face	type	mid	human-likeness	and	the	Cluster	3	
face	type	high	human-likeness.	As	anchors	deliberately	chosen	for	their	artificial	or	
human	nature,	it	would	be	expected	that	the	Artificial	face	would	be	rated	as	the	least	
human-like	and	the	Human	face	type	as	the	most	human-like.	The	Human	anchor	face	
was	rated	overall	as	slightly	less	human-like	than	the	Cluster	3	face	with	a	mean	rating	of	
8.37	rather	than	8.41	but	the	post-hoc	testing	demonstrated	that	this	difference	was	not	
statistically	significant.	It	is	possible	that	given	the	highly	realistic	nature	of	the	Cluster	3	
picture,	participants	may	have	had	difficulty	perceiving	her	as	anything	other	than	
human.		
The	results	of	Study	1	predicted	that	the	Cluster	1	face	type	would	have	high	
strangeness,	the	Cluster	2	face	type	mid	strangeness	and	the	Cluster	3	face	type	low	
strangeness.	The	anchor	faces	were	not	included	in	that	study	but	as	human	faces	should	
not	appear	strange	to	participants	while	robot	faces	may	well	be	found	to	be	strange,	it	
could	be	expected	that	the	human	face	would	have	a	low	strangeness	rating	and	the	
robot	face	a	moderate	strangeness	rating.	As	with	the	human-likeness	ratings,	the	ratings	
found	in	this	study	did	support	this	pattern	with	one	small	difference	as	Cluster	2	was	
rated	as	stranger	than	would	have	been	predicted	as	a	mean	of	7	represents	a	high	rather	
than	mid	rating.	The	Cluster	3	and	Human	face	types	were	the	only	non-significant	pair	in	
the	post-hoc	analysis	and	the	Human	face	was	rated	as	slightly	stranger	than	the	Cluster	3	
face	but	as	was	suggested	in	the	human-likeness	ratings,	participants	may	have	had	
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difficulty	in	making	distinct	ratings	of	strangeness	for	two	faces	that	did	appear	similarly	
human-like.		
The	clusters	derived	from	Study	1	were	identified	when	human-likeness	was	plotted	
against	strangeness	rather	than	plotting	it	against	eeriness	but	as	eeriness	was	positively	
correlated	with	strangeness	so	it	can	be	expected	that	the	eeriness	ratings	should	follow	
a	similar	pattern	to	that	of	strangeness,	with	high	eeriness	for	Cluster	1,	mid	for	Cluster	2	
and	low	for	Cluster	3.	The	results	here	do	support	that	pattern.		
Correlations	between	pairs	of	the	measures	were	considered	in	this	study	to	test	H2,	
and	while	the	predicted	significant	correlations	were	found	in	the	expected	directions,	it	
was	found	that	these	correlations	were	generally	weak.	As	with	the	results	of	the	Study	1,	
the	strongest	of	the	three	was	a	positive	correlation	between	eeriness	and	strangeness,	
explaining	25%	of	the	variance.	The	negative	strangeness	and	human-likeness,	and	
eeriness	and	human-likeness	correlations	explained	only	7%	and	5%	of	the	variance	
respectively.	It	is	therefore	prudent	to	treat	these	results	with	caution,	and	even	though	
they	were	found	to	be	significant,	to	consider	whether	it	would	be	valid	to	extrapolate	
beyond	these	findings	to	more	general	conclusions	relating	to	the	relationship	between	
these	variables.		
The	final	hypothesis	(H3)	proposed	that	when	the	mean	human-likeness	and	
strangeness	ratings	for	each	face	are	plotted,	the	strangeness	plot	will	show	a	deviation	
from	a	linear	trend	between	the	50%	and	100%	human	point.	No	such	plot	was	found	as	
the	strangeness	ratings	peaked	with	the	Cluster	1	faces,	which	were	not	rated	as	
particularly	close	to	human.	The	Human	and	Cluster	3	faces	were	both	rated	low	for	
eeriness.	However,	the	Cluster	2	face	had	been	identified	as	a	likely	candidate	for	an	
uncanny	response	based	on	a	review	of	MacDorman’s	(2006)	results	and	the	results	from	
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this	study	did	support	those	criteria:	the	Cluster	2	face	was	rated	having	a	mean	eeriness	
of	over	4.5	for	human-likeness	as	well	as	a	mean	eeriness	and	strangeness	of	over	6.	
3.3.4:	When	asked	to	describe	the	faces	of	five	NHAs,	which	features	will	be	
emphasised	and	how	will	this	compare	to	the	descriptions	of	human	and	non-human	
comparison	faces?		
3.3.4.1:	Results	
This	section	will	explore	two	hypotheses	about	how	participants	would	describe	the	
different	face	types.		
H4.	When	descriptions	are	analysed	for	the	frequency	of	types	of	descriptive	term,	
there	will	be	a	significant	difference	between	the	frequency	of	terms	describing	the	whole	
face	compared	to	those	describing	individual	features.	The	rationale	for	this	hypothesis	is	
to	begin	to	explore	whether	there	is	a	relationship	between	levels	of	human-likeness	and	
how	faces	are	processed	and	particularly	whether	there	was	any	evidence	that	NHFs	were	
processed	analytically	rather	than	holistically.	At	this	stage,	while	this	was	an	area	of	
interest,	there	was	no	suggestion	from	the	supporting	literature	that	there	would	be	a	
specific	pattern	of	response	by	human-likeness,	so	no	specific	predictions	were	made	
about	the	nature	of	that	difference.		
The	free	text	descriptions	about	each	face	type	were	analysed	to	count	how	
frequently	key	terms	were	used.	These	were	either	specific	facial	features	(e.g.	eyes,	nose,	
mouth,	chin)	or	general	attributes	about	the	agent	(e.g.	female,	middle-aged,	Caucasian).	
The	frequency	of	terms	used	to	describe	each	face	type	were	aggregated	to	give	totals	of	
analytic	and	holistic	descriptions.	The	sum	of	references	to	eyes,	nose,	mouth	and	chin	
formed	the	analytic	description	total	and	the	sum	of	references	to	age,	gender,	ethnicity,	
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or	the	word	‘face’	created	the	holistic	description	total.	Table	5	presents	the	means	and	
standard	deviations	of	the	frequencies	of	each	key	term	for	the	five	face	types.	
	
Table	5:	Mean	frequencies	of	references	to	key	terms	for	five	face	types.		
These	totals	were	analysed	using	a	two-way	within-participants	ANOVA.	A	5	x	2	design	
was	employed	with	five	levels	of	the	face	type	factor	(Artificial,	Cluster	1,	Cluster	2,	
Cluster	3	and	Human)	and	two	levels	of	description	type	factor	(analytic	and	holistic).	The	
interaction	between	face	type	and	description	type	was	significant:	F(3.8,801.5)=89.78,	p	
<	.0005,	partial	η2	=	.29.	Sphericity	had	been	violated	for	this	interaction:	χ2(9)=33.1,	p	<	
.0001,	ε=.95	so	Huynh-Feldt	corrections	were	used	for	the	degrees	of	freedom.	For	the	
main	effect	of	face	type,	Mauchley’s	test	indicated	that	the	assumption	of	sphericity	had	
been	violated:	χ2(9)=26.1,	p	<	.0001,	ε=.96.	Using	corrected	degrees	of	freedom	according	
to	the	Huynh-Feldt	estimates	of	sphericity,	the	results	showed	a	significant	effect	of	face	
type:	F(3.83,809.7)=12.98,	p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	=	.06.	The	main	effect	of	description	type	
was	also	significant:	F(1,211)=20.74,	p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	=	.09.		
The	interaction	graph	in	Figure	12	has	been	produced	to	illustrate	the	relationship	
between	the	variables.		
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Figure	12:	Holistic	terms	were	most	frequently	used	when	describing	the	Human	and	Cluster	3	faces,	
analytic	terms	for	the	Cluster	2	face.		
Artificial	and	Cluster	1	faces	were	described	using	mainly	analytic	terms	with	the	
other	three	face	types	showing	different	patterns	where	a	mix	of	analytic	and	holistic	
terms	were	used.	Participants	used	a	lot	of	analytic	terms	to	describe	the	Cluster	2	face,	
but	holistic	terms	were	used	as	well.	The	Cluster	3	face	showed	the	inverse	pattern	to	the	
Artificial	and	Cluster	1	faces,	with	considerably	more	holistic	descriptions	than	analytic	
descriptions.	The	human	face	had	a	high	number	of	holistic	terms,	as	was	expected,	but	
also	a	high	number	of	analytic	terms.	
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	H5.	When	the	descriptions	are	analysed	for	the	frequency	of	references	to	different	
facial	features,	the	eyes	will	be	mentioned	most	frequently	for	the	moderately	human	face	
(Cluster	2).	
There	was	a	significant	difference	between	the	face	types:	when	analysed	with	a	one-
way	within-participants	ANOVA,	Mauchley’s	test	indicated	that	the	assumptions	of	
sphericity	had	been	violated:	χ2(9)=47.13,	p	<	.0005,	and	so	degrees	of	freedom	were	
corrected	using	the	Huynh-Feldt	estimates	of	sphericity	(ε=.941).	The	corrected	results	
show	that	face	type	was	a	significant	factor	in	the	frequency	of	descriptions	of	eyes:	
F(3.766,722.84)=76.58,	p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	=.266.	Figure	13	below	shows	the	mean	
number	of	references	to	eyes	for	each	face	type.	
	 	
Figure	13:	Mean	number	of	references	to	eyes	used	when	describing	the	five	different	face	types.		
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Examination	of	the	repeated	contrasts	for	face	type	found	significant	differences	
between	three	of	the	four	possible	comparisons	with	only	the	Artificial	and	Cluster	1	pair	
emerging	as	non-significant.	(p=.212)	(Cluster	1	to	Cluster	2:	F(1,211)=13.20,	p	<	.0005,	
partial	η2	=.059,	Cluster	2	to	Cluster	3:	F(1,211)=130.47,	p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	=.38,	Cluster	3	
to	Human:	F(1,211)=54.70,	p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	=.21)		
It	can	be	concluded	that	there	was	a	significant	difference	in	the	number	of	
references	to	eyes	between	all	the	face	types	except	for	the	artificial	and	the	Cluster	1	
face,	which	was	the	low-human,	high-eeriness	face.	There	was	no	significant	difference	in	
the	number	of	eye	references	between	those	clusters.	However,	the	hypothesis	that	eyes	
would	be	mentioned	most	often	for	the	moderately	human	face	drawn	from	Cluster	2	
was	not	supported:	the	face	type	with	the	highest	frequency	of	references	to	eyes	was	
Artificial	(M=1.18)	rather	than	the	hypothesised	moderately-human	Cluster	2	face	
(M=0.87).		
3:3:4:2:	Discussion	
The	analyses	in	this	section	explored	whether	there	was	any	evidence	from	the	open	
comments	to	demonstrate	whether	participants	used	generally	holistic	or	analytic	terms	
to	describe	the	different	faces,	based	on	open	comments	given	by	participants	in	
response	to	a	question	asking	how	they	would	approach	the	task	of	describing	each	
agent.		
H4	explored	which	features	would	feature	prominently	in	the	descriptions	of	the	NHFs	
and	how	they	would	compare	with	the	features	used	to	describe	the	human	and	non-
human	faces.	H4	quantified	this	question	to	explore	whether	there	would	be	a	significant	
difference	between	the	frequency	of	terms	describing	the	whole	face	compared	to	those	
describing	individual	features.	Evidence	that	participants	were	focused	particularly	on	
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certain	features,	or	were	generally	using	descriptions	of	facial	features	rather	than	of	an	
impression	of	the	overall	face	when	describing	the	NHFs	compared	to	the	human	or	non-
human	faces	would	support	the	theory	that	human-likeness	has	an	effect	on	how	faces	
are	processed.	No	specific	predictions	were	made	about	the	nature	of	that	difference	as	
although	anecdotal	evidence	suggests	certain	patterns	of	concentration,	there	was	no	
suggestion	from	the	supporting	literature	relating	the	UVE	to	patterns	of	human-likeness,	
eeriness	and	analytic	processing,	so	no	specific	predictions	were	made	about	the	nature	
of	that	difference.		
A	significant	interaction	was	found	between	face	type	and	the	type	of	description	
term	used.	Analytic	terms	were	used	most	for	the	Artificial,	Cluster	1	and	Cluster	2	faces,	
and	were	used	least	used	for	the	Cluster	3	faces	with	a	moderate	number	used	for	the	
Human	faces.	Holistic	terms	were	used	most	for	the	Cluster	3	and	Human	faces,	least	for	
the	Artificial	and	Cluster	1	faces,	and	moderately	used	for	Cluster	2.	It	is	possible	to	
separate	the	face	types	into	two	groups	in	terms	of	term	use	as	the	Artificial,	Cluster	1	
and	Cluster	3	faces	were	described	in	either	analytic	or	holistic	terms	but	the	Human	and	
Cluster	2	terms	did	not	show	such	a	clear	distinction	between	the	terms	used.	Of	the	
three	images,	the	Cluster	2	face	was	the	one	identified	as	the	potential	UV	candidate	
image	as	it	sat	in	a	region	of	medium	strangeness	and	eeriness	and	medium	human-
likeness,	so	this	finding	could	be	due	to	UV	images	being	harder	to	describe	and	that	
there	was	less	of	a	consensus	in	the	approach	taken	to	describe	the	faces.	However,	the	
human	face	was	also	described	in	both	analytic	and	holistic	terms,	and	as	this	was	the	
face	introduced	as	an	anchor	for	comparison	this	was	an	unexpected	finding.	It	should	be	
noted	that	these	findings	may	have	been	due	to	the	specific	characteristics	of	the	images	
that	were	used	in	the	study.		
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H5	explored	whether	the	UV	candidate	face	drawn	from	Cluster	2	faces	would	have	
the	highest	number	of	references	to	eyes	when	compared	to	the	other	clusters.	This	
hypothesis	is	grounded	in	the	idea	that	it	may	be	an	aspect	of	how	eyes	are	presented	
that	can	make	NHFs	eerie.	The	Cluster	2	image,	as	a	moderately	human	and	moderately	
strange/eerie	face	was	drawn	from	the	cluster	containing	the	most	likely	UV	candidates,	
and	so	it	was	predicted	that	the	references	to	eyes	would	be	highest	for	this	cluster.	While	
a	significant	difference	in	the	number	of	references	to	eyes	was	found	in	the	results,	that	
particular	hypothesis	was	not	supported	as	eyes	were	mentioned	most	frequently	for	the	
Artificial	face.		
The	method	used	in	this	study	was	to	review	the	comments	made	by	participants	and	
allocate	them	to	different	categories,	which	could	then	be	used	for	analysis	to	see	
whether	there	were	significant	differences	in	term	usage	for	each	of	the	five	faces.	While	
this	is	a	valid	and	useful	way	of	distilling	a	large	body	of	qualitative	data	to	allow	
comparisons	to	be	drawn,	it	is	useful	to	be	critically	reflective	at	this	stage	about	how	the	
comments	were	allocated.	In	designing	this	study,	choices	were	made	in	how	references	
should	be	allocated	to	individual	categories	and	then	in	how	those	should	be	grouped	
further	into	the	over-arching	categories	of	whether	each	face	was	being	perceived	in	a	
broadly	analytic	or	holistic	manner.	It	could	be	argued	that	some	of	the	categories	
selected	as	evidence	of	holistic	processing	(for	example,	race)	could	equally	have	been	
allocated	to	the	analytic	category	as	they	can	be	used	as	a	way	to	convey	a	perception	of	
aspects	of	the	face.	Different	design	choices	may	have	led	to	some	different	conclusions	at	
the	overarching	category	level.	This	study	has	also	taken	the	view	that	the	approaches	
participants	use	to	describe	or	react	to	the	images	they	see	can	be	used	through	this	
process	of	distillation	to	extrapolate	indicators	of	how	the	images	are	actually	being	
processed.	It	is	acknowledged	that	this	involves	several	steps	that	must	have	occurred	
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between	the	way	that	the	image	was	actually	processed	and	the	participant’s	ability	to	
reflect	this	in	their	behaviour	through	their	comments.	However,	the	studies	that	follow	in	
Phase	2	and	Phase	3	will	take	a	more	rigorous	and	experimental	approach	to	build	on	
these	findings	and	ensure	that	more	direct,	and	less	exploratory,	conclusions	can	be	
drawn.		
These	findings	may	be	indicative	of	differences	between	how	people	process	human,	
near-human,	and	artificial	faces	but	as	this	study	examined	one	example	of	each	face	type	
so	further	research	would	be	required	to	ascertain	whether	such	processing	differences	
can	be	generally	applied	to	NHAs.		
3.3.5:	When	considering	a	hypothetical	social	encounter	with	the	NHAs,	what	terms	
will	be	used	to	express	how	people	would	feel	about	this	and	which	emotions	will	
characterise	their	reactions?	
3.3.5.1:	Results	
This	section	will	explore	two	hypotheses	about	social	encounters	with	NHAs.		
H6.	The	response	descriptions	will	be	analysed	for	how	frequently	positive,	negative	
and	neutral	emotion	terms	are	used	to	describe	each	face:		
a.	The	highest	frequency	of	negative	emotions	will	be	used	for	the	moderately	human	
face	type.		
b.	The	lowest	frequency	of	positive	emotions	will	be	used	for	the	moderately	human	
face	type.		
c.	There	will	be	no	significant	difference	in	the	number	of	neutral	emotion	terms	used	
for	each	face	type.		
Participant’s	comments	about	how	they	would	feel	sharing	their	home	with	each	of	
the	NHAs	were	categorised	according	to	key	terms	relating	to	emotions.	These	were	first	
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coded	as	references	to	individual	emotions	(e.g.	happy,	angry,	excited,	sad)	and	then	
aggregated	into	categories	of	positive,	negative	or	neutral.	Table	23,	Table	24,	and	Table	
25	in	Appendix	1d	present	the	frequencies	of	individual	positive,	negative	and	neutral	
terms	used	for	each	face	type	and	Table	6	below	shows	the	mean	and	standard	deviation	
for	the	aggregate	categories	of	each	emotion.		
	
Table	6:	Mean	frequencies	of	references	to	key	emotion	terms	for	five	face	types.		
Figure	14	depicts	the	means	of	the	positive,	negative	and	neutral	frequencies	for	each	
face	type	as	a	bar	chart	for	ease	of	comparison.		
	
Figure	14:	Bar	chart	comparing	mean	frequencies	of	references	to	key	terms	for	five	face	types.		
To	investigate	H6a,	the	frequency	of	negative	emotions	was	analysed	using	a	one-way	
within-participants	ANOVA.	There	was	a	significant	difference	between	the	face	types.	
When	analysed	with	a	one-way	within-participants	ANOVA,	Mauchley’s	test	indicated	that	
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the	assumptions	of	sphericity	had	been	violated:	χ2(9)=59.70,	p	<	.0005,	and	so	degrees	
of	freedom	were	corrected	using	the	Huynh-Feldt	estimates	of	sphericity	(ε=.90).	The	
corrected	results	show	that	face	type	was	a	significant	factor	in	the	frequency	of	negative	
emotions	used	to	describe	each	face	type:	F(3.61,762.03)=100.93,	p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	
=.32.	Examination	of	the	repeated	contrasts	for	face	type	found	significant	differences	
between	all	of	the	four	possible	comparisons:	Artificial	to	Cluster	1:	F(1,211)=217.79,	p	<	
.0005,	partial	η2	=.51,	Cluster	1	to	Cluster	2:	F(1,211)=38.75,	p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	=.16,	
Cluster	2	to	Cluster	3:	F(1,211)=85.37,	p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	=.29,	Cluster	3	to	Human:	
F(1,211)=10.74,	p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	=.05.	However,	the	face	type	with	the	highest	
frequency	of	negative	references	was	Cluster	1	(M=1.0)	rather	than	the	hypothesised	
moderately-human	Cluster	2	face	(M=0.65).		
To	investigate	H6b,	the	frequency	of	positive	emotions	was	analysed	using	a	one-way	
within-participants	ANOVA.	There	was	a	significant	difference	between	the	face	types.	
Mauchley’s	test	indicated	that	the	assumptions	of	sphericity	had	been	violated:	
χ2(9)=310.6,	p	<	.0005,	and	so	degrees	of	freedom	were	corrected	using	the	Greenhouse-
Geisser	estimates	of	sphericity	(ε=.66).	The	corrected	results	show	that	face	type	was	a	
significant	factor	in	the	frequency	of	positive	emotions	used	to	describe	each	face	type:	
F(2.66,562.1)=48.24,	p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	=.18.	Examination	of	the	repeated	contrasts	for	
face	type	found	significant	differences	between	all	of	the	four	possible	comparisons:	
Artificial	to	Cluster	1:	F(1,211)=94.62,	p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	=.31,	Cluster	1	to	Cluster	2:	
F(1,211)=12.9,	p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	=.06,	Cluster	2	to	Cluster	3:	F(1,211)=77.12,	p	<	.0005,	
partial	η2	=.27,	Cluster	3	to	Human:	F(1,211)=18.14,	p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	=.08	However,	the	
face	type	with	the	lowest	frequency	of	positive	references	was	Cluster	1	(M=0.1)	rather	
than	the	hypothesised	moderately-human	Cluster	2	face	(M=0.08).		
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To	investigate	H6c,	the	frequency	of	neutral	emotions	was	analysed	using	a	one-way	
within-participants	ANOVA.	There	was	a	significant	difference	between	the	face	types	
which	did	not	support	the	original	hypothesis	which	predicted	that	while	the	number	of	
positive	and	negative	emotions	would	vary,	there	would	be	no	difference	for	the	neutral	
emotions:	Mauchley’s	test	indicated	that	the	assumptions	of	sphericity	had	been	violated:	
χ2(9)=72.5,	p	<	.0005,	and	so	degrees	of	freedom	were	corrected	using	the	Greenhouse-
Geisser	estimates	of	sphericity	(ε=.87).	The	corrected	results	show	that	face	type	was	a	
significant	factor	in	the	frequency	of	neutral	emotions	used	to	describe	each	face	type:	
F(3.49,737.65)=6.31,	p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	=.29.	Examination	of	the	repeated	contrasts	for	
face	type	found	significant	differences	between	two	of	the	four	possible	comparisons:	
Artificial	to	Cluster	1	(F(1,211)=15.13,	p	<	.0005)	and	Cluster	1	to	Cluster	2	
(F(1,211)=16.13,	p	<	.0005).	(Cluster	2	to	Cluster	3	and	Cluster	3	to	Human	were	not	
significant,	p=.55	and	p=.04	respectively.)		
H7.	Emotion	terms	synonymous	with	eeriness	or	unease	will	be	highest	for	the	
moderately	human	face	type.		
To	explore	this	hypothesis,	the	keywords	used	in	each	comment	were	examined	to	
derive	a	count	of	the	number	of	references	to	eeriness,	unease	or	a	synonymous	term	for	
each	face	type2.	Table	7	below	shows	the	means	and	standard	deviations	for	the	
frequency	of	eeriness	synonyms	for	each	face	type.		
	
																																																						
2	These	were:	creeped/creeps/creepy;	disconcerted;	disturbed/disturbing;	eerie;	freaked/freaky;	
frightened/frightening;	haunted;	nervous;	nightmarish;	scared;	spooked;	uneasy;	unnerved;	unsettled.	
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Table	7:	Mean	references	to	terms	synonymous	with	eeriness	for	each	face	type.		
When	analysed	using	a	one-way	within-participants	ANOVA,	there	was	a	significant	
difference	between	the	face	types	in	terms	of	the	number	of	references	to	eeriness	or	
synonymous	terms.	Mauchley’s	test	indicated	that	the	assumptions	of	sphericity	had	been	
violated:	χ2(9)=105.78,	p	<	.0005,	and	so	degrees	of	freedom	were	corrected	using	the	
Greenhouse-Geisser	estimates	of	sphericity	(ε=.80).	The	corrected	results	show	that	face	
type	was	a	significant	factor	in	the	frequency	of	eeriness	synonyms	used	to	describe	each	
face	type:	F(3.23,681.82)=81.68,	p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	=.28.	Examination	of	the	repeated	
contrasts	for	face	type	found	significant	differences	between	three	of	the	four	possible	
comparisons:	Artificial	to	Cluster	1:	F(1,211)=195.01,	p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	=.48,	Cluster	1	to	
Cluster	2:	F(1,211)=46.17,	p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	=.18,	Cluster	2	to	Cluster	3:	F(1,211)=38.99,	
p	<	.0005,	partial	η2	=.16.	The	comparison	of	Cluster	3	to	Human	was	not	significant,	
p=.26.)	However,	the	face	type	with	the	most	references	to	terms	synonymous	with	
eeriness	was	the	Cluster	1	face,	rather	than	Cluster	2	as	hypothesised.		
3.3.5.2:	Discussion	
This	section	of	the	study	used	measures	derived	from	the	open	comments	given	by	
participants	about	their	feelings	on	potential	social	encounters	with	NHAs.	As	such	it	
represents	an	exploration	of	emotional	responses,	and	serves	as	an	indication	for	further	
research.	It	used	two	hypotheses	to	explore	the	terms	that	participants	would	use	to	
describe	how	they	might	feel	in	an	encounter	with	an	NHA,	and	also	explored	specified	
patterns	of	response	terms.		
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The	first	of	the	two	hypotheses	explored	in	this	section	was	that	three	patterns	would	
be	found	in	terms	of	the	type	of	emotion	terms	used	for	each	face	type.	The	rationale	for	
these	predictions	is	that	the	moderately	human	face	was	drawn	from	the	cluster	
containing	the	three	best	UV	candidates	and	the	concept	of	the	UV	requires	that	there	is	a	
negative	or	unsettling	emotional	component	to	the	response	to	NHFs	which	would	predict	
that	the	moderately	human	face	would	be	described	more	negatively	and	less	positively.		
H6	was	explored	in	three	parts:		
a.	The	highest	frequency	of	negative	emotions	will	be	used	for	the	moderately	human	
face	type.		
A	significant	difference	was	found	here,	but	the	highest	number	of	negative	
descriptions	was	actually	found	for	the	low	human-like/highly	strange	and	eerie	(Cluster	
1)	face	rather	than	the	moderately	human	face.		
b.	The	lowest	frequency	of	positive	emotions	will	be	used	for	the	moderately	human	
face	type.		
The	finding	above	was	mirrored	for	the	lowest	frequency	of	positive	emotions,	with	
the	Cluster	1	face	receiving	the	lowest	frequency	of	positive	emotions.	While	it	may	be	a	
common-sense	assumption	that	these	two	would	represent	opposites	in	the	analysis,	it	is	
still	a	reassuring	finding	that	the	results	do	indeed	bear	this	out,	and	it	adds	validity	to	the	
measurement	scales	and	tasks	that	were	employed	in	the	study.		
c.	There	will	be	no	significant	difference	in	the	number	of	neutral	emotion	terms	used	
for	each	face	type.		
This	hypothesis	predicted	that	neutral	terms	would	be	used	equally	for	all	of	the	face	
types,	but	it	was	found	that	this	was	not	the	case.	More	neutral	terms	were	used	for	the	
human	face	than	any	other.		
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H7	was	a	direct	exploration	of	the	linguistic	terms	that	were	used	by	participants	in	
describing	the	different	faces	and	served	as	a	method	for	testing	the	extent	to	which	the	
different	face	types	were	being	described	in	terms	synonymous	with	eeriness	and	unease.	
It	serves	as	a	more	direct	check	of	whether	the	UV	candidate	face	type	was	actually	
described	as	more	eerie	when	viewed	by	participants.	As	the	moderately	human	cluster	
(Cluster	2)	was	predicted	to	contain	the	most	likely	candidate	images	for	eliciting	an	UVE,	
it	was	predicted	that	terms	synonymous	with	eeriness	would	be	most	frequent	for	that		
face.	Emotion	terms	synonymous	with	eeriness	or	unease	will	be	highest	for	the	
moderately	human	face	type.	Following	the	findings	above,	a	significant	difference	was	
found	but	it	was	the	Cluster	1	face	where	participants	used	terms	synonymous	with	
eeriness	to	describe	the	face.		
3.3.6:	How	will	the	ratings	of	eeriness	relate	to	the	identified	features	and	emotions?		
3.3.6.1:	Results	
The	results	so	far	have	considered	aspects	of	the	scale-based	ratings	of	human-
likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness	as	well	as	the	methods	used	by	participants	in	
describing	each	face	type	and	saying	how	they	would	feel	about	sharing	their	home	with	
the	different	NHAs.	The	final	results	section	for	this	chapter	will	consider	the	eeriness	
measure	in	more	detail:	as	it	is	core	to	the	UVE	theory,	three	potential	relationships	
between	eeriness	and	other	measures	derived	in	this	study	will	be	considered	using	
correlational	methods.		
H8.	There	will	be	a	correlation	between	ratings	of	eeriness	and	the	frequency	of	
descriptions	referring	to	individual	features	rather	than	to	the	whole	face.		
H9.	There	will	be	a	positive	correlation	between	ratings	of	eeriness	and	the	frequency	
of	references	to	eyes.	
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H10.	Eeriness	will	be	positively	correlated	with	the	proportion	of	descriptions	
containing	a	word	synonymous	with	uncanniness.		
These	three	hypotheses	were	explored	using	Spearman’s	rs	correlations.	The	results	of	
the	correlations	are	summarised	in	Table	8	below.	
	
Table	8:	Summary	of	correlation	results	for	H8,	H9	and	H10	
Six	of	the	fifteen	correlations	were	found	to	be	significant.	It	can	be	seen	that	only	H10	
was	fully	supported	across	each	of	the	five	face	types,	with	the	proportion	of	terms	
synonymous	with	uncanniness	being	significantly	and	positively	correlated	with	eeriness.	
However,	these	correlations	were	not	strong,	with	the	highest	for	the	Artificial	cluster	
explaining	only	15.05%	of	the	variance.	The	other	significant	correlation	related	to	H9,	as	
a	significant	negative	correlation	was	found	between	the	number	of	references	to	eyes	
and	eeriness	for	the	Cluster	2	face	type.	
3.3.6.1:	Discussion	
The	final	exploration	in	this	study	looked	across	the	different	tasks	to	understand	the	
relationship	between	eeriness	ratings	for	each	face	type	and	the	measured	frequency	of	
references	to	individual	features	as	opposed	to	whole	face	descriptors,	references	to	eyes,	
and	emotional	responses	containing	words	synonymous	with	eeriness.	
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Firstly,	H8	predicted	that	a	significant	correlation	would	be	found	between	ratings	of	
eeriness	and	the	frequency	of	descriptions	referring	to	individual	features	rather	than	to	
the	whole	face.	The	rationale	for	this	question	is	to	test	the	concept	that	eerier	faces	are	
processed	analytically	rather	than	holistically,	as	described	in	H4,	but	the	difference	with	
this	hypothesis	is	that	it	uses	the	eeriness	ratings	for	each	face	rather	than	making	a	
prediction	based	on	the	moderately	human	face	type	as	the	potential	UV	candidate.	This	
was	explored	as	a	two-tailed	hypothesis	as	while	a	difference	was	expected,	the	literature	
did	not	support	a	prediction	of	the	nature	of	this	difference.	However,	this	hypothesis	was	
not	supported	as	no	significant	relationships	were	found	between	eeriness	and	term	
usage	for	any	of	the	face	types.			
The	concept	was	explored	in	more	detail	in	H9	which	predicted	that	there	would	be	a	
positive	correlation	between	ratings	of	eeriness	and	the	frequency	of	references	to	eyes:	
this	develops	the	concept	detailed	in	H5	above	that	one	of	the	explanations	for	the	
eeriness	in	the	UVE	may	be	some	aspect	of	eye	appearance	where	higher	ratings	of	
eeriness	are	linked	to	referring	to	the	eyes	more	in	the	description.	These	were	only	
significantly	correlated	for	one	face	type,	Cluster	2.	However,	this	was	a	weak	negative	
correlation	rather	than	a	positive	one	as	predicted.		
Finally,	in	H10	it	was	hypothesised	that	ratings	of	eeriness	would	be	positively	
correlated	with	the	proportion	of	descriptions	containing	a	word	synonymous	with	
uncanniness.	The	rationale	here	was	to	examine	whether	the	eeriness	ratings	were	in	line	
with	the	emotional	response	behaviour	as	it	would	be	expected	that	as	rated	eeriness	
increases,	so	would	the	emotional	response	behaviour.	Support	was	found	for	this	
hypothesis,	with	a	significant	and	positive	correlation	found	for	each	of	the	five	face	
types.	This	helps	to	provide	evidence	that	the	eeriness	scale	is	robustly	measuring	that	
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aspect	of	the	UVE	and	adds	to	the	reliability	of	this	scale	as	an	instrument	for	investigating	
uncanniness.		
	The	implications	for	these	findings	in	terms	of	the	UV	and	face	perception	literature	
will	now	be	considered	in	a	general	discussion	of	the	studies	which	have	been	carried	out	
in	this	first	phase	of	research.		
3.4:	General	Discussion	of	Phase	1	
Phase	1	started	with	the	basic	concept	of	Mori’s	UVE	and	then	looked	at	how	it	could	
be	operationalised	to	see	whether	there	was	indeed	a	relationship	between	the	human-
likeness	of	an	agent	and	how	people	viewing	that	agent	would	respond.	It	was	designed	
to	address	a	knowledge	gap	in	that	although	a	UVE	could	be	elicited	as	a	function	of	
increasing	human-likeness,	there	was	insufficient	psychological	evidence	explaining	why	it	
occurred	or	a	detailed	description	of	the	emotional	response	itself.	This	study	collected	
quantitative	and	qualitative	data	as	a	first	step	in	answering	this	question,	posed	by	Pollick	
(2009):		
'what	bit	of	the	human	response	to	these	artefacts	is	the	essential	aspect	of	its	
uncanny	nature?'	(p76)	
Similarly,	Steckenfinger	and	Ghazanfar	(2009)	asked	which	aspects	of	the	appearance	
of	NHAs	elicit	our	expectations	of	human	appearance	and	behaviour	but	then	fail	to	live	
up	to	those	expectations.	As	described	in	the	design	principles	for	investigating	the	UVE,	
(Table	1	in	Section	3.1)	the	first	step	towards	doing	this	is	to	operationalise	the	key	
variables	of	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness	and	test	these	with	examples	of	
NHAs,	which	could	potentially	display	uncanny	properties.	It	was	possible	to	predict	the	
nature	of	the	relationship	between	those	variables	from	the	UVE	literature	described	in	
Section	1.1,	1.2	and	1.3	and	to	test	whether	NHAs	would	elicit	corresponding	ratings	of	
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strangeness	and	eeriness.	Ratings	of	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness	were	
collected	for	twenty	NHFs,	from	which	three	images	were	identified	for	further	
exploration,	along	with	two	similar	anchor	images.	Correlations	and	visualisations	were	
used	to	examine	the	rating	results	and	limited	support	for	the	UVE	was	found	as	the	
correlations	indicated	that	the	expected	patterns	of	relationship	did	occur.	Eeriness	and	
strangeness	were	always	positive	correlated,	and	both	were	negatively	correlated	with	
human-likeness.	However,	when	the	mean	results	were	plotted	against	each	other	to	
emulate	Mori’s	graph,	the	classic	‘valley’	in	familiarity	did	not	appear	in	either	case.		
In	Study	1,	the	NHFs	formed	three	distinct	clusters	of	images	rated	as	highly,	
moderately	or	barely	human-like,	with	corresponding	ratings	of	barely,	moderately	and	
highly	strange.	These	three	clusters	mirror	Tinwell’s	(2009)	finding	in	a	similar	study	where	
a	range	of	different	NHAs	were	rated	on	human-likeness	and	familiarity	and	rather	than	a	
single	‘uncanny’	dip,	three	distinct	zones	of	high	strangeness	were	found	as	human-
likeness	increased.	One	possible	explanation	for	Tinwell	et	al’s	multiple	valleys	and	the	
image	clusters	found	in	Study	1	here	may	have	been	the	lack	of	human	and	non-human	
reference	faces	in	the	sets	of	images	to	be	rated,	as	having	no	point	of	comparison	for	the	
NHAs	meant	that	it	was	not	possible	to	be	sure	that	the	human-likeness	continuum	being	
mapped	spanned	all	the	full	range	of	possible	points.	Study	2	in	this	thesis	added	human	
and	artificial	faces	along	with	the	NHFs	to	address	this	issue	by	testing	an	anchored	range	
of	responses	by	using	human,	three	types	of	near-human	and	non-human	faces,	but	the	
typical	UVE	was	not	found.	Cluster	2	was	predicted	to	be	the	face	that	would	fall	into	a	
‘valley’,	where	it	was	rated	as	moderately	human	and	strange/eerie,	but	this	was	not	
found.	The	premise	for	that	prediction	was	that	it	represented	Study	1’s	cluster	of	
potentially	unsettling	faces	so	either	it	was	not	the	best	exemplar	of	that	type,	or	it	may	
be	that	those	qualities	did	not	generalise	beyond	the	scope	of	Study	1.	This	relates	back	to	
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this	issue	of	circularity	discussed	in	Section	2.3.1	which	presents	a	methodological	
difficulty	in	any	exploration	of	the	UVE.	The	three	NHFs	selected	for	Study	2	were	chosen	
subjectively	from	the	faces	in	each	cluster,	so	the	inclusion	of	anchor	faces	in	a	stimulus	
image	set	alone	may	not	be	sufficient	to	avoid	this	circularity	issue.	
The	collection	and	analysis	of	the	subjective	rating	data	in	both	studies	served	to	
ground	the	stimulus	images	in	terms	of	their	human-likeness	and	strangeness,	but	did	not	
provide	any	information	about	the	nature	of	participants’	responses	to	them.	The	second	
study	explored	this	question	by	asking	participants	to	describe	the	five	faces	and	also	to	
imagine	how	it	would	be	to	spend	time	in	close	proximity	with	an	agent	with	that	face.	
The	aim	was	to	begin	to	gather	unstructured	data	on	the	broad	question	of	how	people	
describe	different	faces	and	also	how	their	emotional	reactions	to	each	face	would	vary.	
The	measurements	used	for	this	study	were	based	on	a	quantification	of	the	free	text	
responses	to	explore	specific	hypothesis	drawn	from	the	UVE	literature	and	anecdotal	
observation	of	faces	which	were	subjectively	judged	to	be	eerie.	One	point	to	note	is	that	
several	of	the	comments	that	have	been	coded	as	holistic	were	ones	where	participants	
compared	the	stimulus	image	to	famous	people,	characters	from	video	games	or	
compared	them	to	racial	archetypes.	
Participants	used	more	terms	relating	to	individual	features	to	describe	the	eerier	
faces,	compared	to	the	human	and	highly	human	face	in	Cluster	3,	and	they	also	used	
terms	relating	to	eyes	more.	The	table	below	presents	several	of	the	comments	that	
referenced	the	eyes	of	the	stimulus	images,	and	the	cluster	to	which	they	belonged.		
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Table	9:	Verbatim	comments	where	references	were	made	to	eyes	in	a	creepy	or	unsettling	context	
To	an	extent	this	had	been	predicted	from	the	anecdotal	evidence	that	‘uncanny’	faces	
were	often	characterised	by	unusual	or	distorted	eyes	but	since	the	design	of	this	phase,	
more	recent	research	(Seyama	and	Nagayama	(2007,	2009)	and	Looser	and	Wheatley	
(2010))	has	also	found	support	for	the	role	of	eyes	in	the	UVE.	Study	2	was	an	exploratory	
study	with	the	aim	of	directing	later	research	so	this	finding	was	not	taken	as	a	firm	
conclusion	confirming	the	role	of	eyes	in	eliciting	the	UVE	but	rather	as	corroboration	for	
the	hypothesis	that	this	may	be	part	of	the	effect	and	an	indication	of	an	area	for	the	next	
phase	of	research.		
The	last	part	of	this	phase	looked	at	the	emotions	that	were	elicited	when	participants	
described	how	they	would	feel	sharing	their	home	with	an	android	possessing	the	
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appearance	of	each	of	the	NHAs.	This	task	was	designed	to	see	whether	there	was	any	
evidence	that	eeriness	was	elicited	for	the	NHFs	in	Clusters	1-3,	and	to	see	whether	there	
was	any	systematic	pattern	to	the	types	of	emotions	that	were	used	to	describe	each	face.	
The	measurements	were	again	drawn	from	analyses	of	unstructured	comments	given	by	
participants,	and	found	support	for	the	hypotheses	that	negative	terms	were	used	most	
for	the	eeriest	face.		
It	is	possible	to	draw	tentative	conclusions	from	the	research	questions	posed	in	this	
first	phase,	and	these	findings	have	suggested	areas	for	follow-up	studies.	In	reviewing	
Study	1	and	2,	some	limitations	were	noted.	A	key	point	to	note	from	these	studies	is	the	
importance	of	ensuring	that	reference	images	are	always	included	when	working	with	
NHFs	to	serve	as	controls	for	rating	data	and	points	of	comparison	when	drawing	
conclusions	about	the	nature	of	the	UVE.	Without	a	gradual	progression	in	human-
likeness	it	is	difficult	to	confidently	locate	any	observations	in	terms	of	the	UV	graph	and	
to	be	sure	that	findings	do	relate	to	that	relationship	between	human-likeness	and	
familiarity,	where	a	dip	should	emerge	where	images	are	close	to	but	not	quite	human.	
Secondly,	stimulus	materials	should	be	carefully	selected	or	developed	to	cover	as	wide	a	
range	of	that	human-likeness	continuum	as	possible	so	it	is	possible	to	identify	images	
representing	defined	points	on	that	scale	and	to	be	able	to	say	confidently	that	they	are	,	
for	example,	25%	or	75%	human.	Thirdly,	the	second	study	in	this	phase	relied	upon	just	
five	images	to	explore	detailed	questions	about	the	nature	of	those	faces	so	while	the	
results	can	be	used	to	suggest	areas	for	future	research,	it	is	not	possible	to	generalise	the	
findings	to	all	types	of	NHF	as	the	patterns	of	description	and	response	may	actually	be	in	
response	to	those	individual	images.	For	example,	without	further	research	it	is	not	
possible	to	say	with	confidence	that	all	robots	would	be	described	in	the	way	found	in	this	
study	because	only	one	example	robot	image	was	used.	A	limitation	of	the	study	was	that	
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it	investigated	just	five	face	types	in	a	lot	of	detail,	and	the	anchor	face	would	not	be	
strong	candidate	for	a	UVE.	To	test	whether	the	differences	that	this	study	hints	at	in	
terms	of	how	faces	are	processed,	a	more	systematic	variation	in	human-likeness	will	be	
needed.	Finally,	a	general	issue	should	be	acknowledged	in	that	this	study	used	a	process	
of	categorisation	to	allocate	participants’	comments	to	categories	which	were	then	
aggregated	to	draw	the	broad	conclusions	on	analytic	versus	holistic	processing.	It	is	
acknowledged	that	this	process	builds	on	several	assumptions	between	any	processing	
that	occurred	when	a	participant	viewed	one	of	the	stimuli	and	their	behaviour	in	
reporting	their	emotional	responses	and	perceptions	of	willingness	to	share	a	home	with	
the	NHE.		
These	limitations	were	addressed	in	the	design	for	the	second	and	third	research	
phases	which	developed	more	systematic	and	sophisticated	methods	for	investigating	the	
UVE.		
In	conclusion,	when	considering	all	of	the	results	from	this	phase	in	terms	of	the	UVE,	
it	can	be	seen	that	the	rating	and	description	data	has	provided	some	limited	support	for	
the	idea	that	an	UVE	exists.	The	hypothesised	relationship	between	the	rating	variables	
were	found,	and	while	the	correlational	analyses	do	not	allow	causal	conclusions	to	be	
drawn,	they	do	serve	as	an	indication	that	there	is	validity	in	Mori’s	broad	concept	of	a	
relationship	between	human-likeness	and	strangeness/eeriness,	and	that	some	of	the	
NHAs	tested	are	able	to	reliably	elicit	an	eerie	and	unsettled	emotional	response.	
However,	this	small-scale	study	was	exploratory	in	nature	with	the	intention	of	directing	
empirical	studies	to	test	possible	explanations	for	why	the	UVE	may	occur	and	to	
understand	the	nature	of	uncanniness	as	a	response.	Certain	decisions	on	scope	and	
direction	needed	to	be	taken	at	this	stage:	computer	graphics,	motion	capture	and	
android	design	had	progressed	rapidly	while	this	phase	was	in	its	design	and	analysis	
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stages,	which	greatly	expanded	the	domain	of	near-human	and	virtual	agents	which	
would	be	available	for	investigation	with	new	examples	of	embodied	agents	and	high-
quality	avatars	emerging	on	a	regular	basis.	As	well	as	offering	a	wider	range	of	types	of	
stimuli,	this	also	presented	a	challenge	as	the	original	collection	of	potential	UV-candidate	
stimuli	used	in	this	phase	became	out-dated.	The	body	of	literature	looking	into	the	UVE	
had	also	expanded	during	the	period	covered	by	this	phase	and	several	new	studies	
looking	at	roles	of	mismatched	expressions	and	anomalous	facial	features	meant	it	was	
possible	to	identify	parallels	with	the	suggestions	above	that	certain	features	were	more	
salient	than	others	in	triggering	the	effect.	This	led	to	the	decision	to	position	the	next	
two	studies	within	the	specific	domain	of	face	perception,	synthesising	the	UV	literature	
with	existing	literature	how	human	faces	are	generally	perceived,	with	the	goal	of	
understanding	more	about	whether	NHFs	represented	a	different	category	of	face-type	
stimuli	and	could	be	said	to	be	being	processed	differently.	The	second	phase	of	research	
developed	the	finding	that	participants	used	different	approaches	in	describing	the	faces	
suggesting	that	there	may	be	differences	in	the	way	that	these	faces	are	processed,	and	
whether	those	processes	for	NHFs	mirror	those	for	natural	human	or	artificial	faces.	The	
third	and	final	research	phase	was	designed	to	focus	on	developing	the	findings	about	
different	emotional	responses	to	the	faces	by	looking	at	facial	expressions	of	emotion	and	
drawing	conclusions	about	the	aspects	of	different	faces	or	facial	features	that	might	
contribute	to	a	sense	of	the	uncanny.		
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Chapter	4:	Phase	2:	The	Inversion	Effect	
4.1:	Introduction	to	Phase	2	
This	second	research	phase	applies	theories	of	face	processing	to	the	subject	of	the	
UVE	by	continuing	to	explore	whether	NHFs	have	eerie	and	unsettling	qualities	along	with	
an	examination	of	whether	those	NHFs	are	processed	differently	from	how	human	or	non-
human	faces	are	processed.	The	UVE	is	characterised	as	a	particular	pattern	of	emotional	
responses	to	NHAs	as	they	vary	in	human-likeness,	with	a	characteristic	decline	in	positive	
emotion	and	increase	in	negative	emotion	at	a	specific	point.	The	intention	of	the	studies	
in	Phase	2	was	to	begin	to	explore	how	this	effect	can	be	applied	to	the	perception	of	
faces,	and	in	particular,	whether	it	can	be	said	that	there	is	a	relationship	between	how	
faces	that	vary	in	human-likeness	are	processed	and	how	we	respond	to	them.	This	is	an	
important	area	for	consideration	as	NHAs	become	more	common-place,	as	their	
acceptability	is	likely	to	hinge	on	how	people	respond	to	them.		
This	phase	explored	the	premise	that	NHFs	are	processed	using	an	analytic	approach	
rather	than	holistically,	by	looking	for	a	presence	of	a	FIE	to	test	whether	inverting	NHFs	
would	have	the	same	detrimental	effect	on	recognition	performance	that	is	found	when	
human	faces	are	inverted.		
Section	1.4	above	described	how	human	faces	are	generally	processed	holistically,	as	
an	overall	impression	of	the	face	rather	than	analytically	in	terms	of	their	individual	
features.	However,	striking	individual	features	were	a	notable	characteristic	of	many	of	
the	NHFs	explored	in	Study	1	where	several	had	features	that	were	particularly	distinctive,	
especially	as	many	had	large	or	unusual	eyes.	This	can	be	seen	particularly	striking	in	the	
eeriest	face	which	was	image	16,	see	Table	3	in	Section	3.2.3.	NHFs	also	represent	a	novel	
class	of	stimuli	which	may	be	processed	in	a	unique	manner.	For	example,	robot	faces	
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which	are	basically	mechanical	but	possess	some	humanlike	features	and	expressions	may	
be	encoded	analytically,	in	a	manner	closer	to	objects,	rather	than	holistically,	as	with	
human	faces.	This	was	explored	in	in	Study	2	by	looking	at	the	differing	patterns	of	holistic	
and	analytic	terms	used	when	describing	human,	near-human	and	artificial	faces.	The	
Artificial,	Cluster	1	and	Cluster	3	faces	were	described	either	in	analytic	or	holistic	terms	
while	the	Cluster	2	and	Human	faces	were	described	using	a	mix	of	both	analytic	and	
holistic	terms.	Analytic	terms	were	used	more	when	describing	the	Artificial,	Cluster	1	and	
Cluster	2	faces,	holistic	terms	more	for	this	Cluster	3	and	Human	faces.	This	suggested	an	
area	for	further	enquiry	to	explore	generally	whether	NHFs	were	processed	analytically	
rather	than	holistically	and	to	see	if	the	pattern	found	for	those	five	individual	faces	would	
be	demonstrated	in	a	wider	range	of	face	types.		
The	elicitation	of	a	FIE	has	been	used	to	explore	holistic	processing	of	faces.	(Yin,	
1969;	Kanwisher	and	Moscovitch,	2009;	Farah	and	Tanaka,	1995;	Searcy	and	Bartlett,	
1996,	Freire	et	al,	2000).	Inverting	faces	makes	them	harder	to	recognise,	and	the	
explanation	for	this	has	been	that	an	upside-down	face	has	a	completely	different	
configural	appearance	to	the	upright	face.	This	means	that	it	is	not	possible	to	use	an	
encoded	holistic	representation	to	extract	information	about	that	face,	making	it	harder	
to	identity	an	individual	or	to	know	whether	the	face	has	been	seen	before.	However,	
some	factors	can	mitigate	the	magnitude	of	an	inversion	effect	and	Hills	et	al	(2011)	found	
that	if	participants	were	cued	to	pay	particular	attention	to	the	eye	region,	the	FIE	
decreased	and	those	faces	were	easier	to	recognise	compare	to	when	no	cues	were	given.	
Therefore,	even	when	the	configural	information	has	been	disrupted	by	inversion,	an	
inverted	face	which	has	unusual	or	striking	individual	features	may	not	be	as	
detrimentally	affected	as	a	face	without	such	distinctive	features.		
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Chapter	1	described	several	studies	which	found	an	UVE	for	NHFs	which	have	
exaggerated	or	unusual	eyes	(Geller,	(2008),	Seyama	and	Nagayama	(2007,	2009)	and	
Looser	and	Wheatley,	2010.).	If	it	is	the	case	that	NHFs	are	processed	analytically	rather	
than	holistically,	as	a	result	of	these	unusual	or	anomalous	features	or	for	other	reasons,	
there	should	be	a	decreased	FIE	for	the	NHFs	compared	to	the	human	and	non-human	
faces.	
Applying	the	FIE	to	the	UVE	builds	on	the	work	of	Seyama	and	Nagayama	(2007,	2009)	
in	applying	face	perception	theory	and	techniques	to	the	question	of	the	UVE	but	takes	a	
novel	approach	of	examining	the	FIE	as	a	measure	of	analytic	versus	holistic	processing.	
This	approach	makes	it	possible	to	ask	whether	NHFs	are	processed	more	analytically	than	
human	or	non-human	faces.	This	question	of	whether	analytic	processing	varies	as	a	
function	of	human-likeness	was	explored	by	two	studies	which	applied	the	design	
principles	outlined	in	the	introduction	to	Phase	1	of	this	thesis.	Having	observed	a	feature	
that	potentially	contributes	to	an	UVE	and	linked	it	to	an	area	of	psychological	theory,	the	
premise	of	analytic	processing	for	NHFs	was	tested	using	stimuli	that	varied	in	human-
likeness	in	a	systematic	and	measurable	fashion.	The	nature	of	the	non-human	end	of	the	
continuum	was	also	varied	by	selecting	different	categories	of	images	to	allow	an	
exploration	of	whether	images	taken	from	the	‘classic’	robot	to	human	morph	described	
in	much	of	the	UV	literature	would	differ	from	images	originating	from	other	non-human	
agents	such	as	statues,	dolls	and	animals.	Study	3	gathered	subjective	measurements	of	
strangeness,	eeriness	and	human-likeness,	and	then	Study	4	used	these	rated	images	as	
experimental	stimuli	in	a	face	discrimination	task	measuring	recognition	performance	
under	different	conditions	of	image	orientation.	These	two	studies	will	now	be	introduced	
in	detail	and	the	research	questions	they	addressed	will	be	presented.	
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4.2:	Study	3:	Ratings	of	morph	faces	for	inversion	study	
4.2.1:	Introduction	to	Ratings	of	morph	faces	
The	main	aim	of	this	research	phase	was	to	answer	the	question	of	whether	NHFs	
show	evidence	of	greater	analytical	processing	compared	to	human	or	non-human	faces.	
This	first	study	collected	standardised	data	about	the	stimulus	materials	that	were	
designed	for	that	experiment.	This	introduction	will	present	the	types	of	images	that	were	
selected	for	inclusion	in	this	study	and	recap	on	the	measurements	that	were	collected.	
Finally,	the	research	question	and	hypotheses	to	be	considered	in	this	study	will	be	
presented.		
As	has	been	described	above,	the	UVE	describes	a	relationship	between	human-
likeness	and	emotional	response.	In	the	majority	of	the	UV	literature,	that	human-likeness	
dimension	is	generally	presented	as	a	continuum	beginning	with	a	robot	at	the	non-
human	starting	point	and	ending	with	a	real	human	at	the	opposite	end.	However,	a	robot	
is	only	one	of	several	types	of	entities	which	exhibit	human-like	properties	so	a	range	of	
continua	can	be	imagined	which	begin	with	other	entities	such	as	dolls	or	statues.	It	could	
be	that	the	observations	of	eeriness	that	characterise	the	UVE	are	specific	to	the	robot-
human	continuum	and	may	not	appear	when	other	types	of	entity	are	placed	at	the	other	
end	of	the	continuum.	While	the	main	aim	of	this	phase	is	to	explore	how	NHFs	are	
processed,	a	sub-goal	addresses	this	question	by	using	four	different	types	of	starting	
point	for	the	non-human	to	human	morphs.	Robots	were	identified	as	the	first	category,	
as	these	are	the	classic	example	given	by	Mori	(1970)	as	the	entity	that	will	evoke	an	UVE	
when	humanised.	Looser	and	Wheatley’s	(2010)	research	inspired	the	inclusion	of	dolls	
and	statues	as	categories	for	exploration	as,	although	they	were	not	measuring	eeriness	
and	so	weren’t	exploring	the	UVE	directly,	their	work	is	relevant	to	the	present	study	as	it	
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explored	a	similar	transition	between	non-human	and	human	to	find	the	point	at	which	
faces	begin	to	appear	lifelike.	Finally,	a	fourth	category	of	animals	was	added.	The	dolls,	
robots	and	statue	faces	shared	the	attribute	that	they	were	created	with	an	intention	to	
emulate	human-like	qualities,	but	the	animal	faces	represented	a	class	of	face-like	objects	
which	do	not	bear	an	overt	physical	resemblance	to	human	faces.	This	would	allow	an	
exploration	of	whether	an	UV	would	emerge	for	this	continuum	but	also	whether	there	
would	be	any	evidence	of	analytic	processing	for	these	faces.		
The	desirability	of	collecting	standardised	ratings	of	eeriness,	human-likeness	and	
strangeness	for	any	stimuli	used	to	assess	the	UVE	has	been	described	in	detail	in	the	
Introduction	to	this	thesis.	The	rating	scales	that	have	been	chosen	for	this	thesis	are	
those	based	on	MacDorman	(2006)	as	described	in	Phase	1.		
Research	Question	
How	will	the	subjective	ratings	of	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness	compare	
for	a	collection	of	morphed	face	images	created	as	animals,	dolls,	robots	and	statues	are	
progressively	morphed	into	matched	humans?	This	research	question	mirrors	those	posed	
in	Study	1	and	Study	2,	and	is	the	basic	test	of	whether	there	is	evidence	for	an	UVE.	As	
such,	it	is	based	mainly	on	Mori’s	proposal	of	the	UVE	and	the	shape	of	his	hypothesised	
graph	where	familiarity	gradually	increases	with	human-likeness	until	a	valley	is	found	at	
the	almost	but	not	quite	human	point.		
H1.	The	measured	human-likeness	for	each	face	will	increase	with	each	morph	stage,	
with	the	non-human	end	point	rated	as	the	least	human	and	the	final	human	image	rated	
as	most	human.	This	may	seem	like	a	common-sense	prediction	but	if	it	is	supported	it	
will	provide	evidence	that	the	morph	technique	does	indeed	represent	a	way	to	create	a	
gradual	progression	in	human-likeness	against	which	the	eeriness	and	strangeness	ratings	
could	be	reasonably	compared.		
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H2.	Ratings	of	strangeness	will	be	significantly	higher	for	the	near-human	morphs	(75%	
human/25%	non-human).		
H3.	Ratings	of	eeriness	will	be	significantly	higher	for	the	near-human	morphs	(75%	
human/25%	non-human).		
The	UVE	is	characterised	by	a	peak	of	both	strangeness	and	eeriness	at	the	near-
human	point:	support	for	these	two	hypotheses	will	provide	evidence	that	a	UVE	does	
occur	with	these	morphed	faces.		
In	interpreting	the	results	of	these	hypotheses,	as	well	as	looking	at	the	overall	ratings	
of	eeriness,	strangeness	and	human-likeness,	the	results	will	be	examined	by	category	to	
whether	the	UVE-indicative	pattern	will	be	found	for	each	of	the	four	image	categories:	
animals,	dolls,	robots	and	statues.	As	the	UVE	was	initially	proposed	as	an	artefact	of	
making	robots	more	human-like,	it	is	a	reasonable	prediction	that	the	robot	category	will	
show	this	pattern.	The	doll	and	statue	categories	were	added	based	on	the	work	of	Looser	
and	Wheatley,	(2010}	who	found	that	perceptions	of	animacy	emerged	at	the	near-human	
point.	They	theorised	that	awareness	of	whether	something	is	alive	or	not	may	contribute	
to	the	UVE	and	so	it	is	predicted	that	a	valley	pattern	will	emerge	for	these	two	categories	
as	well.	However,	the	animal	category	has	been	added	as	a	novel	exploration	to	see	if	it	
does	demonstrate	an	UVE	so	no	specific	prediction	of	the	direction	has	been	made.		
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4.2.2:	Method	
Design	
A	4	x	5	repeated	measures	design	was	used	to	explore	the	factors	of	image	category	
and	morph	stage.	There	were	four	levels	of	image	category:	animals,	dolls,	robots	and	
statues	and	five	levels	of	morph	stage:	non-human,	25%	human,	50%	human,	75%	human	
and	human.	Three	dependent	variables	were	measured,	with	participants	rating	60	
images	on	the	following	three	scales:	
Human-likeness:	9	point	scale	from	'very	mechanical'	to	'very	human'	
Strangeness:	10	point	scale	from	'very	familiar'	to	'very	strange'	
Eeriness:	10	points	from	'not	eerie'	to	'extremely	eerie'.		
Participants	provided	180	ratings	each,	one	each	of	three	ratings	for	each	of	the	60	
images.	Presentation	order	was	randomised	to	control	for	order	effects.	
Materials	-	Stimulus	Images	
Sixty	photographic	quality	images	were	produced	from	twelve	base	pairs	of	human	
and	non-human	photographs	of	faces,	by	morphing	the	non-human	images	into	the	
human	images.	Stills	were	taken	at	the	25%,	50%	and	75%	human	point,	which	produced	
five	morph	stage	images	for	each	base	pair.	Four	categories	of	non-human	initial	images	
were	used	(animals,	dolls,	robots	and	statues)	with	three	examples	in	each	category.	The	
five	‘morph	stages’	were	the	original	non-human	and	human	photographs	plus	
intermediate	still	images	taken	from	the	morphing	process	at	the	points	where	the	
morphed	face	was	25%	human/75%	non-human,	50%	human/50%	non-human,	75%	
human/25%	non-human.	An	example	of	a	base	pair	plus	the	three	intermediate	images	is	
shown	in	the	figure	below:		
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Non-human	 25%	human	 50%	human	 75%	human	 Human	
Figure	15:	Image	set	for	one	example	of	a	statue	to	human	morph.		
An	example	illustrating	each	category	is	shown	in	Figure	16	below.		
	 	 	 	
Animal	 Doll	 Robot	 Statue	
Figure	16:	Image	set	for	one	example	from	each	image	category.		
Each	set	of	five	morph	stage	images	was	produced	using	the	same	method.	Firstly,	an	
internet	search	was	carried	out	to	find	three	starting	images	in	each	category	of	non-
human	image	plus	a	matched	human	face.	These	pairs	of	images	were	used	as	the	start	
and	end	points	to	create	an	animation	systematically	transforming	the	starting	face	into	
the	end	face.	Finally,	still	images	were	taken	from	the	animation	at	defined	points	so	
these	stills	could	represent	the	desired	five	points	along	the	human-likeness	continuum.	
Each	of	the	stages	in	this	method	will	now	be	described	in	detail.		
Collecting	source	images	
Following	the	theme	of	this	research	project	to	date,	it	was	decided	that	the	first	
criterion	should	be	that	they	were	faces	that	participants	may	have	encountered	in	the	
course	of	their	day	to	day	life	rather	than	ones	manufactured	to	be	deliberately	
unsettling.	To	this	end,	a	general	internet	search	for	existing	photographs	was	chosen	over	
the	creation	of	posed	new	images	of	faces	for	each	category.	Criteria	were	set	to	narrow	
the	search	to	appropriate	images	and	to	ensure	consistent	presentation:		
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• The	photographs	had	to	be	a	clear	and	unambiguous	representation	of	the	
category;	for	example,	even	very	realistic	statues	needed	to	clearly	portray	that	
they	were	crafted	from	an	artificial	material.		
• The	pictures	had	to	show	the	full	face	presented	frontally	and	had	to	avoid	having	
any	part	of	the	face	obscured	by	hair,	shadow	or	spectacles.		
• Start	and	end	point	images	had	to	match	facial	expression	as	closely	as	possible	in	
each	pair.		
• The	images	had	to	be	high	quality	as	the	morph	process	works	best	with	images	
that	are	crisp	and	clear	at	their	original	resolution.		
• Only	images	which	stated	that	they	were	produced	as	royalty-free	and	available	
for	general	use	or	ones	that	had	been	shared	with	the	appropriate	creative	
commons	permissions	to	allow	research	use	with	acknowledgement.		
Appendix	2c	presents	a	list	of	each	of	the	source	images	with	their	original	web	link.		
Issues	considered	in	the	selection	of	the	corresponding	human	images	
As	well	as	ensuring	that	the	corresponding	human	faces	showed	a	comparable	
expression	to	their	non-human	pair,	human	faces	were	sought	which	were	matched	as	
closely	as	possible	in	terms	of	colouring,	shape	and	size.	This	was	easiest	for	the	doll	and	
statue	images	but	harder	to	achieve	for	the	robot	and	animal	images.	(Two	of	the	animal	
images	were	sourced	from	pet	food	commercials	where	‘owners’	and	their	pets	were	
presented	side	by	side	to	emphasise	the	similarities	between	their	appearances.	a	
humorous	advertising	technique	that	proved	to	be	very	useful	for	the	matching	
quandary!)	In	some	instances	it	was	impossible	to	find	a	suitable	human	match	which	met	
the	above	quality	criteria	and	as	a	result	that	non-human	face	was	discarded.	The	final	set	
of	images	therefore	represented	non-human	faces	which	could	be	matched	to	a	freely	
available	human	image	of	suitable	quality	for	the	morphing	process.		
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Cleansing	of	images	
The	source	images	presented	the	human	and	non-human	faces	against	a	range	of	
different	backgrounds.	The	morph	process	required	the	images	to	be	as	‘clean’	as	possible	
with	either	a	standardised	identical	background	or	no	background	all.	To	accommodate	
this,	the	source	photographs	were	masked	so	that	the	face	area	was	presented	against	a	
plain	black	background	and	any	extraneous	items	were	removed.	Where	there	were	small	
discrepancies	between	the	sizes	of	the	two	images	these	were	also	corrected	at	this	stage.		
Designing	morph	sequences	
The	chosen	morphing	software	(Abrasoft	Fantamorph	SE)	produces	short	animated	
sequences	where	a	starting	image	is	transformed	frame	by	frame	into	a	different	image.	
This	process	gradually	blends	the	contents	of	one	image	into	another	using	shared	key	
points	on	the	two	images.	(It	is	possible	to	combine	more	than	two	images	but	for	the	
purposes	of	this	research	only	pairs	of	images	were	used.)	When	a	key	point	is	selected	on	
the	first	image,	a	corresponding	point	is	automatically	highlighted	on	the	second	image	
and	the	user	can	either	accept	it’s	positioning	or	adjust	it	to	move	it	closer	to	the	correct	
position.	Individual	points	can	be	used	to	produce	simple	morphs	but	a	more	powerful	
technique	is	to	use	several	points	in	the	same	area	connected	by	lines	to	define	the	
boundaries	of	individual	features	such	as	the	eyes	or	to	indicate	where	there	is	a	region	
on	one	face	that	does	not	correspond	exactly	to	the	other	face	in	the	pair.	The	figure	
below	illustrates	this	principle:		
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Figure	17:	Screenshot	of	the	Fantamorph	software	package,	showing	the	set-up	of	
correspondence	dots	for	two	faces.		
The	key	points	are	used	by	the	software	to	produce	an	automated	animation	between	
the	two	images.	Where	images	are	similar	this	usually	has	straightforward	and	predictable	
results	but	trying	to	morph	between	features	with	very	different	appearances	can	
occasionally	have	unexpected	consequences.	This	can	result	in	the	production	of	
unwanted	'ghosting'	where,	for	example,	whiskers	on	an	animal	face	appear	as	a	
prominent	feature	of	the	later	human	stages	of	the	morph	or	'tearing'	where	the	software	
cannot	accommodate	large	differences	in	appearance	and	blacks	out	areas	on	some	
frames.	The	only	solution	to	these	problems	is	to	carefully	review	the	placement	of	the	
key	points	to	mask	the	unwanted	features	at	that	stage.	While	it	is	possible	to	create	face	
templates	which	can	be	re-used	for	different	images	to	speed	up	the	morph	design	
process	that	was	not	a	useful	shortcut	for	this	project	as	the	non-human	images	varied	
widely	in	the	arrangement	of	the	features.	Designing	the	morph	sequence	for	each	pair	
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required	careful	review	of	the	individual	features,	selection	of	appropriate	key	points	and	
adjustment	and	tuning	of	the	animated	sequences.		
Exporting	final	images	
Once	the	animation	has	been	produced	and	judged	to	be	a	satisfactory	morph	
between	the	two	images,	the	final	stage	is	to	export	the	frames	at	the	desired	defined	
points.	Regardless	of	the	size	of	the	starting	images,	all	stills	were	exported	at	a	size	of	400	
x	400	pixels.		
Materials	-	Study	Web	Pages	
Web	Survey	Pages	
An	online	experiment	was	used	to	present	the	sixty	images	and	collect	participant	
ratings	on	each	of	the	three	scales.	The	web	survey	was	produced	using	the	same	page	
templates	as	those	used	in	Study	2	described	above.		
Pilot	
Two	volunteers	offered	to	test	the	survey	and	give	critical	feedback	to	help	improve	
the	final	product.	While	there	was	no	technical	problem	in	working	through	the	web	
pages,	they	felt	that	that	rating	60	images	on	three	different	scales	-	a	total	of	180	images	
to	look	at	and	click	through	-	was	an	arduous	task	that	risked	participants	dropping	out	
part	of	the	way	through.	To	address	this,	consideration	was	given	to	the	best	method	to	
allow	fast	ratings	to	be	provided	while	ensuring	that	participants	gave	accurate	answers.	
In	the	version	presented	to	the	pilot	testers,	the	same	method	was	used	for	the	rating	
Study	1	where	participants	chose	their	answer	on	the	scale	and	then	clicked	a	button	to	
submit	it	and	move	to	the	next	image.	This	effectively	doubled	the	number	of	clicks	that	a	
participant	needed	to	make;	one	for	the	rating	selection	and	one	to	submit	it	and	see	the	
next	image.	For	the	earlier	study	where	only	fifteen	images	were	being	rated	this	was	
tolerable	but	for	a	larger	number	of	images	it	became	time-consuming.	The	code	was	
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amended	so	that	the	page	would	advance	automatically	as	soon	as	a	response	button	in	
the	scale	was	clicked.	If	participants	did	accidentally	click	on	the	‘submit	this	response’	
button	without	a	making	a	selection	on	the	scale,	another	image/scale	combination	was	
presented	but	the	counter	did	not	increment	and	the	combination	that	had	been	seen	but	
not	answered	went	back	into	the	pool	of	responses	still	to	be	completed.	This	version	was	
reviewed	by	the	testers	who	commented	that	it	was	an	improvement	and	allowed	them	
to	complete	the	survey	in	a	shorter	time.		
Results	Database	
The	study	results	(ratings	and	demographics)	were	again	stored	in	a	Lotus	Notes	
database	hosted	at	the	Open	University,	built	using	the	same	design	principles	and	data	
security	considerations	as	those	previously	described.	Only	fully	completed	responses	
were	passed	through	to	the	database	as	any	participants	who	abandoned	the	study	part	
of	the	way	through	were	deemed	to	have	withdrawn	and	their	partial	responses	were	not	
stored.		
Procedure	
As	with	the	previous	web	study,	participants	were	recruited	from	a	variety	of	routes.	
social	media	links	were	used	as	before,	as	well	as	direct	recruitment	of	participants	who	
had	expressed	an	interest	in	the	research.	In	addition,	three	new	sources	of	potential	
participants	were	used	as	advertisements	were	placed	on	the	PsyPAG	mailing	list	used	by	
post-graduate	psychology	researchers	and	two	web	sites3	that	exist	to	promote	
psychology	research	studies	to	interested	parties.	All	participants	arrived	at	the	online	
study	by	clicking	on	a	web	link.	The	structure	of	the	study	was	identical	for	everyone	but	
																																																						
3	http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html	and	
http://www.onlinepsychresearch.co.uk/researchers	
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the	180	pages	were	randomly	ordered	for	each	participant,	with	the	constraint	that	it	was	
not	possible	to	see	the	same	image	twice	in	a	row.	Example	screenshots	of	the	final	web	
pages	used	in	study	are	included	in	Appendix	2e.	The	structure	of	the	experiment	was	as	
follows:	
Introduction:	The	initial	landing	page	introduced	the	study	and	the	researcher	and	
gave	background	information	about	the	benefits	and	implications	of	participation.	
Participants	could	only	proceed	to	take	part	in	the	study	if	they	clicked	to	indicate	that	
they	were	over	eighteen	years	old	and	had	understood	the	terms	and	conditions	
sufficiently	to	give	their	consent.		
Task	screens:	180	task	screens	were	then	presented	one	by	one.	Each	page	displayed	
one	of	the	sixty	images	to	be	rated	in	the	top	part	of	the	screen	and	one	of	the	three	
scales	beneath	the	image.	The	number	of	images	that	had	been	rated,	the	number	that	
were	still	to	come	and	this	ratio	expressed	as	a	percentage	were	all	presented	next	to	the	
image	to	indicate	progress	through	the	study.	
Participants	made	a	selection	rating	the	image	on	the	scale	and	then	the	next	page	
was	presented.		
Demographic	information:	When	all	of	the	images	had	been	presented	and	rated,	
participants	were	asked	if	they	were	willing	to	give	some	basic	demographic	information.	
These	optional	questions	(gender,	age	and	location)	were	the	same	as	those	collected	in	
the	first	web	study	described	above.	Finally,	participants	were	asked	if	they	would	be	
willing	to	take	part	in	future	experiments	and	if	so,	to	provide	their	preferred	email	
address.		
Close:	Once	the	final	questions	had	been	answered,	participants	were	routed	to	the	
main	project	web	page	for	further	reading	about	the	UVT.	The	landing	page	repeated	the	
contact	information	for	the	researcher	if	there	were	any	further	queries.		
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Screenshots	showing	an	example	of	each	page	in	the	structure	are	given	in	Appendix	
2e.		
Participants	
107	participants	completed	Study	3.	105	participants	provided	demographic	
information;	68%	of	those	were	female	and	the	mean	age	was	38.	When	asked	about	
their	location,	most	participants	(80%)	reported	that	their	location	was	in	the	United	
Kingdom.	A	full	breakdown	of	the	demographic	data	is	shown	in	Appendix	2a.		
4.2.3:	Results	
H1.	The	measured	human-likeness	for	each	face	will	increase	with	each	morph	stage,	
with	the	non-human	end	point	rated	as	the	least	human	and	the	final	human	image	rated	
as	most	human.		
Participants	rated	all	sixty	faces	on	all	three	scales.	Firstly,	the	ratings	of	human-
likeness	will	be	described	and	analysed.	Human-likeness	was	measured	on	a	9	point	scale,	
9	where	1	was	labelled	as	'very	mechanical'	and	9	'very	human'.		
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Figure	18:	Mean	human-likeness	with	error	bars	for	each	image	category.	
The	bar	chart	above	presents	the	mean	human-likeness	ratings	for	each	image	
category.	They	are	based	on	figures	derived	by	collapsing	rating	scores	across	all	five	
morph	categories	and	all	three	individual	images	in	each	category	to	give	an	overall	mean	
human-likeness	rating.	At	the	overall	category	level,	none	were	rated	as	highly	human-like	
but	the	doll	images	were	rated	as	the	most	human-like	(M=5.8)	followed	by	the	statues	
(M=5.5).	The	robots	were	the	next	human-like	(M=4.3)	with	the	animals	rated	as	least	
human-like	of	all	(M=3.9).		
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Figure	19:	Mean	human-likeness	with	error	bars	for	each	morph	stage.		
Figure	19	above	presents	the	mean	human-likeness	for	each	morph	stage.	The	mean	
ratings	show	a	clear	progression	of	increasing	human-likeness	as	the	morph	stages	
progress	from	non-human	to	human	and	suggests	that	the	morph	stages	were	perceived,	
as	they	were	designed,	to	represent	a	continuum	of	human-likeness	for	the	different	
image	categories.	However,	although	the	morph	images	were	taken	from	the	morph	
animation	at	equidistant	intervals,	the	ratings	do	not	show	such	a	linear	progression.	It	
could	be	expected	that	the	magnitude	of	these	differences	in	human-likeness	rating	
would	also	be	equal	but	this	was	not	the	case	as	is	shown	in	Table	10	below.		
Morph	Stage	 Difference	between	means	
Non-human	to	25%	 0.5	
25%	to	50%	 0.5	
50%	to	75%	 1.6	
75%	to	Human	 2.0	
Table	10:	Increases	in	human-likeness	between	morph	stages.		
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It	can	be	seen	that	the	differences	between	the	categories	increase	as	the	morphs	
progress	from	less	human	to	more	human.		
When	the	rating	results	were	analysed	using	a	4	x	5	repeated	measures	ANOVA,	
Mauchley’s	test	indicated	that	the	assumption	of	sphericity	had	been	violated	for	the	
main	effects	of	category	and	morph	stage,	as	well	as	for	the	interaction	between	them:	
Category:	χ2(5)=55.23,	p	<	.0001,	ε=.76.		
Morph	stage:	χ2(9)=198.86,	p	<	.0001,	ε=.48.		
Interaction:	χ2(77)=178.28,	p	<	.0001,	ε=.76.	
When	interpreting	the	ANOVA	results	the	degrees	of	freedom	were	corrected	to	
accommodate	this	using	the	Greenhouse-Geisser	estimates	of	sphericity	for	the	morph	
stage	and	Huynh-Feldt	estimates	for	the	category	and	the	interaction.		
A	significant	interaction	between	image	category	and	morph	stage	was	found.	
(F(10.05,1065.57)=63.75,	p	<	.0001,	partial	η2	=	.38)	In	addition	to	the	significant	
interaction	between	the	image	category	and	morph	stage,	there	was	a	significant	main	
effect	of	the	category	of	the	non-human	image,	F(2.27,240.36=182.98,	p	<	.0001,	partial	
η2	=	.63)	and	the	main	effect	of	morph	stage	was	also	significant,	F(1.92,203.41=626.98,	p	
<	.0001,	partial	η2	=	.86).	Considering	these	findings	in	the	light	of	the	hypothesis	detailed	
above,	the	presence	of	a	significant	interaction	indicates	that	the	image	category	had	
different	effects	on	the	ratings	of	human-likeness	at	each	morph	stage.	A	visualisation	of	
this	interaction	is	shown	in	the	figure	below,	showing	that	ratings	of	human-likeness	
increase	for	all	image	categories	as	the	morph	stage	progresses	from	non-human	to	
human,	but	that	the	pattern	of	this	increase	varies	according	to	the	type	of	initial	image.		
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Figure	20:	A	comparison	of	human-likeness	ratings	for	four	image	categories	as	the	morphed	
faces	progressed	from	non-human	to	human		
The	robot	category	is	the	most	useful	reference	point	in	reviewing	the	variation	by	
category	as	it	is	the	classic	example	from	Mori’s	proposal	of	an	UVE	and	should	show	a	
steady	increase	in	ratings	of	human-likeness	from	non-human	to	human.	The	robot	
morphs	do	show	the	expected	progression	with	increases	in	human-likeness	across	the	
morph	stages	but	this	is	not	a	continuous	progression,	with	steeper	increases	between	
the	50%	to	75%	human	stages,	and	the	75%	to	human	stage.	The	novel	animal	category	
showed	a	similar	pattern	to	the	robots,	as	both	had	low	ratings	of	human-likeness	at	the	
non-human,	25%	and	50%	stages,	but	the	animals	were	rated	as	slightly	more	humanlike	
than	the	robots	at	the	75%	stage,	and	slightly	less	at	the	human	stage.	The	dolls	were	
rated	as	more	human	in	their	un-morphed	state	than	the	robots	and	animals,	which	
makes	sense	considering	that	they	are	objects	designed	to	look	like	human	infants.	Their	
human-likeness	ratings	increased	with	each	morph	stage	as	predicted	in	H1.	Finally,	the	
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statues	had	the	highest	ratings	for	human-likeness	in	their	original,	un-morphed	state	and	
the	lowest	ratings	for	human-likeness	at	the	fully	human	stage.	The	human-likeness	
ratings	did	increase	with	each	morph	stage	but	the	pattern	was	markedly	different	from	
the	other	categories,	with	a	much	shallower	curve	showing	only	very	small	increases	
between	the	non-human	and	25%,	and	25%	and	human	stages.	The	high	initial	ratings	
may	be	explained	because	statues	are	objects	which	are	designed	to	look	like	people	so	
began	at	a	higher	level	of	human-likeness	than	any	of	the	other	image	categories.		
H2.	Ratings	of	strangeness	will	be	significantly	higher	for	the	near-human	morphs	(75%	
human/25%	non-human).		
Participant	ratings	of	the	strangeness	of	the	images	will	now	be	described	and	
analysed.	Strangeness	was	measured	on	a	10	point	scale	with	the	low	anchor	labelled	
'very	familiar'	and	the	high	anchor	'very	strange'.		
	
Figure	21:	Mean	strangeness	with	error	bars	for	each	image	category.		
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The	strangest	faces	(collapsed	across	the	three	example	images	and	the	five	morph	
stages)	were	the	robots	(M=5.9)	and	statues	(M=5.2)	with	the	animals	the	next	strange	
(M=5.0)	and	the	dolls	the	least	strange	of	all	(M=4.1).	As	noted	above,	robots	were	
initially	proposed	as	the	non-human	entities	that	display	an	UVE	as	they	become	more	
human-like	and	as	such	serve	as	a	reference	category	for	comparison	to	the	other	three	
types.		
	
Figure	22:	Mean	strangeness	with	error	bars	for	each	morph	stage.		
The	strangeness	ratings	for	the	five	morph	categories	(collapsed	across	the	four	
categories	and	three	images	within	each	category)	show	a	pattern	of	an	initial	rise	from	
non-human	to	25%,	peaking	with	the	strangest	face	being	the	50%	human	(M=6.4)	before	
decreasing	again	with	the	humans	rated	as	least	strange,	(M=2.9)	as	would	be	expected.	
When	the	strangeness	ratings	were	analysed	using	a	4	x	5	repeated	measures	ANOVA,	
Mauchley’s	test	indicated	that	the	assumption	of	sphericity	had	been	violated	for	the	
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main	effect	of	the	morph	stage	(χ2(9)=101.75,	p	<	.0001,	ε=.70)	and	for	the	interaction	
between	the	image	category	and	morph	stage	χ2(77)=223.22,	p	<	.0001,	ε=.70).	(This	was	
not	the	case	for	the	main	effect	of	category	where	p=	.62.	When	interpreting	the	ANOVA	
results	the	degrees	of	freedom	were	corrected	for	the	interaction	and	main	effect	of	
morph	stage	using	the	Greenhouse-Geisser	estimates	of	sphericity.	
All	effects	were	found	to	be	significant	at	p	<	.05:	the	interaction	between	image	
category	and	morph	stage	was	found	to	be	significant,	F(8.15,863.40)=118.89,	p	<	.0001,	
partial	η2	=	.53,	as	well	as	a	significant	main	effect	of	the	image	category,	F(3,318)=98.73,	p	
<	.0001,	partial	η2	=	.48,	and	of	the	morph	stage,	F(2.81,298.13)=334.56,	p	<	.0001,	partial	
η2	=	.76.	The	significant	interaction	indicates	that	although	strangeness	does	indeed	vary	
by	morph	stage	and	category,	the	pattern	of	the	differences	in	strangeness	between	
different	the	morph	stages	varies	according	to	the	type	of	image	that	was	used	as	the	
non-human	endpoint	of	the	morph.		
A	visualisation	of	how	the	interaction	between	morph	stage	and	image	category	
impacted	on	strangeness	ratings	is	shown	in	Figure	23	below:		
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Figure	23:	A	comparison	of	strangeness	ratings	for	four	image	categories	as	the	morphed	faces	
progressed	from	non-human	to	human		
H2	predicted	that	ratings	of	strangeness	would	be	highest	for	the	75%	morph	but	this	
was	not	actually	found	for	any	of	the	categories.	Following	Mori’s	graph,	there	should	
have	been	a	gradual	increase	in	strangeness	up	to	the	75%	morph	stage,	after	which	it	
should	have	decreased	sharply	with	the	human	faces	being	rated	as	not	particularly	
strange.	Considering	robots	first,	these	were	rated	strangest	of	all	four	categories	in	their	
un-morphed	state,	and	strangest	robot	morphs	were	actually	those	at	the	25%	and	50%	
points.	The	mean	ratings	at	those	stages	were	very	similar	with	M=7.115	for	the	25%	
stage,	and	7.121	at	the	50%	stage.	Strangeness	sharply	decreased	from	the	50%	stage	to	
the	human	stage.	The	strangeness	ratings	for	statues	followed	a	very	similar	pattern	to	
those	for	robots,	albeit	at	a	lower	level	of	strangeness	across	each	of	the	morph	stages.	
This	may	be	explained	as	the	initial	statues	were	designed	to	look	like	people	while	the	
robots	were	designed	to	approximate	human-likeness	to	varying	degrees,	but	still	
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retained	some	aspects	of	an	artificial	appearance.	The	animal	category	did	have	a	high	
peak	of	strangeness,	rated	as	the	strangest	of	all	of	the	morphs,	with	a	steep	increase	in	
strangeness	between	non-human	and	50%	and	a	correspondingly	steep	decrease	in	
strangeness	from	the	50%	stage	to	the	human	stage.	The	doll	category	is	particularly	
interesting	here	as	it	is	the	only	one	to	show	a	consistent	decrease	in	strangeness	across	
the	morph	stages.	Dolls	have	been	proposed	as	a	type	of	NHA	which	may	be	seen	as	
inherently	eerie	so	it	is	notable	here	that	their	strangeness	ratings	decreased	at	each	
morph	stage.		
H3.	Ratings	of	eeriness	will	be	significantly	higher	for	the	near-human	morphs	(75%	
human/25%	non-human).		
Finally,	the	ratings	of	eeriness	will	now	be	described	and	analysed.		
	
Figure	24:	Mean	eeriness	with	standard	error	bars	for	each	image	category.		
Reviewing	the	mean	eeriness	by	category	(collapsed	across	morph	stage	and	
individual	image)	the	eeriest	categories	were	the	robot	and	statue	images	with	similar	
204	
 
mean	eeriness	ratings	of	M=5.27	and	M=5.29.	The	animal	category	was	slightly	less	eerie	
with	a	mean	rating	of	4.8	but	the	least	eerie	was	the	doll	category	with	a	mean	rating	of	
4.2.	
	
Figure	25:	Mean	eeriness	with	error	bars	for	each	morph	stage.		
The	mean	eeriness	ratings	for	each	morph	stage	(collapsed	across	category	and	
individual	image)	followed	the	same	type	of	pattern	as	the	strangeness	ratings	previously	
described,	with	the	50%	human	morph	stage	rated	as	the	eeriest	(M=6.3),	with	the	
human	(M=2.75)	and	non-human	(M=4.6)	stages	rated	as	the	least	eerie.		
When	the	rating	results	were	analysed	using	a	4	x	5	repeated	measures	ANOVA,	
Mauchley’s	test	indicated	that	the	assumption	of	sphericity	had	been	violated	for	the	
main	effect	of	morph	stage,	χ2(9)=57.6,	p	<	.0001	and	the	interaction	between	category	
and	morph	stage,	χ2(77)=250.2,	p	<	.0001.	The	assumption	of	sphericity	for	the	main	
effect	of	category	was	not	violated.	To	accommodate	the	above	violations,	the	degrees	of	
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freedom	were	corrected	using	the	Greenhouse-Geisser	estimates	of	sphericity	using	ε=.77	
for	the	main	effect	of	morph	stage	and	ε=.67	for	the	interaction.	
All	effects	were	found	to	be	significant	at	p	<	.05.	There	was	a	significant	interaction	
effect	between	the	image	category	and	the	morph	stage,	F(8.1,857.8)=106.59,	p	<	.0001,	
partial	η2	=	.50.	The	main	effects	of	the	category	of	the	non-human	image	and	the	morph	
category	were	also	significant:	category	=	F(3,318)=38.95,	p	<	.0001,	partial	η2	=	.76.	
Morph	stage	=	F(3.83,327.2)=328.45,	p	<	.0001,	partial	η2	=	.76.	The	significant	interaction	
demonstrates	that	the	image	category	had	different	effects	on	the	ratings	of	eeriness	at	
each	of	the	morph	stages.	A	visualisation	of	this	interaction	is	shown	in	the	figure	below:		
	
Figure	26:	A	comparison	of	eeriness	ratings	for	four	image	categories	as	the	morphed	faces	
progressed	from	non-human	to	human		
H3	proposed	that	the	75%	human	category	would	be	rated	as	significantly	more	eerie	
than	the	others	but	this	was	not	supported,	as	none	of	the	categories	were	rated	as	most	
eerie	at	the	75%	human	stage.	However,	the	pattern	of	eeriness	ratings	across	the	five	
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morph	stages	varied	significantly	by	category	and	so	these	will	be	considered	separately.	
The	robot	images	were	rated	as	moderately	strange	in	their	un-morphed	state,	and	
increased	in	eeriness	with	the	highest	ratings	of	eeriness	at	the	25%,	50%	and	75%	stages.		
It	was	decided	to	focus	in	detail	on	the	differences	between	these	stages	and	explore	
whether	the	differences	between	pairs	of	mean	ratings	of	eeriness	were	significant.	To	do	
this,	two	repeated	measures	ANOVAs	were	carried	out,	with	one	looking	at	the	
differences	in	eeriness	for	the	robots	at	the	25%	to	50%	stages	and	the	other	looking	at	
the	50%	to	75%	stages,	and	these	were	both	found	to	be	statistically	significant.	For	25%	
stage	to	50%	stage,	F(1,106)=16.18,	p	<	.0001,	partial	η2	=	.132,	and	for	the	50%	to	75%	
stages	F(1,106)=8.77,	p	<	.0001,	partial	η2	=	.076.	It	can	be	concluded	that	the	level	of	
human-likeness	does	indeed	have	a	significant	effect	on	how	unsettling	participants	
found	the	images,	and	that	the	changes	between	the	morph	stages	representing	low,	
medium	and	high	levels	of	human-likeness	are	significant.		
The	eeriness	ratings	for	statues	again	started	high,	but	only	increased	modestly	from	
the	non-human	to	25%,	then	25%	to	50%	stages,	before	decreasing	sharply	from	50%	to	
75%	and	again	from	75%	to	human.		
The	eeriness	ratings	for	the	animal	category	mirrored	their	strangeness	ratings	in	
starting	with	the	lowest	eeriness	ratings	of	all	four	categories,	being	peaking	with	the	
highest	ratings	of	eeriness	at	the	50%	human	point	and	then	sharply	decreasing	in	
eeriness	between	the	50%	and	75%	stages,	and	the	75%	and	human	stages.	The	eeriness	
ratings	of	dolls	followed	a	unique	pattern	in	these	four	categories	by	decreasing	in	
eeriness	at	each	stage,	a	similar	pattern	to	that	found	for	the	strangeness	ratings,	which	
may	provide	some	evidence	that	people	find	dolls	intrinsically	strange	and	eerie	and	the	
act	of	morphing	them	to	become	more	humanlike	removes	some	of	those	unsettling	
properties.		
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Visualising	human-likeness	and	strangeness	
Mori’s	UVE	idea	relies	upon	the	relationship	between	human-likeness	and	
strangeness,	so	in	addition	to	the	hypotheses	based	on	specific	measures,	the	mean	
values	of	human-likeness	and	strangeness	were	plotted	against	each	other	for	each	image	
category,	with	a	predicted	curve	was	been	overlaid	on	these	charts	to	shows	the	
relationship	that	would	be	expected	in	the	UVE.	As	in	Study	2	above,	note	that	this	curve	
shows	a	peak	rather	than	a	valley	as	the	ratings	in	this	study	measured	strangeness	rather	
than	familiarity.	None	of	the	image	categories	showed	the	predicted	relationship	
between	human-likeness	and	strangeness.		
	
Figure	27:	Mean	human-likeness	and	strangeness	for	animal	faces		
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Figure	28:	Mean	human-likeness	and	strangeness	for	doll	faces	
	
Figure	29:	Mean	human-likeness	and	strangeness	for	robot	faces	
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Figure	30:	Mean	human-likeness	and	strangeness	for	statue	faces		
4.2.4:	Discussion	
How	will	the	subjective	ratings	of	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness	compare	
for	a	collection	of	face	images	created	by	progressively	morphing	images	of	animals,	dolls,	
robots	and	statues	into	matched	human	faces?	These	measures	test	for	evidence	of	an	
UVE,	based	on	Mori’s	hypothesised	graph	where	familiarity	gradually	increases	with	
human-likeness	until	a	valley	is	found	at	the	almost	but	not	quite	human	point.	Study	3	
tested	three	hypotheses	which	predicted	a	steady	increase	in	ratings	of	human-likeness	
(H1)	and	peaks	in	eeriness	and	strangeness	for	the	morphs	at	the	near-human	point	(H2	
and	H3).	This	study	was	designed	to	examine	whether	those	ratings	were	affected	by	the	
type	of	image	used	to	start	the	morph,	looking	at	four	categories	of	animals,	dolls,	robots	
and	statues.	The	UVE	was	originally	proposed	as	the	result	of	making	robots	more	human-
like	so	it	is	a	reasonable	to	predict	that	the	robot	category	will	show	an	UVE.	The	doll	and	
statue	categories	were	included	as	other	examples	of	non-human	objects	which	
approximated	human-likeness,	and	with	the	intention	of	comparing	the	results	to	those	
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found	by	Looser	and	Wheatley	(2010)	who	found	that	perceptions	of	animacy	emerged	at	
the	near-human	point	for	a	set	of	images	which	included	dolls,	statues	and	robots.	They	
theorised	that	awareness	of	whether	something	is	alive	or	not	may	contribute	to	the	UVE	
and	so	it	was	predicted	that	a	valley	pattern	will	emerge	for	these	two	categories	as	well.	
Finally,	the	animal	category	was	included	to	consider	a	particular	type	of	relationship	
between	human	and	non-human,	as	it	is	the	only	category	where	the	non-human	
examples	are	clearly	animate	and	alive	but	definitely	non-human.	With	the	doll,	robot	and	
statue	categories,	the	non-human	examples	all	have	qualities	which	are	object-like	as	well	
as	person-like,	but	this	is	not	the	case	for	the	animal	examples.	
The	aim	of	examining	different	types	of	non-human	categories	was	to	allow	
conclusions	to	be	drawn	as	to	whether	the	UVE	occurs	due	to	unique	process	of	making	a	
robot	appear	more	humanlike,	or	whether	it	is	a	more	general	effect	emerging	with	any	
transition	between	non-human	and	human.	However,	this	study	did	not	find	evidence	to	
support	the	UVE	as	the	strangeness	and	eeriness	rating	data	did	not	show	a	peak	in	at	the	
75%	human	morph	stage,	and	when	the	human-likeness	and	strangeness	ratings	were	
plotted	against	each	other,	none	presented	a	UVE-type	curve.	However,	the	results	did	
show	differences	in	the	three	measures	at	each	level	of	the	morph	category,	indicating	
that	humanising	the	non-human	agents	did	affect	perceptions	of	human-likeness,	
strangeness	and	eeriness.	Each	measure	also	showed	an	interaction	between	the	degree	
of	human-likeness,	as	manipulated	by	the	morph	stage,	and	the	type	of	image	category	
that	was	used,	so	it	can	be	concluded	that	the	influence	of	the	morph	stage	on	the	three	
ratings	was	influenced	by	the	type	of	image	that	was	used	in	the	morph.	To	consider	these	
differences,	the	results	for	each	image	category	will	now	be	discussed.		
The	robot	category	represents	the	archetypal	non-human	in	terms	of	the	UVE,	as	
Mori’s	prediction	was	that	the	dip	in	emotional	response	should	emerge	as	these	agents	
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become	humanised.	There	was	a	gradual	increase	in	the	human-likeness	ratings	of	robots	
as	the	morphed	faces	progressed	from	non-human	to	human,	but	eeriness	and	
strangeness	peaked	at	the	50%	human	point	rather	than	the	75%	human	point.	When	the	
strangeness	and	human-likeness	ratings	were	plotted	against	each	other,	the	pattern	did	
not	resemble	that	which	would	have	been	expected	in	the	UVE.	The	robot	faces	were	also	
rated	as	quite	strange	in	their	un-morphed	state,	which	initially	seemed	like	an	
unexpected	finding,	but	in	a	comparison	with	Mori’s	original	chart	in	Section	1.1,	this	may	
have	been	as	the	robots	used	in	this	study	were	all	closer	to	the	‘humanoid	robot’	than	
the	starting	point	of	‘industrial	robot’	posited	there	as	inhabiting	the	region	of	lowest	
human-likeness.		
Dolls	were	not	included	in	Mori’s	original	graph,	but	have	been	anecdotally	located	
within	the	UV	as	they	can	appear	eerie	and	unsettling,	and	they	were	also	part	of	the	
image	set	used	by	Looser	and	Wheatley	(2010)	in	identifying	animacy	as	emergent	as	the	
near-human	point	in	a	non-human	to	human	morph	sequence.	Their	rating	results	were	
different	from	those	predicted	by	the	UVE	and	also	different	from	the	other	image	
categories	as	they	were	the	only	category	where	eeriness	and	strangeness	decreased	as	
human-likeness	increased.	This	may	represent	a	general	property	of	dolls	when	
transformed	into	human	faces,	but	it	may	also	be	due	to	the	specific	images	used	in	this	
study.	The	three	doll	images	used	as	starting	points	for	this	study	(See	Appendix	2d	for	
illustrative	images)	may	have	been	responsible	for	this	initial	positioning	of	the	un-
morphed	images	as	highly	strange	and	eerie,	as	two	of	them	were	infant-like,	potentially	
‘cute’	dolls	that	were	isolated	from	any	context	and	their	presentation	as	isolated	stimuli	
against	a	dark	background	may	have	been	unsettling	due	the	lack	of	context	rather	than	
any	characteristics	of	the	faces	themselves.		
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The	statue	images	were	similar	to	the	dolls	in	that	they	were	initially	rated	as	rather	
strange,	but	they	showed	a	small	increase	in	strangeness	and	eeriness	across	the	morph	
stages,	at	least	up	to	the	50%	human	point,	rather	than	the	decrease	shown	by	the	dolls.	
This	may	be	because	the	statues	chosen	for	this	study	were	manufactured	objects	
designed	to	present	a	highly	humanlike	appearance	and	in	this	way	they	may	not	have	
appeared	as	distinctively	non-human,	and	so	could	not	reasonably	span	that	continuum	
between	non-human	and	human.		
Finally,	the	morphed	images	with	animal	faces	as	the	starting	point	of	the	morph	were	
clearly	identified	as	non-human	in	their	un-morphed	state,	as	would	be	expected,	and	
they	were	rated	as	highly	strange	and	eerie	at	the	50%	human	point.	As	there	were	no	
suggestions	from	the	literature	as	to	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	human-
likeness	and	strangeness	or	eeriness	for	morphs	starting	with	animal	images,	this	was	an	
interesting	novel	exploration	and	the	finding	that	the	50%	morphs	between	the	animal	
and	human	images	were	rated	as	the	eeriest	and	strangest	does	suggest	that	there	is	
more	to	the	UVE	than	can	be	explained	in	terms	of	a	continuum	between	object-like	and	
human-like.	The	animal	and	robot	categories	may	be	the	most	interesting	of	those	
described	here,	as	they	span	the	greatest	distance	across	the	scales	of	human-likeness	
and	strangeness.	Compared	to	the	animals	and	robots,	the	dolls	and	statues	both	
occupied	smaller	regions	in	the	humanlike-ness/strangeness	space.	Of	the	four	categories,	
the	animal	and	robot	categories	were	the	two	with	the	highest	ratings	for	the	near-human	
(75%)	morph	stage.	However,	it	cannot	be	said	that	there	is	an	UVE	for	nearly	humanised	
robot	faces,	as	this	study	did	not	find	that	nearly	humanised	robots	at	the	75%	point	were	
eerier	than	the	robots	at	other	morph	stages.	However,	it	may	be	that	valley	in	emotional	
response	does	exist,	but	the	proposed	location	is	closer	to	the	50%	human	rather	than	the	
75%	human	point,	or	these	results	may	have	been	due	to	experimental	effects	of	
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morphing	the	images	in	a	particular	way.	These	issues	will	be	considered	further	in	
Section	4.4,	the	General	Discussion	of	this	Phase.	While	the	results	of	Study	3	are	certainly	
interesting	and	notable	in	their	own	right,	their	core	purpose	was	to	examine	how	the	
stimuli	would	vary	in	terms	of	their	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness	to	inform	
Study	4	in	looking	at	the	effect	of	inversion	of	each	of	these	image	types.	This	study	will	
now	be	introduced.		
4.3:	Study	4:	The	effect	of	inversion	on	recognising	near-human	faces	
4.3.1:	Introduction	to	Effect	of	inversion	
Study	4	used	an	experiment	to	present	images	of	faces	which	varied	in	their	level	of	
human-likeness	and	the	type	of	non-human	entity	presented.	These	images	were	
presented	in	either	an	upright	or	inverted	orientation	and	participants’	recognition	
performance	was	measured.	The	aim	of	the	study	was	to	allow	conclusions	to	be	drawn	as	
to	the	extent	to	which	each	type	of	face	at	each	level	of	human-likeness	would	be	subject	
to	a	FIE	and	thus	whether	there	was	any	support	for	the	hypothesis	that	NHFs	are	
processed	more	analytically	than	human	or	non-human	faces.		
Studies	of	the	FIE	have	considered	the	impact	of	inversion	on	different	types	of	face	
processing	tasks,	generally	finding	that	performance	at	those	tasks	is	decreases	when	
faces	are	inverted.	Two	types	of	tasks	were	considered	for	this	study,	and	these	were	‘pair	
comparison	tasks'	and	'same/different'	or	'new/old'	tasks.	The	pair	comparison	tasks	were	
used	in	the	following	studies:	Yin	(1969),	Diamond	and	Carey	(1977),	Pellicano	and	Rhodes	
(2003),	Yovel	(2005),	Searcy	and	Bartlett	(1996)	(Experiment	2),	Freire	et	al	(2000),	Rhodes	
et	al	(1993),	and	Sekuler	et	al	(2004).	In	these	studies,	participants	learned	a	target	face	
image	and	were	then	asked	to	identify	that	target	face	when	it	was	presented	in	a	pair	
with	a	distractor	face	by	comparing	the	two	images	and	deciding	which	one	was	the	one	
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they	had	seen	before.	The	same/different	or	new/old	tasks	were	used	in	Zlotowski	and	
Bartneck	(2013),	Searcy	and	Bartlett	(1996)	(Experiment	1),	Freire	et	al	(2000)	
Experiments	1	and	2,	Hills	et	al	(2011)	and	Schwaninger	et	al	(2009).	As	with	the	pair	
comparison	tasks	participants	were	presented	with	a	target	face	image	to	learn	but	rather	
than	picking	out	the	face	they	had	seen	from	a	choice	of	faces,	they	were	presented	with	
another	image	and	asked	to	indicate	if	it	was	the	same	as	the	one	they	had	previously	
seen.	In	this	type	of	task,	faces	are	presented	singly	so	no	simultaneous	comparison	is	
possible.		
The	relative	merits	of	the	task	types	were	considered	and	it	was	decided	to	adopt	a	
pair	comparison	task	for	this	study,	partly	as	it	was	felt	that	Searcy	and	Bartlett's	(1996)	
study	had	a	particular	resonance	with	the	UVE	as	their	stimuli	include	distorted	and	
disfigured	faces	so	a	useful	comparison	could	be	made	between	the	present	study	and	
their	findings.	Searcy	and	Bartlett	(1996)	used	the	pair	comparison	task	and	a	modified	
version	of	that	task	was	adopted	in	this	study,	with	a	modification	made	due	to	the	nature	
of	the	faces	used	in	this	study,	as	even	though	the	target	and	distractor	faces	were	
designed	to	be	as	similar	as	possible	given	the	scope	of	the	images	used,	they	were	all	
highly	distinctive	as	shown	in	the	example	in	Figure	31.		
	
Figure	31:	Test	image	set	for	an	animal	to	human	morph	at	the	75%	human,	25%	artificial	point.		
It	was	felt	that	a	pair-comparison	task	could	risk	a	genuine	effect	being	masked	by	a	
ceiling	effect	of	very	high	performance	regardless,	of	the	human-likeness	or	non-human	
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category.	To	make	the	task	more	difficult	and	have	a	better	chance	of	capturing	an	effect	if	
one	exists,	a	modified	version	of	a	same-different	task	was	used	where	participants	were	
asked	to	select	the	training	image	from	three	test	images.	The	left	to	right	order	of	the	
test	images	was	controlled	to	ensure	that	there	was	no	over-representation	of	the	test	
image	in	the	left,	middle	or	right	position.	Accuracy	and	response	speed	were	both	
measured	In	Study	4,	with	accuracy	included	as	a	check	on	the	presence	of	ceiling	effect	
of	identification	performance	and	response	speed	as	the	measure	for	analysis,	against	
which	the	hypotheses	were	tested.		
Research	Question	
The	theory	of	a	FIE	states	that	faces	should	be	harder	to	recognise	when	inverted.	
Phase	1	suggested	that	NHFs	may	be	processed	analytically	rather	than	holistically,	
meaning	they	may	not	be	as	affected	by	inversion	as	human	or	non-human	faces.	These	
analyses	look	at	the	reaction	speed	results	to	see	if	there	is	evidence	for	a	difference	in	
reaction	time	when	faces	are	presented	inverted	rather	than	upright,	to	address	the	
following	two	hypotheses:	
H1:	(Classic	FIE	hypothesis)	A	FIE	effect	will	be	found	where	all	faces	take	longer	to	
recognise	when	they	are	presented	inverted	rather	than	upright.		
H2:	(UVE	hypothesis)	Any	FIE	effect	will	be	related	to	the	human-likeness	of	the	image,	
operationalised	here	as	the	morph	stage	of	each	image.	If	the	NHFs	are	processed	
analytically	rather	than	holistically,	the	speed	of	identifying	the	NHFs	should	be	less	
affected	by	inversion	than	the	speed	to	identify	the	human	faces.	It	is	predicted	that	there	
will	be	an	interaction	between	morph	stage	and	inversion,	based	on	the	findings	of	Study	
3	which	demonstrated	that	the	image	category	did	affect	the	ratings	of	strangeness,	
eeriness	and	human-likeness	at	each	morph	stage.	Post-hoc	examination	of	the	results	
data	will	be	used	to	examine	the	nature	of	any	difference	in	FIE	for	these	categories.		
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4.3.2:	Method	
Design	
The	study	used	a	mixed	design	with	one	between-subjects	factor:	morph	stage	(5	
levels:	non-human,	25%	human,	50%	human,	75%	human	and	human)	and	two	within-
participants	factors	(4	levels:	animals,	dolls,	robots	and	statues)	and	orientation	(2	levels:	
upright	and	inverted).	The	dependent	variable	was	the	time	to	make	a	correct	response,	
defined	as	the	time	it	took	for	the	participant	to	correctly	select	the	previously	seen	
image	when	it	was	presented	alongside	two	foil	images.		
Materials	
Stimulus	Images	
This	study	used	the	sixty	images	of	faces	as	described	in	Ratings	of	morph	faces	for	
inversion	study	above.	They	represented	the	five	morph	stages	created	by	morphing	
images	of	animals,	dolls,	robots	and	statues	into	matched	human	faces.	Their	
experimental	role	was	to	serve	as	target	images	for	recognition:	120	‘foil’	images	were	
also	created	using	the	same	morphing	technique	to	serve	as	distractors	when	participants	
were	choosing	which	was	the	target	image	they	had	previously	seen.	The	foil	images	were	
additional	examples	of	each	image	category	and	morph	stage.	The	distractor	and	target	
images	were	combined	into	panes	of	three	images	presented	side	by	side.	(An	example	is	
shown	in	Figure	32	below.)		
Participants	were	asked	to	identify	the	target	face	by	selecting	whether	it	was	the	
leftmost,	middle	or	rightmost	face	out	of	the	three	shown	in	the	testing	panel.	The	foil	
images	were	matched	for	image	category	and	morph	stage	to	the	target	image.	The	left	to	
right	order	of	the	three	faces	in	the	testing	image	panels	was	balanced	to	ensure	that	the	
target	image	fell	equally	and	randomly	in	each	of	the	three	positions.		
Inverted	version	of	images	
217	
 
To	explore	the	effect	of	presenting	the	images	upside-down	as	well	as	upright,	it	was	
necessary	to	create	inverted	versions	of	the	target	and	test	images.	The	original	images	
were	inverted	using	a	batch	software	process	which	vertically	flipped	the	images.	In	this	
way,	the	test	panels	retained	the	same	left	to	right	order	as	shown	in	the	example	below:		
	 Target	image	 Testing	image	panel	
Upright	
	 	
Inverted	
	 	
Figure	32:	Inverted	and	upright	versions	of	the	original	and	testing	images.		
Stimulus	Presentation	Design	
Superlab	4.5	stimulus	presentation	software	was	used	to	present	the	images	to	
participants	in	a	controlled	manner	and	to	collect	their	responses.	In	this	study,	separate	
blocks	were	created	for	each	of	the	between-subject	conditions:	participants	were	
assigned	to	one	of	the	five	morph	stage	levels	at	the	start	of	the	experiment.	They	then	
saw	24	trials	involving	the	same	12	target	images	in	both	upright	and	inverted	conditions.	
The	12	target	images	comprised	3	examples	of	each	image	category	but	at	the	same	
morph	stage.	Each	trial	involved	first	learning	the	images	for	10	seconds	(the	learning	
phase),	followed	by	a	delay,	and	then	showing	the	target	face	and	two	matched	foils	(the	
recognition	phase)	where	participants	were	asked	to	select	the	target	face.	A	training	
block	was	included	at	the	start	of	the	experiment	to	give	participants	the	chance	to	
become	familiar	with	the	apparatus	and	resolve	any	comfort	issues	or	queries	before	
proceeding	to	the	live	trials.	
The	events	were	presented	in	a	constrained	random	order.	As	the	left	to	right	order	of	
the	test	panel	was	the	same	for	the	upright	as	for	the	inverted	version,	presenting	the	
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upright	trial	directly	after	the	inverted	version	(or	vice	versa)	was	avoided	in	case	the	first	
experience	provided	an	advantageous	cue	to	the	second	viewing.	While	the	presentation	
order	was	still	random	overall,	it	was	constrained	so	that	no	pairs	of	upright	and	inverted	
images	were	ever	sequenced	together.		
Apparatus	
A	15'	MacBook	Pro	was	used	to	present	the	experiment.	A	customised	keyboard	cover	
was	created	specifically	for	use	in	this	study	as	a	result	of	the	feedback	from	the	pilot	
study,	as	it	covered	the	standard	keys	and	indicated	which	key	the	participant	should	
press	to	indicate	the	choice	of	the	left,	middle	and	right	image.	Participants	were	asked	to	
sit	at	a	comfortable	distance	from	the	screen,	and	directed	to	place	their	dominant	hand	
close	to	the	keyboard	to	be	able	to	press	the	keys	quickly.	In	practice	this	meant	that	they	
were	seated	no	more	than	60cm	back	from	the	screen,	and	were	able	to	adjust	the	rake	of	
the	screen	to	a	comfortable	angle.		
Pilot	
Two	pilot	tests	were	carried	out	for	this	experiment.	The	first	was	a	quality	assurance	
test	to	ensure	that	the	pseudo-random	ordering	of	the	trials	was	working	correctly	where	
the	experiment	ran	ten	times	in	each	condition	and	the	order	of	the	images	was	manually	
logged.	The	logs	were	analysed	to	check	that	the	same	testing	panel	did	not	appear	
upright	and	inverted	in	consecutive	trials.	The	second	test	asked	a	volunteer	participant	to	
work	through	the	standardised	procedure	as	described	below,	with	the	exception	that	the	
tester	was	also	given	a	notepad	and	asked	to	write	down	any	comments	or	problems	
during	the	experiment.	Two	amendments	were	introduced	to	improve	the	clarity	of	the	
briefing	instructions	and	to	add	the	keyboard	guide	to	make	it	easier	to	see	which	keys	to	
use	to	give	a	response.	
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Participants	
54	participants	were	recruited	from	members	of	Open	University	staff.	Recruitment	
was	carried	out	using	an	advertisement	on	the	institution’s	Intranet	noticeboard	where	
volunteers	were	invited	to	make	contact	with	the	researcher	and	make	an	appointment	to	
attend	an	experiment	session.	It	was	desirable	that	participants	were	naive	with	regard	to	
the	UVE	but	essential	that	they	had	not	taken	part	in	the	rating	exercise:	participants	were	
asked	at	the	expression	of	interest	stage	if	they	had	taken	part	in	the	researcher’s	
previous	projects	and	were	thanked	for	their	interest	but	screened	out	if	they	said	that	
they	had.	Participant	gender	and	age	were	recorded	at	the	end	of	each	session.	65%	of	
the	participants	were	female	and	the	mean	age	was	43	years	old.		
Procedure	
Each	participant	completed	the	experiment	in	a	single	session	in	a	quiet	location.	Each	
had	been	sent	an	information	sheet	(see	Appendix	2f)	in	advance	of	their	session,	so	on	
arrival,	after	being	welcomed	and	asked	to	take	a	seat,	they	were	asked	if	they	had	read	
and	understood	the	information	that	had	been	sent	in	advance.	Participants	were	then	
asked	to	read	and	sign	an	'agreement	to	participate'	form	to	read	and	were	asked	if	they	
had	any	queries	they	had	about	the	research	or	the	process.	At	this	point	some	
participants	queried	how	long	the	study	was	likely	to	take	but	all	were	happy	to	proceed	
when	they	were	reassured	that	the	duration	was	likely	to	be	ten	to	fifteen	minutes.	
While	the	participant	read	and	signed	the	consent	form,	the	researcher	launched	the	
Superlab	software,	assigned	the	participant	to	the	appropriate	morph	stage	condition	by	
referring	to	a	list	of	randomly	generated	numbers	to	balance	participants	evenly	across	
the	five	conditions,	and	loaded	the	experiment.	From	this	point	on,	the	experiment	ran	
automatically	in	Superlab	and	proceeded	at	the	speed	set	by	the	participant	and	the	
researcher	only	intervened	if	the	participant	had	problems	or	queries.	
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The	laptop	was	moved	to	a	convenient	space	in	front	of	the	participant	where	it	was	
free	from	glare	and	shadow,	and	the	researcher	demonstrated	the	keyboard	cover	and	
guide,	explaining	to	the	participant	that	during	the	experiment	they	would	be	making	
choices	between	several	sets	of	three	images	to	indicate	which	ones	they	recognised.	
Participants	were	told	that	there	would	be	two	parts	to	the	experiment	so	they	would	
experience	a	training	phase	where	they	would	have	the	chance	to	try	a	practice	trial	to	
check	they	were	comfortable	with	the	instructions	and	the	apparatus	and	a	set	of	twenty-
four	live	trials	where	their	responses	would	be	collected.	Participants	were	told	that	from	
now	on	the	experiment	would	proceed	solely	on	the	laptop	and	that	the	researcher	would	
not	interrupt	but	would	remain	nearby	to	help	if	there	were	any	problems.	They	were	
advised	that	the	laptop	would	tell	them	when	they	had	completed	the	experiment	and	to	
let	the	researcher	know	so	she	could	complete	some	final	tasks	before	the	session	was	
completed	and	the	participant	could	leave.	A	final	check	was	made	to	ensure	that	the	
participant	understood	the	instructions	so	far	and	was	still	comfortable	and	willing	to	
proceed.	They	were	asked	to	start	by	reading	and	following	the	instructions	on	the	first	
screen,	which	explained	that	they	would	be	looking	at	images	of	faces	and	then	being	
asked	to	identify	them	from	a	line-up	of	similar	faces,	and	then	to	press	any	key	on	the	
keyboard	to	begin.		
The	experimenter	moved	to	a	nearby	chair.	In	most	sessions	participants	worked	
through	the	experiment	without	any	need	for	intervention	or	help	but	a	small	number	of	
participants	had	questions	after	the	training	example.	As	this	was	a	reasonably	short	
experiment	all	participants	completed	it	in	a	single	session	and	provided	data	for	all	the	
trials.	The	final	screen	in	the	experiment	told	participants	that	all	the	required	data	had	
been	collected	and	presented	them	with	a	detailed	description	of	the	aims	of	the	study	
and	how	their	participation	would	be	used	to	contribute	to	a	further	understanding	of	the	
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UVE	When	they	had	read	this,	participants	indicated	to	the	researcher	that	they	were	
finished.	At	this	stage,	several	participants	had	further	questions	about	the	specifics	of	
this	study	or	about	the	UVE	in	general	and	these	were	answered	in	detail.	
At	the	close	of	the	experiment	participants	were	asked	if	they	were	happy	to	disclose	
their	age	and	have	their	gender	recorded	for	demographic	analysis	purposes.	If	consent	
was	given	these	items	were	recorded	against	their	participant	identifier	and	stored	
separately	from	their	signed	consent	form.	Finally,	participants	were	asked	if	they	would	
be	interested	in	receiving	a	summary	of	the	final	results	of	the	project	and	if	so,	their	
preferred	email	address	was	collected.	Again,	this	personal	information	was	not	
associated	with	their	participant	identifier.	Participants	were	warmly	thanked	for	their	
interest	and	their	time	and	the	session	was	closed.	In	terms	of	the	duration	of	the	
experiment,	30	minutes	was	allowed	for	each	experiment.	Of	this,	the	experiment	took	
around	fifteen	minutes	to	run,	with	the	introductory	formalities	and	final	question	and	
answer	session	comprising	the	rest	of	the	time.		
4.3.3:	Results	
The	FIE	states	that	faces	should	be	harder	to	recognise	when	inverted.	Phase	1	
suggested	that	NHFs	may	be	processed	analytically	rather	than	holistically,	and	so	may	not	
be	as	affected	by	inversion	as	human	faces.	This	section	analysed	participant’s	reaction	
speeds	to	see	if	there	is	evidence	for	a	difference	in	reaction	speed	when	the	NHFs	from	
different	image	categories	were	presented	upright	and	inverted.	Two	hypotheses	were	
proposed:	
H1:	(Classic	FIE	hypothesis)	A	FIE	effect	will	be	found,	where	faces	take	longer	to	
recognise	when	they	are	presented	inverted	rather	than	upright.		
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H2:	(UVE	hypothesis)	Any	FIE	effect	will	be	related	to	the	human-likeness	of	the	image,	
operationalised	here	as	the	morph	stage	of	each	image.	If	the	NHFs	are	processed	
analytically	rather	than	holistically,	the	speed	of	identifying	the	NHFs	should	be	less	
affected	by	inversion	than	the	speed	to	identify	the	human	faces.	It	is	predicted	that	there	
will	be	an	interaction	between	orientation,	morph	stage	and	inversion.	
Data	preparation	
Each	participant	was	allocated	to	one	of	the	five	morph	categories	and	contributed	24	
response	times	from	their	experience	of	looking	at	three	images,	from	four	categories,	in	
two	orientations.	Accuracy	was	high	at	99%	across	all	trials,	as	only	12	participants	made	
any	errors	and	only	one	participant	made	two	errors	during	their	session.	This	indicates	a	
ceiling	effect	of	accurate	recognition	in	this	study,	so	accuracy	will	not	be	considered	
further	in	these	analyses.	The	13	errors	(from	a	total	of	1296	trials)	are	summarised	in	
Figure	33	which	details	the	images	where	the	target	face	was	not	correctly	identified.	
Statue	#3	in	its	inverted	presentation	is	notable	as	the	image	with	most	errors.	
	
Figure	33:	Images	which	were	not	correctly	identified	by	participants	in	Study	3.		
Corrected	means	were	calculated	to	replace	the	response	times	for	the	13	incorrect	
responses.	The	corrected	response	times	for	the	different	faces	were	collapsed	to	give	a	
single	value	for	each	participant,	representing	their	speed	of	recognising	faces	in	that	
category	in	both	orientations.	
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Analysis	of	response	time	
Table	11	presents	the	descriptive	statistics	for	the	response	times	across	all	morph	
stages	and	categories.	
	
Table	11:	Mean	response	times	and	standard	deviations	for	each	morph	stage,	upright	and	
inverted.		
The	response	times	were	analysed	using	a	three-way	mixed	ANOVA	to	explore	image	
category	and	morph	stage	at	both	orientations.	Mauchley’s	test	indicated	that	the	
assumption	of	sphericity	had	been	violated	for	the	main	effects	of	category	χ2(5)=36.38,	p	
<	.0001,	ε=.66	and	the	interaction	between	category	and	orientation:	χ2(5)=21.61,	p	<	
.0001,	ε=.79.	As	a	consequence,	Greenhouse-Geisser	corrections	to	the	degrees	of	
freedom	were	used	in	interpreting	those	significance	tests.	The	between-subjects	main	
effect	of	morph	stage	was	found	to	be	significant:	F(4,49)=3.04,	p	=	.026,	partial	η2	=.199.	
The	two	within-participants	main	effects	were	also	found	to	be	significant:	image	category	
(F(1.98,96.76)=5.84,	p	<	.05,	partial	η2	=.106)	and	orientation	(F(1,49)=10.77,	p	<	.05,	
partial	η2	=.180).	None	of	the	interactions	were	significant:	morph	stage	x	orientation,	
(F(4,49)=1.124,	p	=	.356,	partial	η2	=.084)	category	x	orientation	(F(2.39,116.936)=.586,	p	=	
.588,	partial	η2	=.012)	and	category	x	orientation	x	morph	stage	(F(12,147)=.782,	p	=	.668,	
partial	η2	=.060).		
The	main	effects	of	orientation,	image	category	and	morph	stage	will	now	be	
considered	to	evaluate	evidence	in	support	of	H1	and	H2.		
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Orientation	
Upright	faces	were	identified	significantly	faster	than	inverted	faces	(M=4949.47ms	for	
upright	faces,	compared	to	5081.57ms	for	inverted	faces.)	This	supports	H1,	that	faces	
would	be	recognised	faster	when	upright	than	inverted.		
Morph	Stage	and	Image	Category	
H2	predicted	an	interaction	between	orientation,	image	category	and	morph	stage,	
where	the	NHFs	would	be	faster	to	recognise	when	inverted,	compared	to	the	human	
images.	This	interaction	was	not	found.	Significant	differences	were	found	between	the	
image	categories	and	the	morph	stages.	Post-hoc	tests	of	four	simple	pairwise	
comparisons	using	Bonferroni’s	correction	were	used	to	examine	which	of	the	morph	
stages	differed	significantly	from	each	other.	Only	one	of	the	comparisons	was	significant,	
with	a	significant	mean	difference	in	response	speed	found	between	the	Artificial	and	the	
75%	human	morph	stages,	with	a	874.67ms	slower	mean	response	speed	for	the	75%	
human	faces,	p	<	0.05.	Three	simple	pairwise	comparisons	using	Bonferroni’s	correction	
were	used	to	look	at	the	image	categories.	Two	of	those	comparisons	were	significant,	
with	the	statues	identified	significantly	faster	than	the	animal	or	doll	faces	(statues	were	
recognised	191ms	faster	than	the	animal	faces,	p	<	0.01,	and	265ms	faster	than	the	doll	
faces).	
The	slower	response	speed	for	the	NHFs	compared	to	the	human	faces	was	
unexpected.	Figure	34	and	Figure	35	below	show	the	mean	response	speed	for	each	
image	category	and	morph	stage.	
	
225	
 
	
Figure	34:	Mean	response	time	for	each	image	category.		
	
Figure	35:	Mean	response	time	for	each	morph	stage.		
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4.3.4:	Discussion	
The	research	question	in	Study	4	was	to	investigate	whether	a	FIE	would	be	found	for	a	
collection	of	faces	which	had	been	systematically	varied	in	two	ways.	They	were	created	
by	morphing	artificial	faces	into	human	faces	so	the	first	variation	was	the	level	of	human-
likeness,	measured	by	the	point	in	the	morph	sequence	that	each	image	had	been	taken	
from.	The	second	variation	was	the	nature	of	the	non-human	starting	point	of	the	morph,	
to	explore	whether	there	would	be	a	difference	in	the	responses	to	morphs	created	from	
animals,	dolls,	robots	and	statues.	Classically,	Mori’s	(1970)	UVE	describes	an	emotional	
response	that	occurs	as	robots	are	made	more	human-like.	However,	as	there	are	several	
other	types	of	non-human	entity	which	can	also	be	humanised,	three	other	categories	
were	included	to	compare	whether	any	FIE	would	be	affected	by	the	type	of	non-human	
starting	point.	This	is	part	of	a	general	enquiry	as	to	the	nature	of	the	UV	and	to	explore	
whether	the	UVE	is	an	artefact	of	a	particular	type	of	artificial	to	human	transformation	or	
if	it	is	a	more	general	phenomenon.		
This	study	was	grounded	in	face	perception	research	into	how	images	of	faces	are	
perceived	and	draws	upon	the	long-standing	finding	that	face	perception	performance	
across	a	variety	of	tasks	is	degraded	when	faces	are	inverted.	This	disruption	in	perception	
is	generally	compared	to	how	non-face	objects	are	perceived,	as	they	are	generally	seen	
in	terms	of	their	component	parts	rather	than	as	a	holistic	entity,	so	inversion	does	not	
have	such	a	disruptive	effect	on	perceptual	ability.	This	theory	was	applied	to	NHFs	to	test	
a	hypothesis	that	the	perception	of	these	faces	may	be	different	to	that	described	for	
normal	human	faces	as	studies	by	Brenton	et	al	(2005),	Geller	(2008)	and	Seyama	and	
Nagayama	(2007	and	2009)	all	observed	that	a	characteristic	of	faces	thought	to	be	
uncanny	was	that	their	eyes	were	unusual	in	some	fashion,	either	exaggeratedly	large	or	
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unusual	in	their	appearance	or	positioning.	If	analytic	processing	is	already	being	engaged	
for	these	NHFs,	inversion	should	not	cause	a	degradation	in	performance	so	a	smaller	
effect	of	inversion	should	be	found.		
Participant’s	reaction	time	and	accuracy	of	response	were	measured	in	this	study.	
Accuracy	rates	of	99%	were	found	so	no	further	analyses	of	accuracy	were	conducted.	The	
analyses	in	this	section	looked	at	the	differences	in	response	time	across	the	different	
morph	stages	and	categories	at	each	orientation,	to	test	two	hypotheses.	The	results	were	
supportive	of	H1’s	prediction	of	a	classic	FIE,	as	across	all	categories	and	morph	stages,	
response	time	was	significantly	slower	for	the	inverted	faces	compared	to	the	faces	
presented	upright.	However,	there	was	no	support	for	H2	that	the	NHFs	would	be	
processed	more	quickly	than	the	human	faces.	The	opposite	effect	was	found	with	the	
NHFs	processed	significantly	more	slowly	than	the	artificial	faces.	The	75%	morph	faces	
took	significantly	longer	to	identify	compared	to	the	artificial	faces,	but	no	significant	
difference	was	found	between	the	human	and	artificial	faces,	or	between	any	of	the	other	
morph	levels.	The	image	category	also	had	a	significant	effect	on	the	response	time	as	
dolls	were	found	to	have	the	slowest	response	time	and	statues	the	fastest.	Considering	
the	individual	images	that	were	selected	for	inclusion	in	this	study,	it	is	may	be	the	case	
that	the	three	doll	images	subjectively	appeared	more	animated	and	‘lifelike’	than	the	
statues,	which	may	suggest	that	the	statue	images	are	being	perceived	in	terms	of	their	
object-like	nature	and	this	is	not	occurring	for	the	doll	faces	as	they	are	manufactured	
objects	designed	to	look	both	humanlike	and	life-like.	The	significant	differences	In	
response	times	to	the	artificial	and	NHFs	does	provide	evidence	that	the	faces	in	these	
two	morph	stages	are	being	processed	differently	but	the	nature	of	that	difference	was	
not	as	predicted	as	they	did	not	show	a	decreased	inversion	effect,	but	instead	the	
response	times	were	slower,	rather	than	faster.		
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It	may	be	that	some	aspects	of	the	research	design	inhibited	the	ability	to	
demonstrate	the	UVE,	and	a	critical	reflection	on	these	does	suggest	ways	in	which	this	
study	could	have	been	improved.	The	nature	of	the	stimuli	used	in	the	trials	meant	that	it	
was	very	difficult	to	produce	sets	of	images	that	were	relatively	homogenous	but	still	
allowed	the	morphing	approach	to	subtly	vary	the	human-likeness	of	each	image,	with	
the	result	that	the	test	images	and	foils	did	naturally	look	quite	different	from	each	other.	
It	is	useful	to	reflect	on	the	extent	to	which	this	meant	that	participants	were	able	to	
apply	pattern	matching	and	the	identification	of	salient	characteristics	within	the	target	
image	to	identify	them	from	the	test	foils.	This	is	acknowledged	as	a	limitation	of	the	type	
of	design	used	for	this	study,	and	one	way	in	which	it	could	potentially	be	addressed	
would	be	to	make	a	transition	away	from	using	photographs	of	humans	and	non-humans	
as	the	base	images	and	instead,	working	from	the	start	with	a	more	homogenous	set	of	
CGI	stimuli.	At	the	time	when	this	study	was	developed,	the	image	quality	of	these	was	
too	poor	for	participants	to	believe	that	any	might	actually	be	realistic	humans	or	realistic	
animals,	dolls,	robots	or	statues,	but	progress	in	this	area	means	that	it	may	now	be	a	
realistic	proposition	for	follow-up	work,	and	it	would	help	to	smooth	out	that	marked	
difference	between	the	appearances	of	the	different	images.		
4.4:	General	Discussion	of	Phase	2	
This	section	will	review	the	findings	from	two	studies	included	in	Phase	2	and	discuss	
what	can	be	concluded	from	their	findings.	This	phase	was	designed	to	explore	the	
premise	that	one	aspect	contributing	to	the	UVE	may	be	that	the	NHFs	which	trigger	an	
unsettling	or	eerie	response	may	also	display	an	unusual	property	in	that	they	are	
processed	analytically	rather	than	holistically.	This	premise	was	grounded	in	previous	
research	into	the	UVE	which	suggested	that	unusual	or	distorted	eyes	may	contribute	to	
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an	impression	of	uncanniness,	and	then	developed	with	reference	to	psychological	
research	into	face	processing	which	has	explored	evidence	of	analytic	versus	holistic	
processes	for	different	types	of	face.	It	was	designed	as	no	studies	have	been	carried	out	
which	systematically	varied	the	human-likeness	of	a	face	and	measured	whether	speed	of	
discrimination	would	vary	as	the	face	became	closer	to	human.		
This	phase	used	a	morphing	technique	to	generate	a	set	of	faces	which	represented	
five	points	on	a	continuum	between	non-human	and	human,	created	from	four	different	
categories	of	non-human	face.	If	the	NHFs	are	processed	analytically,	it	was	expected	that	
the	faces	at	the	75%	point	would	be	less	affected	by	inversion	than	the	natural	human	
faces	or	the	artificial	faces.	Participant	ratings	of	their	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	
eeriness	were	gathered	to	ensure	consistency	with	studies	presented	in	Phase	1	and	also	
to	confirm	whether	these	did	represent	a	reasonable	continuum	of	human-likeness.	These	
ratings	were	also	analysed	by	image	category	to	explore	whether	the	UVE	emerges	as	a	
general	effect	when	any	non-human	face	is	made	more	human-like,	or	whether	it	is	a	
specific	property	of	robots	increasing	in	human-likeness	as	had	been	originally	proposed	
by	Mori	(1970).	Analyses	of	these	ratings	found	that	human-likeness	did	indeed	increase	
as	the	morph	stages	progressed	from	non-human	to	human,	but	that	there	was	not	an	
entirely	consistent	increase	between	each	stage	as	there	was	a	larger	difference	between	
the	50%	and	75%	stages	than	between	any	of	the	other	stages.	The	ratings	of	strangeness	
and	eeriness	did	not	provide	support	for	the	UVE	hypothesis	as	it	had	been	predicted	that	
the	faces	at	the	75%	stage	would	be	rated	as	the	strangest	and	the	eeriest	but	it	was	
found	that	the	mid-point	face,	representing	50%	human	and	50%	non-human,	was	rated	
as	the	strangest	and	eeriest	overall.	The	finding	that	the	50%	point	was	the	peak	of	
eeriness	and	strangeness	for	several	of	these	images	was	unexpected,	particularly	for	the	
robot	images.	The	images	did	vary	systematically	in	human-likeness,	but	as	observed	
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above,	participant	ratings	of	human-likeness	showed	a	large	increase	between	the	50%	
and	75%	human	point.	It	may	be	that	the	real	peak	for	eeriness	and	strangeness	would	
actually	have	emerged	at	a	point	between	50%	and	75%	if	the	image	set	had	included	
morphs	from	those	stages.	A	suggestion	for	future	research	would	be	to	replicate	the	
study	with	the	same	initial	and	end-point	images	but	taking	more	than	just	the	five	points	
along	the	continuum	to	evaluate	the	ratings	for	a	larger	number	of	points	along	the	
morph.	This	would	allow	a	more	detailed	evaluation	of	the	human-likeness,	strangeness	
and	eeriness	than	was	possible	with	only	five	points.		
These	images	were	then	used	to	test	whether	the	degree	of	human-likeness	or	the	
image	category	would	affect	how	quickly	participants	responded	to	a	recognition	task,	
when	the	faces	were	presented	upright	or	inverted.	This	was	to	test	the	hypothesis,	
grounded	in	the	FIE	literature,	that	participants	would	respond	more	slowly	when	some	of	
the	faces	were	inverted.	Previous	studies	(e.g.	Farah	and	Tanaka,	1995;	Yin,	1969)	
suggested	that	performance	should	be	significantly	degraded	when	trying	to	recognise	
the	natural	human	faces	upside-down	as	this	presentation	interferes	with	the	configural	
processing	which	is	generally	engaged	in	recognising	a	face.	Yin’s	initial	description	of	this	
FIE	found	that	this	did	not	occur	with	non-face	objects	of	comparative	complexity,	and	
theorised	that	this	may	be	because	participants	pay	selective	attention	to	individual	
component	features	of	those	objects	and	these	serve	as	recognition	cues	as	they	can	be	
identified	when	the	object	is	inverted.	The	key	hypothesis	for	this	study	was	derived	from	
the	findings	of	Phase	1,	which	suggested	that	participants	may	perceive	NHFs	analytically	
rather	than	holistically,	and	that	participants	may	treat	the	NHFs	in	the	same	way	as	non-
face	objects,	encoding	them	analytically	because	of	the	distinctive	features	that	also	make	
them	appear	unsettling	or	eerier.	If	that	was	the	case,	then	these	faces	would	not	suffer	
from	the	same	degradation	in	performance	as	the	natural	human	faces	as	they	are	
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already	being	processed	in	an	analytic	fashion	which	is	not	disrupted	by	inversion.	It	was	
predicted	that	the	NHFs	would	show	a	smaller	inversion	effect	compared	to	the	human	
faces,	but	this	effect	was	not	found	as	there	was	no	interaction	between	orientation	and	
morph	stage.	Overall,	a	FIE	was	found	as	participants	were	indeed	slower	to	respond	to	
the	inverted	faces	compared	to	the	upright	faces	but	the	predicted	advantage	for	the	
NHFs	was	not	found.	It	had	been	expected	that	the	NHFs	would	have	the	fastest	response	
speeds	when	presented	inverted.	Participants	were	actually	significantly	slower	to	
respond	to	those	faces.	One	possible	explanation	for	this	may	be	that	the	original	
prediction	did	not	take	into	account	the	concept	that	inversion	has	been	found	to	disrupt	
the	perception	of	some	types	of	manipulated	faces	differently	to	others.	Searcy	and	
Bartlett	(1996)	investigated	two	types	of	manipulated	faces	to	look	for	evidence	of	
whether	holistic	versus	analytic	modes	were	being	used	to	encode	the	information	
present	in	the	face.	Their	design	created	grotesque	faces,	some	of	which	were	
manipulated	by	‘disfiguring’	the	individual	features	and	some	by	changing	the	location	of	
the	features	in	the	face.	In	this	way,	it	was	possible	to	clearly	distinguish	between	those	
spatial	changes	that	affect	the	holistic	impression	of	the	face,	and	component	changes	
which	would	affect	the	analytic	encoding.	As	with	the	present	study,	they	measured	the	
extent	to	which	performance	was	degraded	when	these	differently	manipulated	faces	
were	inverted	and	found	that	inversion	did	not	impair	the	performance	equally	for	the	
two	types,	as	inversion	had	a	more	marked	effect	for	those	faces	which	had	been	spatially	
manipulated	but	very	little	effect	on	those	that	had	distorted	components.	The	morphs	
created	in	the	present	study	were	designed	by	matching	the	positions	of	facial	features	
(eyes,	nose,	mouth,	and	hairline	where	possible)	and	then	digitally	altering	the	rest	of	the	
face	around	those	fixed	points.	The	technique	was	chosen	as	a	method	of	systematically	
varying	human-likeness	but	it	also	introduced	an	additional	variation,	that	of	gradually	
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distorting	the	components	of	the	face	while	keeping	the	spacial	relations	between	them	
constant.		
Some	limitations	of	the	studies	in	Phase	2	have	also	been	noted	above	as	the	ability	to	
draw	detailed	conclusions	about	the	differences	between	the	levels	of	human-likeness	is	
limited	by	only	having	the	five	morph	stages,	and	concerns	have	been	noted	on	the	
variance	in	rated	human-likeness	between	the	different	morph	stages.	These	suggest	
areas	for	follow-up	research	to	address	those	issues.	Future	research	should	also	consider	
whether	morphing	is	still	the	best	technique	for	systematically	varying	the	human-likeness	
of	an	agent.	The	techniques	used	in	the	present	study	did	allow	a	systematic	
transformation	through	from	artificial	to	human,	but	it	does	have	the	disadvantage	that	
morphed	images	tend	to	be	very	clearly	identifiable	as	the	product	of	a	blend	between	
different	images.	In	addition,	it	is	useful	to	consider	the	issue	of	anchoring	in	the	context	
of	these	studies.	In	both	studies,	the	non-human	and	human	images	were	included	as	a	
way	to	provide	empirical	end-points	on	a	continuum	of	images	of	human-likeness	which	
started	with	something	that	was	very	clearly	not	a	human	being,	and	progressed	to	
images	which	were	clearly	and	definitely	live	human	beings.	This	intention	was	grounded	
in	the	design	principles	described	in	Table	1,	where	being	able	to	reliably	place	entities	on	
an	empirical	continuum	was	seen	as	a	key	component	of	studies	which	should	be	able	to	
draw	conclusions	about	the	UVE.	However,	it	could	well	be	argued	that	simply	including	
these	images	in	the	set	to	be	rated	or	tested	does	not	fully	capture	human	abilities	to	
respond	to	images	that	vary	in	human-likeness,	as	each	image	was	presented	in	isolation	
and	without	any	possibility	of	comparison	to	other	images	in	the	set.	It	would	be	useful	
and	interesting	to	compare	whether	either	of	these	studies	would	produce	the	same	
findings	if	replicated	using	a	comparative	presentation	where	the	anchor	points	were	
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visible	and	constant,	and	used	as	deliberate	reference	points	for	the	different	levels	of	
human-likeness.		
This	phase	has	provided	some	evidence	suggesting	that	there	are	differences	in	how	
faces	at	the	75%	morph	stage	are	processed	compared	to	non-human	faces,	but	the	
anticipated	difference	for	NHFs	compared	to	human	faces	were	not	found.	The	notable	
finding	in	terms	of	the	UVE	was	the	identification	of	the	50%	artificial	and	50%	human	
faces	as	the	strangest	and	most	eerie	which	serves	to	challenge	the	original	prediction	
that	almost	but	not	quite	human	faces	would	be	the	‘uncanny’	candidates.	The	studies	in	
this	phase	applied	theories	and	methods	from	the	psychology	of	face	perception	to	help	
understand	the	UVE	and	ground	it	in	the	context	of	established	research.	It	has	addressed	
one	of	the	initial	strands	of	enquiry	for	this	thesis	by	looking	at	the	cognitive	aspects	of	
the	UV,	a	strand	that	was	initially	developed	from	observations	in	the	description	task	of	
Phase	1.	Phase	3	also	developed	the	findings	of	Phase	1,	but	in	a	different	direction,	by	
looking	in	more	detail	at	the	role	of	emotional	expression	in	the	perception	of	NHFs	as	
uncanny.		
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Chapter	5:	Phase	3:	Study	5:	Facial	Expressions	of	Emotion	
5.1:	Introduction	to	Phase	3	
Mismatched	expressions	and	the	Uncanny	Valley	Effect	
This	final	research	phase	considered	whether	our	reactions	to	NHFs	can	be	explained	
by	subtle	mismatches	between	expectations	that	are	set	up	by	the	overall	appearance	of	
an	agent	and	the	detail	of	the	emotional	expressions	it	displays.	In	particular,	it	tested	
whether	particular	types	of	mismatch	contribute	to	triggering	an	UVE.	Integral	to	the	
uncanny	valley	concept	is	the	premise	that	during	the	“artificial	to	human”	trajectory,	an	
agent	moves	from	merely	looking	lifelike	to	seeming	convincingly	alive	and	transforms	
from	being	predominantly	object-like	to	eventually	appearing	human.	With	increasing	
human-likeness,	it	would	be	reasonable	to	assume	that	our	ability	to	understand,	predict	
and	empathise	with	the	agent	would	also	increase	but	the	UV	dip	appears	to	be	present	in	
levels	of	affinity	as	well	as	acceptability,	which	results	in	the	NHAs	being	rejected.	This	
phase	proposes	that	this	rejection	may	occur	because	the	face	is	able	to	convey	an	overall	
impression	of	human-likeness	and	realism	that	cannot	be	matched	by	the	realism	of	the	
expression	that	the	agent	portrays.	This	makes	it	very	difficult	for	any	potential	social	
connection	to	be	achieved	between	the	viewer	and	the	agent	and	causes	rejection	of	the	
NHA.	To	use	an	example	presented	in	an	earlier	part	of	this	thesis,	androids	such	
as	Repliee	Q1	may	be	unsettling	because	their	movements,	gestures	and	expressions	are	
highly	lifelike	but	their	eyes	lack	the	necessary	build	detail	to	be	able	to	look	completely	
human.	Moreover,	the	contrast	between	something	appearing	highly	lifelike	in	some	ways	
and	un-lifelike	in	others	may	be	deeply	unsettling.	Mori’s	original	(1970)	paper	was	
recently	re-translated	(2012)	and	this	new	translation	is	also	relevant	to	consider	here.	It	
updated	the	original	‘familiarity’	term	used	to	label	the	emotional	response	axis	of	the	
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chart	with	a	new	term	of	‘shinwa-kan’	as	a	more	precise	way	of	conveying	Mori’s	intended	
concept.	There	is	no	direct	translation	into	English	for	this	term	and	while	‘familiarity’	is	
certainly	a	component	of	the	emotion,	shinwa-kan	is	a	broader	positive	feeling	which	
goes	beyond	the	identification	of	something	as	familiar	to	also	include	notions	of	affinity,	
empathy,	comfort	and	likableness.	This	new	term	makes	more	sense	of	the	negative-
familiarity	region	in	the	uncanny	valley	chart	to	explain	why	Mori	thought	that	certain	
examples	would	be	eerie.	There	is	no	intrinsic	link	between	something	being	unfamiliar	
and	eeriness	as	in	most	cases,	novelty	is	not	unsettling	in	its	own	right.	However,	it	is	
easier	to	see	how	something	which	is	uncomfortable	or	unlikeable	(negative	shinwa-kan)	
could	be	unsettling.		
With	this	broader	notion	of	affinity	or	empathy	as	the	response	that	experiences	a	
plunge	when	a	NHA	is	encountered,	questions	of	how	emotional	expressions	are	
conveyed	and	perceived	in	NHAs	become	particularly	relevant.	The	importance	of	
accurate	and	realistic	emotional	expressions	in	interpersonal	relations	has	been	discussed	
in	the	Section	1.5	above,	but	with	specific	reference	to	NHAs,	this	has	also	been	
demonstrated	from	published	research	on	human-robot	interaction.	Breazeal	(2003)	
found	that	spontaneous	emphatic	reactions	occurred	in	participants	when	working	with	a	
robot	that	could	pose	different	emotional	expressions	even	when	the	overall	appearance	
of	the	robot	was	minimally	human.	Leite	et	al’s	(2013)	work	on	the	influence	of	empathy	
in	human-robot	relations	found	that	a	robot	programmed	to	display	convincing	and	
appropriate	facial	expressions	during	an	interaction	was	rated	as	more	acceptable	and	
friendlier	then	when	it	made	the	same	responses	without	the	facial	expressions.	They	
suggest	that	establishing	empathy	through	appropriate	and	believable	facial	expressions	is	
a	requirement	for	making	a	meaningful	relationship	with	a	NHA.	It	follows	that	an	inability	
to	do	this	convincingly	due	to	a	mismatch	between	a	general	impression	and	a	specific	
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expression	could	lead	to	a	rejection	of	the	agent	and	may	explain	some	of	the	unease	that	
characterises	the	uncanny	valley	effect.		
Rationale	for	expression	mismatch	study	design	
The	approach	used	to	investigate	this	question	has	been	developed	from	findings	in	
Phase	1,	as	well	as	from	evidence	from	published	studies.	In	the	emotional	response	task	
carried	out	as	part	of	Phase	1,	it	was	found	that	there	were	more	references	to	eyes	for	
the	barely-humanoid	faces	than	to	any	other	feature,	suggesting	that	this	prominent	
feature	was	responsible	for	how	participants	felt	about	its	appearance.	In	addition,	
several	of	the	participants’	comments	for	the	barely-humanoid	face	expressed	disquiet	at	
the	blank	eyes.	For	example:		
'VERY	creepy	(made	me	jump	when	picture	loaded)	doll	with	no	eyes,	just	big	black	
holes,	and	ridiculously	small	mouth	and	chin	if	you	can	get	past	the	freaky	eyes.'	
‘Creepy,	hollow	eyes,	horror	film	puppet’	
‘Go	to	the	figure	that	looks	really	freaky!!	[…]	She	has	big	eyes	which	are	blackened	
and	look	like	blackened	closed	doll	eyes.’	
While	that	particular	face	did	indeed	have	prominent	and	unusual	eyes,	it	was	felt	that	
these	observations	warranted	further	exploration.	The	unsettling	sensation	produced	by	
almost-human	faces	may	occur	because	the	overall	impression	of	the	face	sets	up	an	
expectation	that	a	particular	emotion	is	being	expressed	which	is	then	violated	when	that	
expression	is	not	carried	through	to	the	eyes,	either	because	they	have	been	deliberately	
left	‘lifeless’	or	because	the	ability	to	reproduce	and	animate	the	expressiveness	of	human	
eyes	lags	behind	the	ability	to	produce	photorealistic	skin	texture	or	bone	structure.	This	
mismatch	between	the	expected	expressiveness	and	the	expressiveness	that	can	be	
portrayed	may	contribute	to	the	sense	of	there	being	‘something	wrong’	about	the	
almost-human	entity.		
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Published	research	also	pointed	to	the	role	of	unusual	or	blank	eyes	in	to	contributing	
to	the	UVE,	particularly	where	they	are	presented	in	a	face	where	the	skin	has	a	realistic	
texture	causing	a	mismatch	between	the	realism	of	the	eyes	and	the	surrounding	face.	
The	background	to	research	into	cue	mismatches	and	their	role	in	the	UVE	has	already	
been	described	in	the	Section	1.3	above,	but	this	introduction	will	recap	some	key	studies	
before	introducing	the	research	questions	that	were	addressed	in	this	phase.		
A	precedent	for	investigating	a	mismatch	in	aspects	of	how	an	almost-human	entity	is	
presented	can	be	seen	in	a	study	by	Creed	and	Beale	(2008)	where	participants	viewed	a	
CG	figure	whose	facial	expression	and	voice	inflection	could	be	congruent	or	incongruent.	
Participants	rated	the	figure	on	pairs	of	positive	and	negative	characteristics	and	their	
ratings	of	the	positive	characteristics	were	amplified	where	those	characteristics	were	
congruent.	They	concluded	that	being	presented	with	mismatched	stimuli	did	have	an	
impact	on	participant’s	responses	to	the	figure	and	suggested	that	this	may	be	due	to	a	
type	of	cognitive	dissonance.	Seyama	and	Nagayam’s	(2007)	systematic	manipulation	of	
artificial	and	photorealistic	faces	found	that	the	eeriest	faces	were	those	where	oversized	
eyes	were	paired	with	realistic	skin	texture.	Similarly,	MacDorman	et	al	(2009)	found	that	
the	eeriest	faces	were	those	where	the	skin	texture	was	photorealistic	and	the	eyes	were	
magnified	to	50%	their	original	size.	In	both	cases	there	was	a	mismatch	between	the	
realism	of	the	overall	face	(i.e.	skin	texture)	and	the	expected	proportions	of	the	eyes.	
Tinwell	et	al	(2010)	presented	participants	with	videos	of	faces	posed	to	display	particular	
emotions	or	a	lack	of	emotion,	and	compared	ratings	of	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	
eeriness.	Their	key	finding	was	that	a	lack	of	emotional	expression	in	the	upper	part	of	the	
face	elicited	feelings	of	uncanniness,	particularly	when	a	negative	emotion	was	being	
portrayed	in	the	rest	of	the	face.		
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This	final	phase	built	on	the	results	of	those	published	studies	but	developed	the	
mismatch	idea	to	look	specifically	at	reactions	to	mismatched	emotional	expressions.	This	
develops	Creed	et	al’s	research	into	mismatched	expressions,	as	well	as	Tinwell	et	al’s	
approach,	as	the	latter	studies	paired	a	lack	of	emotion	in	the	upper	part	of	the	face	with	
a	different	expression	in	the	rest	of	the	face,	whereas	the	present	study	explored	the	
ratings	that	would	be	given	for,	for	example,	a	face	posed	to	display	a	happy	expression	
overall	but	with	the	eye	region	from	the	happy	face	replaced	with	the	eye	region	from	a	
face	posed	to	display	a	frightened	expression.	These	expression	combinations	are	not	
possible	for	anyone	to	produce	naturally	and	so	these	images	do	belong	to	the	category	of	
artificially	created	'near-human'	faces.	The	original	faces	from	which	the	expressions	were	
created	are	also	included	in	the	stimulus	set	so	it	is	possible	to	compare	responses	to	
these	NHFs	to	their	human	originals.	Examples	illustrating	three	of	these	expression	
blends	are	shown	in	Figure	36	below.		
	 	 	
Figure	36:	Three	examples	of	face	expression	blends,	from	left	to	right:	happy	face,	neutral	eyes;	
sad	face,	happy	eyes;	happy	face,	fearful	eyes.	
The	premise	that	some	of	these	combinations	may	give	rise	to	a	response	pattern	in	
keeping	with	the	UVE	will	be	explored	through	topics	relating	to	the	perception	of	
emotional	expressions	and	their	relationship	to	the	UVE.	These	have	been	grouped	into	
four	explorations,	firstly	looking	at	the	core	question	of	the	eeriness	of	the	different	
blends	and	then	going	on	to	explore	the	differences	in	how	each	blend	was	perceived.	
This	phase	used	an	online	experiment	to	explore	whether	mismatched	expressions	are	
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eerie	and	whether	different	types	of	blended	faces	resulted	in	different	ratings	of	
eeriness.	Strength	of	participants’	emotional	responses	to	the	different	blends	was	also	
measured	as	well	as	whether	they	were	able	to	accurately	categorise	and	recognise	the	
emotions	present	in	each	blend.	Image	orientation	was	also	varied	in	one	of	the	tasks	to	
explore	whether	the	previous	evidence	of	NHFs	being	processed	analytically	rather	than	
holistically	could	be	supported.		
The	effect	of	face	blend	on	eeriness:	are	mismatched	expressions	eerie?		
This	exploration	looked	at	the	effect	of	face	blend	on	eeriness.	This	is	the	first	study	to	
explicitly	measure	this	effect	of	mismatch	on	eeriness,	so	three	scenarios	for	the	pattern	
that	the	ratings	of	eeriness	may	take	have	been	predicted	from	previous	studies	whose	
results	touch	on	similar	aspects	of	face	perception.		
Firstly,	Tinwell	et	al’s	(2013)	research	found	that	a	lack	of	expression	in	the	upper	part	
of	the	face	was	linked	to	participants	feeling	a	heightened	sense	of	eeriness	when	looking	
at	particular	faces.	Participants	also	attributed	psychopathic	traits	to	the	entities	
displaying	this	expression.	If	the	present	study	was	to	support	Tinwell	et	al’s	finding,	the	
face	expression	blends	where	neutral	eyes	were	presented	in	disgusted,	fearful	or	sad	
faces	would	be	rated	as	the	most	eerie.	The	angry	faces	with	neutral	eyes	have	also	been	
considered	in	this	hypothesis,	but	Tinwell	et	al’s	(2011b)	findings	suggested	that	a	lack	of	
expression	in	the	upper	part	of	an	angry	face	did	not	reliably	predict	eeriness	or	negative	
evaluations,	perhaps	because	cold,	angry	expressions	are	not	particularly	unusual.	
Secondly,	Ekman	et	al’s	(2005)	study	of	‘leaked	expressions’	found	that	an	attempt	to	
cover	up	a	negative	emotion	using	a	forced	or	fake	smile	rendered	people	untrustworthy	
due	to	the	discrepancy	between	the	smile	and	the	negative	emotional	cues	that	were	also	
present	in	the	expression.	Ekman	et	al’s	work	was	not	an	exploration	of	the	UVE	but	his	
findings	can	be	applied	to	the	concept	because	one	plausible	explanation	for	the	UVE	may	
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be	that	some	NHFs	are	negatively	evaluated	as	they	lack	congruent	expressions	and	this	
may	make	them	appear	untrustworthy.	In	this	scenario,	it	would	follow	that	the	happy	
faces	blended	with	angry,	disgusted,	fearful	or	sad	eyes	would	be	rated	at	the	most	eerie.		
Finally,	Seyama	and	Nagayama’s	(2009)	study	found	that	enlarged	eyes	were	a	factor	
in	triggering	a	sense	of	the	uncanny	in	artificial	faces.	In	terms	of	the	face	images	used	for	
this	study,	the	blended	faces	including	a	fearful	expression	would	display	larger	eyes	
because	these	are	widened	in	fright	whereas	the	angry,	disgusted	and	sad	expressions	
would	not	be	characterised	by	a	widening	of	the	eyes.	Therefore,	the	blends	with	fearful	
eyes	will	be	rated	as	the	most	eerie	and	of	those,	the	neutral	face	with	the	fearful	
expression	will	be	rated	as	eeriest.		
Based	on	these	studies,	it	was	hypothesised	that	there	would	be	significant	difference	
in	eeriness,	with	the	mismatched	faces	rated	as	eerier	than	the	matched	faces	(H1).	In	
terms	of	the	nature	of	that	difference,	three	scenarios	were	considered.	Firstly,	after	
Tinwell	et	al	(2013),	it	was	predicted	that	the	eeriest	faces	would	be	those	with	neutral	
eyes	and	disgusted,	fearful	or	sad	faces.	Secondly,	after	Ekman	et	al	(2005)	it	was	
predicted	that	the	eeriest	faces	would	be	those	with	a	happy	face	paired	with	any	
negative	eye	regions.	Finally,	after	Seyama	and	Nagayama	(2009)	it	was	predicted	that	the	
neutral	face,	fearful	eye	blends	would	be	rated	as	eeriest.		
A	second	hypothesis	was	considered	to	explore	the	effect	of	inversion	on	ratings	of	
eeriness.	Study	4,	reported	above,	found	that	NHFs	were	subject	to	an	inversion	effect	
and	that	the	75%	human	faces	took	significantly	longer	to	identify	than	the	non-human	
faces,	suggesting	that	they	may	be	processed	differently.	H2	predicted	that	orientation	
would	have	a	significant	effect	on	participant’s	ratings	of	eeriness,	and	that	inverted	faces	
would	not	be	found	to	be	as	eerie	as	the	upright	faces.	This	prediction	is	grounded	in	the	
literature	presented	in	Section	1.5,	as	Fallshore	and	Bartholow	(2003)	found	that	it	was	
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harder	to	recognise	most	negative	emotions	from	inverted	faces,	and	Prkachin	(2003)	
found	that	negative	emotions	were	more	easily	confused	when	viewed	in	inverted	faces.	
Face	blends	and	emotional	responses:	which	faces	will	evoke	the	strongest	ratings	of	
anger,	disgust,	fear,	sadness,	happiness	and	surprise?	
As	well	as	being	rated	for	eeriness,	the	faces	were	each	rated	for	how	strongly	
participants	felt	six	emotions	when	looking	at	each	blend.	These	responses	were	collected	
to	understand	more	about	the	emotional	composition	of	the	UVE,	as	it	is	generally	
described	as	a	sense	of	eeriness	or	unease	but	the	precise	nature	of	it	as	an	emotion	is	
not	yet	clearly	understood.	Ho	et	al’s	(2008)	findings	suggested	that	both	fear	and	disgust	
were	key	components	of	the	UVE.	In	addition,	sadness	and	happiness	were	considered	
under	(H3).	It	was	predicted	that	the	mismatched	faces,	which	were	predicted	to	be	eerier	
than	the	mismatched	faces,	would	evoke	the	strongest	ratings	of	fear,	sadness	and	disgust	
and	the	lowest	ratings	of	happiness.		
In	addition,	as	each	of	the	blended	faces	was	produced	as	a	composite	of	two	
emotions,	the	emotion	experienced	by	participants	could	be	one	of	those	emotions	or	the	
blended	face	may	elicit	emotions	not	present	in	either	of	the	original	expressions.	
Identifying	which	emotions	are	felt	most	strongly	when	looking	at	the	faces,	and	whether	
these	are	congruent	or	incongruent	with	the	emotion	shown	in	the	eyes	or	surrounding	
face	will	allow	conclusions	to	be	drawn	about	the	effectiveness	of	the	face	as	a	convincing	
portrayal	of	those	emotions.	H4,	based	on	Bassili’s	(1979)	work,	predicts	that	happiness	
and	disgust	will	be	experienced	more	strongly	when	these	expressions	are	present	in	the	
eyes	of	the	blend,	anger	and	fear	in	the	surrounding	face,	but	that	there	will	be	no	such	
distinct	pattern	for	surprise	or	sadness.	This	was	explored	by	inspecting	the	mean	ratings	
for	each	of	the	matched	and	mismatched	blends.		
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A	final	question	in	this	section	looked	at	how	subjective	ratings	of	eeriness	for	each	of	
the	faces	correlated	with	measurements	of	feeling	angry,	disgusted,	frightened,	sad,	
happy	or	surprised	when	looking	at	each	image.	H5	proposed	that	ratings	of	eeriness	
should	correlate	strongly	and	positively	with	participant	experiences	of	fear	and	disgust	
but	not	with	sadness	or	anger.	Fear	and	disgust	have	been	previously	anecdotally	
identified	as	emotions	implicit	in	the	uncanny	valley	effect,	and	this	is	also	supported	by	
the	work	of	Ho	et	al	(2008)	who	found	that	these	were	the	terms	most	closely	correlated	
with	‘eerie’	and	‘creepy’	in	their	inventory	of	the	characteristics	of	NHAs.		
Emotion	Identification:	are	there	differences	in	how	each	face	is	perceived?		
Having	explored	the	ratings	of	eeriness	for	each	face	and	looked	at	correlations	
between	eeriness	and	experienced	emotions,	the	third	area	explored	the	accuracy	with	
which	emotions	were	identified	from	each	of	the	blended	faces	to	see	whether	
participants	were	able	to	identify	happiness,	neutrality,	anger,	disgust,	fear	and	sadness	
when	present	in	the	blends.	It	was	generally	hypothesised	that	matched	faces	would	be	
recognised	more	accurately	than	mismatched	faces,	and	four	hypotheses	were	considered	
for	the	nature	of	that	difference.	
Firstly,	Calvo	and	Lundqvist’s	(2008)	findings	suggested	that	participants	may	find	
disgust	and	anger	hard	to	distinguish	and	so	disgust	may	be	identified	when	a	blended	
face	contains	anger	and	vice	versa	(H6).		
Secondly,	the	work	of	Calder	et	al	(2000)	suggested	a	pattern	of	recognition	errors	as	a	
function	of	whether	the	emotion	is	displayed	in	the	eye-region	of	the	blend	or	in	the	
surrounding	face.	More	errors	in	identifying	disgust	and	happiness	will	occur	in	the	blends	
displaying	these	in	the	eye	region,	and	more	errors	in	identifying	anger,	fear	and	sadness	
will	occur	when	these	are	presented	as	the	face	expression	with	mismatched	eyes	(H7).		
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A	third	pattern	is	grounded	in	earlier	research	by	Hanawalt	(1944)	which	suggests	a	
broader	division	where	the	positive	emotions	are	identified	from	the	top	part	of	the	face	
and	negative	emotions	from	the	lower	part.	This	would	mean	that	happiness	would	be	
identified	in	the	happy-eye	blends,	and	the	negative	emotions	(anger,	disgust,	fear	and	
sadness)	from	the	blends	where	those	are	the	expression	in	the	surrounding	face	(H8).	
Happy	faces	with	sad	eyes	present	a	challenge	to	Hanawalt’s	evidence	and	will	be	
considered	with	interest.		
Another	question	concerns	whether	the	identified	emotions	will	be	the	ones	
displayed	in	the	eyes/top	of	the	face	or	the	surrounding	face/bottom	of	the	face?	It	is	
possible	to	create	‘chimeric’	faces	by	taking	the	top	part	of	a	picture	of	a	face	and	aligning	
it	with	the	bottom	part	of	another	image.	Calder	(1996)	used	this	technique	to	create	
chimeric	faces	where	two	different	expressions	are	presented	in	one	face.	While	the	
blends	in	the	present	study	have	been	created	by	isolating	and	transferring	only	the	eye	
region	from	each	face	leaving	the	rest	of	the	top	of	the	face	intact,	chimeric	faces	do	have	
obvious	similarities	with	these	blends	and	the	findings	from	that	literature	have	been	
used	to	inform	hypotheses	about	the	way	in	which	emotions	will	be	perceived	from	the	
blends.	A	theme	of	interest	for	this	study	is	whether	participants	would	identify	particular	
emotions	in	the	top	and	bottom	halves	of	the	face.	H9	predicted	that	happiness	and	
disgust	will	be	identified	in	the	faces	where	these	are	present	in	the	eyes	of	the	blend,	
and	anger	and	fear	identified	where	these	are	present	in	the	surrounding	face.	There	will	
be	no	distinct	pattern	of	localisation	for	identification	of	surprise	or	sadness.	This	has	
been	predicted	from	Bassili’s	(1979)	work	(H9).		
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Emotion	Classification:	Will	the	blended	faces	be	classified	in	terms	of	the	emotion	
displayed	in	the	upper	part	of	the	face,	the	lower	part	of	the	face,	or	will	they	be	judged	
neutral	or	too	difficult	to	classify?	
A	classification	task	has	been	included	in	this	study	to	see	if	there	are	any	patterns	in	
participant’s	ability	to	classify	the	blended	faces	in	terms	of	the	emotions	they	displayed.	
These	results	were	explored	descriptively	and	three	patterns	were	investigated.	Firstly,	it	
was	proposed	that	the	eerier	blends	would	be	hardest	to	categorise.	Secondly,	as	noted	
above,	Hanawalt	(1944)	suggests	that	positive	emotions	are	generally	perceived	from	the	
bottom	of	the	face,	negative	from	the	top,	so	the	negative	eyes,	happy	face	blends	would	
be	classified	as	displaying	positive	emotions	and	the	happy	eyes,	negative	face	blends	will	
be	categorised	as	displaying	negative	emotions.	Finally,	the	classifications	were	also	
considered	in	light	of	the	first	scenario	explored	in	H1	above	to	see	whether	the	neutral-
eyed	blends	would	be	particularly	hard	or	easy	to	classify.		
5.2:	Method	
Design	
An	independent	groups	design	was	used	and	nine	dependent	variables	were	
measured,	eight	in	the	first	task	and	one	in	the	second.	The	first	task	involved	two	IVs,	
orientation	and	face	type.	Participants	were	presented	with	images	of	faces	and	asked	to	
rate	how	strongly	they	felt	six	emotions.	They	were	then	asked	how	eerie	they	found	each	
of	the	faces,	and	then	to	identify	the	image	that	they	thought	the	face	was	displaying.	Half	
of	the	faces	were	presented	upright	and	half	presented	inverted.	The	second	task	involved	
the	IV	of	face	type	only,	and	did	not	test	orientation	as	all	images	were	presented	upright.	
In	this	task,	participants	were	asked	to	classify	a	subset	of	the	face	images	in	terms	of	
whether	they	presented	positive,	negative	or	neutral	expressions.		
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The	stimuli	used	in	these	tasks	were	24	photographs	of	faces	displaying	emotional	
expressions.	18	were	blended	faces,	or	Facial	Expression	Blends	(FEBs)	defined	as	a	type	
of	chimeric	face	created	from	images	of	posed	expressions	where	the	eye	region	of	one	
face	is	blended	into	a	base	face	displaying	a	different	expression.	6	of	the	images	were	the	
original	un-blended	emotional	expressions,	18	were	different	types	of	blended	images.	All	
combinations	are	a	blend	of	either	a	positive,	negative	or	neutral	expression	with	another	
positive,	negative	or	neutral	expression.	There	are	four	variants	of	negative	expression:	
anger,	disgust,	fear	and	sadness.	These	combinations	created	24	different	levels	of	FEBs.	
Figure	37	presents	the	24	levels.	The	faces	in	the	top-left,	centre	and	four	bottom-right	
cells	are	unmodified	images	of	the	original	posed	expressions.	In	all	the	other	cells,	
blended	faces	have	been	created	by	taking	the	eye	region	from	one	expression	and	
blending	it	into	the	base	face	of	another.		
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Figure	37:	Examples	of	all	24	levels	of	FEBs	showing	how	the	expression	images	were	combined.		
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Table	12	below	summarises	the	design	used	for	the	separate	parts	of	the	study,	
presented	in	the	order	in	which	participants	experienced	each	task:	
	
Table	12:	Structure	of	tasks,	IVs,	DVs,	measures	and	survey	questions.		
To	ensure	a	highly	standardised	set	of	stimulus	materials,	the	images	used	to	create	
the	blends	were	carefully	selected	to	ensure	they	were	matched	for	quality	and	isolation	
of	the	face	image	from	any	distracting	background,	lack	of	facial	accessories	including	
glasses	or	facial	hair.	Male	and	female	models	were	included	and	models	of	different	ages	
were	selected	where	possible.	To	avoid	the	issue	of	comparative	ratings,	the	image	sets	
seen	by	each	participant	were	constructed	to	only	present	one	blend	from	each	model:	
participants	who	saw	the	'model	one'	face	where	the	happy	expression	had	been	
modified	by	the	application	of	fearful	eyes	would	never	see	'model	one'	displaying	any	
other	type	of	blend.	Participants	were	randomly	allocated	to	one	of	eight	groups.	The	
groups	were	based	on	a	collection	of	FEBs	structured	to	ensure	that	each	participant	saw	
every	type	of	blend	once	but	that	the	type	was	only	seen	once	in	each	task	and	each	
model	was	seen	only	once	in	the	course	of	the	study.	Images	were	presented	in	a	random	
order	within	each	group.		
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Pilot	testing	
Pilot	tests	were	used	in	the	development	of	the	survey	web	pages	and	many	of	the	
changes	involved	incremental	improvements	to	the	layout	of	the	survey	pages	and	
wording	of	questions	but	five	substantial	changes	were	also	made	and	will	be	described.	
The	version	sent	to	pilot	testers	was	a	functionally	complete	version	of	the	survey	but	did	
not	include	all	potential	FEBs.	The	following	changes	were	made:		
• Input	options,	Sliders	vs	Radio	Buttons:	An	early	version	of	the	survey	used	‘sliders’	
to	collect	rating	data.	Participants	operate	these	by	dragging	a	marker	to	the	
correct	place	on	the	scale.	While	they	are	visually	appealing	and	can	add	interest	
to	the	participant	experience,	it	was	concluded	that	they	do	have	several	
disadvantages	in	a	study	of	this	nature.	They	can	be	hard	to	operate	on	mobile	
devices,	meaning	that	inaccurate	response	data	may	be	collected.	Radio	buttons	
are	a	less	interactive	but	more	accurate	input	method,	particularly	where	the	scale	
is	reasonably	short	as	in	the	present	study.	It	was	decided	to	adopt	radio	buttons	
rather	than	sliders	for	the	final	version	of	the	study.		
• Image	Size	and	Survey	Performance:	it	was	found	that	the	survey	was	taking	some	
time	to	load	for	some	of	the	testers.	Investigations	found	that	this	was	due	to	the	
size	of	the	images.	The	images	in	the	pilot	study	were	based	on	the	originals	from	
the	Radboud	database	and	were	therefore	very	large,	high	quality	JPEG	graphics	
which	took	quite	some	time	to	load.	This	had	not	been	apparent	when	designing	
the	images	on	a	local	network	but	as	soon	as	participants	were	accessing	the	
images	as	part	of	the	survey	and	needing	to	download	them	from	the	Qualtrics	
servers	it	became	apparent	that	this	was	taking	several	seconds	per	image	and	
making	the	survey	rather	slow	to	complete.	This	could	be	quite	off-putting	to	
participants	and	might	have	caused	them	to	abandon	the	survey	part	of	the	way	
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through.	To	address	this,	the	images	were	resized	to	give	a	smaller	file	size	but	no	
appreciable	loss	in	quality.		
• Platform	Recommendation:	One	goal	of	pilot	testing	was	to	have	the	survey	
completed	using	as	many	different	platforms	as	possible.	A	concern	was	that	given	
the	recruitment	strategy	there	may	be	a	high	proportion	of	participants	trying	to	
complete	the	survey	on	mobile	devices	so	pilot	testers	were	asked	to	try	the	
survey	out	on	their	tablet	devices	and	mobile	phones	as	well	as	standard	laptop	
and	desktop	computers.	This	was	an	extremely	valuable	test:	firstly,	it	was	found	
that	the	slider	interface	used	in	the	pilot	version	of	the	survey	was	particularly	
cumbersome	to	use	on	iPad	devices	but	also	that	the	survey	was	impossible	to	
complete	using	several	older	smart	phones	as	the	images	were	too	large	to	view	
comfortably.	By	this	stage	the	images	had	already	been	resized	to	address	the	
loading	speed	issue	detailed	above	and	it	was	felt	that	any	further	reduction	
would	begin	to	impact	on	the	image	quality	when	viewed	on	larger	screens.	
Rather	than	try	to	accommodate	all	platforms	with	limited	success,	it	was	decided	
that	a	better	approach	would	be	to	provide	advice	to	participants	on	which	
platforms	would	be	best	to	use	to	complete	the	survey.	The	initial	instruction	
screen	was	modified	to	include	advice	to	this	effect.		
Once	these	amendments	and	improvements	were	made	and	reviewed,	the	final	
version	of	the	survey	was	created	and	the	full	set	of	FEBs	loaded.	At	this	stage	it	was	
ready	for	launch	and	recruitment	was	started.		
Materials	
The	images	in	this	study	were	drawn	from	the	Radboud	Faces	Database	(Langner	et	al,	
2010).	This	is	a	database	of	high-quality	face	images	where	the	models	had	been	trained	
to	consistently	pose	expressions	as	defined	by	the	Facial	Action	Coding	System.	The	
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images	in	the	database	had	been	validated	for	reliability	of	emotional	expression	
recognition	plus	mean	intensity,	clarity,	genuineness	and	valence	of	the	expressions	
shown.	Permission	was	sought	from	the	developers	to	use	the	database	for	this	study,	and	
a	subset	of	the	images	were	downloaded	for	manipulation,	containing	different	emotions	
posed	by	individual	models.	Each	set	contained	a	happy	and	neutral	image,	plus	angry,	
fearful,	disgusted	and	sad	images.	These	were	chosen	as	representing	core	emotions	that	
should	be	universally	and	clearly	identifiable	in	their	unmodified	state	(Ekman,	1992).	As	
described	above,	the	eye	regions	from	selected	faces	were	blended	onto	target	faces	
displaying	different	emotions,	producing	a	total	of	24	image	blends	from	each	model.	48	
models	(19	female,	29	male)	were	used	in	this	study:	blends	created	from	24	models	(12	
female,	12	male)	were	used	in	Task	One	where	inverted	versions	of	their	blends	were	also	
created	by	using	a	built-in	rotation	and	flipping	commands	in	the	Pixelmator4	graphic	
editing	package	to	rotate	the	images	180°	and	then	flip	the	left-to-right	orientation.	12	
models	were	used	in	Task	Two	(6	female,	6	male)	where	inversion	was	not	explored	so	no	
inverted	versions	were	created.	The	remaining	images	from	3	sets	of	models	(1	female,	2	
male)	were	used	in	the	study	as	training	examples	rather	than	experimental	images.	
Procedure	
Participants	were	recruited	using	the	methods	described	for	previous	studies,	a	
mailing	list	used	by	post-graduate	psychology	researchers	and	two	recruitment	web	sites5.	
In	addition,	a	link	to	the	study	was	distributed	via	social	media,	recruiting	a	large	number	
																																																						
4	http://www.pixelmator.com/mac/		
	
5	http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html		
http://www.onlinepsychresearch.co.uk/researchers/	
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of	participants.	The	study	was	presented	online	using	the	Qualtrics6	system.	The	diagram	
below	describes	the	structure	of	the	experiment	and	the	flow	that	participants	took	
through	each	task.		
	
	
Figure	38:	Diagram	showing	the	survey	flow	and	elements	encountered	by	participants.		
After	they	had	completed	the	initial	screens,	participants	were	randomly	allocated	to	
one	of	eight	groups.	It	was	possible	to	randomly	allocate	participants	to	an	experimental	
group	and	then	present	the	elements	within	the	study	in	a	random	order.	The	system	
presented	a	count	of	how	far	through	the	participant	had	progressed,	displayed	
underneath	the	image	that	they	were	looking	at	at	that	moment	in	time.	In	this	way,	it	
																																																						
6	http://www.qualtrics.com	
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was	clear	how	many	images	they	still	had	to	review.	Also,	if	a	question	was	not	answered	
and	the	participant	tried	to	progress	to	the	next	page,	a	pop-up	appeared	asking	them	if	
they	were	sure	that	they	want	to	continue	without	answering.	They	were	able	to	do	so,	
but	the	pop-up	encouraged	them	to	go	back	and	add	their	answers.		
The	structure	of	the	experiment	was	as	follows:	
Introduction:	The	initial	landing	page	introduced	the	study	and	the	researcher	and	
gave	background	information	about	the	benefits	and	implications	of	participation.	
Participants	could	only	proceed	to	take	part	in	the	study	if	they	clicked	to	indicate	that	
they	were	over	eighteen	years	old	and	had	understood	the	terms	and	conditions	
sufficiently	to	give	their	consent.		
Task	One	pages:	Once	participants	had	given	their	consent	to	take	part	they	started	
Task	One.	This	began	with	a	training	phase	where	an	example	FEB	was	presented:	this	FEB	
was	unique	to	the	training	phase	and	not	used	in	any	other	part	of	the	study.	Participants	
were	asked	the	three	questions	(strength	of	emotional	response,	perceived	eeriness	and	
emotion	identification)	about	it	that	they	would	see	in	the	live	trials.	Full	details	of	the	
question	texts	are	given	in	Appendix	3b.	Each	question	page	had	the	same	format	where	
the	FEB	image	filled	the	top	part	of	the	visible	area	of	the	screen	with	the	scale	or	grid	
presented	below.	This	training	example	allowed	participants	to	get	used	to	the	interface	
and	also	to	check	that	the	images	were	loading	quickly	and	correctly	for	them.	After	the	
training	phase,	24	FEBs	were	each	presented	and	the	three	questions	asked	about	them.	
The	order	of	the	FEBs	was	randomised.	Participants	could	see	how	far	they	had	
progressed	through	the	task	as	'n/24'	was	presented	under	the	image	where	n	referred	to	
the	current	FEB.	When	all	24	had	been	presented	and	participants	had	given	their	
answers,	they	moved	on	to	Task	Two.		
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Task	Two	pages:	Task	Two	again	started	with	a	practice	example.	The	interface	for	Task	
2	was	quite	different	to	a	standard	survey	page	so	the	training	phase	allowed	participants	
to	check	that	their	equipment	was	capable	of	completing	the	task.	For	this	task,	the	
screen	was	split	with	an	information	area	at	the	top	and	an	interaction	area	in	the	centre	
of	the	screen.	To	the	left	of	the	interaction	area	was	a	‘stack’	of	images,	and	to	the	right	a	
grid	of	four	squares,	each	labelled	with	a	category	identifier.	The	participants’	task	was	to	
pick	up	the	images	from	the	stack	and	place	them	into	the	category	which	they	felt	best	
represented	that	face.	The	training	example	only	included	two	FEBs	and	again	they	were	
unique	to	the	training	part	of	the	study.	Once	they	had	completed	the	training	example	
they	moved	to	a	live	version	where	there	were	12	images	to	categorise.	Once	these	had	
all	been	categorised,	participants	clicked	to	move	to	the	last	section	of	the	study.		
Demographic	information:	Finally,	participants	were	asked	if	they	were	willing	to	give	
some	basic	demographic	information.	Only	if	they	said	that	they	were	willing	to	give	that	
information	were	they	presented	with	these	optional	questions:	they	were	age,	gender	
and	location	as	before	but	with	the	addition	of	ethnicity	for	this	study	only.	Finally,	
participants	were	asked	if	they	would	be	interested	in	receiving	further	information	about	
the	project	including	a	report	of	the	eventual	results,	and	if	so,	they	could	leave	a	
preferred	email	address.		
Close:	Once	the	final	questions	had	been	answered,	participants	were	routed	to	the	
main	project	web	page	for	further	reading	about	the	UVT.	The	landing	page	repeated	the	
contact	information	for	the	researcher	if	there	were	any	further	queries.		
Screenshots	showing	an	example	of	each	page	in	the	structure	are	given	in	Appendix	
3b.		
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Participants	
3082	participants	visited	the	first	page	of	the	survey	and	of	those,	3077	gave	their	
consent	to	start	the	study.	2316	participants	completed	the	first	training	question	and	
1078	participants	went	on	to	complete	both	tasks.	The	analyses	in	the	rest	of	this	report	
are	based	on	those	participants.	Of	those,	999	of	those	were	willing	to	give	their	
demographic	information;	of	those,	66%	were	female	and	the	mean	age	was	37	years	old.	
When	asked	about	their	location,	47%	of	participants	reported	that	they	were	in	the	UK	
with	another	35%	reporting	they	were	in	the	US.	When	asked	about	their	ethnicity,	most	
participants	(56%)	described	themselves	as	white.		
A	full	breakdown	of	participant	demographic	data	is	shown	in	Appendix	3a.		
5.3:	Results	and	Discussions	
5.3.1:	Eeriness	ratings	for	different	face	image	types	
5.3.1.1:	Results	
The	following	analyses	are	drawn	from	the	second	question	asked	during	Task	1	of	
Study	5.	The	idea	that	some	faces	may	be	perceived	as	eerier	than	others	is	key	to	the	
UVE,	and	this	task	evaluated	responses	to	manipulated	photographs	of	faces	where	
emotional	expressions	from	the	eye	and	face	region	had	been	systematically	combined	to	
test	two	hypotheses	about	how	these	different	combinations	would	affect	whether	
participants	would	find	them	eerie.	H1	predicted	that	the	blended	faces,	where	there	was	
a	mismatch	between	the	emotions	displayed	in	different	parts	of	the	face,	would	be	rated	
as	eerier	than	the	original	unchanged	face	images.	This	prediction	was	drawn	from	
findings	from	earlier	phases	of	the	present	project,	and	three	potential	patterns	for	the	
nature	of	this	difference	were	explored,	based	on	Tinwell	et	al’s	(2013)	work	linking	the	
UVE	to	perceptions	of	psychopathy,	Ekman	et	al’s	(2005)	theory	of	leaked	emotions,	and	
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Seyama	and	Nagayama’s	(2009)	findings	that	enlarged	eyes	triggered	perceptions	of	
eeriness.	H2	predicted	that	orientation	would	have	a	significant	effect	on	eeriness	ratings.		
Data	preparation	
To	explore	the	hypotheses	that	mismatched	faces	would	be	found	to	be	eerier	than	
matched	faces,	and	that	this	would	be	affected	by	inversion,	the	raw	eeriness	rating	data	
was	prepared	for	analysis.	Participants	had	each	seen	24	face	images,	half	presented	
upright	and	half	inverted.	4	sets	of	different	models	were	used	to	create	the	images,	so	
the	raw	results	files	were	processed	to	give	an	eeriness	rating	score	for	each	participant	
for	each	image,	in	the	orientation	they	saw,	regardless	of	the	model	used.	Six	of	the	24	
images	were	matched	(the	basic	happy,	neutral,	angry,	disgusted,	fearful	and	sad	faces)	
and	the	other	18	mismatched.	This	analysis	stage	was	not	concerned	with	which	model	
had	been	used	to	create	the	specific	combination	of	emotions,	so	the	ratings	from	each	
participant	were	processed	so	that,	regardless	of	the	model	they	had	seen,	their	eeriness	
ratings	could	be	allocated	to	whether	the	face	they	had	seen	was	an	original,	unblended	
‘matched’	image,	or	one	of	the	‘mismatched’	blended	faces.	Responses	were	only	
analysed	where	participants	had	given	ratings	for	matched	and	unmatched	faces,	so	any	
responses	where	ratings	were	not	given	for	both	types	of	face	were	excluded.		
The	effect	of	inversion	on	ratings	of	eeriness	for	matched	and	mismatched	faces.		
This	first	test	established	whether	there	was	a	difference	in	eeriness	ratings	between	
the	different	face	images,	by	analysing	eeriness	ratings	to	explore	a	possible	interaction	
between	match	and	orientation.	A	2*2	within-participants	ANOVA	was	used	to	examine	
the	two	main	effects	of	match	versus	mismatch	and	orientation.	The	main	effects	of	
match	and	orientation	were	both	significant:	F(1,1077)	=	358.628,	p	<	.001,	partial	η2	=	.25	
for	the	match-mismatch	factor	and	F(1,1077)	=	367.105,	p	<	.001,	partial	η2	=	.25	for	
orientation.	However,	there	was	no	significant	interaction	between	the	two	factors:	
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F(1,1077)	=	4.918,	p	=	.027,	partial	η2	=	.05.	The	absence	of	an	interaction	is	illustrated	by	
the	parallel	lines	in	the	figure	below.	The	mismatched	faces	were	rated	as	eerier	than	the	
matched	faces,	both	when	presented	upright	and	when	presented	inverted.	This	provided	
support	for	H1	as	the	mismatched	faces	were	rated	as	eerier	than	the	matched	faces,	and	
in	terms	of	H2	it	indicated	that	inverting	all	the	faces	made	them	significantly	eerier,	
regardless	of	whether	they	were	matched	or	mismatched.	This	was	the	opposite	to	the	
predicted	direction	for	H2,	where	it	was	expected	that	eeriness	would	be	lower	for	the	
faces	when	presented	inverted	rather	than	upright.		
	
Figure	39:	Comparison	of	the	mean	eeriness	for	matched	and	mismatched	blends	when	
presented	upright	and	inverted.		
This	study	was	designed	so	that	participants	each	saw	a	sub-set	of	face	images	drawn	
from	a	collection	created	from	photographs	of	several	different	base	models.	This	was	to	
ensure	that	any	observed	effects	could	be	applicable	to	faces	in	general	rather	than	
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grounded	in	a	small	set	of	specific	images.	However,	this	does	mean	that	it	was	necessary	
to	carry	out	an	analysis	by	item	to	examine	whether	any	of	the	variance	in	eeriness	could	
be	due	to	characteristics	of	the	specific	face	images	themselves,	perhaps	due	to	some	
expressions	appearing	particularly	exaggerated	or	not	clearly	portrayed.	To	perform	this,	
the	original	dataset	of	eeriness	rating	data	was	transposed	to	allow	the	96	individual	
images	(4	models	x	24	face	images)	to	be	analysed	by	their	match/mismatch	status	and	
the	orientation	in	which	they	had	been	seen.	A	2*2	ANOVA	was	carried	out,	which	found	
the	same	results	as	the	standard	analysis	by	participant	above	as	the	main	effects	of	
match	and	orientation	were	both	significant	(F(1,188)	=	9.388,	p	<	0.001,	partial	η2	=	.048),	
F(1,188)	=	24.038,	p	<	0.001,	partial	η2	=	.113.	There	was	no	significant	interaction	
between	match	and	orientation:	F(1,188)	=	.183,	p	=	669,	partial	η2	=	.001.	As	these	results	
mirror	those	found	in	the	standard	analysis	by	participant,	it	was	concluded	that	the	
images	did	not	represent	a	confounding	variable	and	could	be	considered	reliable	for	the	
purposes	of	this	study.		
Which	face	images	were	rated	as	the	most	eerie?		
The	analyses	above	have	demonstrated	that	the	mismatched	face	images	were	
perceived	as	eerier	than	the	original	unmodified	face	images,	and	this	this	was	found	both	
when	faces	were	presented	upright	and	inverted.	It	is	therefore	valuable	to	consider	in	
detail	how	the	individual	images	differ	from	each	other,	to	explore	the	specific	predictions	
which	had	been	made	based	on	findings	from	the	UV	and	face	perception	literature.		
The	first	prediction	was	based	on	Tinwell	et	al's	(2013)	work	which	suggested	that	in	
general,	the	negative	faces	with	the	neutral	eyes	would	be	the	eeriest,	and	of	those,	the	
disgusted,	fearful	and	sad	faces	would	be	eeriest.	The	second	prediction,	based	on	Ekman	
et	al's	(2005)	theory,	was	that	the	eeriest	faces	would	be	those	with	a	happy	face	and	
negative	(angry,	disgusted,	fearful	or	sad	eyes).	The	final	prediction,	based	on	Seyama	&	
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Nagayama	(2009),	suggested	that	the	mismatched	images	with	the	largest	eyes	would	be	
rated	as	the	eeriest,	which	in	this	study	would	be	the	happy	face	with	the	fearful	eyes.	
The	second	hypothesis	was	that	there	would	be	a	difference	in	eeriness	as	an	effect	of	
inversion,	and	the	results	of	the	ANOVA	presented	above	indicated	that	inversion	made	all	
faces	appear	eerier.	So,	to	explore	the	face	types	that	were	rated	as	particularly	eerie,	a	
heat	map	was	constructed	to	visualise	the	variation	in	eeriness	for	each	face	image	and	
orientation:		
	
Figure	40:	Heat	map	visualising	eeriness	ratings	for	each	individual	face	image,	presented	
upright	and	inverted.	
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It	can	be	seen	that	the	eeriest	images	were	those	where	happy	faces	were	blended	
with	the	negative	emotions,	with	the	happy	face,	fearful	eyes	and	the	happy	face,	angry	
eyes	being	the	two	eeriest	images.	In	terms	of	the	three	hypotheses,	these	results	start	to	
indicate	support	for	the	predictions	grounded	in	Ekman’s	(2005)	work	and	Seyama	and	
Nagayama	(2009),	but	not	for	Tinwell	(2013).	Inferential	analyses	were	then	performed	to	
see	if	these	differences	were	statistically	significant.		
Two	3*2	mixed	ANOVA	tests	were	used	to	analyse	whether	there	was	a	significant	
difference	in	eeriness	between	the	blends	containing	fearful	and	angry	eyes	and	the	basic	
unblended	fearful	and	angry	faces.	Firstly,	the	happy	face,	fearful	eyes	blend,	the	neutral	
face,	fearful	eyes	blend	and	the	basic	fearful	un-blended	face	were	compared.	Examples	
of	these	three	faces	are	shown	in	Figure	41	below:		
	
Figure	41:	Examples	of	the	three	face	images	where	fearful	eyes	were	presented,	either	blended	
with	a	happy	or	neutral	face	or	in	the	unblended	fearful	face.		
This	test	analysed	two	factors,	the	within-subject	factor	of	face	image	with	three	levels	
(happy	face,	fearful	eyes;	neutral	face,	fearful	eyes;	and	unblended	fearful	face).	The	
second,	between-subjects	factor	was	inversion,	with	two	levels,	upright	and	inverted.	As	
these	analyses	served	as	post-hoc	tests,	exploring	the	main	effects	found	in	the	ANOVA	
above,	Bonferroni’s	correction	was	applied	to	the	target	p	value	for	the	three	
comparisons,	so	significance	was	assessed	at	p	<	0.017.	The	main	effect	of	blend	was	
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significant:	F	(2,2152)	=	398.268,	p	<	.001,	partial	η2	=	.27.	The	main	effect	of	orientation	
was	also	significant:	F	(1,1076)	=	3934.13,	p	<	.001,	partial	η2	=	.785,	with	eeriness	ratings	
higher	when	the	images	were	presented	inverted	compared	to	upright.	The	interaction	
between	face	image	and	orientation	was	not	significant:	F	(2,2152)	=	.389,	p	=	.678,	partial	
η2	=	.0.	Post-hoc	pairwise	comparisons,	again	using	Bonferroni’s	adjustment	at	p	<	0.017	
for	the	comparisons	indicated	that	there	were	significant	differences	between	two	of	the	
images:	the	differences	between	the	happy	face,	fearful	eyes	and	neutral	face,	fearful	
eyes	blends	and	the	happy	face,	fearful	eyes	and	unblended	fearful	face	images	were	
significant	but	the	neutral	face,	fearful	eyes	blend	was	not	significantly	different	from	the	
unblended	fearful	face	(p=0.77).	The	figure	below	illustrates	the	mean	eeriness	for	each	
orientation	and	face	image.		
	
Figure	42:	Comparison	of	mean	eeriness	for	fearful-eyed	faces	when	presented	upright	and	
inverted.		
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These	results	can	be	used	to	consider	the	third	prediction	for	the	nature	of	H1,	based	
on	the	findings	of	Seyama	and	Nagayama	(2009),	and	it	can	be	seen	that	this	was	not	
supported	as	the	eeriness	ratings	were	not	highest	for	the	neutral	face,	fearful	eyes	blend,	
nor	were	they	significantly	different	from	the	unblended	fearful	face.	However,	they	begin	
to	provide	support	for	H2,	grounded	in	Ekman’s	(2005)	research,	which	proposed	that	the	
faces	images	where	the	negative	eyes	were	blended	with	happy	faces	would	be	rated	as	
most	eerie.		
A	second	3*2	mixed	ANOVA	was	performed	to	analyse	the	second	group	of	faces	
which	seemed	particularly	eerie	in	the	heat	map	visualisation.	These	were	the	face	images	
including	angry	eyes:	happy	face,	angry	eyes	blend,	the	neutral	face,	angry	eyes	blend	and	
the	basic	angry	un-blended	face.	Examples	of	these	three	faces	are	shown	in	the	Figure	
below:		
	
Figure	43:	Examples	of	the	three	face	images	where	angry	eyes	were	presented,	either	blended	
with	a	happy	or	neutral	face	or	in	the	unblended	angry	face.		
As	with	the	fearful-eyed	faces,	the	main	effect	of	face	image	was	significant:	F	(2,2152)	
=	350.924,	p	<	.001,	partial	η2	=	.246	and	the	main	effect	of	orientation	was	also	
significant:	F	(1,1076)	=	3630.345,	p	<	.001,	partial	η2	=	.771.	The	interaction	between	face	
image	and	orientation	was	also	significant	when	assessed	at	p	<	0.017:	F	(2,2152)	=	5.762,	
p	=	.003,	partial	η2	=	.005.	Ratings	of	eeriness	were	higher	when	the	images	were	
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presented	inverted	rather	than	upright,	with	a	more	marked	effect	of	inversion	on	the	
happy	face,	angry	eyes	blend.	Post-hoc	pairwise	comparisons	using	Bonferroni’s	
adjustment	indicated	that	there	were	significant	differences	between	all	three	images	at	p	
<	0.017.	The	figure	below	illustrates	the	mean	eeriness	for	each	orientation	and	image:		
	
	
Figure	44:	Comparison	of	mean	eeriness	for	angry-eyed	faces	when	presented	upright	and	
inverted.		
These	results	mirror	those	found	for	the	fearful	blends,	which	does	provide	support	
for	the	prediction	grounded	in	Ekman	et	al’s	theory	of	leaked	expressions	which	suggested	
that	in	general,	the	eeriest	blends	will	be	those	where	positive	faces	and	negative	eyes	are	
combined.	Post-hoc	analysis	of	whether	this	is	a	general	pattern	across	the	image	types	
was	also	considered.	The	blended	faces	images	used	in	this	study	were	created	by	taking	
posed	emotional	expressions	and	transforming	them	into	blended	faces	by	merging	the	
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eye	regions	from	one	expression	into	the	face	of	another.	The	general	effects	of	matched	
and	mismatched	faces	have	been	described	above,	and	the	two	eeriest	types	of	
combination	have	been	explored.	Those	two	blends	were	both	combinations	of	a	positive	
face	with	negative	eyes,	but	would	a	more	general	pattern	be	found	across	all	of	the	
blends	where	negative	eyes	had	been	blended	with	a	positive	face?	One	explanation	for	
the	mismatch	effect	found	in	H1	proposes	the	principle	that	these	would	be	the	eeriest	
faces.	To	explore	this,	the	individual	face	images	were	combined	into	groups	for	analysis,	
where	the	24	individual	images	were	grouped	into	nine	combinations	of	positive,	negative	
or	neutral	faces	and	eyes.	For	example,	the	happy	face,	fearful	eyes	blend	is	an	example	of	
a	positive	face,	negative	eyes	blend	type	and	the	sad	face,	happy	eyes	blend	an	example	
of	a	negative	face,	positive	eyes	blend	type.	By	grouping	the	faces	in	this	way,	it	is	possible	
to	move	beyond	examining	individual	face	images	and	to	test	the	patterns	of	eeriness	
between	these	categorised	types.	Examples	of	the	nine	face	image	types	are	shown	in	the	
table	below.		
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Figure	45:	Examples	of	the	positive,	negative	and	neutral	face	image	types	
As	each	participant	saw	half	of	the	blends	upright	and	half	inverted,	a	new	variable	for	
image	type	in	each	orientation	was	calculated	from	the	eeriness	ratings	for	the	individual	
blends.	For	example,	the	upright	positive	face,	negative	eyes	blend	type	value	for	each	
participant	was	calculated	as	a	mean	of	the	ratings	they	gave	for	the	two	of	the	four	
blends	(positive	face/angry	eyes,	positive	face/disgusted	eyes,	positive	face/fearful	eyes,	
positive	face/sad	eyes)	that	they	saw	in	the	upright	orientation.	This	variable	could	then	
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be	analysed	to	give	the	mean	eeriness	rating	by	face	image	and	orientation	as	shown	in	
Figure	46	below.	The	eeriest	blend	type	was	the	positive	face,	negative	eyes	type,	and	the	
inverted	images	were	again	rated	as	eerier	than	the	upright	blends.		
	
Figure	46:	Mean	eeriness	ratings	for	positive,	negative	and	neutral	blend	types,	by	orientation.		
To	test	whether	the	positive	face,	negative	eyes	blend	types	would	be	found	to	be	
significantly	eerier	than	the	other	four	types,	the	eeriness	ratings	for	the	upright	blend	
types	were	analysed	using	a	within-participants	ANOVA.	Mauchley’s	test	indicated	that	
the	assumptions	of	sphericity	had	been	violated:	χ2(9)=223.67,	p	<	.0005,	and	so	degrees	
of	freedom	were	corrected	using	the	Greenhouse-Geisser	estimates	of	sphericity	(ε=.90).	
The	corrected	results	show	that	blend	type	did	have	a	significant	effect	on	eeriness:	
F(3.588,3863.90)	=	147.629,	p	<	0.005,	partial	η2	=	.121.	Post-hoc	pairwise	comparisons	
using	Bonferroni’s	adjustment	indicated	that	there	were	significant	differences	between	
three	of	the	five	blend	types	at	p	<	0.013:	significant	differences	were	found	between	all	
the	blends	except	for	the	negative	face,	neutral	eyes	blend	type	and	the	neutral	face,	
negative	eyes	blend	type,	or	between	the	neutral	face,	negative	eyes	blend	type	and	the	
negative	face	and	eyes	blend	type.	The	figure	below	illustrates	the	mean	eeriness	for	each	
blend	type.	
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Figure	47:	Comparing	mean	eeriness	ratings	for	face	image	types	when	presented	upright.		
These	results	provide	support	for	Ekman	et	al’s	prediction	as	the	type	of	combination	
where	negative	eyes	paired	with	a	positive	face	were	rated	as	the	eeriest	type.	
5.3.1.2:	Discussion	
Having	presented	the	results	of	the	eeriness	analysis,	the	implications	of	these	findings	
will	now	be	briefly	described	before	the	results	of	the	emotion	response	data	are	
presented.	The	core	research	aim	for	the	analysis	of	the	eeriness	data	was	to	establish	
whether	mismatched	faces	would	be	perceived	as	eerier	than	matched	faces.	This	
hypothesis	was	supported,	as	mismatched	faces	were	found	to	be	rated	as	significantly	
more	eerie	than	the	matched	faces.	This	was	found	at	the	overall	level	and	also	when	
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blend	types	were	compared.	The	blend	types	that	was	rated	as	the	most	eerie	were	the	
ones	with	the	greatest	‘distance’	of	a	mismatch	between	the	eyes	and	face,	the	positive	
face,	negative	eyes	face	and	negative	face,	positive	eyes	face.	At	the	level	of	individual	
images,	the	least	eerie	was	an	original,	unblended	image,	and	this	was	the	original	sad	
face	which	had	a	mean	eeriness	rating	of	only	1.7.	These	significant	findings	will	now	be	
considered	in	the	context	of	the	theoretical	background	to	the	UVE	and	also	to	face	
perception	in	general.		
The	UV	literature	suggested	two	potential	patterns	for	the	subjective	ratings	of	
eeriness	that	may	be	found	in	this	study,	based	on	Tinwell	et	al’s	(2013)	theory	of	
perceptions	of	psychopathy	and	Seyama	and	Nagayama’s	(2009)	findings	that	enlarged	
and	exaggerated	eyes	were	key	to	evoking	a	sense	of	the	uncanny.	In	addition,	Ekman	et	
al’s	(2005)	theory	of	leaked	expressions	was	applied	to	the	idea	of	the	UVE,	even	though	
this	theory	pre-dates	the	idea	of	an	UVE.		
There	was	the	most	support	for	the	pattern	of	response	described	by	Ekman	et	al,	as	
leaked	emotion	theory	would	propose	that	the	most	aversive	face	blends	would	be	those	
with	a	marked	incongruity	between	a	smiling	face	and	negative	expression	which	was	
‘leaked’	in	the	expression	conveyed	by	the	eyes.	The	blends	in	the	present	study	would	be	
those	blends	with	a	happy	face	and	the	angry,	afraid,	sad	or	disgusted	eyes.	The	blend	
type	analysis	found	that	those	positive	face,	negative	eye	blends	were	the	most	eerie	and	
when	blends	were	individually	considered,	the	ones	found	to	be	most	eerie	were	those	
with	the	fearful	and	angry	eyes	in	the	happy	faces.	In	terms	of	leaked	emotion	theory,	
these	“poorly	concealed”	emotions	would	cause	people	to	be	negatively	evaluated	
because	it	makes	them	appear	untrustworthy.	The	findings	of	the	present	study	may	
complement	this	general	theory	by	suggesting	that	some	leaked	emotions	are	more	
aversive	than	others.	The	happy	faces	with	angry	and	fearful	eyes	were	found	to	be	the	
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most	eerie	and	this	may	be	due	to	the	fact	that	these	actors	were	perceived	as	attempting	
to	mask	their	genuine	feelings	of	anger	or	fear,	as	someone	who	is	pretending	not	to	be	
angry	when	they	actually	do	feel	that	emotion	strongly	may	be	dangerous	or	
unpredictable.	A	masked	expression	of	fear	may	elicit	concern	as	to	why	this	concealment	
is	being	attempted.	Of	the	four	emotions	used	in	this	study,	combinations	of	anger	and	
frightened	eyes	in	a	happy	face	are	suggestive	of	scenarios	which	could	be	read	as	
potentially	threatening	while	someone	attempting	to	conceal	feelings	of	sadness	or	
disgust	are	less	likely	to	represent	imminent	danger.	It	may	actually	be	that	these	blends	
were	also	less	eerie	because	they	mimic	expressions	that	are	more	commonly	
experienced	in	social	encounters	where	everyday	conventions	of	politeness	mean	that	it	is	
quite	normal	to	cover	up	one’s	sense	of	sorrow	or	revulsion.	
The	hypothesis	based	on	Tinwell	et	al’s	(2013)	theory,	that	the	blends	where	the	
neutral	eyes	were	presented	in	negative-expression	faces	would	be	rated	as	the	most	
eerie,	was	not	supported.	Anecdotally,	NHAs	proposed	as	inhabitants	of	the	uncanny	
valley	are	often	described	as	‘dead-eyed’.	In	addition,	the	results	of	the	studies	described	
in	Phase	1	of	the	present	thesis	found	that	the	NHA	with	large,	blank	eyes	was	found	to	be	
most	eerie	and	aversive.	However,	in	this	study	the	neutral	eye	blends	were	only	
moderately	eerie	as	the	negative	face,	neutral	eyes	blend	type	was	only	the	third	eeriest,	
with	a	mean	eeriness	of	2.4,	and	the	positive	face,	neutral	eyes	blend	itself	only	had	a	
mean	eeriness	of	2.9.	
Based	on	Tinwell	et	al’s	(2013)	theory,	it	was	possible	to	predict	patterns	of	eeriness	
for	the	individual	blends	when	the	four	different	negative-emotion	faces	were	combined	
with	neutral	eyes	and	the	disgusted,	fearful	and	sad	faces	were	hypothesised	to	be	the	
eeriest	within	this	subset	of	blends.	When	analysed,	it	was	found	that	angry	and	happy	
faces	with	neutral	eyes	were	the	eeriest,	as	shown	in	the	figure	below.		
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Figure	48:	Heat	map	visualising	eeriness	ratings	for	the	five	neutral-eyed	blends.	
While	the	‘dead-eyed’	theory	may	not	have	been	supported	by	these	results,	the	
finding	that	the	eeriest	faces	were	those	where	the	expressions	were	mismatched	
suggests	that	an	element	of	non-congruence	may	be	at	the	heart	of	the	UVE	but	in	a	
different	manner	to	that	found	by	Tinwell	et	al	as	their	type	of	mismatch	involved	
inexpressive	eyes	but	the	results	in	this	study	suggest	a	particular	type	of	positive-
negative	mismatch	rather	than	a	general	lack	of	expression	in	the	upper	part	of	the	face.	
These	results	are	supportive	of	Creed	and	Beale	(2008)	which	suggested	an	incongruence	
in	emotional	expression	may	be	responsible	for	the	UVE.		
The	final	scenario	for	consideration	here	is	that	based	on	Seyama	and	Nagayama	
(2009)	study	which	found	that	enlarged	eyes	were	a	factor	in	triggering	a	sense	of	the	
uncanny	in	artificial	faces.	The	blended	faces	in	this	study	included	some	where	the	eyes	
appeared	large,	even	exaggeratedly	so,	where	frightened	eyes	were	blended	with	happy	
or	neutral	expressions.	These	blends	showed	eyes	widened	in	fright	whereas	the	angry,	
disgusted	and	sad	expressions	would	not	be	characterised	by	a	widening	of	the	eyes.	
Therefore,	the	blends	with	fearful	eyes	will	be	rated	as	the	most	eerie	and	of	those,	the	
neutral	face	with	the	fearful	expression	will	be	rated	as	eeriest.	It	was	found	that	the	first	
part	of	this	hypothesis	was	supported	as	the	eeriest	blend	was	one	with	fearful	eyes	but	it	
was	the	happy	face	with	fearful	eyes	rather	than	the	neutral	face	with	fearful	eyes	that	
was	rated	as	eeriest.		
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Three	scenarios	relating	specifically	to	theories	of	the	UVE	have	been	considered,	but	
the	eeriness	findings	can	also	be	discussed	more	broadly	in	terms	of	implications	for	face	
perception	by	examining	the	pattern	of	these	eeriness	ratings	when	the	blends	were	
presented	inverted	rather	than	upright.	This	was	considered	in	H2,	and	the	results	suggest	
two	notable	observations	when	orientation	is	considered	as	a	factor	for	analysis.	Firstly,	
significant	differences	in	eeriness	were	found	for	mismatched	and	matched	faces	in	either	
orientation.	Secondly,	it	was	found	that	all	of	the	individual	blends	were	rated	as	eerier	
when	presented	inverted	compared	to	when	they	were	presented	upright.	Figure	49	
below	presents	the	difference	between	the	upright	and	inverted	eeriness	ratings,	coded	
to	highlight	the	blends	where	the	inverted	faces	were	rated	as	eerier	than	the	upright	
faces.		
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Figure	49:	Face	blends	sorted	by	descending	eeriness	when	inverted,	highlighted	to	present	
difference	between	inverted	and	upright	eeriness	ratings.		
These	findings	suggest	support	for	the	H2,	following	on	from	Study	4	detailed	above,	
that	blended	faces	may	be	processed	differently	to	non-blended	faces.	It	can	be	seen	that	
the	mismatched	blends	are	rated	as	eerier	than	the	matched	blends,	and	that	the	eeriest	
inverted	blends	are	again	those	with	the	happy	face,	negative	eyes	blends.	The	high	
ratings	of	eeriness	for	the	inverted	faces	is	notable	as	it	does	not	follow	the	expected	
pattern	of	emotional	response	to	inverted	faces	as	generally,	emotional	expressions	are	
harder	to	perceive	from	inverted	faces	(Prkachin,	2003;	Fallshore	and	Bartholow,	2003).	A	
close	analogue	to	the	blended	faces	used	in	this	study	would	be	Thatcherised	faces	
(Thompson,	1980)	where	internal	features	are	transformed	by	inversion,	creating	a	
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chimeric	face	which	is	grotesque	in	appearance	when	presented	upright	but	does	not	
appear	grotesque	when	inverted.	This	is	generally	seen	as	evidence	that	faces	are	
processed	holistically	as	the	inversion	of	the	face	disrupts	the	perception	of	the	
relationship	between	the	individual	features,	making	it	harder	to	recognise	that	those	
features	have	been	manipulated.	Cornes	et	al	(2011)	found	that	ratings	of	Thatcherised	
faces	when	presented	inverted	were	rated	as	considerably	less	grotesque	than	when	
presented	upright.	Applying	that	logic	to	the	faces	in	the	present	study,	it	would	be	
expected	that	inverted	faces	would	be	rated	as	less	eerie	than	the	upright	faces.	However,	
this	was	not	the	case	which	suggests	that	some	analytic	aspects	of	face	perception	are	
being	engaged	with	these	blended	faces.	This	surprising	finding	does	suggest	that	these	
results	could	be	explored	in	more	detail	in	future	studies	to	find	out	why	this	pattern	of	
responses	occurred.	One	possibility	may	be	that	the	nature	of	the	task,	in	asking	
participants	to	focus	on	eeriness	and	to	rate	how	eerie	they	found	each	face,	may	have	
primed	them	to	be	more	sensitive	to	any	atypical	or	unusual	images,	and	in	the	course	of	
day-to-day	life,	it	is	unusual	to	encounter	an	upside-down	face.	If	this	was	the	case,	then	
the	inverted	versions	of	the	images	may	have	been	rated	as	eerier	because	the	
orientation	was	unusual	in	itself,	with	the	unsettling	nature	of	the	mismatched	faces	
acting	as	a	secondary	influence	to	the	rating.	There	were	marked	differences	between	the	
eeriness	ratings	for	each	of	the	face	types,	so	although	the	higher	eeriness	of	inverted	
faces	is	unusual,	a	lack	of	familiarity	with	inversion	cannot	be	the	only	factor	at	work	in	
causing	this	effect.		
A	second	notable	finding	is	that	the	pattern	of	difference	between	the	upright	and	
inverted	face	images	is	the	same	for	the	matched	and	mismatched	faces.	The	mismatched	
faces	were	indeed	found	to	be	the	eeriest	overall,	but	it	may	have	been	expected	that	
there	would	be	a	more	marked	effect	of	inversion	for	the	original,	unblended	faces.	It	
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would	be	expected	that	perception	of	natural	faces	would	be	more	disrupted	by	the	act	of	
inversion.	The	fact	that	the	same	pattern	of	difference	was	observed	for	the	original	and	
blended	images	does	suggest	that	inversion	alone	is	not	the	sole	reason	for	the	variation	
in	eeriness	between	these	face	images.	It	may	be	that	as	participants	were	explicitly	asked	
to	rate	eeriness	in	the	images,	some	form	of	analytic	processing	was	being	engaged	for	all	
of	the	images,	regardless	of	whether	they	were	matched	or	not.	The	implications	of	these	
findings	will	be	considered	in	more	detail	in	Section	5.4,	the	general	discussion	of	the	
findings	in	this	chapter.	
5.3.2:	Emotional	responses	to	face	image	types	
5.3.2.1:	Results	
How	do	feelings	of	eeriness	relate	to	those	of	fear,	anger,	sadness,	disgust,	happiness	
and	surprise?		
The	following	analyses	are	drawn	from	the	first	question	asked	during	Task	1	of	Study	
5.	Participants	gave	ratings	of	how	strongly	they	felt	six	emotions:	anger,	fear,	happiness,	
disgust,	sadness	and	surprise,	on	a	scale	of	1-9	scale,	with	1	labelled	as	‘I	don't	feel	this	at	
all’,	5	labelled	as	‘I	feel	this	moderately	strongly’	and	9	labelled	as	‘I	feel	this	extremely	
strongly’.	(See	Table	12	for	the	full	question	wording	and	response	labels.)		
These	responses	were	gathered	to	explore	the	relationship	between	eeriness	and	
other	emotions,	with	a	view	to	understanding	more	about	the	emotional	composition	of	
the	UVE.	Eeriness	is	seen	as	the	key	emotion	characterising	the	effect	but	the	relationship	
between	it	and	other,	more	basic,	emotions	has	not	yet	been	explored	systematically	for	
NHAs.	By	mapping	the	relationship	between	these	ratings	for	these	blended	faces	it	is	
possible	to	test	two	hypotheses.	Firstly,	H3,	was	based	on	Ho	et	al	(2008)	who	reported	
that	eeriness	for	NHAs	should	be	strongly	associated	with	feelings	of	fear	and	disgust,	so	
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the	mismatched	blends	would	also	evoke	the	strongest	feelings	of	fear	and	disgust,	and	
H4,	based	on	Bassili	(1979)	which	suggests	that	participant	ratings	of	happiness	and	
disgust	will	be	higher	when	those	emotions	are	presented	in	the	eyes	of	the	blend,	and	
the	ratings	of	anger	and	fear	highest	when	these	are	the	emotions	presented	in	the	rest	of	
the	face.	To	explore	the	nature	of	the	emotional	response	ratings	for	each	face	blend,	the	
mean	ratings	given	by	each	participant	were	analysed	and	the	heat	maps	in	Figure	50	
below	present	the	mean	emotion	strength	for	each	face	blend	on	the	six	emotion	scales.	
These	results	will	be	considered	in	detail	below,	but	an	initial	reading	of	these	maps	
indicated	that	the	most	strongly	felt	emotions	were	consistent	with	the	expressions	posed	
in	the	images	and	that	emotions	were	generally	felt	more	strongly	when	looking	at	the	
upright	blends.		
	
Figure	50:	Mean	emotion	strength	across	all	face	blends,	presented	upright	and	inverted.	Tables	
are	grouped	by	whether	the	blend	was	matched	or	mismatched,	and	sorted	in	descending	order	
of	the	emotion	strength	when	presented	upright.		
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To	explore	the	nature	of	these	differences,	and	test	H3	above,	four	of	these	emotion	
scales	were	selected	for	detailed	analysis.	As	the	UVE	is	characterised	as	an	unsettling	or	
creepy	feeling,	feeling	afraid	is	key	to	understanding	the	effect.	It	has	also	been	suggested	
that	the	UVE	has	an	aversive	component	so	the	ratings	of	disgust	and	sadness	were	also	
analysed.	Happiness	was	analysed	as	a	check	against	the	negative	emotions,	as	it	would	
not	be	expected	that	blends	evoking	a	strongly	uncanny	response	would	also	make	
participants	report	feeling	happy.	Four	2*2	within-participants	ANOVAs	were	carried	out	
to	examine	these	effects,	and	significant	main	effects	and	interactions	were	found	in	all	
cases.	
The	effects	of	face	mismatch	and	orientation	on	feeling	afraid	
A	2*2	within-participants	ANOVA	was	used	to	examine	the	two	main	effects	of	match	
versus	mismatch	and	orientation	on	participant’s	reported	experience	of	feeling	afraid.	
The	main	effects	of	match	and	orientation	were	both	significant:	F(1,1077)	=	355.456,	p	<	
.001,	partial	η2	=	.248	for	the	match-mismatch	factor	and	F(1,1077)	=	71.593,	p	<	.001,	
partial	η2	=	.062	for	orientation.	There	was	also	a	significant	interaction	between	match	
and	orientation:	F(1,1077)	=	207.167,	p	<	.001,	partial	η2	=	.161.	Considering	the	relative	
effect	sizes	for	each	of	the	reported	fear	ratings,	it	can	be	seen	that	the	largest	was	that	
for	the	match	versus	mismatch	factor,	with	the	interaction	between	the	factors	having	a	
medium	effect	size	and	the	orientation	itself	only	a	small	effect	size.	The	interaction	
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between	match	and	orientation	is	shown	in	Figure	51	below:
	
Figure	51:	Comparison	of	the	mean	fear	strength	for	matched	and	mismatched	blends	when	
presented	upright	and	inverted.		
Post-hoc	t-tests	were	used	to	explore	the	nature	of	this	interaction	by	testing	the	
significance	of	each	of	the	four	combinations	of	match	and	orientation.	The	results	of	
these	tests	are	shown	in	Table	13	below.		
	
Table	13:	Results	of	post-hoc	t-tests	on	mean	fear	ratings	
p	values	were	assessed	at	<0.0125,	and	it	was	found	that	matched	images	were	
significantly	more	frightening	when	presented	inverted	compared	to	upright	and	that	
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mismatched	images	were	significantly	scarier	than	matched	images,	but	only	when	
presented	upright.	When	considering	mismatched	images	only,	orientation	did	not	
significantly	affect	fear	ratings	nor	did	mismatch	versus	match	when	only	inverted	images	
were	considered.	Given	that	the	emotions	of	fear	and	eeriness	may	be	considered	similar,	
this	finding	is	interesting	when	compared	to	the	pattern	of	findings	for	the	eeriness	
ratings,	as	these	were	higher	for	inverted	presentations	regardless	of	whether	the	images	
were	matched	or	mismatched.		
The	effects	of	face	mismatch	and	orientation	on	feeling	sad	
A	2*2	within-participants	ANOVA	was	used	to	examine	the	two	main	effects	of	match	
versus	mismatch	and	orientation	on	participant’s	reported	experience	of	feeling	sad.	The	
main	effects	of	match	and	orientation	were	both	significant:	F(1,1077)	=	436.911,	p	<.001,	
partial	η2	=	.289	for	the	match-mismatch	factor	and	F(1,1077)	=	765.179,	p	<	.001,	partial	
η2	=	.415	for	orientation.	There	was	also	a	significant	interaction	between	match	and	
orientation:	F(1,1077)	=	378.538,	p	<	.001,	partial	η2	=	.260.		All	effect	sizes	were	large	in	
this	analysis,	but	the	largest	was	found	for	the	orientation	factor,	suggesting	it	was	most	
responsible	for	the	variance	in	sadness	ratings	across	these	two	factors.	The	interaction	
between	match	and	orientation	is	shown	in	Figure	52	below:		
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Figure	52:	Comparison	of	the	mean	sadness	strength	for	matched	and	mismatched	face	images	
when	presented	upright	and	inverted.		
Post-hoc	t-tests	were	used	to	explore	the	nature	of	this	interaction	by	testing	the	
significance	of	each	of	the	four	combinations	of	match	and	orientation.	The	results	of	
these	tests	are	shown	in	Table	14	below.	
	
Table	14:	Results	of	post-hoc	t-tests	on	mean	sadness	ratings	
p	values	were	assessed	at	<0.0125,	and	it	was	found	that	both	mismatched	and	
matched	images	evoked	stronger	feelings	of	sadness	when	presented	upright	compared	
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to	inverted,	but	there	was	no	significant	difference	in	sadness	between	mismatch	and	
match	when	only	upright	presentations	or	only	inverted	presentations	were	considered.		
The	effects	of	face	mismatch	and	orientation	on	feeling	disgusted	
A	2*2	within-participants	ANOVA	was	used	to	examine	the	two	main	effects	of	match	
versus	mismatch	and	orientation	on	participant’s	reported	experience	of	feeling	
disgusted.	The	main	effects	of	match	and	orientation	were	both	significant:	F(1,1077)	=	
551.843,	p	<	.001,	partial	η2	=	.339	for	the	match-mismatch	factor	and	F(1,1077)	=	
293.310,	p	<	.001,	partial	η2	=	.214	for	orientation.	There	was	also	a	significant	interaction	
between	match	and	orientation:	F(1,1077)	=	298.051,	p	<	.001,	partial	η2	=	.217.	The	
match	factor	had	the	largest	effect	size	of	the	three,	with	the	main	effect	of	orientation	
and	the	interaction	between	the	two	factors	having	medium	effect	sizes.	The	interaction	
between	match	and	orientation	is	shown	in	Figure	53	below:
	
Figure	53:	Comparison	of	the	mean	disgust	strength	for	matched	and	mismatched	face	images	
when	presented	upright	and	inverted.		
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Post-hoc	t-tests	were	used	to	explore	the	nature	of	this	interaction	by	testing	the	
significance	of	each	of	the	four	combinations	of	match	and	orientation.	The	results	of	
these	tests	are	shown	in	Table	15	below:	
	
Table	15:	Results	of	post-hoc	t-tests	on	mean	disgust	ratings	
p	values	were	assessed	at	<0.0125,	and	it	was	found	that	disgust	strength	for	both	
mismatched	and	matched	images	was	significantly	higher	when	presented	upright	
compared	to	inverted.	Mismatched	images	also	evoked	significantly	stronger	ratings	of	
disgust	than	matched	images	when	presented	upright.	However,	match	versus	mismatch	
did	not	significantly	affect	disgust	strength	when	images	were	presented	inverted.		
The	effects	of	face	mismatch	and	orientation	on	feeling	happy		
A	2*2	within-participants	ANOVA	was	used	to	examine	the	two	main	effects	of	match	
versus	mismatch	and	orientation	on	participant’s	reported	experience	of	feeling	happy.	
The	main	effects	of	match	and	orientation	were	both	significant:	F(1,1077)	=	343.934,	p	<	
.001,	partial	η2	=	.242	for	the	match-mismatch	factor	and	F(1,1077)	=	69.256,	p	<	.001,	
partial	η2	=	.060	for	orientation.	There	was	also	a	significant	interaction	between	match	
and	orientation:	F(1,1077)	=	111.152,	p	<	.001,	partial	η2	=	.094.	While	the	differences	
between	match	and	mismatch	and	orientation	were	significant,	the	effect	sizes	in	this	
analysis	were	all	small	to	medium,	and	the	effect	sizes	for	the	orientation	and	interaction	
were	very	small.	It	was	found	that	the	match	versus	mismatch	factor	was	responsible	for	
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most	of	the	variance	in	happiness.	The	interaction	between	match	and	orientation	is	
shown	in	Figure	54	below:	 
	
Figure	54:	Comparison	of	the	mean	happiness	strength	for	matched	and	mismatched	face	
images	when	presented	upright	and	inverted.		
Post-hoc	t-tests	were	used	to	explore	the	nature	of	this	interaction	by	testing	the	
significance	of	each	of	the	four	combinations	of	match	and	orientation.	The	results	of	
these	tests	are	shown	in	Table	16	below:
	
Table	16:	Results	of	post-hoc	t-tests	on	mean	happiness	ratings		
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Mismatched	faces	did	evoke	stronger	feelings	of	happiness	than	matched	faces,	both	
when	presented	upright	and	inverted.	Inversion	was	found	to	have	a	significant	effect	on	
happiness	for	mismatched	images	and	mismatched	images	evoked	significantly	stronger	
ratings	of	happiness	than	matched	images	when	presented	upright.		
H4,	based	on	Bassili’s	(1979)	work,	predicted	that	certain	mismatched	blends	would	
evoke	strong	ratings	of	happiness,	disgust,	anger,	fear,	sadness	and	surprise.	The	blends	
with	happy	or	disgusted	eyes	should	have	evoked	the	highest	ratings	of	those	emotions,	
but	both	of	those	expressions	seemed	to	be	carried	in	the	rest	of	the	face,	particularly	in	
the	mouth	region	as	overall,	the	highest	ratings	of	happiness	were	those	given	for	the	
happy	face,	but	highest	blends	were	all	of	those	with	happy	faces	regardless	of	the	eyes.	
Similarly,	the	disgusted	faces	with	happy	or	neutral	eyes	both	evoked	slightly	stronger	
ratings	of	disgust	compared	to	the	basic	unmodified	disgusted	face.		
The	blends	with	angry	or	fearful	faces	should	have	evoked	the	strongest	ratings	of	
anger	and	fear.	In	terms	of	anger,	the	blend	with	the	neutral	face	and	angry	eyes	was	
rated	as	evoking	the	strongest	response,	with	the	same	pattern	found	for	ratings	of	fear	
with	the	neutral	face	and	fearful	eyes	evoking	the	strongest	fear	rating	within	those	
blended	faces.		
Correlations	between	eeriness	and	emotional	response.	
Finally,	the	ratings	of	eeriness	given	for	the	eeriest	blend	(happy	face,	fearful	eyes)	
were	analysed	to	examine	the	correlations	between	this	measure	and	each	of	the	six	
emotions,	exploring	H5	and	testing	the	links	between	uncanniness,	fear	and	disgust.	The	
eeriness	ratings	given	for	each	participant	when	viewing	the	eeriest	face	were	correlated	
with	each	of	the	six	emotions.	Significant	correlations	were	found	between	eeriness	and	
all	emotions	except	happiness,	visualised	in	Figure	55	below	with	the	details	of	the	
correlation	coefficients	given	in	Table	17.	
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Figure	55:	Eeriness	ratings	plotted	against	mean	fear,	sadness,	disgust,	anger,	happiness	and	surprise.		
	
Table	17:	Summary	of	Pearson’s	correlation	tests	on	mean	ratings	of	eeriness	and	fear,	sadness,	disgust,	
anger,	happiness	and	surprise.		
A	positive	relationship	between	eeriness	and	the	negative	emotions	was	found	when	
participants	were	looking	at	the	eeriest	face,	but	no	such	relationship	was	found	between	
eeriness	and	felt	happiness.	However,	these	were	only	very	weak	correlations	and	their	
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significance	may	have	been	an	artefact	of	the	large	number	of	participants	in	this	study.	
These	findings	will	now	be	briefly	considered.		
5.3.2.2:	Discussion	
The	implications	of	the	results	of	the	analyses	of	emotional	response	ratings	will	now	
be	briefly	discussed	to	highlight	key	issues	relating	to	the	three	hypotheses	posed	for	this	
section.		
Firstly,	H3	proposed	that	there	would	be	a	difference	between	the	matched	and	
mismatched	images	on	ratings	of	sadness,	fear	and	disgust,	and	that	this	would	mirror	the	
finding	reported	in	Section	5.3.1.1	above,	where	the	eeriness	ratings	given	to	the	
mismatched	faces	were	found	to	be	eerier	than	the	matched	blends.	Experienced	
happiness	was	also	explored	to	see	if	this	would	reflect	an	inverted	pattern	compared	to	
the	eeriness	ratings.	These	expected	patterns	were	not	found,	firstly	because	the	matched	
faces	evoked	stronger	overall	emotion	ratings	than	the	mismatched	faces,	but	also	as	
there	was	a	significant	interaction	in	experienced	emotion	between	the	match	factor	and	
the	orientation	in	which	the	images	were	presented,	and	no	such	relationship	was	found	
for	the	eeriness	ratings.	Different	patterns	of	interaction	were	found	for	the	different	
emotions,	suggesting	that	there	is	more	complex	relationship	between	orientation	and	
mismatch	for	these	emotions	compared	to	eeriness.	The	effect	of	mismatch	was	to	
significantly	increase	eeriness	in	both	orientations,	and	as	fear	serves	as	a	useful	
benchmark	to	compare	to	the	ratings	of	eeriness	reported	above	it	is	interesting	that	the	
mismatched	images	were	only	found	to	be	more	frightening	when	presented	upright,	
when	they	had	been	found	to	be	eerier	in	both	orientations.	Sadness	was	felt	significantly	
more	strongly	when	presented	upright	compared	to	inverted	for	matched	and	
mismatched	images,	and	significantly	higher	ratings	of	disgust	were	given	for	mismatched	
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faces	presented	upright.		These	findings	suggest	that	experienced	eeriness	does	seem	to	
be	quite	different	from	experienced	fear,	sadness	and	disgust.	Happiness	was	also	
analysed	to	compare	a	positive	emotion	to	these	four	negative	ones,	to	see	if	an	opposite	
pattern	might	be	found,	but	this	was	not	the	case	as	it	was	found	that	inversion	only	had	a	
significant	effect	on	happiness	ratings	for	mismatched	images.		
The	ratings	of	emotion	did	not	follow	the	patterns	that	were	expected	from	the	
findings	of	eeriness	but	it	should	be	noted	that	the	differences	between	the	reported	
emotion	strengths	were	only	very	small,	and	while	significant,	their	effect	sizes	indicated	
that	this	significance	may	have	been	an	artefact	of	the	very	large	number	of	responses	
received	to	the	study.	The	mean	emotion	strength	ratings	for	the	matched	and	
mismatched	face	in	each	orientation	were	also	only	rather	low,	with	none	of	these	means	
exceeding	2.	Considering	the	rating	scale	used	by	participants,	point	1	was	labelled	as	‘I	
do	not	feel	this	at	all’	and	point	5	was	labelled	as	‘I	feel	this	moderately	strongly’,	so	it	
cannot	be	argued	that	these	mean	ratings	represent	particularly	strong	experienced	
emotion	for	the	matched	or	mismatched	blends	in	either	orientation.	
H4,	grounded	in	Bassili’s	(1979)	work	suggested	that	happiness	and	disgust	will	be	
experienced	most	strongly	in	the	eyes	of	the	blend,	anger	and	fear	in	the	surrounding	
face,	but	that	there	will	be	no	distinct	pattern	for	surprise	or	sadness.	This	was	not	
supported	from	the	results	of	this	study	as	the	emotions	were	most	strongly	evoked	by	
the	base	images	for	those	expressions,	rather	than	in	the	blends	that	had	been	created	by	
blending	the	eyes	of	those	expressions	into	happy	or	neutral	faces.	The	blends	evoking	
the	highest	mean	ratings	of	fear,	sadness,	happiness	and	anger	were	the	un-blended	base	
faces	for	those	emotions.	There	was	some	overlap	with	another	blend	for	the	ratings	of	
disgust	as	the	disgusted	face,	happy	eyes	blend	had	the	highest	mean	rating	of	disgust	
(4.4)	with	the	unblended	disgusted	face	image	only	slightly	lower	with	a	mean	disgust	of	
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4.3.	Surprise	was	the	only	emotion	reported	by	participants	which	was	not	actually	
present	in	the	expressions	used	to	create	a	blend,	and	this	was	included	as	some	of	the	
neutral	and	happy	faces	blended	with	the	fearful	eyes	created	a	wide-eyed	expression	
which	was	suggestive	of	surprise	even	though	it	wasn’t	originally	present	in	either	the	
base	face	or	eyes.	When	analysed,	it	was	found	that	the	blends	evoking	the	highest	
ratings	of	surprise	were	indeed	the	happy	face,	fearful	eyes	and	neutral	face,	fearful	eyes	
blends.		
These	mean	ratings	for	each	of	the	emotions	evoked	were	also	considered	by	looking	
at	the	emotions	evoked	for	the	blended	images	which	had	been	found	to	be	the	eeriest	in	
Section	5.3.1.1.	The	table	below	presents	the	mean	ratings	for	the	experienced	six	
emotions,	for	those	two	blends	which	had	been	highlighted	as	particularly	eerie,	the	
happy	face,	angry	eyes	and	happy	face,	fearful	eyes	images.		
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Table	18:	Mean	fear,	anger,	disgust,	happiness	and	sadness	for	the	two	eeriest	blends.		
It	can	be	seen	from	this	table	that	most	of	the	evoked	emotions	were	relatively	low	on	
the	scale,	with	only	the	happy	face,	fearful	eyes	blend	evoking	an	emotion	above	the	
bottom	third	of	the	scale	for	the	ratings	of	feeling	surprised.	It	is	notable	that	even	these	
eeriest	blends	did	not	evoke	particularly	strong	ratings	of	fear,	sadness	or	disgust.	This	
does	not	provide	the	expected	support	for	Ho	et	al’s	(2008)	findings	that	these	emotions	
were	core	components	of	the	UVE.		
Finally,	H5	considered	the	correlations	between	participants’	ratings	of	eeriness	and	
their	ratings	of	anger,	disgust,	fear,	sadness	and	happiness.	The	hypothesis	for	this	
question	was	that	ratings	of	eeriness	should	correlate	strongly	and	positively	with	
participant	ratings	of	feeling	fear	and	disgust	but	not	with	sadness	or	anger.	Fear	and	
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disgust	have	been	previously	anecdotally	identified	as	emotions	implicit	in	the	uncanny	
valley	effect,	and	this	is	also	supported	by	the	work	of	(Ho	et	al.,	2008)	who	found	that	
these	were	the	terms	most	closely	correlated	with	‘eerie’	and	‘creepy’	in	their	inventory	of	
the	characteristics	of	NHAs.	These	variables	were	found	to	be	correlated	when	analysed	
for	the	eeriest	happy	face,	fearful	eyes	blend,	as	significant	positive	correlations	were	
found	between	eeriness	and	all	of	the	emotions	except	for	happiness,	with	the	strongest	
correlations	found	between	eeriness	and	fear	and	eeriness	and	disgust.	However,	these	
were	moderately	weak	correlations,	explaining	13%	and	11%	of	the	variance	respectively.	
While	the	correlations	for	eeriness	and	surprise,	eeriness	and	sadness,	and	eeriness	and	
anger	were	significant,	there	were	only	very	weak,	explaining	5%,	2%	and	1%	of	the	
variance	respectively.		
5.3.3:	Emotion	identification	
5.3.3.1:	Results	
Emotion	identification:	is	accuracy	of	emotional	recognition	linked	to	face	blend?		
Having	explored	the	ratings	of	eeriness	for	each	blend	and	looked	at	correlations	
between	eeriness	and	experienced	emotions,	an	exploration	of	the	accuracy	of	emotion	
identification	was	carried	out.	These	results	were	drawn	from	the	third	question	asked	
during	Task	1	of	Study	5.	Participants	were	asked	to	identify	the	expression	present	in	the	
face	image	by	selecting	one	response	from	a	list	of	anger,	fear,	happiness,	disgust,	
sadness,	surprise	and	no	emotion.	(See	Table	12	for	the	full	question	wording	and	
response	labels.)		
The	accuracy	of	emotion	identification	was	calculated	as	the	percentage	of	correctly	
identified	images	for	the	matched	and	mismatched	blends,	presented	upright	and	
inverted.	A	correct	identification	for	the	unmodified	face	images	simply	meant	correctly	
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identifying	happiness,	neutrality,	anger,	disgust,	sadness	or	fear.	Correct	identification	for	
a	blended	face	meant	identifying	either	the	emotion	present	in	the	eyes	or	the	emotion	in	
the	surrounding	face.	Percentage	accuracy	was	calculated	by	dividing	the	number	of	
correct	identifications	by	the	number	of	matched	and	mismatched	faces	seen	in	each	
orientation.	It	was	hypothesised	that	the	matched	face	image	would	be	more	accurately	
identified	than	the	mismatched	blends.	A	2*2	within-participants	ANOVA	was	used	to	
examine	the	two	main	effects	of	match	versus	mismatch	and	orientation.	The	main	effects	
of	match	and	orientation	were	both	significant:	F(1,1077)	=	503.135,	p	<	.001,	partial	η2	=	
.319	for	the	match-mismatch	factor	and	F(1,1077)	=	151.877,	p	<	.001,	partial	η2	=	.124	
for	orientation.	There	was	also	a	significant	interaction	between	match	and	orientation:	
F(1,1077)	=	346.773,	p	<	.001,	partial	η2	=	.244.	The	interaction	between	match	and	
orientation	is	shown	in	Figure	56	below:		
	
Figure	56:	Comparison	of	the	mean	%	accuracy	for	matched	and	mismatched	face	images	when	
presented	upright	and	inverted.		
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The	matched	faces	were	recognised	more	accurately	than	the	mismatched	faces	when	
they	were	presented	upright,	and	less	accurately	when	they	were	presented	inverted.	
However,	the	effect	size	for	orientation	was	only	small,	with	a	medium	effect	size	for	the	
interaction	and	the	largest	was	the	main	effect	of	match	versus	mismatch.	To	explore	the	
interaction	in	more	detail,	post-hoc	t-tests	were	carried	out	between	all	four	
combinations	of	match	and	orientation.	The	results	are	shown	in	Table	19	below:		
	
Table	19:	Results	of	post-hoc	t-tests	on	mean	emotion	identification	accuracy	
It	can	be	seen	that	all	comparisons	were	significant,	suggesting	that	accuracy	for	
matched	images	and	mismatched	images	was	significantly	affected	by	inversion,	and	that	
when	looking	at	the	upright	or	inverted	presentations	only,	match	versus	mismatch	also	
significantly	affected	accuracy.	Having	found	significant	differences	in	accuracy	between	
the	matched	and	mismatched	blends,	the	results	were	examined	descriptively	in	more	
detail	to	consider	the	patterns	of	identification	in	each	face	image	to	explore	H6	and	H7.	
Figure	57	and	Figure	58	below	present	heatmaps	of	the	frequency	of	emotions	identified,	
correctly	and	incorrectly,	in	each	blend,	when	presented	upright	and	inverted.
291	
 
	
Figure	57:	Heat	map	presenting	the	emotions	identified	for	each	blend,	presented	upright,	indicating	
whether	this	was	a	correct	or	incorrect	identification.	
	
Figure	58:	Heat	map	presenting	the	emotions	identified	for	each	blend,	presented	inverted,	indicating	
whether	this	was	a	correct	or	incorrect	identification.		
	 	
292	
 
These	heat	maps	present	the	number	of	correct	and	incorrect	identifications	for	each	
of	the	face	images	when	presented	upright	and	inverted.	For	example,	it	can	be	seen	that	
there	were	417	correct	identifications	of	the	original	unblended	face	as	angry	when	it	was	
presented	upright,	compared	to	112	incorrect	identifications.	The	incorrect	identifications	
also	show	the	emotions	that	were	mistakenly	identified	for	each	image,	so	again	
considering	the	upright	angry	blend,	most	of	the	incorrect	identifications	were	that	it	was	
a	sad	expression	rather	than	an	angry	one.	The	saturation	of	the	cell	background	indicates	
the	frequency	identifications	of	that	emotion,	so	by	looking	at	the	cells	with	the	darkest	
and	lightest	green	backgrounds	it	is	possible	to	identify	the	key	patterns	of	correct	and	
incorrect	identifications	for	each	face	image	type.	Upright	faces	containing	happiness	and	
sadness	were	the	easiest	to	identify,	with	the	highest	frequency	of	correct	identifications	
in	their	original	unblended	state	and	the	highest	correct	identifications	when	blended	
with	neutral	eyes.	Upright	faces	containing	fear	appeared	to	be	the	hardest	to	identify,	
with	most	incorrect	identifications	in	their	unblended	state	and	also	high	numbers	of	
incorrect	identifications	when	fearful	faces	were	blended	with	happy	eyes.	The	
unblended	fearful	face	was	most	commonly	identified	as	surprised,	and	the	fearful	face,	
happy	eyes	blend	identified	as	either	disgusted	or	sad.	For	the	inverted	faces,	faces	
containing	happy	expressions	were	the	most	easily	identified,	with	the	highest	frequency	
of	correct	identifications	for	the	original	unblended	face	but	also	high	frequencies	of	
correct	identifications	for	the	happy	face	with	disgusted	eyes.	As	with	the	upright	
presentations	of	the	faces,	fear	was	most	commonly	misidentified,	both	in	its	unblended	
state	where	it	was	most	commonly	confused	with	surprise	and	when	the	fearful	face	was	
blended	with	happy	eyes,	which	was	most	commonly	misidentified	as	sadness.		
The	heatmaps	were	used	to	consider	the	predictions	made	in	H6,	H7	and	H8.	H6	was	
based	in	Calvo	and	Lundqvist’s	(2008)	findings	and	predicted	that	disgust	and	anger	are	
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harder	to	distinguish	and	so	disgust	may	be	identified	when	a	blended	face	contains	anger	
and	vice	versa.	Only	partial	support	was	found	for	this,	as	anger	was	not	misidentified	as	
disgust,	but	disgust	was	sometimes	mistaken	for	anger.	This	occurred	when	images	were	
presented	upright,	or	when	presented	inverted.	The	highest	frequency	of	incorrect	
identifications	for	the	unblended	disgusted	faces	was	anger.	Most	of	the	
misidentifications	for	the	unblended	angry	faces	reported	sadness	rather	than	disgust.	
Eight	of	the	blended	faces	contained	anger	or	disgust:	angry	face,	happy	eyes;	angry	face,	
neutral	eyes;	happy	face,	angry	eyes;	neutral	face,	angry	eyes;	disgusted	face,	happy	eyes;	
disgusted	face,	happy	eyes;	happy	face,	disgusted	eyes;	neutral	face,	disgusted	eyes.	There	
were	low	frequencies	of	misidentifications	of	disgust	for	the	anger-containing	blends	but	
the	disgusted	faces	with	happy	or	neutral	eyes,	and	the	neutral	face	with	disgusted	eyes,	
were	both	most	commonly	misidentified	as	angry.	H7	was	based	in	Calder	et	al’s	(2000)	
suggestion	that	recognition	errors	in	different	part	of	the	face	would	vary	by	emotion	
type.	It	was	predicted	that	the	highest	frequency	of	errors	in	identifying	disgust	and	
happiness	would	occur	when	these	were	present	in	the	eyes	of	the	blend,	and	that	more	
errors	in	identifying	anger,	fear	or	sadness	would	be	made	when	these	were	present	in	
the	face	region.	This	was	not	supported	in	the	results	found	in	this	study.	Both	when	
presented	upright	and	presented	inverted,	the	images	with	the	highest	error	rates	for	
disgust	were	those	with	the	fearful	face,	happy	eyes	combination.	Mistaken	identifications	
of	happiness	were	very	low,	with	a	maximum	of	five	errors	being	made,	which	was	for	the	
neutral	face	with	sad	eyes.	The	upright	blend	most	commonly	misidentified	as	angry	was	
the	neutral	face	with	disgusted	eyes,	for	fear	the	happy	face	with	sad	eyes	and	for	sadness	
the	fearful	face	with	the	happy	eyes.		
H8	was	a	more	general	prediction,	based	on	Hanawalt	(1944)	and	predicted	that	
happiness	would	be	the	most	commonly	identified	emotion	for	the	happy	eyed	blends,	
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and	the	negative	emotions	(anger,	disgust,	fear	and	sadness)	identified	most	from	the	
blends	where	those	are	the	expression	in	the	surrounding	face.	There	were	five	blends	
where	happy	eyes	were	present:	angry	face,	happy	eyes;	disgusted	face,	happy	eyes;	
fearful	face,	happy	eyes;	neutral	face,	happy	eyes	and	sad	face,	happy	eyes.	Of	those,	
happiness	was	the	most	commonly	identified	emotion	for	only	one	blend,	the	fearful	face,	
happy	eyes	blend.	This	was	not	found	when	the	faces	were	presented	inverted	as	fear	was	
the	most	commonly	identified	emotion.	
Emotion	identification:	are	emotions	more	often	correctly	recognised	from	the	eyes	
or	the	face?	
To	explore	H9,	this	section	will	consider	whether	blended	emotions	will	be	identified	
correctly	from	the	eyes	or	the	surrounding	face.	The	following	heatmap	is	based	on	
correct	responses	only	and	presents	the	frequencies	of	correct	identifications	by	emotion,	
according	to	whether	this	was	presented	in	the	eyes	or	the	surrounding	face.		
	
Figure	59:	Comparison	of	correctly	identified	emotions	by	whether	these	were	identified	in	the	eyes	or	
the	surrounding	face,	when	presented	upright	or	inverted.		
H9	was	based	on	Bassili’s	(1979)	work,	and	predicted	that	happiness	and	disgust	
would	be	identified	in	the	faces	where	these	are	present	in	the	eyes	of	the	blend,	and	
anger	and	fear	identified	where	these	are	present	in	the	surrounding	face.	There	will	be	
no	distinct	pattern	of	localisation	for	identification	of	surprise	or	sadness.	This	was	only	
partially	supported	in	the	results	of	this	study,	as	for	both	upright	and	inverted	faces,	
happiness	and	disgust	were	identified	from	the	face	rather	than	the	eyes.	The	prediction	
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for	anger	was	supported	for	upright	and	inverted	faces,	as	this	were	correctly	identified	
more	commonly	from	the	eyes	in	both	orientations,	but	not	for	fear	where	it	was	
identified	correctly	from	the	eyes	when	upright	and	from	the	surrounding	face	when	
inverted.		
A	final	notable	finding	was	also	considered,	as	this	emerged	from	the	analyses	
necessary	to	test	H6-9.	This	was	that	the	patterns	of	identifying	happiness	in	the	blended	
faces	seemed	to	be	particularly	interesting	for	the	two	blends	which	were	found	to	be	
eeriest	and	thus	the	best	candidates	for	explaining	the	UVE.	The	results	for	the	
participants	who	had	correctly	identified	any	of	the	blends	where	a	happy	face	was	
combined	with	negative	eyes	were	extracted	and	analysed	separately	to	compare	the	
particular	patterns	of	happiness	identification	for	the	two	key	eerie	blends	(happy	face,	
fearful	eyes	and	happy	face,	angry	eyes)	against	the	other	three	blends	where	a	happy	
face	had	been	blended	with	neutral,	disgusted	or	sad	eyes.	A	correct	identification	could	
be	made	either	from	the	face	or	the	surrounding	eyes	and	the	heatmap	highlighted	that	
in	the	case	of	the	two	eeriest	blends,	participants	were	less	likely	to	make	their	correct	
identification	based	on	happiness	and	more	likely	to	base	it	on	the	angry	or	fearful	
components.	The	segmented	frequency	chart	below	compares	these	re-categorised	
variables:		
	
Figure	60:	Comparison	of	happy/non	happy	emotions	identified	in	blended	faces	where	happy	faces	
were	combined	with	different	types	of	non-happy	eyes.		
Happiness	was	the	emotion	recognised	more	commonly	in	all	of	the	blends	but	the	
angry,	neutral	and	sad	blends	did	have	a	smaller	identification	from	happiness	than	the	
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happy	faces	with	disgusted	or	neutral	eyes.	The	implications	of	these	observations	will	be	
discussed	below.		
5.3.3.2:	Discussion	
Three	areas	of	emotion	identification	were	considered	in	this	section.	Firstly,	emotion	
identification	accuracy	was	analysed	to	see	whether	it	would	be	affected	by	the	type	of	
face	image	(either	matched	or	mismatched)	and	the	orientation	in	which	it	was	
presented.	It	had	been	hypothesised	that	the	matched	images	would	be	easier	to	
recognise	than	mismatched	images,	and	this	was	found,	but	more	importantly	an	
interaction	effect	was	found	so	this	relationship	was	only	the	case	for	images	when	
presented	upright.	As	a	result,	orientation	was	considered	when	examining	each	of	the	
three	follow-up	hypotheses	which	explored	the	nature	of	this	difference.		
These	three	follow-up	explorations	of	the	nature	of	the	accuracy	of	identifying	
emotions	from	the	blended	faces	were	carried	out	with	reference	to	three	previous	
theories	of	emotion	perception.	The	results	of	this	study	did	not	provide	full	support	for	
any	of	the	theories	that	were	proposed.	Firstly,	only	partial	support	was	found	for	Calvo	
and	Lundqvist’s	(2008)	predictions	of	complementary	confusion	between	anger	and	
disgust,	as	blends	containing	anger	were	not	consistently	misidentified	as	expressions	of	
disgust,	but	blends	containing	disgust	were	misidentified	as	angry,	both	when	presented	
upright	and	when	presented	inverted.	Calder	et	al	(2000)	predicted	specific	patterns	of	
emotion	identification	from	different	face	regions	but	none	of	the	blends	in	this	study	
supported	those	patterns.	Finally,	support	was	also	not	found	for	Hanawalt’s	(1944)	
proposal	that	generally,	happiness	would	be	perceived	in	faces	with	happy	eyes	as	only	
one	of	the	blends	(fearful	face,	happy	eyes)	had	particularly	high	identification	based	in	
the	eyes.	
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It	may	be	that	there	was	some	aspect	of	these	blended	faces	that	caused	participants	
to	respond	in	a	new	and	unique	way,	but	these	findings	may	also	have	been	a	result	of	
applying	previous	theories	based	on	the	perception	of	unmodified	faces	to	these	blended	
faces	as	Calvo	and	Lundqvist	and	Hanawalt	both	used	images	of	natural	human	
expressions	in	their	research.	Only	Calder’s	study	used	manipulated	faces,	and	as	these	
were	top-bottom	chimeric	faces	it	could	be	argued	that	the	results	of	this	study	would	be	
most	likely	to	follow	those	predictions.	
A	final	exploration	moved	beyond	the	stated	hypotheses	to	look	at	an	unusual	
property	of	how	emotions	were	identified	from	the	blends	where	negative	eyes	were	
blended	into	the	happy	faces,	as	the	two	blends	that	were	identified	as	particularly	eerie	
in	Section	5.3.1.1	were	mostly	identified	from	the	negative	eye	region	rather	than	the	
happy	surrounding	face,	and	this	was	not	the	case	for	the	other	negative	eyed	blends.	It	
may	be	that	the	eeriness	of	these	two	blends	occurred	as	a	result	of	it	being	harder	to	
perceive	positive	emotions	from	these	faces,	or	that	for	some	reason	participants	chose	
to	focus	particularly	on	the	negative	features	of	these	faces	rather	than	the	positive,	
happy	component.	The	data	collected	in	this	study	do	not	support	a	further	exploration	as	
to	whether	these	explanations	may	be	true	but	it	does	suggest	an	interesting	area	for	
future	research.		
5.3.4:	Emotion	classification	
5.3.4.1:	Results	
Emotion	classification:	is	the	ability	to	categorise	emotional	expressions	linked	to	
face	blend?		
A	final	analysis	briefly	considered	how	participants	would	classify	the	blended	
emotions,	to	explore	which	of	the	blended	emotions	would	be	used	in	the	categorisation,	
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and	whether	the	eerier	faces	would	be	harder	to	categorise	than	the	other	blends.	These	
results	were	drawn	from	Task	2	of	Study	5.	Participants	were	presented	with	twelve	
blended	faces	and	asked	to	drag	and	drop	each	image	into	one	of	four	boxes	on	screen	to	
indicate	whether	they	felt	the	emotion	it	presented	was	broadly	positive,	negative	or	
neutral,	with	the	final	box	used	for	those	emotions	that	were	too	hard	to	classify.	
Participants	were	also	asked	to	rank	the	images	within	the	four	categories	in	order	of	how	
well	they	represented	positive,	negative	or	neutral	expressions.	However,	some	of	the	
categories	were	used	for	very	small	numbers	of	images	so	the	ranking	data	was	not	used	
for	further	analysis.	The	images	in	Task	2	were	all	blended	faces,	not	the	original	
unmatched	images,	and	they	were	all	presented	upright.	The	images	in	Task	2	were	
created	from	different	models	from	those	used	in	Task	1	so	although	participants	had	
seen	those	types	of	blended	face	in	the	first	study,	they	had	not	seen	those	specific	face	
images.	(See	Table	12	for	the	full	question	wording	and	response	labels.)		
A	segmented	frequency	chart	was	constructed	to	visualise	the	distribution	of	
categories	used	for	each	of	the	blended	faces:		
	
Figure	61:	Categorisation	ratings	for	the	blends	presented.		
It	was	hypothesised	that	the	eerier	blends	would	be	the	hardest	to	categorise.	The	
table	below	shows	the	proportions	of	the	‘cannot	decide’	category	compared	to	the	other	
three	and	contrary	to	expectations,	the	happy	face,	sad	eyes	blend	was	found	to	be	the	
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hardest	to	categorise,	measured	by	the	percentage	of	participants	who	indicated	that	
they	were	unable	to	assign	a	blend	to	a	category.		
	
Figure	62:	Comparing	‘cannot	decide’	and	other	categories	by	blend.		
The	implications	of	these	findings	will	now	be	briefly	discussed.		
5.3.4.2:	Discussion	
The	classification	task	in	this	study	has	been	included	to	see	if	there	are	any	patterns	in	
participant	ability	to	classify	blend	faces	in	terms	of	the	emotions	they	display.	Three	
hypotheses	were	initially	proposed.	Firstly,	as	noted	above,	Hanawalt	(1944)	suggests	that	
positive	emotions	are	generally	perceived	from	the	bottom	of	the	face,	negative	from	the	
top.	The	first	hypothesis	is	that	each	of	four	different	versions	of	the	happy	face,	negative	
eyes	blends	would	be	classified	as	displaying	positive	emotions	but	this	was	not	
supported	from	the	classifications	carried	out	in	this	study	where	participants	all	classified	
those	as	displaying	negative	emotions.	This	was	particularly	strongly	shown	for	the	happy	
face,	fearful	eyes	and	happy	face,	angry	eyes	blends	which	have	also	been	identified	as	
the	most	eerie	of	all	the	blended	emotions.		
Going	on	to	test	the	second	part	of	that	hypothesis,	that	the	negative	face,	happy	eyes	
blends	will	be	categorised	as	displaying	negative	emotions	found	that	all	four	blends	
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(angry	face,	happy	eyes,	disgusted	face,	happy	eyes,	fearful	face,	happy	eyes	and	the	sad	
face,	happy	eyes)	were	indeed	classified	as	negative.		
A	final	question	to	consider	was	that	of	whether	the	blends	where	neutral	eyes	were	
combined	with	any	of	the	other	base	faces	would	be	particularly	hard	to	classify.	This	was	
a	development	from	Tinwell	et	al’s	(2013)	hypothesis	that	these	would	be	the	eeriest	
blends	and	also	those	presenting	the	most	ambiguous	appearance	to	participants.	It	is	
hypothesised	that	these	unsettling	faces	would	be	the	hardest	to	classify	as	their	unusual	
nature	may	make	it	harder	for	participants	to	make	decisions	about	the	category	to	which	
they	belong.	Most	participants	were	able	to	classify	the	blends,	with	only	a	small	number	
using	the	‘cannot	decide’	category	for	each	blend.	However,	when	the	percentages	of	
participants	who	said	they	were	unable	to	decide	about	the	face	category	were	compared	
to	those	who	were	able	to	classify	the	blends,	the	neutral	eye	blends	did	not	emerge	as	
those	where	it	was	hardest	to	decide	as	that	blend	was	the	happy	face,	sad	eyes	blend.	It	
may	be	that	there	is	a	relationship	between	the	extremity	of	mismatch	and	classification	
ease,	as	faces	where	happiness	and	sadness	were	combined	would	make	for	the	most	
extreme	pairing.	However,	this	relationship	is	unlikely	to	contribute	to	an	understanding	
of	the	UVE	per	se	as	neither	the	happy	face,	sad	eyes	nor	the	sad	face,	happy	eyes	blends	
were	found	to	be	particularly	eerie	when	those	ratings	were	gathered.		
5.4:	General	Discussion	of	Phase	3	
This	final	research	phase	took	a	core	finding	from	the	results	from	Phases	1	and	2	that	
certain	types	of	NHF	are	eerier	than	others,	and	developed	this	by	testing	whether	this	
could	be	explained	by	looking	at	how	NHFs	are	able	to	covey	emotional	expressions.	It	
explored	the	idea	of	emotion	mismatch	to	test	the	hypothesis	that	expectations	of	affinity	
and	empathy	may	be	established	in	an	overall	impression	of	a	NHA	but	when	these	
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cannot	be	fully	realised	from	the	finer	detail	of	the	appearance,	this	may	cause	the	
uneasiness	that	characterises	a	UV	response.	An	examination	of	the	relevant	face	
perception	and	UV	literature	suggested	four	research	questions	and	associated	
hypotheses,	and	an	online	study	was	designed	to	collect	respondent	data	to	measure	this.	
These	sources	had	suggested	a	wide	range	of	potential	outcomes	for	different	types	of	
mismatch	so	a	large	set	of	novel	stimuli	were	designed	which	blended	together	different	
emotional	expression	from	eye	and	faces	regions,	allowing	a	detailed	and	complex	
explorations	of	the	interactions	between	different	emotions.	The	blended	faces	were	
presented	upright	and	inverted	to	continue	the	explorations	from	Phase	2	and	examine	
which	components	of	emotion	expression	processing	would	be	disrupted	by	the	inversion	
of	the	image.		
The	key	finding	from	this	phase	was	the	discovery	that	blending	emotional	
expressions	did	indeed	have	a	significant	(yet	subtle)	effect	on	participant	perceptions	of	
eeriness	and	how	they	felt,	with	clear	patterns	emerging	that	the	blended	faces	were	
certainly	more	eerie	than	any	of	the	unblended	faces;	a	finding	that	persisted	whether	the	
face	was	inverted	or	not.	However,	the	actual	ratings	of	eeriness	were	low	so	it	cannot	be	
concluded	that	participants	found	any	of	these	faces	particularly	eerie.	Overall,	the	eeriest	
faces	were	those	where	the	happy	faces	were	combined	with	the	negative	emotions,	
particularly	the	two	blends	where	fearful	or	angry	eyes	were	blended	into	the	happy	face.	
Relating	back	to	the	question	from	Phase	2	on	analytic	versus	holistic	processing,	it	is	
notable	that	every	one	of	the	inverted	faces	were	rated	as	eerier	than	the	upright	faces,	
whether	blended	or	not	blended.	One	explanation	for	this	may	be	because	the	usual	
orientation	for	encountering	a	face	is	upright	and	so	all	faces	when	presented	inverted	
look	stranger	than	they	otherwise	would	do,	so	even	with	the	unblended	faces	where	no	
unusual	features	were	present	in	either	orientation,	an	expectation	of	strangeness	may	be	
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driving	the	higher	rating	of	eeriness.	The	eeriness	ratings	were	supported	by	participant	
ratings	of	how	strongly	they	felt	different	emotions,	with	the	happy	face,	fearful	eyes	and	
happy	face,	angry	eyes	blends	also	rated	as	evoking	the	highest	ratings	for	feeling	afraid.		
Finally,	an	analysis	of	the	emotion	identification	data	found	that	a	feature	of	those	two	
particularly	eerie	faces	was	that	participants	were	focusing	on	the	eye	region	when	
making	their	decision.	All	of	the	blended	faces	were	created	from	two	base	images,	but	
participants	were	not	paying	as	much	attention	to	the	happy	part	of	the	face	in	those	
blends	with	angry	and	fearful	eyes,	compared	to	the	other	happy-face	blends.	It	is	
hypothesised	that	an	extreme	mismatch	between	the	expressions	present	in	the	eye	and	
face	regions	of	these	blends	seemed	to	over-ride	the	happiness	that	could	have	been	
perceived	from	part	of	the	face	displaying	a	happy	expression.	These	eeriness	ratings	for	
the	happy	faces	with	fearful	or	angry	eyes	blended	into	the	image	may	be	an	indication	
that	participants	found	those	blended	faces	to	be	more	aversive	because	they	did	not	feel	
such	a	sense	of	affinity	towards	them.		
Consideration	will	now	be	given	to	aspects	of	the	experimental	design	which	may	have	
had	a	confounding	effect	on	the	results.	Firstly,	the	nature	of	the	stimulus	images	
themselves	should	be	considered,	especially	as	it	was	observed	in	Phase	2	that	the	
stimulus	images	were	clearly	the	product	of	a	computer	transformation	and	would	be	
hard	to	encounter	in	real	life.	The	blended	images	used	in	this	third	phase	were	
developed	with	this	in	mind,	and	care	was	taken	to	try	and	blend	the	images	carefully	so	
they	were	not	immediately	obvious	as	manipulated	images.	In	this	way,	it	should	be	
possible	to	generalise	those	findings	to	real	world	encounters	with	NHAs	displaying	
mismatched	expressions,	as	well	as	those	presented	as	static	images.	These	Phase	3	
images	do	avoid	the	issues	raised	for	those	used	in	Phase	2	faces	as	at	first	glance,	many	
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of	the	faces	did	not	appear	that	unusual	and	it	was	sometimes	hard	to	tell	just	which	
expressions	had	been	used	to	create	each	blend.		
It	can	be	concluded	that	this	research	phase	has	some	indications	that	started	to	
provide	some	evidence	suggesting	that	the	sense	of	eeriness	that	characterises	the	UVE	
may	be	caused	by	certain	types	of	mismatched	expressions.	In	this	study,	faces	which	
have	happy,	smiling	expressions	in	the	lower	part	of	the	face	along	with	expressions	in	the	
eye	region	which	are	suggestive	of	anger	or	fear	were	rated	as	the	most	eerie,	but	it	may	
represent	a	more	general	effect	that	eeriness	can	be	elicited	where	there	is	a	marked	
disconnect	between	the	expression	that	is	shown	in	the	face	and	the	eyes.	These	findings	
are	framed	as	initial	evidence	that	this	may	be	a	generally	applicable	effect	but	would	
need	to	be	tested	further	by	looking	at	different	participant	cohorts	and	other	types	of	
face	processing	task	to	evaluate	the	extent	to	which	it	can	be	considered	as	a	generally	
applicable	finding.	In	terms	of	applying	these	indications	to	a	real-world	context,	it	can	be	
concluded	that	designers	should	attempt	to	avoid	ambiguity	of	facial	expression	between	
different	parts	of	a	face,	by	matching	levels	of	detail	and	realism	between	eye	and	face	
regions.	For	example,	concentrating	on	highly	detailed	smiles	in	a	face	where	the	eyes	
could	not	convey	the	same	level	of	happiness	may	cause	people	to	reject	the	agent,	but	
considering	the	types	of	mismatch	found	to	be	particularly	eerie,	this	could	be	made	even	
worse	in	animated	agents	where	expressions	are	changing	and	may	not	always	be	well	
synchronised.	A	fearful	or	angry	expression	that	was	still	being	displayed	in	the	eye	region	
while	the	mouth	had	moved	on	to	presenting	a	smile	may	be	unsettling	and	so	should	be	
avoided.		
The	General	Discussion	section	to	follow	in	Chapter	6	will	consider	the	UVE	in	general,	
and	suggest	areas	where	research	in	this	area	could	be	progressed,	but	several	fruitful	
areas	have	been	suggested	following	up	on	the	findings	from	this	phase	alone.	Empirical	
304	
 
testing	of	the	expression	‘lag’	suggested	above	is	needed	to	explore	whether	the	extent	to	
which	what	has	been	observed	in	the	image	blends	could	be	replicated	in	an	animated	
agent.	It	would	also	be	useful	to	examine	participant	sensitivity	to	the	different	blends,	
and	look	for	what	would	constitute	a	just	noticeable	difference	in	eeriness	as	different	
expressions	are	blended,	and	whether	it	might	be	possible	to	map	the	point	at	which	
eeriness	emerges	when	different	features	are	blended	together.	Finally,	repeating	this	
study	but	taking	a	cross-cultural	perspective	was	initially	proposed	by	Brenton	et	al	(2005)	
who	suggested	that	the	UVE	is	culturally	dynamic.	Brenton	et	al	gave	the	example	of	
facelifts,	which	generally	do	not	cause	consternation	in	this	culture	but	may	in	one	where	
that	sort	of	surgery	is	not	commonplace.	It	can	be	imagined	that	the	discrepancy	in	
perceived	age	of	features	between	a	young	face	and	aged	hands	might	be	unsettling	if	you	
were	unaware	of	the	reason	why.	Similarly,	it	could	be	argued	that	there	may	be	cultural	
differences	in	the	extent	to	which	mismatched	expressions	are	acceptable,	as	to	an	extent	
some	of	the	expectations	that	it	is	believed	are	being	challenged	here,	leading	to	rejection	
of	the	mismatched	faces,	are	set	up	are	based	on	what	you	expect	to	be	able	to	read	from	
a	face.	For	example,	some	cultures	are	attuned	to	more	subtle	facial	expressions	than	
others,	with	the	effect	that	it	is	hard	from	people	outside	that	culture	to	read	subtle	
expressions.	Recent	research	by	Yuki	et	al	(2007)	and	Koda	and	Ruttkay	(2014)	looked	at	
the	region	of	the	face	that	was	most	influential	in	identifying	emotions	from	cartoon-like	
faces,	and	found	significant	differences	between	Hungarian	and	Japanese	participants.	
They	found	that	the	Japanese	participants	consistently	paid	more	attention	to	the	eye	
region	compared	to	the	mouth	region,	with	the	opposite	being	found	for	the	Hungarian	
participants.	It	would	be	very	interesting	to	look	at	whether	the	same	eeriness,	emotional	
response,	identification	and	classification	patterns	found	in	this	study	would	also	be	found	
in	non-Western	participants.	While	participant	demographics	were	collected	for	this	
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phase	(see	Appendix	3a	for	a	full	breakdown)	there	was	insufficient	diversity	in	the	
respondent	population	to	break	down	the	response	data	in	a	meaningful	sense	as	the	
majority	of	the	participants	in	this	study	(86%)	identified	as	White,	either	British	or	Other.	
A	modified	version	of	this	experiment,	directed	to	participants	from	different	cultural	
backgrounds,	would	be	highly	useful	in	exploring	the	extent	to	which	these	findings	can	
be	generalised	and	also	to	add	to	knowledge	on	the	design	of	virtual	agents.		
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Chapter	6:	General	Discussion	
6.1:	Overview	of	Research	Findings	
The	overarching	aim	of	this	thesis	was	to	explore	the	UVE	,	which	began	by	examining	
the	concepts	described	by	Mori	(1970,	2005,	2012),	Pollick	(2005)	and	MacDorman	
(2006)	and	using	these	to	design	a	novel	method	for	collecting	evidence	which	would	
allow	a	mapping	of	the	relationship	between	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness	
alongside	an	exploration	of	the	subjective	experience	of	encountering	NHAs.	The	findings	
of	Phase	1	suggested	that	there	were	indeed	interesting	qualities	in	NHFs	that	warranted	
further	exploration,	and	once	the	nature	of	those	relationships	between	perceived	
human-likeness	and	emotional	response	had	been	established,	later	studies	
were	designed	to	step	off	those	familiar	paths	within	the	UV,	and	move	into	the	as-yet	
unexplored	territory	of	how	NHFs	were	perceived.	Several	novel	and	notable	observations	
can	be	made	from	these	explorations,	and	this	general	discussion	will	consider	these	
across	five	areas.	In	this	overview	of	the	research	findings,	the	three	key	theories	explored	
in	this	thesis	will	be	revisited	and	the	findings	discussed	in	the	context	of	what	they	are	
able	to	contribute	to	an	understanding	of	those	concepts.	These	will	then	be	discussed	
with	specific	reference	to	approaches	to	researching	the	UVE,	looking	back	across	the	
various	explanations	that	had	been	proposed	for	the	UVE	and	discussing	the	extent	to	
which	the	present	thesis	has	addressed	the	vexing	issue	of	circularity	in	this	area.	This	
leads	into	a	third	section	where	the	methods	used	in	this	thesis	will	be	critically	
considered.	A	fourth	section	on	future	directions	for	research	in	this	area	will	be	
considered,	and	finally	this	thesis	will	close	with	some	concluding	thoughts.		
The	first	theory	to	be	reviewed	revisits	the	original	concept	of	an	UVE	based	on	Mori’s	
1970	idea	that	emotional	responses	to	artificial	agents	would	become	more	positive	as	
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those	agents	became	more	human-like	but	only	up	to	a	certain	point	when	they	would	
start	to	appear	unsettling	rather	than	likeable.	Notably,	this	point	of	rejection	would	be	
typified	as	uncanny	and	characterised	by	a	sense	of	unease	and	feelings	of	eeriness.	
MacDorman’s	(2005c)	interest	in	this	area	brought	the	concept	to	a	new	level	of	
prominence	and	initiated	research	in	various	disciplines,	but	at	the	heart	of	the	present	
research	into	the	UVE	has	been	the	hypothesised	dip	in	positive	responses	at	the	near-
human	point.	Three	of	the	studies	in	this	thesis	compared	measurements	of	human-
likeness	with	subjective	ratings	of	emotional	response	and	while	a	non-linear	pattern	was	
found	in	all	of	the	analyses,	these	studies	did	not	find	an	UVE	where	high	eeriness	
accompanied	levels	of	human-likeness	which	were	almost	but	not	quite	human.	In	the	
first	of	two	studies	in	Phase	1,	the	strangeness	and	eeriness	ratings	for	20	NHFs	found	that	
the	eeriest	faces	were	those	that	were	not	human,	or	had	a	moderately	human	
appearance.	This	was	confirmed	in	the	second	study	in	Phase	1,	where	three	faces	taken	
from	the	first	study	were	compared	to	each	other	and	also	to	human	and	artificial	anchor	
faces.	While	a	non-linear	pattern	was	found,	the	eeriest	and	strangest	face	was	the	
moderately,	rather	than	highly,	human	face.	This	was	also	found	in	Phase	2,	where	rather	
than	being	drawn	from	a	collection	of	human-like	faces	rated	for	their	human-like	
appearance,	an	attempt	had	been	made	to	systematically	vary	the	human-likeness	by	
morphing	between	different	types	of	non-human	face	and	matched	human	face	images,	
and	evaluating	still	images	taken	at	different	points.		
The	UV	hypothesis	would	predict	that	the	nearly-human	point	in	the	morph	(where	
the	face	represented	75%	human-likeness	and	only	25%	‘otherness’)	would	have	been	
rated	as	the	most	eerie	and	most	strange,	but	the	eeriest	face	was	found	to	be	the	one	at	
the	50%	point.	While	this	was	an	unexpected	finding,	it	is	not	sufficient	to	reject	the	UV	
hypothesis	as	the	overall	relationship	between	human-likeness	and	emotional	response	
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did	consistently	follow	the	predicted	pattern	that	positive	responses	would	generally	
increase	as	human-likeness	increased,	but	that	there	would	be	a	point	at	which	the	
positive	ratings	dipped	rather	than	continuing	to	increase,	and	it	is	at	this	point	that	it	was	
predicted	the	eeriest	faces	would	be	found.	Instead,	the	eeriest	faces	were	found	to	be	
those	which	were	50%	artificial	and	50%	human.	This	is	not	the	only	study	of	the	UVE	to	
have	identified	the	mid-point	between	artificial	and	human	in	their	findings.	Cheetham	et	
al	(2013)	and	Burleigh	et	al	(2013)	both	identified	this	as	the	key	location	rather	than	the	
near-human	point.	This	may	also	reflect	Tinwell’s	(2009)	and	Tinwell	et	al’s	(2011a)	
findings	which	described	a	series	of	valleys	within	the	overall	UV	plot.	These	appeared	as	
several	dips	in	familiarity	at	different	points	of	human-likeness	and	were	clustered	around	
different	types	of	NHA.	It	should	also	be	considered	that	the	finding	may	be	as	a	result	of	
the	selection	of	individual	stimuli	for	rating,	or	the	relatively	rough-grained	number	of	
morph	stages.	In	the	latter	case,	introducing	more	steps	around	the	moderate	to	highly	
human-like	morphs	may	allow	finer	discrimination	in	human-likeness.		
The	second	part	of	Mori’s	(1970)	hypothesis	was	that	the	emotional	response	will	be	
characterised	as	eerie	and	the	present	research	was	able	to	explore	this	in	each	of	the	
phases	by	measuring	ratings	of	eeriness.	Mean	ratings	of	eeriness	varied	across	the	
phases,	with	the	eeriest	(M=9.6)	face	found	to	be	the	dark	eyed	doll-face	chosen	as	the	
Cluster	1	exemplar	in	Phase	1	and	the	least	eerie	(M=1.7)	the	unmodified	base	sad	face	
used	in	Phase	3.	Figure	63	below	illustrates	this	range	by	presenting	the	images	in	the	top	
and	bottom	10%	of	mean	eeriness.	Table	32	in	Appendix	4	presents	the	full	list	of	all	
stimulus	images	and	their	mean	eeriness.		
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Figure	63:	Eeriness	ratings	of	face	images	presented	in	each	research	phase,	indicating	those	rated	as	
most	and	least	eerie.		
It	can	be	seen	that	some	of	the	images,	those	highlighted	in	green	as	the	top	10%,	
were	indeed	rated	as	eerie.	However,	46%	of	the	images	had	a	mean	eeriness	of	3	or	
below,	and	so	although	differences	in	eeriness	were	found,	not	all	of	the	stimulus	images	
were	rated	as	strongly	or	highly	eerie,	so	some	of	the	analyses	in	this	thesis	have	been	
based	on	relatively	small	differences	in	eeriness.	This	wide	variation	in	eeriness	is	an	
important	point	to	consider,	given	the	crucial	role	that	eeriness	plays	in	any	discussion	of	
the	UVE.	While	it	has	been	acknowledged	above	that	eeriness	is	a	subtle	and	complex	
emotion,	and	so	reported	experiences	of	eeriness	could	be	expected	to	be	lower	than	
those	for	outright	fear	or	startle	responses	to	unexpected	stimuli.	However,	the	range	of	
responses	across	the	different	phases	is	interesting	and	suggests	that	further	research	in	
this	area	may	be	able	to	shed	light	on	why	this	may	be.	A	working	theory	is	that	the	
experimental	settings	for	all	of	these	studies	were	designed	to	be	non-threatening,	and	by	
presenting	static	images	of	faces	to	participants	it	meant	their	comfort	levels	made	it	
difficult	for	them	to	experience	being	genuinely	unsettled	by	the	images	that	they	were	
viewing.	The	external	context	for	the	research	is	also	worth	considering	at	this	point,	
given	that	ratings	of	eeriness	decreased	across	the	different	phases	and	these	studies	
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were	conducted	over	a	period	of	several	years.	It	may	have	been	that	the	general	
population	simply	became	more	acclimatised	to	the	experience	of	looking	at	artificial	
faces	due	to	greater	exposure	in	day-to-day	life,	setting	general	expectations	for	eeriness	
at	different	levels	over	time.			
It	can	be	seen	that	a	valley	effect	was	found	in	the	relationship	between	human-
likeness	and	emotion	response,	and	even	though	the	topography	of	this	valley	was	not	as	
expected,	some	of	the	stimuli	were	able	to	elicit	uncanny	responses.	Later	studies	in	this	
thesis	looked	in	detail	at	mechanisms	that	may	have	been	responsible	for	this	response	
pattern.	It	can	be	seen	from	the	scope	of	the	literature	presented	in	the	Chapter	1	that	
there	were	a	range	of	theoretical	perspectives	and	approaches	that	could	have	been	
adopted	to	explore	the	UVE.	This	thesis	began	with	a	broad	exploration	of	the	effect,	
which	was	then	refined	to	test	two	specific	areas	of	face	perception	theory	and	research	
which	were	applied	to	the	UVE.	The	first	of	these	applied	face	perception	theories	to	
examine	how	information	about	the	appearance	and	identity	of	NHFs	was	encoded,	using	
a	recognition	task	to	look	at	whether	performance	would	differ	as	a	function	of	human-
likeness.		
Previous	studies	have	found	that	one	cause	of	the	UVE	was	the	presence	of	
anomalous,	unrealistic	or	otherwise	unusual	features,	most	notably	eyes.	Seyama	and	
Nagayama	(2007,	2009)	found	that	manipulations	to	the	size	and	realism	of	eyes	could	
explain	uncanniness	in	a	range	of	different	face	types.	Distorted	or	manipulated	features	
have	been	used	in	face	perception	research	to	isolate	and	explain	mechanisms	of	face	
processing	and	information	encoding,	with	Searcy	and	Bartlett	(1996)	use	of	grotesque	
features	and	Thompson	(1980)	and	Cornes	et	al’s	(2011)	technique	of	inverting	features	
within	a	face	have	both	having	been	used	as	evidence	that	upright	face	information	is	
encoded	at	the	level	of	the	whole	face	rather	than	individual	features,	and	that	faces	are	
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processed	holistically	rather	than	analytically.	Natural	human	faces	are	known	to	be	
processed	differently	from	other	types	of	complex	object	(Kanwisher	and	Moscovitch	
(2000))	but	no	research	had	been	carried	out	into	how	this	would	apply	to	NHFs.	The	idea	
of	a	transition	between	‘non-human’	and	‘human’	is	key	to	the	UVE	but	the	concept	that	
at	some	point	on	that	continuum	there	may	also	be	a	switch	in	processing	mechanisms	
where	the	increasingly	human-like	faces	stop	being	processed	as	objects	and	begin	to	be	
processed	as	natural	faces	had	not	been	explored.	The	presence	of	a	FIE	(Yin,	1969)	at	
different	levels	of	human-likeness	for	different	categories	of	face	type	was	used	to	
examine	this,	and	to	specifically	test	whether	some	of	the	NHFs	(with	the	most	unusual	
features)	would	show	a	decreased	inversion	effect	suggestive	of	analytic	rather	than	
holistic	processing.	Hills	et	al’s	(2011)	‘feature	salience’	findings	also	suggested	that	the	
morphed	faces	would	not	be	as	affected	by	inversion	as	the	natural	human	faces,	as	in	
their	studies,	selectively	directing	attention	to	the	eye	region	meant	that	there	was	not	as	
much	of	a	performance	decrement	when	those	faces	were	inverted.	While	Study	4	did	not	
use	a	cueing	technique	to	direct	attention	in	that	way,	it	may	be	that	the	unusual	
appearance	of	the	morphed	eyes	could	have	served	a	similar	purpose	in	directing	
attention	to	that	area.	The	results	found	that	an	inversion	effect	did	occur	at	all	levels	of	
human-likeness,	but	the	predicted	effect	of	human-likeness	on	that	inversion	effect	was	
not	found.	It	had	been	expected	that	the	morphed	faces	would	not	be	as	affected	by	
inversion	as	the	natural	human	faces,	and	so	they	would	have	been	recognised	more	
quickly,	but	the	slowest	performance	was	actually	found	for	the	faces	at	the	75%	human	
point	where	they	were	almost	but	not	quite	human.	The	suggestion	that	the	anomalous	
features	may	have	‘protected’	these	NHFs	from	the	detrimental	effects	of	inversion	could	
not	be	supported.	One	explanation	for	this	may	be	in	the	nature	of	the	changes	in	the	
appearance	of	the	faces	that	occurred	when	the	faces	were	morphed	from	non-human	to	
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human,	particularly	considering	these	findings	in	the	light	of	Searcy	and	Bartlett’s	(1996)	
observations	of	the	impact	on	inversion	of	manipulations	that	change	faces	featurally	or	
configurally.	They	found	that	the	inversion	effect	was	least	for	the	faces	which	had	been	
disrupted	in	their	configuration,	and	most	for	the	ones	where	the	features	had	been	
altered.	The	larger	inversion	effect	found	for	the	morphed	faces	may	be	explained	in	this	
study	as	morphing	keeps	the	configuration	of	the	face	static	while	incrementally	altering	
the	appearance	of	the	individual	features	which	does	mirror	the	techniques	used	in	
Searcy	and	Bartlett’s	(1996)	study.	Cheetham	et	al’s	(2013)	finding	that	participants	spent	
longer	looking	at	objects	at	the	perceptual	boundary	between	artificial	and	human	may	
also	explain	why	participants	spent	longer	looking	at	those	morphed	faces	as	they	would	
certainly	be	ones	that	straddle	the	boundary	between	the	human	and	non-human.	
Additionally,	some	explanations	for	the	increased	inversion	effect	for	the	morphed	faces	
may	be	found	in	studies	which	offered	interpretations	of	the	FIE	that	did	not	rely	
exclusively	on	analytic	versus	holistic	processing.	Rhodes	et	al	(1993)	found	a	difference	in	
the	size	of	the	inversion	decrement	depending	on	which	parts	of	a	face	had	been	
manipulated	and	how	they	were	presented.	Their	results	showed	that	the	largest	
decrements	occurred	when	individual	eye	and	mouth	areas	were	isolated	and	presented	
without	the	context	of	the	surrounding	face.	While	the	this	study	used	whole	faces	rather	
than	presenting	features	in	isolation,	the	markedly	unusual	appearance	of	the	eye	regions	
in	the	morph	images	may	have	drawn	attention	selectively	to	those	areas,	resulting	in	the	
large	inversion	decrement	that	occurred	for	the	morphed	faces.	Sekuler	et	al’s	(2004)	
theory	suggested	that	the	ease	of	extracting	information	from	a	face	was	key	to	whether	
an	inversion	effect	occurred	and	that	it	was	not	the	mode	of	processing	which	was	
relevant,	but	the	ability	to	extract	the	information	from	the	faces	when	they	are	inverted.	
It	could	be	that	the	morphed	features	of	the	NHFs	represented	a	particular	challenge	for	
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information	extraction,	meaning	that	it	took	longer	to	discriminate	between	them.	Finally,	
it	may	be	that	the	non-human	starting	points	for	the	face	morphs	could	not	really	be	
considered	as	objects	rather	than	faces.	While	the	robots	and	statues	could	perhaps	be	
read	as	object-like	before	the	transition	to	human-likeness,	the	dolls	and	animals	are	
clearly	identifiable	as	faces,	albeit	non-human	ones.	An	area	for	further	exploration	would	
be	to	repeat	this	study	and	use	some	of	the	most	abstract	face-like	representations	
currently	in	use	for	some	embodied	agents	as	the	non-human	starting	point	to	see	if	this	
has	an	impact	on	the	way	faces	drawn	from	that	continuum	are	processed.		
The	second	theoretical	construct	applied	to	the	question	of	the	UVE	in	this	thesis	was	
the	question	of	whether	of	mismatched	and	incongruent	emotional	expressions	would	
elicit	perceptions	of	eeriness.	This	construct	drew	upon	three	sources	of	theory	and	
evidence	in	formulating	the	research	questions	and	the	experimental	design.	These	were	
the	literature	relating	to	the	UVE	as	an	artefact	of	categorical	perception,	empirical	
studies	of	cue	mismatch	and	the	impact	of	incongruent	stimuli	on	the	UVE,	and	face	
perception	literature	looking	at	how	emotional	expressions	are	perceived.	It	was	also	a	
development	of	the	strand	mentioned	above	where	the	eyes	had	been	identified	as	a	
probable	cause	of	eeriness	to	ask	whether	the	reason	that	large	or	distorted	eyes	make	
people	feel	uneasy	may	be	because	they	interfere	with	an	ability	to	present	a	realistic,	
relatable	emotional	expression.	The	general	prediction	was	that	the	eeriest	faces	would	
be	those	with	a	mismatch	between	the	expression	shown	in	the	area	immediately	around	
the	eyes	and	that	suggested	in	the	rest	of	the	face	(e.g.	the	expression	suggested	by	the	
mouth	position,	shape	and	openness	or	by	creasing	of	the	forehead).	In	terms	of	
categorical	perception,	this	follows	Ramey’s	(2005)	prediction	that	uncanniness	emerges	
when	entities	straddle	categorical	boundaries	because	they	possess	attributes	from	two	
possible	categories,	making	it	hard	to	accurately	allocate	them	to	either	category.	The	
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presence	of	two	different	expressions	in	one	face	may	make	it	hard	to	categorise	the	
emotion	shown	by	the	person,	causing	a	difficultly	in	classifying	them	as,	for	example,	
definitely	happy	or	definitely	angry.		
Cue	mismatch	theory	is	recognised	as	an	area	of	enquiry	in	the	UVE,	with	research	by	
Seyama	and	Nagayama	(2009)	and	MacDorman	et	al	(2009)	having	found	that	mixing	
levels	of	detail	in	a	virtual	agent	elicited	eeriness	and	negative	evaluations	as	the	agent	
was	not	able	to	present	a	realistic	overall	appearance.	MacDorman	(2009)	also	found	that	
the	more	extreme	this	mismatch,	the	more	negative	the	overall	assessment.	Tinwell’s	
research	into	cue	mismatch	has	been	extensive	and	has	found	evidence	for	UVEs	in	
animations	where	the	spoken	dialogue	was	not	perfectly	synchronised	with	the	moving	
image	(Tinwell,	2009),	in	videos	of	faces	with	a	mismatch	between	the	emotional	
expression	conveyed	in	the	voice	and	that	suggested	by	the	expression	(Tinwell	et	al,	
2010),	and	a	lack	of	expression	in	the	upper	part	of	the	face	(Tinwell	at	al,	2011b,	2013).	
The	latter	explanation	was	key	to	the	design	of	Phase	3,	as	Tinwell	et	al	had	found	that	
faces	lacking	emotion	in	the	upper	part	of	the	face	while	displaying	emotion	in	the	lower	
part	of	the	face	were	the	eeriest,	but	one	aspect	that	had	not	been	explored	in	Tinwell’s	
studies	was	the	scenario	where	different	expressions	were	presented	in	the	two	parts.	
Tinwell	et	al’s	explanation	for	the	eeriness	of	a	lack	of	upper-face	emotion	drew	upon	the	
perception	of	psychopathic	traits	from	facial	expressions,	where	expressions	are	only	
conveyed	in	the	lower	part	of	the	face	and	it	was	suggested	that	these	faces	may	seem	
eerie	because	they	elicit	the	same	warning	signals.	This	idea	was	developed	in	the	present	
thesis	by	considering	Ekman	et	al’s	work	on	emotional	expressions	(particularly	Ekman	et	
al,	2005)	and	how	they	are	perceived,	predicting	that	an	extreme	mismatch	where	
completely	incongruent	expressions	were	presented	in	the	same	face	may	augment	this	
understanding	even	further.		
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Blended	faces	were	created	from	images	of	two	different	emotions	so	the	eye	region	
always	displayed	an	expression	incongruent	with	the	rest	of	the	face.	These	were	used	
(along	with	their	unblended	originals)	in	a	series	of	tasks	with	participants	where	they	
were	asked	to	rate	them	for	eeriness,	indicate	how	strongly	they	elicited	different	
emotions	and	identify	the	emotions	that	were	present	in	the	face.	To	continue	the	FIE	
strand	in	Phase	2,	faces	were	presented	inverted	as	well	as	upright.	The	results	supported	
the	prediction	that	mismatched	faces	are	eerier	overall	than	matched	ones,	and	it	was	
also	found	that	they	were	still	eerier	even	when	they	were	presented	inverted	rather	than	
upright.	The	increased	eeriness	for	inverted	faces	was	a	notable	finding,	particularly	as	it	
was	not	mirrored	in	the	results	for	how	strongly	participants	felt	fear	when	they	were	
looking	at	the	images	either	inverted	or	upright.	While	this	may	have	been	a	result	of	the	
unusual	qualities	of	the	face	blends,	it	may	also	have	been	because	participants	were	
unused	to	looking	at	faces	when	presented	upside-down	so	the	unusual	nature	of	the	task	
primed	them	to	report	the	higher	ratings	of	eeriness.	An	area	for	future	research	could	be	
to	present	some	of	the	typically	‘eerie’	NHFs	such	as	those	identified	in	Phase	1	in	
different	orientations,	and	explore	the	extent	to	which	this	affects	participant’s	tendency	
to	report	eeriness	compared	to	ratings	of	human-likeness	and	strangeness.		
There	was	no	interaction	between	match-mismatch	and	orientation	as	mismatched	
faces	were	always	eerier	than	matched	ones	and	inverted	faces	were	always	eerier	than	
upright	ones.	The	results	also	supported	MacDorman’s	(2009)	theory	that	more	extreme	
mismatches	lead	to	more	negative	assessments,	as	the	blend	types	where	positive	faces	
were	blended	with	negative	eyes	were	consistently	rated	as	the	most	eerie,	but	these	
eeriness	ratings	were	still	not	found	to	be	particularly	strong	in	terms	of	the	scale	used	to	
rate	eeriness.	Four	different	negative	emotions	were	included	so	it	was	also	possible	to	
identify	which	combinations	resulted	in	the	eeriest	blends	of	individual	emotions.	It	was	
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found	that	the	happy	face,	fearful	eyes	and	happy	face,	angry	eyes	were	the	eeriest	
blends	in	both	orientations.	A	notable	finding	was	that	these	results	did	not	support	the	
idea,	grounded	in	Tinwell	et	al’s	2013	research,	that	the	eeriest	faces	would	be	those	
where	the	strong	emotions	were	shown	in	the	surrounding	face,	with	a	neutral	expression	
in	the	eyes	as	a	parallel	to	their	‘expression	lack’	condition.	None	of	the	neutral	('dead')	
eye	blends	were	rated	as	particularly	eerie,	and	all	were	less	eerie	than	the	happy	face,	
angry	eyes	blend.	Considering	all	of	the	blends	where	neutral	eyes	were	present,	the	
blend	with	neutral	eyes	in	happy	and	angry	faces	were	eeriest	(2.9)	but	that	was	still	less	
eerie	than	the	happy	face,	angry	eyes	blend.	This	finding	can	be	interpreted	with	
reference	to	Ekman	et	al’s	(2005)	theory	of	leaked	expressions,	where	witnessing	
someone	who	was	attempting	to	conceal	a	negative	expression	by	covering	it	with	a	
positive	one	would	induce	a	sense	of	distrust	and	unease	in	the	observer.	These	extremely	
mismatched	blends	were	presenting	just	that	scenario,	with	something	that	looked	like	an	
attempt	to	conceal	a	fearful	expression	being	found	to	be	the	most	eerie	of	all.	This	also	
links	into	the	theories	of	affinity	and	trust	that	were	hypothesised	to	be	influential	in	the	
UVE.		
Gray	and	Wegner	(2012)	found	that	when	an	agent’s	appearance	sets	up	an	
expectation	that	they	should	be	able	to	experience	human	emotions	yet	their	actual	
ability	does	not	satisfy	that	expectation,	that	acceptability	is	reduced	and	unease	is	
increased.	In	this	way,	a	disconnect	between	two	emotional	expressions	could	set	up	a	
similar	conflict	and	cause	feelings	of	unease.		
Finally,	it	is	useful	to	consider	the	2012	translation	of	Mori’s	(1970)	original	article,	as	
this	time,	‘affinity’	was	used	in	the	place	of	the	original	term	of	‘familiarity’.	This	subtle	
difference	does	lead	to	a	new	interpretation	of	the	theory	as	affinity	speaks	more	to	the	
role	of	interaction	and	the	ability	to	identify	with	a	NHA.	It	can	be	seen	how	being	unable	
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to	form	a	connection	with	an	NHA	because	of	the	conflicting	signals	given	in	incongruent	
expressions	could	result	in	an	unsettling	loss	of	affinity.	
In	addition	to	the	key	finding	that	mismatched	faces	elicit	eeriness,	two	additional	
notable	findings	from	Study	5	related	to	the	accuracy	of	emotion	identification,	and	
participant’s	ability	to	categorise	the	different	emotional	blends.	The	ability	to	accurately	
identify	emotions	in	the	matched	blends	were	recognised	more	accurately	when	
presented	upright,	but	the	mismatched	blends	were	recognised	more	accurately	when	
presented	inverted.	Looking	at	all	of	the	positive	face,	negative	eye	blends,	the	correct	
identification	of	emotion	was	particularly	based	on	fear	or	anger	in	the	eyes	for	the	
eeriest	blends	rather	than	the	happy,	smiling	face	component,	which	was	used	most	for	
the	disgusted,	neutral	or	sad	eye	blends.	These	findings	counter	the	happiness	superiority	
effect	proposed	by	Calvo	and	Lundqvist	(2008)	so	it	may	be	that	there	are	some	specific	
aspects	of	those	particular	blends	that	serves	to	over-ride	the	expected	pattern	where	
happiness	would	be	identified,	and	instead	are	perceived	in	terms	of	the	negative	part	of	
the	face.		
In	terms	of	categorical	perception	theory	and	considering	the	two	eeriest	blends,	the	
one	hardest	to	categorise	was	the	happy	face	with	the	fearful	eyes,	but	none	of	the	
blends	were	found	to	be	particularly	difficult	to	categorise	so	this	does	not	support	
Ramey’s	(2005)	proposal	that	a	source	of	the	UVE	may	be	ambiguity	at	categorical	
boundaries.	In	interpreting	the	results	of	this	phase,	it	is	important	to	consider	whether	
they	could	have	resulted	from	broader	perceptual	mechanisms	governing	emotional	
responses	to	faces.	One	additional	explanation	for	the	findings	may	be	that	certain	types	
of	blend	are	going	to	be	more	likely	to	give	negative	or	threatening	signals.	Tipples	(2007)	
found	that	faces	with	wide	eyes	and	open	mouths	were	most	likely	to	be	indicative	of	
threat	than	other	combinations	of	features.	The	happy	face,	fearful	eyes	blend	that	was	
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found	to	be	the	eeriest	of	the	mismatches	does	present	a	wide-eyed	appearance	and	
while	not	all	of	the	smiles	are	not	indicative	of	open	mouths,	they	are	certainly	unusual	in	
the	context	of	a	wide-eyed	expression.	The	importance	of	the	wide-open	eyes	in	this	
study	also	relates	back	to	and	provides	support	for	Seyama	and	Nagayama’s	(2009)	
findings	that	enlarged	eyes	contribute	to	the	UVE.		
However,	the	research	was	not	without	its	challenges,	and	some	reflections	on	the	
methodologies	used	will	now	be	briefly	considered.	This	section	will	reflect	on	the	
methods	used	in	this	thesis	and	assess	aspects	of	the	methodology	that	may	have	
contributed	to	the	findings.	A	mixed	methods	approach	was	taken	across	the	three	
research	phases,	with	the	later	experimental	phases	informed	by	an	initial	exploration	of	a	
small	number	of	stimuli	which	had	been	identified	as	potential	candidates	for	eliciting	an	
UVE.	The	manual	coding	approach	used	in	Phase	1	did	allow	the	experimenter	to	absorb	
the	comments	in	detail	and	to	gain	a	subjective	understanding	of	the	material	which	
informed	the	design	of	the	themes	that	were	used	to	categorise	the	comments,	but	a	
disadvantage	of	this	approach	is	that	by	reducing	the	free-text	data	to	frequencies	of	
coded	quantitative	observations,	some	of	the	richness	of	the	original	source	will	inevitably	
be	lost.	However,	this	approach	was	an	appropriate	method	for	an	area	that	was	relatively	
unexplored	when	the	research	was	initiated	as	it	meant	the	research	topics	for	Phases	2	
and	3	were	able	to	emerge	from	an	undirected	exploration	and	to	avoid	the	research	
being	driven	by	taken	for	granted	assumptions	about	the	nature	of	the	UVE.		
In	terms	of	aspects	of	the	methodology	which	may	have	impacted	on	the	findings	of	
this	thesis,	the	main	area	of	concern	relates	to	the	morph	images	which	were	used	in	
Phase	2.	This	has	been	discussed	in	detail	in	the	General	Discussion	of	Phase	2	but	this	
study	would	have	been	improved	considerably	by	using	more	morph	stages	rather	than	
just	the	three	plus	the	starting	and	end	point	images.	Other	studies	using	morphed	
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images	have	taken	stills	every	5%,	10%	or	12.5%	rather	than	the	25%	used	in	this	study	
and	having	a	finer-grained	view	of	the	non-human	to	human	scale	would	have	allowed	for	
a	greater	insight	into	the	nature	of	the	UVE.	Technological	improvements	have	also	been	
in	morphing	tools,	and	more	powerful	ones	are	now	available	which	would	avoid	some	of	
the	artefacts	and	issues	found	in	the	moped	faces.	It	is	now	possible	to	create	much	
smoother	transitions	and	to	apply	local	masking	to	areas	where	features	do	not	always	
morph	cleanly	into	each	other,	meaning	that	it	would	be	possible	to	generate	better	
stimuli	which	preserve	the	basic	premise	of	a	non-human	to	human	transition	but	do	so	in	
a	way	which	does	not	appear	quite	so	obvious	as	a	manipulated	face.		
Finally,	the	UVE	is	one	which	is	hard	to	inspect	in	isolation	from	a	broader	societal	and	
technological	context	as	the	ability	to	depict	virtual	humans	continues	to	improve	rapidly.	
In	recent	years	there	have	been	considerable	developments	in	this	area,	such	as	improved	
software	tools	for	manipulating	images,	and	also	in	the	creative	environment	where	the	
virtual	humans	that	are	being	designed	for	games	and	film	continue	to	become	more	
realistic	and	believable.	If	people	adapt	to	NHAs	through	real-world	exposure,	research	
into	the	UVE	risks	falling	behind	the	exposure	participants	may	have	experienced.	It	will	
be	an	on-going	challenge	to	create	stimuli	that	have	the	potential	to	reliably	elicit	a	UVE.	
Given	the	long-term	time	frame	of	a	research	project	of	this	nature,	stimuli	that	may	have	
been	strong	UV	candidates	at	the	development	stage	may	no	longer	be	at	the	eerie	edge	
of	realism	by	the	time	they	come	to	be	tested.		
The	findings	across	each	of	the	research	phases	have	been	considered	in	terms	of	the	
underlying	theories	and	research	in	each	area.	This	discussion	will	now	move	back	to	the	
question	of	the	UVE	and	discuss	the	extent	to	which	this	thesis	has	contributed	to	the	
development	of	techniques	for	research	in	this	area.		
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6.2:	Implications	for	the	Uncanny	Valley	Theory	
The	UV	is	no	longer	considered	an	obscure	concept	and	it	is	widely	used	in	popular	
culture.	Mainstream	media	now	also	make	reference	to	it	while	discussing	topics	relating	
to	robots	or	new	technologies	(e.g.	Devlin	(2015)).	While	this	thesis	has	been	in	
development,	the	academic	landscape	around	the	UV	has	changed	dramatically	and	the	
effect	is	now	seen	as	a	reasonable	area	for	serious	enquiry.	The	original	aim	of	this	thesis	
was	to	pinpoint	a	single	explanation	for	why	the	UVE	occurs.	The	initial	exploration	phases	
indicated	quickly	that	this	was	beyond	the	scope	of	a	single	research	project	so	detailed	
attention	was	turned	to	understanding	more	about	the	specific	domain	of	NHFs,	how	they	
are	perceived	and	whether	it	would	be	possible	to	identify	individual	attributes	
responsible	for	the	effect.		
Looking	back	at	Mori’s	(1970)	original	graph	and	revisiting	his	idea	that	increasing	
human-likeness	would	eventually	cause	the	rejection	of	entities	which	came	too	close	to	
human,	what	has	this	thesis	been	able	to	contribute	to	an	understanding	of	that	theory?	
Firstly,	it	has	empirically	demonstrated	that	there	is	a	relationship	between	human-
likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness	and	that	the	location	of	the	eeriness	peaks	were	found	
to	be	closer	to	the	midpoint	between	non-human	and	human,	but	it	has	confirmed	that	
there	are	entities	that	will	be	negatively	evaluated	as	they	increase	in	human-likeness.	
Secondly,	it	has	looked	in	detail	at	how	we	perceive	faces	as	they	become	more	human-
like,	and	contributed	to	an	understanding	of	how	NHFs	are	processed	in	the	findings	of	
Study	4	which	found	that	NHFs	are	indeed	subject	to	the	effects	of	inversion,	even	more	
so	than	human	faces.	This	thesis	also	developed	Mori’s	idea	by	asking	whether	the	effect	
was	solely	the	result	of	a	transition	between	robot	and	human	or	whether	it	would	also	
appear	when	other	types	of	non-humans	were	humanised.	Study	4	examined	animals,	
dolls	and	statues	alongside	robots	and	only	the	dolls	showed	a	consistent	decrease	in	
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eeriness	as	human-likeness	increased.	The	animals,	robots	and	statues	followed	the	
expected	pattern	of	a	peak	of	eeriness	part	way	along	their	transition	to	human.	Dolls	are	
sometimes	described	as	eerie	in	their	un-morphed	state	(Eberle	(2009))	in	a	way	that	
animals,	robots	and	statues	are	not,	so	the	addition	of	humanising	features	through	
morphing	may	have	been	caused	them	to	follow	a	different	trajectory	through	the	valley.	
The	dolls	were	also	the	only	category	where	some	of	the	matched	humans	were	babies	
rather	than	adult	faces	so	it	may	have	been	the	transformation	from	doll	to	infant,	rather	
than	doll	to	human,	that	caused	them	to	appear	cuter,	more	appealing	and	therefore	less	
eerie.	Finally,	differences	in	eeriness	were	found	where	mismatched	emotional	
expressions	did	elicit	significantly	higher	ratings	of	eeriness	in	participants,	when	
compared	to	the	original	unmodified	expressions.	It	was	found	that	the	strongest	of	these	
responses	occurred	when	a	happy	face	was	presented	with	fearful	eyes.	However,	the	
differences	between	the	face	images	were	found	to	be	small	and	so	further	research	
would	be	needed	to	confirm	whether	this	finding	would	apply	more	generally	to	NHFs.		
In	terms	of	an	approach	to	investigating	the	UV,	another	contribution	has	been	in	the	
development	of	a	set	of	design	principles	which	it	is	hoped	will	be	of	use	for	future	
research	in	this	area.	These	were	detailed	in	Table	1	in	Section	3.1.	To	recap,	they	were	
designed	to	avoid	the	inherent	circularity	present	in	several	of	the	early	studies	in	this	
area	where	it	was	taken	for	granted	that	certain	types	of	NHA	would	evoke	an	uncanny	
response,	and	that	certain	agents	were	eerie	simply	by	virtue	of	being	close	to	human.	
The	five	principles	were	designed	to	guide	the	systematic	and	rigorous	collection	of	the	
important	measurements	relating	to	the	UVE,	allowing	unambiguous	and	data-driven	
conclusions	to	be	drawn.	They	describe	a	framework	for	studies	where	it	is	possible	to	
systematically	increase	the	human-likeness	of	an	agent	from	a	given	non-human	starting	
point	through	to	a	fully	realised	version,	indistinguishable	from	a	human	being.	The	
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dimension	described	in	this	thesis	has	been	the	presentation	of	a	realistic	and	convincing	
human	face,	but	these	principles	could	equally	be	applied	to	realistic	motion	or	voice.	It	
was	felt	that	only	by	exerting	careful	control	over	the	transition	between	non-human	and	
human,	while	measuring	the	effects	of	that	gradual	transition,	would	it	be	possible	to	be	
certain	of	the	relationship	between	human-likeness	and	emotional	response,	and	in	doing	
so,	to	identify	characteristics	of	the	NHAs	that	were	most	closely	associated	with	eeriness	
and	then	explore	those	in	more	detail.	The	guiding	principles	were	designed	to	aid	
practical	research	into	the	UVE	but	it	was	actually	found	that	these	are	still	difficult	to	
apply	in	practice	as	even	with	objective,	baselines	measurements	of	the	key	dependent	
variables	it	is	hard	to	draw	conclusions	about	the	nature	of	the	UVE	when	participant	
responses	of	eeriness	were	generally	rather	low.	It	is	also	still	difficult	to	avoid	attempting	
to	interpret	differences	in	human-likeness,	strangeness	and	eeriness	as	a	result	of	some	
stimuli	seeming	subjectively	eerier	than	others.	For	example,	this	was	found	in	Study	4,	
where	participant	ratings	of	eeriness	for	morphed	faces	varied	according	to	the	category	
of	the	initial	images.	The	finding	that	dolls	were	initially	rated	as	eerie	and	then	their	
eeriness	decreased	as	human-likeness	increased	could	have	been	explained	as	a	result	of	
the	doll	images	being	inherently	eerier	than	animals,	dolls	and	statues,	and	therefore	
already	residing	within	an	uncanny	valley,	but	this	explanation	would	risk	falling	foul	of	
just	that	type	of	circularity.		
This	thesis	has	presented	an	exploration	of	the	UV:	findings	have	been	noted	in	terms	
of	the	valley	theory	itself,	with	reference	to	wider	psychological	literature	on	face	
perception	and	a	practical	framework	has	been	suggested	which	could	be	useful	for	future	
research	designs	looking	to	explore	new	aspects	of	the	theory.	This	discussion	will	now	
move	on	to	reflecting	on	some	of	the	methodological	choices	that	were	made	in	designing	
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these	studies	and	then	looking	at	potential	areas	for	future	exploration	before	closing	
with	some	concluding	comments.		
6.3:	Future	Directions	
The	aim	of	this	thesis	was	to	explore	the	UVE	and	as	the	discussions	above	have	
demonstrated,	has	been	able	to	contribute	new	findings	in	this	area.	However,	there	are	
certainly	other	areas	for	research	within	this	discipline	that	are	still	to	be	explored.	This	
section	will	describe	three	areas	of	potential	new	research.		
Firstly,	there	has	been	relatively	little	research	carried	out	systematically	exploring	the	
UVE	in	embodied	agents	and	while	virtual	agents	and	images	are	now	relatively	well	
understood,	studies	of	artificial	agents	in	the	real	world	have	tended	to	be	small	scale	in	
nature	or	carried	out	as	case	studies	with	specific	reference	to	the	testing	of	a	particular	
aspect	of	an	individual	android.	One	intriguing	possibility	for	further	research	would	be	
looking	at	the	highly	realistic	‘reborn’	dolls	that	are	now	available	that	mimic	the	
appearance	of	human	babies.	Eberle	(2009)	carried	out	a	comparison	of	a	reborn	doll	
compared	to	a	more	traditional	and	stylised	doll	and	found	that	a	quarter	of	their	
respondents	described	both	of	them	unsettling,	but	the	strongest	rejections	were	found	
for	the	reborn	doll.	This	would	contribute	to	an	understanding	of	the	UVE	as	these	dolls	
are	created	to	be	appealing	copies	of	human	babies,	not	to	disquiet	or	unsettle,	but	they	
seemed	to	have	the	opposite	effect	for	some	participants.	In	terms	of	the	research	carried	
out	in	this	thesis	it	would	be	interesting	to	explore	whether	this	effect	can	be	generalised	
beyond	the	single	dolls	used	in	Eberle’s	study,	and	if	so	to	explore	whether	it	may	be	that	
this	occurs	as	another	variant	of	the	mismatch	hypotheses,	where	in	this	case	the	
mismatch	would	be	between	the	highly	realistic	appearance	paired	with	the	inherent	
stillness	and	lack	of	animation	present	in	a	doll.		
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The	second	suggestion	for	further	research	would	look	for	evidence	of	cultural	
differences	in	the	perception	of	mismatched	expressions	to	explore	whether	they	are	
universally	eerie,	or	whether	there	is	a	cultural	influence	on	how	easily	a	sense	of	
uncanny	can	be	elicited	when	happy	faces	and	paired	with	fearful	or	angry	eyes.	Evidence	
for	universal	eeriness	would	support	the	idea	that	there	may	be	an	evolutionary	
component	to	the	UVE	while	if	culturally	specific	components	can	be	found	for	the	effect,	
it	may	be	that	exposure	to	particular	types	of	face	image	may	be	responsible	for	triggering	
or	flattening	the	effect.		
Finally,	this	research	is	concluding	at	an	exciting	time	in	the	world	of	virtual	humans	as	
rapid	advances	in	computer	technology	mean	that	encounters	with	virtual	agents	are	now	
commonplace	and	it	is	becoming	increasingly	difficult	to	distinguish	digital	actors	from	
virtual	ones.	Journalists	are	now	more	likely	to	ask	whether	the	latest	film	or	game	
crosses	the	UV	than	to	question	whether	the	valley	exists,	as	exemplified	by	Perry	(2014)	
who	reviewed	recent	innovations	in	this	area	in	interviews	with	digital	artists,	film	
directors	and	two	experts	on	the	UVE	(Tinwell	and	Saygin).	The	article	considered	the	rise	
of	‘digital	actors’,	and	looked	at	the	challenges	that	will	be	presented	if	they	do	become	
commonplace	over	the	next	few	years.	Photorealistic	actors	such	as	Digital	Ira	(Debevec,	
2012)	are	rendered	at	high	levels	of	detail	and	have	the	ability	to	present	a	growing	
repertoire	of	convincing	emotional	expressions,	and	may	be	used	in	future	to	act	
alongside	or	even	replace	conventional	actors	in	games	and	films.	At	the	moment	the	
actors	are	limited	to	short	set	pieces	and	the	real	challenge	will	be	in	making	them	portray	
convincing	and	emotionally	engaging	narratives	in	film,	and	even	more	so	when	they	are	
the	subjects	for	interaction	in	games.	This	challenge	may	present	opportunities	for	
developing	the	work	in	this	thesis	looking	at	mismatched	emotional	expressions	in	static	
images	to	exploring	this	further	in	animated	faces,	virtual	agents	or	even	beyond	the	
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screen	and	into	embodied	agents.	In	addition,	these	initial	findings	about	the	perceptual	
mechanisms	for	NHFs	could	well	be	extended	to	virtual	agents	as	they	become	more	
sophisticated,	and	could	make	important	contributions	to	the	ability	to	present	convincing	
and	relatable	characters	in	these	advanced	computer	graphics	arenas.	Digital	Ira,	like	
many	convincing	virtual	actors,	has	been	produced	through	motion	capture	of	a	real	actor,	
whose	appearance	and	emotion	were	then	digitally	recreated	in	such	a	way	as	to	allow	
reproduction	of	realistic	face	movements	and	expressions.	This	technique	has	also	been	
used	to	create	virtual	versions	of	well-known	figures,	often	with	unsettling	or	amusing	
results	when	the	digital	recreations	are	less	than	completely	realistic.	This	suggests	a	new	
study	as	an	area	for	future	research	concerning	whether	our	familiarity	with	the	actor	
would	make	us	more	sensitive	to	the	flaws	in	their	digital	double.	The	digital	recreation	of	
an	actor	who	is	already	well	known	presents	a	double	challenge	for	the	designer	in	that	
they	not	only	have	to	design	for	a	realistically	human	appearance	but	they	need	to	
reproduce	the	minute	gestures	and	mannerisms	that	the	audience	will	expect	from	the	
original.	To	date,	no	research	has	been	published	on	the	relationship	between	digital	
doubles	and	eeriness	but	it	certainly	seems	to	be	a	promising	area	for	future	enquiry	as	it	
would	allow	an	exploration	of	the	factors	that	influence	the	acceptability	of	different	
types	of	NHA.	This	thesis	has	suggested	one	such	factor	in	expression	mismatch,	but	by	
exploring	a	wider	range	of	potential	explanations	it	may	be	possible	to	achieve	a	greater	
depth	of	understanding	of	how	NHAs	are	perceived.	
6.4:	Reflections	on	the	Uncanny	Valley	Effect		
This	thesis	has	reviewed	the	prior	theories	and	evidence	for	the	UVE,	and	used	these	
to	inform	the	design	of	several	studies	which	have	considered	the	existence	and	nature	of	
the	valley	from	broad,	qualitative	explorations	through	to	detailed	and	nuanced	
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experimental	studies	where	variables	have	been	carefully	manipulated	to	allow	
conclusions	to	be	drawn	on	some	factors	which	appear	to	provide	a	compelling	argument	
that	certain	types	of	faces	are	able	to	reliably	elicit	a	sense	of	eeriness.	The	contributions	
that	these	explorations	can	make	to	general	psychological	knowledge,	and	specifically	to	
the	domain	of	face	perception	research,	have	been	detailed	above,	but	in	closing	it	seems	
apposite	to	reflect	on	the	idea	of	the	uncanny	valley	itself	and	consider	the	extent	to	
which	it	has	real	world	applicability.	The	issue	of	methodological	complexity	in	
investigating	the	effect	does	make	it	a	tricky	one	to	pin	down	and	given	the	eerie	nature	
that	characterises	the	effect,	it	can	be	easy	to	feel	that	research	in	this	area	is	akin	to	
chasing	phantoms	as	they	vanish	into	mist.	Is	there	really	an	uncanny	valley,	or	is	it	simply	
a	convenient	label	to	give	to	certain	types	of	flawed	representations	of	human-likeness	to	
justify	why	they	are	rejected?	My	perspective,	informed	by	research	in	this	area	and	
several	years	of	near-constant	exposure	to	a	rapidly	changing	population	of	near-humans	
is	that	the	effect	is	genuine,	emotionally-driven	and	not	yet	completely	understood.	
Androids,	robots	and	CGI	characters	have	developed	to	the	point	where	they	can	delight,	
entertain	and	intrigue	us,	but	they	can	still	unsettle	in	that	uniquely	subtle	way.	I	look	
forward	to	using	the	knowledge	I	have	developed	from	this	research	study,	and	building	
on	the	findings	in	this	thesis,	to	explore	that	fascinating	effect	in	more	detail.		
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Appendices	
Phase	1	
Appendix	1a:	Participant	demographics	for	the	imagined	encounters	study	
Age	group	 N	 %	
20	and	under	 14	 6.6	
21-30	 77	 36.3	
31-40	 76	 35.8	
41-50	 29	 13.7	
51-60	 11	 5.2	
60+	 5	 2.4	
Total	 212	 100	
Table	20:	Distribution	of	participant	ages	
Gender	 N	 %	
Female	 141	 66.5	
Male	 71	 33.5	
Total	 212	 100	
Table	21:	Distribution	of	participant	gender	
Country	 N	 %	
Argentina	 1	 0.5	
Australia	 3	 1.4	
Belgium	 1	 0.5	
Canada	 13	 6.1	
Germany	 2	 0.9	
Ireland	 1	 0.5	
Japan	 1	 0.5	
Netherlands	 3	 1.4	
Norway	 2	 0.9	
Poland	 1	 0.5	
South	Africa	 1	 0.5	
United	Kingdom	 109	 51.4	
United	States	 73	 34.4	
No	answer	 1	 0.5	
Total	 212	 100.0	
Table	22:	Participant	location 
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Appendix	1b:	Example	survey	webpages	
Introduction	
For	the	purposes	of	this	study,	I	would	like	you	to	imagine	that	you	are	attending	a	
robotics	exhibition.	You	will	be	asked	to	carry	out	three	different	kinds	of	task	relating	to	
figures	that	you	encounter	while	you	are	at	the	exhibition.	I	will	then	ask	some	questions	
about	yourself,	but	these	will	only	be	used	to	analyse	your	answers	by	group	
characteristics,	never	to	identify	you	personally.	
Please	give	your	answers	honestly,	and	feel	free	to	use	as	much	detail	as	you	wish.	
There	are	no	right	or	wrong	answers	to	the	tasks.	
Click	‘proceed’	when	you	are	ready	to	start.	
 
Task	One	
You	arrive	at	the	exhibition	while	the	displays	are	still	being	set	up.	You	start	to	look	
around	while	you	are	waiting	for	your	colleagues	to	arrive.	You	see	five	figures	that	you	
would	really	like	them	to	take	a	look	at,	but	you	know	that	they	will	be	in	a	hurry	when	
they	get	here.	
How	would	you	describe	this	figure	so	that	your	colleagues	will	be	able	to	find	it	
easily?	
Your	description	(text	box)	
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Task	completed.	
Thank	you	for	those	answers.	They	have	not	yet	been	saved,	because	there	are	more	
tasks	to	complete.	Please	note	that	the	instructions	for	the	next	task	will	be	different	
from	the	previous	task,	even	if	they	are	similar.	
Click	‘proceed’	when	you	are	ready	to	continue.	
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Task	Two	
During	the	exhibition,	you	learn	that	these	figures	are	all	prototypes	for	a	new	
household	robot.	A	researcher	for	the	company	who	is	building	the	robot	would	like	to	
know	how	people	would	feel	about	having	each	of	these	in	their	home.	
Please	type	in	the	box	below:	how	does	the	figure	make	you	feel?	
Your	description	(text	box)	
 
Task	completed.	
Thank	you	for	those	answers.	They	have	not	yet	been	saved,	because	there	are	more	
tasks	to	complete.	Please	note	that	the	instructions	for	the	next	task	will	be	different	
from	the	previous	task,	even	if	they	seem	similar.	
Click	‘proceed’	when	you	are	ready	to	continue.	
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Task	Three	
At	the	end	of	the	exhibition,	you	are	asked	to	complete	an	evaluation	of	the	five	
figures	you	have	been	interested	in.	
Please	can	you	rate	each	of	them	on	the	following	scales.	
Note	that	the	scales	may	vary	for	each	question.	The	scale	points	are	not	numbered,	as	
we	want	you	to	think	about	feelings	rather	than	precise	numbers.	
Your	rating:	
Very	strange	--->		<---	Very	familiar	
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Demographics	
We	are	almost	ready	to	save	your	answers.	
In	order	to	analyse	whether	the	results	vary	according	to	participants'	backgrounds,	I'd	
like	to	know	a	little	about	you,	please.	This	information	will	only	be	used	to	analyse	
answers	by	group	characteristics,	never	to	identify	you	personally.	Please	supply	the	
following:	
•	 Your	gender:	
Male	
Female		
•	 Your	age	(years):	
•	 Your	location	(City	&	Country):	
One	last	thing...	(optional)	
If	you	found	this	study	interesting,	would	you	like	to	take	part	in	more	online	research	
for	Open	University	psychologists?	
We	are	setting	up	a	'virtual	participation	panel'	of	people	to	participate	in	a	wide	
variety	of	research	projects.	You	can	choose	how	often	you	take	part,	and	you	can	leave	
the	panel	at	any	time.	If	you'd	like	to	learn	more,	please	leave	your	email	address	in	the	
box	below.	Your	email	address	will	be	used	only	for	panel	recruitment,	and	won't	be	used	
to	identify	the	answers	that	you	have	just	given.	
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•	 Enter	your	email	address:	
	
Appendix	1c:	Frequency	cross-tabulations	of	individual	positive,	negative	and	neutral	
emotion	terms	by	face	type	
Positive	term	 Artificial	 Cluster	1	 Cluster	2	 Cluster	3	 Human	 Grand	Total	
comfortable	 10	 	 3	 18	 21	 52	
Happiness	
happy	 15	 	 	 18	 7	 40	
amused	 19	 	 	 	 2	 21	
ok	 7	 1	 4	 4	 5	 21	
at	ease	 2	 	 1	 9	 6	 18	
good	 3	 	 1	 6	 3	 13	
comforted	 1	 	 1	 5	 3	 10	
fine	 3	 1	 	 5	 1	 10	
interested	 3	 1	 2	 2	 	 8	
cheerful	 5	 	 	 	 1	 6	
friendly	 	 	 	 3	 3	 6	
safe	 2	 	 	 2	 2	 6	
intrigued	 1	 	 2	 1	 1	 5	
warm	 	 	 	 2	 3	 5	
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Positive	term	 Artificial	 Cluster	1	 Cluster	2	 Cluster	3	 Human	 Grand	Total	
confident	 	 	 	 4	 	 4	
positive	 1	 	 	 3	 	 4	
reassured	 	 	 	 3	 1	 4	
acceptable	 1	 	 1	 1	 	 3	
non-threatened	 1	 	 	 1	 1	 3	
relaxed	 	 	 	 1	 2	 3	
attracted	 	 	 	 2	 	 2	
companionable	 	 	 1	 1	 	 2	
funny	 2	 	 	 	 	 2	
pleasant	 1	 	 	 1	 	 2	
protective	 1	 	 1	 	 	 2	
secure	 1	 	 1	 	 	 2	
supported	 	 	 	 	 2	 2	
charmed	 1	 	 	 	 	 1	
compassionate	 	 	 1	 	 	 1	
content	 	 	 	 1	 	 1	
excited	 	 	 	 1	 	 1	
fascinated	 	 	 	 1	 	 1	
maternal	 	 1	 	 	 	 1	
neighbourly	 	 	 	 1	 	 1	
peaceful	 	 	 	 1	 	 1	
pleased	 	 	 	 1	 	 1	
trusting	 	 	 	 	 1	 1	
Grand	Total	 80	 4	 19	 98	 65	 266	
Table	23:	Frequencies	of	key	positive	emotion	terms	for	five	face	types,	by	descending	frequency.		
Negative	term	 Artificial	 Cluster	1	 Cluster	2	 Cluster	3	 Human	 Grand	Total	
Creeped	/	creep	
/	creepy	 8	 33	 10	 4	 8	 63	
scared	 1	 41	 4	 2	 2	 50	
uncomfortable	 3	 11	 23	 4	 9	 50	
uneasy	 1	 9	 14	 3	 5	 32	
disturbed/disturb
ing	 1	 13	 5	 2	 3	 24	
unsettled	 4	 4	 8	 4	 1	 21	
unnerved	 1	 5	 9	 	 2	 17	
freaked/freaky	 2	 10	 1	 1	 2	 16	
weird	 3	 1	 4	 1	 	 9	
frightened/	
frightening	 	 5	 3	 	 	 8	
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Negative	term	 Artificial	 Cluster	1	 Cluster	2	 Cluster	3	 Human	 Grand	Total	
scrutinised	 2	 	 6	 	 	 8	
terrified	 	 8	 	 	 	 8	
bad	 	 4	 1	 1	 1	 7	
disconcerted	 	 2	 3	 1	 1	 7	
sad	 2	 2	 2	 	 1	 7	
nervous	 	 2	 3	 1	 	 6	
strange	 	 	 1	 1	 4	 6	
annoyed	 1	 	 	 	 4	 5	
intimidated	 1	 	 2	 1	 1	 5	
bored	 1	 1	 	 1	 1	 4	
cold	 1	 	 3	 	 	 4	
repulsed	 2	 1	 1	 	 	 4	
spooked	 	 2	 2	 	 	 4	
anxious	 	 3	 	 	 	 3	
disgusted	 	 	 	 2	 1	 3	
eerie	 	 1	 2	 	 	 3	
threatened	 	 	 2	 1	 	 3	
unpleasant	 	 2	 1	 	 	 3	
worried	 1	 	 1	 	 1	 3	
apathetic	 2	 	 	 	 	 2	
apprehensive	 	 1	 1	 	 	 2	
awful	 	 2	 	 	 	 2	
bothered	 	 2	 	 	 	 2	
cautious	 	 	 	 1	 1	 2	
confused	 	 	 1	 	 1	 2	
depressed	 	 	 1	 	 1	 2	
disdainful	 1	 	 	 	 1	 2	
distant	 1	 1	 	 	 	 2	
embarrassed	 	 	 1	 1	 	 2	
guilty	 	 	 1	 	 1	 2	
jealous	 	 	 1	 1	 	 2	
judged	 	 	 1	 	 1	 2	
repelled	 	 	 1	 	 1	 2	
suspicious	 1	 	 1	 	 	 2	
wary	 	 	 1	 	 1	 2	
alarmed/alarming	 	 1	 	 	 	 1	
angry	 	 1	 	 	 	 1	
awkward	 	 	 1	 	 	 1	
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Negative	term	 Artificial	 Cluster	1	 Cluster	2	 Cluster	3	 Human	 Grand	Total	
concerned	 	 1	 	 	 	 1	
conflicted	 	 	 	 	 1	 1	
guarded	 	 	 1	 	 	 1	
haunted	 	 1	 	 	 	 1	
horrified	 	 1	 	 	 	 1	
nightmarish	 	 1	 	 	 	 1	
paranoid	 	 	 1	 	 	 1	
perturbed	 	 1	 	 	 	 1	
tense	 	 1	 	 	 	 1	
unacceptable	 	 	 	 1	 	 1	
Grand	Total	 40	 174	 124	 34	 56	 428	
Table	24:	Frequencies	of	key	negative	emotion	terms	for	five	face	types,	by	descending	frequency.		
Neutral	term	 Artificial	 Cluster	1	 Cluster	2	 Cluster	3	 Human	 Grand	Total	
neutral	 8	 1	 11	 8	 13	 41	
calm	 1	 	 	 7	 2	 10	
indifferent	 1	 	 4	 1	 3	 9	
ambivalent	 2	 	 1	 1	 3	 7	
curious	 4	 	 2	 	 	 6	
normal	 	 	 	 2	 3	 5	
mixed	 1	 	 	 	 1	 2	
nostalgic	 	 	 	 	 2	 2	
amazed	 	 	 	 1	 	 1	
Calm/	
curious	 1	 	 	 	 	 1	
emotionless	 	 	 1	 	 	 1	
maternal	 1	 	 	 	 	 1	
puzzled	 1	 	 	 	 	 1	
startled	 	 1	 	 	 	 1	
Grand	Total	 20	 2	 19	 20	 27	 88	
Table	25:	Frequencies	of	key	neutral	emotion	terms	for	five	face	types,	by	descending	frequency.		
Term	 Eeriness	synonym	
creeped/creeps/creepy	 Yes	
disconcerted	 Yes	
disturbed/disturbing	 Yes	
eerie	 Yes	
freaked/freaky	 Yes	
frightened/frightening	 Yes	
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Term	 Eeriness	synonym	
haunted	 Yes	
nervous	 Yes	
nightmarish	 Yes	
scared	 Yes	
spooked	 Yes	
uneasy	 Yes	
unnerved	 Yes	
unsettled	 Yes	
alarmed/alarming	 No	
angry	 No	
annoyed	 No	
anxious	 No	
apathetic	 No	
apprehensive	 No	
awful	 No	
awkward	 No	
bad	 No	
bored	 No	
bothered	 No	
cautious	 No	
cold	 No	
concerned	 No	
conflicted	 No	
confused	 No	
depressed	 No	
disdainful	 No	
disgusted	 No	
distant	 No	
embarrassed	 No	
guarded	 No	
guilty	 No	
horrified	 No	
intimidated	 No	
jealous	 No	
judged	 No	
paranoid	 No	
perturbed	 No	
repelled	 No	
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Term	 Eeriness	synonym	
repulsed	 No	
sad	 No	
scrutinized	 No	
strange	 No	
suspicious	 No	
tense	 No	
terrified	 No	
threatened	 No	
unacceptable	 No	
uncomfortable	 No	
unpleasent	 No	
wary	 No	
weird	 No	
worried	 No	
Table	26:	Negative	terms	used	to	in	descriptions	of	emotional	reactions	towards	near-human	agents,	
indicating	whether	they	are	synonymous	with	eeriness.		
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Phase	2 
Appendix	2a:	Participant	demographics	for	rating	study	
Sex	 N	 %	
Female	 73	 68.2	
Male	 32	 29.9	
Refused	 2	 1.9	
Total	 107	 100	
Age	 	 	
<21	 2	 1.9	
21	-	25	 7	 6.5	
26	-	30	 22	 20.6	
31	-	35	 27	 25.2	
36	-	40	 13	 12.1	
41	-	45	 7	 6.5	
46	-	50	 7	 6.5	
51	-	55	 5	 4.7	
56	-	60	 10	 9.3	
>60	 5	 4.7	
Refused	 2	 1.9	
Total	 107	 100	
Country	 	 	
Germany	 1	 0.9	
Ireland	 1	 0.9	
Netherlands	 1	 0.9	
Norway	 1	 0.9	
United	Kingdom	 86	 80.4	
United	States	 15	 14.0	
Refused	 2	 1.9	
Total	 107	 100	
Table	27:	Participant	demographics	for	rating	study	
Appendix	2b:	Participant	demographics	for	inversion	study	
Gender	 N	 %	
Female	 35	 64.8	
Male	 19	 35.2	
Total		 54	 100	
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Age	 	 	
21	-	25	 1	 2.0	
26	-	30	 5	 10.2	
31	-	35	 9	 18.4	
36	-	40	 7	 14.3	
41	-	45	 6	 12.2	
46	-	50	 8	 16.3	
51	-	55	 5	 10.2	
56	-	60	 5	 10.2	
>60	 3	 6.1	
Not	known	 5	 6.1	
Total	 54	 100	
Table	28:	Participant	demographics	for	inversion	study	
Appendix	2c:	Image	sources	
This	table	displays	the	original	source	of	the	non-human	and	human	images	used	to	
create	the	morph	animations	and	morph	stage	stills.	The	experimental	images	are	shown	
first	followed	by	the	foil	images	with	the	three	training	images	shown	at	the	end	of	the	
table.		
Experiment	role	 Image	Category	 Source	Link	
Experimental		 Animal	 http://files.myopera.com/Bjørk/albums/60620/doggie5.jpg	
Experimental		 Animal	 http://files.myopera.com/Bjørk/albums/60620/doggie5.jpg	
Experimental		 Animal	 http://files.myopera.com/Bjørk/albums/60620/doggie4.jpg	
Experimental		 Animal	 http://files.myopera.com/Bjørk/albums/60620/doggie4.jpg	
Experimental		 Animal	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/aturkus/279404991/	
Experimental		 Animal	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/mein	arkengel/3994508518/	
Experimental		 Doll	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/a	mason/53722615/	
Experimental		 Doll	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/paramourphotos/4340952343/sizes/o/in/photostream/	
Experimental		 Doll	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/chantelbeam/5678044316/	
Experimental		 Doll	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/chantelbeam/5678044316/	
Experimental		 Doll	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/bergius/77312481/		
Experimental		 Doll	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/a4gpa/5703348740/sizes/o/in/photostream/	
Experimental		 Robot	 Taken	from	previous	MSc	study	
Experimental		 Robot	 Taken	from	previous	MSc	study	
Experimental		 Robot	 http://cache.boston.com/universal/site	graphics/blogs/bigpicture/robots	03	04/r05	17159729.jpg	
Experimental		 Robot	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/abolotnov/3373366268/sizes/
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Experiment	role	 Image	Category	 Source	Link	
o/in/photostream/	
Experimental		 Robot	 http://www.kyosho.com/blog/manoi/log/file/マノイPF	右見
上げ.jpg	
Experimental		 Robot	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/gregpc/3011194936/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Experimental		 Statue	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/jeremybrooks/2055577531/	
Experimental		 Statue	 http://danceadvantage.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/SophiaEyesClosed-266x400.jpg	
Experimental		 Statue	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/tentacles/2230946717/	
Experimental		 Statue	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/toddhiestand/180314723/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Experimental		 Statue	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/michalo/4473670045/	
Experimental		 Statue	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/buginbox/4940404337/	
Foil	 Animal	 http://creativeadvertisingworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/08/cesar-20dog.jpg	
Foil	 Animal	 http://creativeadvertisingworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/08/cesar-20dog.jpg	
Foil	 Animal	 http://creativeadvertisingworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/08/dog-20food.jpg	
Foil	 Animal	 http://creativeadvertisingworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/08/dog-20food.jpg	
Foil	 Animal	 http://creativeadvertisingworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/08/cesar-20dog-20food.jpg	
Foil	 Animal	 http://creativeadvertisingworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/08/cesar-20dog-20food.jpg	
Foil	 Animal	 http://creativeadvertisingworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/08/dog-20food-20cesar.jpg	
Foil	 Animal	 http://creativeadvertisingworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/08/dog-20food-20cesar.jpg	
Foil	 Animal	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/mrsenil/564080909/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Animal	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/59398710@N07/5987216885/in/set-72157627183268525	
Foil	 Animal	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/mydesignselfstudy/3144039153/sizes/o/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Animal	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/nile	red/162805718/sizes/o/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Doll	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/8137371@N05/3779284235/sizes/o/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Doll	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/8137371@N05/3779284235/sizes/o/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Doll	
http://www.brocobellevintage.co.uk/ekmps/shops/karenbro
cshop/images/vtg-50s-60s-cutest-baby-doll-face-for-rag-doll-
making-24-p.jpg	
Foil	 Doll	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/edgarbarany/4387342149/siz
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Experiment	role	 Image	Category	 Source	Link	
es/o/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Doll	 http://fc05.deviantart.net/fs71/i/2010/263/1/8/pocahontas	doll	face	repaint	by	orchideah-d2z5osu.jpg	
Foil	 Doll	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/colinlogan/5234459648/sizes/o/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Doll	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/jeremybrooks/2246729079/sizes/o/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Doll	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/andresthor/3998076363/sizes/o/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Doll	 http://www.mannequinstore.com/busts/images/HB2/head.jpg	
Foil	 Doll	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/mait/4300417797/sizes/o/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Doll	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/babelglyph/5617034509/	
Foil	 Doll	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/23680544@N07/3616010984	
Foil	 Robot	 http://www.fastfancydress.co.uk/templates/imagedirectory/robot%20mask%20lg.jpg	
Foil	 Robot	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/mindonfire/2592282205/sizes/o/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Robot	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/jurvetson/2218864889/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Robot	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/pauldwaite/214450820/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Robot	
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/	
EfNKxLWT6wA/S8CsQRdIfgI/AAAAAAAAANs/2wCzoVy7WEM/
s1600/irobot2.jpg	
Foil	 Robot	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/kliefi/3071616767/sizes/o/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Robot	 http://teamblog.brainsunleashed.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Nexi.jpg	
Foil	 Robot	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/foreverphoto/2188839612/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Robot	 http://www.indiatalkies.com/images/robot-head-7738m.jpg	
Foil	 Robot	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/chiaralily/3639632097/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Robot	 http://www.wallpaperpimper.com/wallpaper/Computer/NEC/Gundam-World-Papero-Nec-1-8CLXUV6YS6-1280x1024.jpg	
Foil	 Robot	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/alexis/1486824926/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Statue	 http://www.free-photos.biz/images/luxury/jewellery/face	of	statue	of	liberty.jpg	
Foil	 Statue	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/alainbachellier/3131290814/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Statue	
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/	
FzeX7fiyEGo/TAdESdxJIbI/AAAAAAAAAF0/1rC52UQhdeo/s16
00/Kelly	face	hi	res.jpg	
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Experiment	role	 Image	Category	 Source	Link	
Foil	 Statue	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/pinkstockphotos/5263478657/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Statue	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/maynard/97495610/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Statue	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/psexypsychic/5065800931/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Statue	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/11287317@N04/2975805610/sizes/o/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Statue	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/jasonpier/5415215335/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Statue	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/fahrradfritze/2206736999/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Statue	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/hugo971/5734794202/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Foil	 Statue	 http://ny-image2.etsy.com/il	fullxfull.64608138.jpg	
Foil	 Statue	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/nihonbunka/2716143841/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Training	 Fruit	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/patdavid/5568423570/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Training	 Fruit	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/tomsaint/3171749726/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Training	 Fruit	 http://www.flickr.com/photos/marcel030nl/2377272785/sizes/l/in/photostream/	
Table	29:	Original	image	source	links	for	Phase	2	
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Appendix	2d:	Foil	and	experimental	images	
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Training	Images	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
   
Table	30:	All	foil	and	experimental	images	used	for	Phase	2,	by	image	category	and	non-human/human	
anchor.             
Appendix	2e:	Online	study	texts	
Cognitive	Psychology	Rating	Exercise	
Thank	you	for	your	interest!	
I'd	like	you	to	take	part	in	a	research	activity	investigating	face	perception.	This	makes	
up	part	of	my	PhD	research	and	is	supervised	by	academics	from	the	Open	University	and	
Glasgow	University.	
HOW	LONG	WILL	THE	STUDY	BE	LIVE?	
The	study	will	run	from	July	22nd	to	August	21st	2011.	
AIM	OF	THE	RESEARCH	ACTIVITY	
This	online	activity	involves	looking	at	images	of	faces	and	giving	your	judgements	
about	them	on	several	different	scales:	this	is	to	investigate	psychological	aspects	of	face	
perception.	
WHAT	DATA	WILL	BE	COLLECTED?	
I	will	collect	the	ratings	that	you	give	for	each	image.	At	the	end	of	the	activity	I	will	ask	
for	some	basic	demographic	information	so	I	can	make	sure	that	my	conclusions	are	fair	
and	not	biased	towards	or	against	any	particular	group.	This	part	is	optional:	you	can	still	
take	part	and	choose	not	to	give	this	information.	I	may	also	collect	your	email	address	at	
the	end	of	the	activity	if	you	wish	to	join	my	mailing	list	to	receive	a	short	report	of	the	
results	of	the	activity.	
HOW	WILL	THE	DATA	BE	COLLECTED?	
The	data	will	be	collected	from	the	responses	you	give	in	the	online	forms	on	the	
following	pages.	
CONFIDENTIALITY/ANONYMITY	
The	data	I	collect	do	not	contain	any	personally	sensitive	information.	If	you	choose	to	
give	any	demographic	information	this	will	not	be	linked	to	the	ratings	you	give	in	the	
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main	part	of	the	activity.	This	research	is	carried	out	in	compliance	with	the	Data	
Protection	and	Freedom	of	Information	Acts.	
TIME	COMMITMENT	
The	activity	has	been	tested	and	will	require	around	20	minutes	to	complete:	this	will	
take	place	in	a	single	session.	
WITHDRAWING	FROM	THE	ACTIVITY	
You	may	decide	to	stop	taking	part	in	the	activity	at	any	time	without	explanation.	If	
you	decide	you	no	longer	want	to	carry	on,	just	close	your	web	browser.	Your	responses	
up	to	that	point	will	be	excluded	from	the	final	analysis.	If	you	complete	the	activity	and	
decide	at	a	later	date	that	you	would	like	to	withdraw	your	responses,	please	contact	me	
before	the	activity	closing	date	and	I	will	ensure	they	are	securely	deleted.	
RISKS	
There	are	no	known	risks	for	you	in	taking	part	in	this	activity.	
COST,	REIMBURSEMENT	AND	COMPENSATION	
Your	participation	in	this	activity	is	voluntary	and	no	reimbursement	or	compensation	
is	offered	for	your	time.	However,	you	will	be	contributing	to	research	in	a	novel	area	of	
psychology,	and	your	participation	is	greatly	appreciated.	
FURTHER	INFORMATION	ABOUT	THIS	RESEARCH	ACTIVITY	
When	you	have	completed	the	activity	you	will	be	able	to	read	more	about	this	
research	and	how	your	participation	in	this	activity	has	contribute	to	the	overall	project.	
There	will	also	be	an	opportunity	to	leave	your	email	address	if	you	wish	to	receive	a	
short	report	on	the	results	of	this	activity.	
CONTACTS	
I	(Stephanie	Lay)	will	be	glad	to	answer	your	questions	about	this	study	at	any	time.	If	
you	have	a	query	that	I	am	unable	to	answer,	please	contact	one	of	my	supervisors.	
Principle	Investigator	 Supervisor	 Supervisor	
Stephanie	Lay	 Nicky	Brace	 Graham	Pike	
Psychology	Department	 Psychology	Department	 Psychology	Department	
The	Open	University	 The	Open	University	 The	Open	University	
Walton	Hall	 Walton	Hall	 Walton	Hall	
Milton	Keynes	 Milton	Keynes	 Milton	Keynes	
MK7	6AA	 MK7	6AA	 MK7	6AA	
S.C.Lay@open.ac.uk	 N.A.Brace@open.ac.uk	 G.E.Pike@open.ac.uk	
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Do	you	confirm	that	you	are	over	18	years	of	age,	and	that	you	accept	these	terms	and	
conditions?	
 
Introduction	
This	activity	involves	rating	pictures	of	faces.	You'll	see	each	face	one	at	a	time,	along	
with	a	rating	scale.	Please	click	on	the	scale	to	indicate	how	you	rate	each	image:	the	
page	will	reload	and	take	you	to	the	next	image.	
You	can	see	how	many	images	are	still	to	rate	as	you	work	through	them.	Please	don't	
be	alarmed	that	there	are	180!	Each	should	only	take	a	few	seconds	to	rate.	
Many	thanks	again	for	your	time	in	supporting	my	research.	
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The	image	below	is	an	example	of	one	of	the	180	screens.	The	image	and	scale	varied	
to	present	all	180	combinations	of	the	images	and	scales.		
Instructions	
Please	rate	this	photograph	on	the	following	scales.	The	scale	points	are	not	
numbered,	as	we	want	you	to	think	about	feelings	rather	than	precise	numbers.	
Note:	The	scale	may	vary	for	each	question!	
 
Demographics	
We	are	almost	ready	to	save	your	answers.	
In	order	to	analyse	whether	the	results	vary	according	to	participants'	backgrounds,	I'd	
like	to	know	a	little	about	you,	please.	This	information	will	only	be	used	to	analyse	
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answers	by	group	characteristics,	never	to	identify	you	personally.	Please	supply	the	
following:	
•	 Your	gender:	
	Male	
	Female	
•	 Your	age	(years):	
•	 Your	location	(City	&	Country)	
One	last	thing...	(optional)	
If	you	found	this	study	interesting,	would	you	like	to	take	part	in	more	online	research	
for	Open	University	psychologists?	
We	are	setting	up	a	'virtual	participation	panel'	of	people	to	participate	in	a	wide	
variety	of	research	projects.	You	can	choose	how	often	you	take	part,	and	you	can	leave	
the	panel	at	any	time.	If	you'd	like	to	learn	more,	please	leave	your	email	address	in	the	
box	below.	Your	email	address	will	be	used	only	for	panel	recruitment,	and	won't	be	used	
to	identify	the	answers	that	you	have	just	given.	
•	 Enter	your	email	address:	
For	more	online	psychology	studies,	visit	OnlinePsychResearch.co.uk.	
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Thank	you!	
If	you	are	interested	in	learning	more	about	this	research,	please	visit	the	project	
home	page	at	uncanny-valley.open.ac.uk.	
If	you	would	like	to	talk	to	the	researcher	about	your	experiences	relating	to	this	
research,	she	can	be	contacted	by	email.	
 
 
Appendix	2f:	Participant	Information	and	consent	forms	for	face	to	face	study	
Information	For	Participants	
INVITATION	TO	TAKE	PART	IN	A	RESEARCH	STUDY	
You	are	being	asked	to	take	part	in	a	research	study	investigating	face	perception.	This	
research	makes	up	part	of	my	PhD	research	and	is	supervised	by	Dr	Nicky	Brace	and	Dr	
Graham	Pike	of	the	Open	University,	and	Dr	Frank	Pollick	of	the	University	of	Glasgow.	
HOW	LONG	WILL	THE	STUDY	BE	LIVE?	
I	will	be	running	this	experiment	from	November	19th	2011	until	January	19th	2012.		
AIM	OF	THE	RESEARCH	STUDY	
To	explore	how	people	perceive	faces:	humans	are	particularly	adept	at	recognising	
faces	and	the	question	of	why	and	how	they	are	processed	to	allow	this	recognition	has	
been	explored	in	depth	by	psychologists.	You	are	being	invited	to	take	part	in	a	study	
exploring	this	mechanism	in	detail:	the	results	will	be	used	to	draw	conclusions	that	will	
help	psychologists	understand	this	important	aspect	of	perception.		
WHAT	DATA	WILL	BE	COLLECTED?	
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The	study	will	be	made	up	of	blocks	of	activities.	In	each	activity,	you	will	be	shown	a	
picture	of	a	face	and	asked	to	remember	it.	You	will	then	be	shown	that	image	along	with	
several	similar	ones	and	asked	to	pick	out	the	one	you	had	learned.	I	will	collect	
information	on	whether	you	pick	out	the	face	you	had	learned,	and	the	time	it	takes	for	
you	to	decide	on	a	particular	face.		
At	the	end	of	the	study	I	will	ask	for	some	basic	demographic	information	so	I	can	
make	sure	that	my	conclusions	are	fair	and	not	biased	towards	or	against	any	particular	
group.	This	part	is	optional:	you	can	still	take	part	and	choose	not	to	give	this	information.		
I	may	also	collect	your	email	address	at	the	end	of	the	study	if	you	wish	to	join	my	
mailing	list	to	receive	a	short	report	of	the	results	of	the	study.		
HOW	WILL	THE	DATA	BE	COLLECTED?	
The	images	will	be	shown	on	a	laptop	using	a	software	package	that	will	record	your	
answers.	You	will	use	the	keyboard	to	indicate	your	choice	of	image	and	move	between	
the	blocks	of	the	experiment.		
CONFIDENTIALITY/ANONYMITY	
The	data	I	collect	do	not	contain	any	personally	sensitive	information.	If	you	choose	to	
give	any	demographic	information	this	will	not	be	linked	to	the	ratings	you	give	in	the	
main	part	of	the	activity.		
This	research	is	carried	out	in	compliance	with	the	Data	Protection	and	Freedom	of	
Information	Acts.		
TIME	COMMITMENT	
The	study	has	been	tested	and	will	require	around	ten	minutes	to	complete:	this	will	
take	place	in	a	single	session.	This	is	an	approximate	time	as	there	are	breaks	built	into	to	
the	experiment	so	you	can	work	at	your	own	pace:	you	may	find	you	complete	more	
quickly	than	that,	or	take	a	little	longer.		
WITHDRAWING	FROM	THE	STUDY	
You	do	not	have	to	complete	the	study:	you	have	the	right	to	withdraw	at	any	time,	
and	you	do	not	have	to	give	me	a	reason	for	withdrawing.	If	you	decide	you	do	not	want	
to	continue,	just	let	me	know	and	I	will	halt	the	session.	
Your	data	will	be	securely	deleted	from	the	laptop,	and	will	not	be	used	in	the	final	
analysis	of	the	results.		
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If	you	complete	the	experiment	and	decide	at	a	later	date	that	you	would	like	to	
withdraw	your	data,	please	contact	me	before	the	study	closing	date	and	I	will	ensure	
they	are	securely	deleted.		
RISKS	
There	are	no	known	risks	for	you	in	taking	part	in	this	activity.	
COST,	REIMBURSEMENT	AND	COMPENSATION	
Your	participation	in	this	study	is	voluntary	and	no	reimbursement	or	compensation	is	
offered	for	your	time.	However,	you	will	be	contributing	to	research	in	a	novel	area	of	
psychology,	and	your	participation	is	greatly	appreciated.	
FURTHER	INFORMATION	ABOUT	THIS	RESEARCH	PROJECT	
When	you	have	completed	the	study	I	will	be	able	to	tell	you	more	about	my	overall	
research	project	and	how	your	participation	in	this	study	has	contribute	to	the	broader	
area	of	psychology.		
There	will	also	be	an	opportunity	to	leave	your	email	address	if	you	wish	to	receive	a	
short	report	on	the	results	of	this	study.		
CONTACTS:	
I	(Stephanie	Lay)	will	be	glad	to	answer	your	questions	about	this	study	at	any	time.	If	
you	have	a	query	that	I	am	unable	to	answer,	please	contact	one	of	my	supervisors:		
Principle	Investigator	 Supervisor	 Supervisor	
Stephanie	Lay	 Nicky	Brace	 Graham	Pike	
Psychology	Department	 Psychology	Department	 Psychology	Department	
The	Open	University	 The	Open	University	 The	Open	University	
Walton	Hall	 Walton	Hall	 Walton	Hall	
Milton	Keynes	 Milton	Keynes	 Milton	Keynes	
MK7	6AA	 MK7	6AA	 MK7	6AA	
s.c.lay@open.ac.uk		 n.a.brace@open.ac.uk	 g.e.pike@open.ac.uk	
Participation	consent	form	
Agreement	to	Participate,	The	Faculty	of	Social	Sciences,	The	Open	University	
Agreement	to	Participate:	Exploring	Face	Perception	
I,									(print	name)	agree	to	take	part	in	this	research	project.	
I	have	had	the	purposes	of	the	research	project	explained	to	me.	
I	have	been	informed	that	I	may	refuse	to	participate	at	any	point	by	simply	saying	so.	
I	have	been	assured	that	my	confidentiality	will	be	protected	as	specified	in	the	
information	sheet.	
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I	agree	that	the	information	that	I	provide	can	be	used	for	research	purposes,	including	
publication.	
I	understand	that	if	I	have	any	concerns	or	difficulties	I	can	contact	Stephanie	Lay,	the	
principle	investigator	at:		
Stephanie	Lay	
Psychology	Department	
The	Open	University	
Walton	Hall	
Milton	Keynes	
MK7	6AA	
s.c.lay@open.ac.uk		
If	I	want	to	talk	to	someone	else	about	this	project,	I	can	contact	Stephanie’s	
supervisors	at:		
Nicky	Brace	 Graham	Pike	
Psychology	Department	 Psychology	Department	
The	Open	University	 The	Open	University	
Walton	Hall	 Walton	Hall	
Milton	Keynes	 Milton	Keynes	
MK7	6AA	 MK7	6AA	
n.a.brace@open.ac.uk	 g.e.pike@open.ac.uk	
	
I	assign	the	copyright	for	my	contribution	to	the	Faculty	for	use	in	research	and	
publication.	
	
Signed:								(signature)	
For	admin	use	only	
Participant:	 	
Condition:	 	
Date:								(date)	
Appendix	2g:	Screenshots	from	face	to	face	study	
Screenshots	of	Superlab	stimulus	presentation	software	screens.		
NB:	The	full	text	is	presented	as	well	as	images	of	the	pages.		
Hello,	and	welcome	to	the	experiment.	I'm	interested	in	how	people	recognise	faces.	
I'm	going	to	show	you	a	series	of	different	faces,	one	at	a	time,	and	ask	you	to	try	and	
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remember	each	one.	When	you've	had	some	time	to	look	at	each	face	I'll	ask	you	to	pick	
out	the	face	you	just	saw	from	a	set	of	three.	Sometimes	the	faces	will	be	shown	upside	
down,	sometimes	they	will	be	the	right	way	up.	You'll	get	a	chance	to	practice	before	we	
start	the	live	test,	and	you'll	get	a	break	between	after	you've	picked	out	each	picture:	
please	feel	free	to	take	your	time.		
Do	you	have	any	questions?	If	so,	ask	me	now.		
If	not,	we'll	start	with	a	practice	run.	Press	any	key	to	get	started.		
	
PRACTICE	RUN	
Here's	a	practice	run	to	help	you	get	used	to	the	controls.		
The	next	screen	will	show	you	a	piece	of	fruit	for	three	seconds.		
I'd	like	you	to	look	at	it	carefully:	in	a	moment	you	will	be	asked	to	pick	it	out	of	a	'line	
up'	including	two	other	pieces	of	fruit.		
On	the	laptop	keyboard,	there	are	three	keys	marked	out	for	you	to	use	to	indicate	the	
position	of	the	piece	of	fruit	you	recognise	as	the	one	you	just	saw:		
'L'	key	-	On	the	left	
'M'	key	-	In	the	middle	
'R'	key	-	On	the	right	
Press	any	key	to	continue...	
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LIVE	RUN	
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That	completes	your	trial	run.	The	next	images	you	see	will	be	faces,	and	there	will	be	
24	to	view.	As	before,	you	will	see	the	face	for	three	seconds.	I'd	like	you	to	look	at	it	
carefully:	after	three	seconds	you	will	be	asked	to	pick	it	out	of	a	'line	up'	including	two	
other	faces.		
Use	the	keys	to	indicate	the	position	of	the	face	you	saw:		
'L'	key	-	On	the	left	
'M'	key	-	In	the	middle	
'R'	key	-	On	the	right	
Press	any	key	to	continue...	
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NB:	This	sequence	of	a	target	image	followed	by	a	testing	panel	and	then	a	break	was	
repeated	another	23	times	to	present	all	possible	images	from	that	morph	stage	
condition.		
Thank	you!	I've	now	collected	all	the	information	that	you	need	to	provide.		
I	have	a	theory	that	human	faces	and	almost	human	faces	are	processed	in	a	different	
way	and	the	information	that	you've	provided	will	allow	me	to	see	if	there	is	a	difference	
in	how	faces	are	processed.	
The	types	of	faces	you	saw	were	randomly	chosen.	They	were	either	human	faces,	not	
human	at	all	(statue,	dolls,	robots	or	animals)	or	somewhere	in-between	where	I've	taken	
human	faces	and	'morphed'	them	using	a	computer	program	so	they	are	somewhere	
between	human	and	not	human.		
Sometimes	you	saw	the	faces	the	right	way	up,	and	sometimes	they	were	inverted.		
I	will	compare	how	you	all	recognised	the	faces	to	see	which	groups	were	easiest	and	
hardest	to	recognise.		
I	would	be	grateful	if	you	could	keep	this	explanation	to	yourself	if	you	speak	to	
anyone	else	who	may	take	part	-	it's	important	that	the	purpose	of	the	experiment	isn't	
known	beforehand,	as	this	could	alter	the	way	people	respond.		
If	you'd	like	to	learn	more	about	my	research,	please	leave	me	your	email	address.	For	
your	reference,	here	are	my	contact	details:		
	
Stephanie	Lay,	
Psychology	Department	
The	Open	University	 	
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Phase	3	
Appendix	3a:	Participant	demographic	tables	
The	1077	participants	were	asked	if	they	were	willing	to	give	demographic	
information.	999	were	willing	to	give	that	information.	The	table	below	summarises	their	
demographics.		
Sex	 N	 %	
Female	 660	 66.1	
Male	 328	 32.8	
Did	not	answer	 11	 1.1	
Total	 999	 100.0	
	 	 	
Age	 N	 %	
<	21	 50	 5.0	
21-	25	 124	 12.4	
26	-	30	 168	 16.8	
31	-	35	 166	 16.6	
36	-	40	 130	 13.0	
41	-	45	 112	 11.2	
46	-	50	 95	 9.5	
51	-	55	 66	 6.6	
56	-	60	 62	 6.2	
>60	 26	 2.6	
Total	 999	 100.0	
	 	 	
Country	 N	 %	
Afghanistan	 1	 0.1	
Argentina	 1	 0.1	
Australia	 31	 3.1	
Austria	 3	 0.3	
Bangladesh	 1	 0.1	
Belgium	 4	 0.4	
Brazil	 2	 0.2	
Bulgaria	 2	 0.2	
Canada	 39	 3.9	
Colombia	 2	 0.2	
Cyprus	 1	 0.1	
Czech	Republic	 1	 0.1	
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Denmark	 1	 0.1	
Ecuador	 1	 0.1	
Finland	 10	 1.0	
France	 6	 0.6	
Germany	 10	 1.0	
Iceland	 2	 0.2	
India	 3	 0.3	
Ireland	 7	 0.7	
Italy	 2	 0.2	
Japan	 1	 0.1	
Latvia	 1	 0.1	
Lithuania	 2	 0.2	
Mexico	 1	 0.1	
Netherlands	 9	 0.9	
New	Zealand	 6	 0.6	
Norway	 3	 0.3	
Poland	 2	 0.2	
Portugal	 2	 0.2	
Russian	Federation	 2	 0.2	
Saudi	Arabia	 1	 0.1	
South	Africa	 2	 0.2	
Spain	 4	 0.4	
Switzerland	 2	 0.2	
Turkey	 1	 0.1	
United	Kingdom	of	Great	Britain	and	Northern	
Ireland	 472	 47.2	
United	States	of	America	 353	 35.3	
Uruguay	 1	 0.1	
Did	not	answer	 4	 0.4	
Total	 999	 100.0	
	 	 	
Ethnicity	 N	 %	
African	 1	 0.1	
Any	other	Asian	background	 6	 0.6	
Any	other	Black/African/Caribbean	
background	 2	 0.2	
Any	other	ethnic	group	 16	 1.6	
Any	other	Mixed/multiple	ethnic	background	 37	 3.7	
Any	other	White	background	 306	 30.6	
Bangladeshi	 1	 0.1	
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Caribbean	 3	 0.3	
Chinese	 4	 0.4	
English	/	Welsh	/	Scottish	/	Northern	Irish	/	
British	 558	 55.9	
Gypsy	or	Irish	Traveller	 2	 0.2	
Indian	 8	 0.8	
Irish	 24	 2.4	
Pakistani	 2	 0.2	
White	and	Asian	 16	 1.6	
White	and	Black	African	 4	 0.4	
White	and	Black	Caribbean	 3	 0.3	
Did	not	answer	 6	 0.6	
Total	 999	 100.0	
Table	31:	Participant	demographics	for	Phase	3  
Appendix	3b:	Survey	web	page	examples	
The	following	images	present	the	survey	screens	used	to	collect	participant	responses.		
 
370	
 
 
  
 
371	
 
Task	1:	Q1	-	Emotion	Strength	
	
Task	1	-	Q2	-	Eeriness	
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Task	1	-	Q3	-	Which	emotion	is	being	displayed?	
	
	
Task	2	-	Categorising	and	Ranking	Images	
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Demographic	data	collection	screens	
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All	Phases	
Appendix	4:	Eeriness	Ratings	across	all	Phases	
Phase	 Face	description	 Orientation	 Mean	Eeriness	
1	 Cluster	1	Face	(Low	human,	highly	strange)	 Upright	 9.6	
1	 Cluster	2	Face	(Medium	human-likeness	and	strangeness)	 Upright	 7.0	
1	 Non-human	anchor	(robot)	 Upright	 3.5	
1	 Human	anchor	 Upright	 2.9	
1	 Cluster	3	Face	(High	human,	low	strange	and	eerie)	 Upright	 2.4	
2	 Animal	-	50%	human	 Upright	 7.7	
2	 Robot	-	50%	human	 Upright	 6.8	
2	 Robot	-	75%	human	 Upright	 6.4	
2	 Robot	-	25%	human	 Upright	 6.3	
2	 Animal	-	75%	human	 Upright	 6.1	
2	 Statue	-	50%	human	 Upright	 6.0	
2	 Statue	-	25%	human	 Upright	 6.0	
2	 Doll	-	Non-human	 Upright	 5.8	
2	 Statue	-	Non-human	 Upright	 5.7	
2	 Statue	-	75%	human	 Upright	 5.3	
2	 Doll	-	25%	human	 Upright	 5.1	
2	 Animal	-	25%	human	 Upright	 5.0	
2	 Doll	-	50%	human	 Upright	 4.6	
2	 Robot	-	Non-human	 Upright	 4.6	
2	 Statue	-	Human	 Upright	 3.4	
2	 Doll	75%	human	 Upright	 3.2	
2	 Animal	-	Human	 Upright	 3.0	
2	 Animal	-	Non-human	 Upright	 2.4	
2	 Doll	-	Human	 Upright	 2.4	
2	 Robot	-	Human	 Upright	 2.3	
3	 Happy	face,	fearful	eyes	 Inverted	 5.3	
3	 Happy	face,	angry	eyes	 Inverted	 4.9	
3	 Happy	face,	fearful	eyes	 Upright	 4.5	
3	 Happy	face,	sad	eyes	 Inverted	 3.9	
3	 Happy	face,	neutral	eyes	 Inverted	 3.9	
3	 Happy	face,	angry	eyes	 Upright	 3.7	
3	 Angry	face,	happy	eyes	 Inverted	 3.7	
3	 Disgusted	face,	neutral	eyes	 Inverted	 3.5	
3	 Neutral	face,	fearful	eyes	 Inverted	 3.5	
3	 Angry	face	and	eyes	 Inverted	 3.4	
3	 Angry	face,	neutral	eyes	 Inverted	 3.3	
3	 Fearful	face	and	eyes	 Inverted	 3.3	
3	 Happy	face,	sad	eyes	 Upright	 3.2	
3	 Disgusted	face,	happy	eyes	 Inverted	 3.2	
3	 Angry	face,	happy	eyes	 Upright	 3.2	
3	 Disgusted	face	and	eyes	 Inverted	 3.2	
3	 Neutral	face,	disgusted	eyes	 Inverted	 3.1	
3	 Fearful	face,	happy	eyes	 Inverted	 3.0	
3	 Sad	face,	happy	eyes	 Inverted	 3.0	
3	 Happy	face,	neutral	eyes	 Upright	 2.9	
3	 Angry	face,	neutral	eyes	 Upright	 2.9	
3	 Sad	face	and	eyes	 Inverted	 2.8	
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Phase	 Face	description	 Orientation	 Mean	Eeriness	
3	 Neutral	face,	fearful	eyes	 Upright	 2.8	
3	 Fearful	face,	happy	eyes	 Upright	 2.7	
3	 Fearful	face,	neutral	eyes	 Inverted	 2.7	
3	 Neutral	face,	angry	eyes	 Inverted	 2.7	
3	 Neutral	face,	sad	eyes	 Inverted	 2.7	
3	 Fearful	face	and	eyes	 Upright	 2.6	
3	 Angry	face	and	eyes	 Upright	 2.6	
3	 Sad	face,	neutral	eyes	 Inverted	 2.6	
3	 Disgusted	face,	neutral	eyes	 Upright	 2.5	
3	 Happy	face	and	eyes	 Inverted	 2.5	
3	 Neutral	face,	disgusted	eyes	 Upright	 2.5	
3	 Sad	face,	happy	eyes	 Upright	 2.5	
3	 Neutral	face	and	eyes	 Inverted	 2.5	
3	 Fearful	face,	neutral	eyes	 Upright	 2.4	
3	 Disgusted	face,	happy	eyes	 Upright	 2.3	
3	 Disgusted	face	and	eyes	 Upright	 2.3	
3	 Neutral	face,	happy	eyes	 Inverted	 2.3	
3	 Happy	face,	disgusted	eyes	 Inverted	 2.3	
3	 Neutral	face,	happy	eyes	 Upright	 2.2	
3	 Happy	face	and	eyes	 Upright	 2.1	
3	 Happy	face,	disgusted	eyes	 Upright	 2.0	
3	 Neutral	face,	angry	eyes	 Upright	 2.0	
3	 Sad	face,	neutral	eyes	 Upright	 2.0	
3	 Neutral	face,	sad	eyes	 Upright	 2.0	
3	 Neutral	face	and	eyes	 Upright	 1.9	
3	 Sad	face	and	eyes	 Upright	 1.7	
Table	32:	Table	comparing	mean	eeriness	ratings	for	images	used	in	each	research	phase.	
